QUESTION: The Mishnah discusses a case of nine people who make their Nezirus contingent upon the status of a "Koy." The Gemara cites a Beraisa which teaches that a single person can also become a Nazir nine times by making the same types of conditions in his oaths of acceptance of Nezirus. The Gemara points out that it is understandable how the first six conditional oaths apply to one person. However, the last three conditional oaths of acceptance of Nezirus can apply only to multiple people. How can one person make such oaths? This is the Gemara's question.

Why does the Gemara assume that the first six conditional oaths of Nezirus can apply to one person? Some of those conditions contradict each other, such as, "I am a Nazir if the Koy is a Chayah," and, "I am a Nazir if the Koy is not a Chayah." How can these contradictory oaths of Nezirus both take effect for one person? Only one of the two oaths can take effect, because if one condition is fulfilled (the Koy is a Chayah), the other is not fulfilled. (ARZEI HA'LEVANON)

(a) The ARZEI HA'LEVANON (fn. 58) answers that the Gemara indeed knows that all six sets of Nezirus cannot take effect at the same time on one person. The Gemara means merely that six of the oaths can make a single person into a Nazir (when they are expressed at different times), while the other three are meaningless whenever they are expressed by a single person.

However, TOSFOS implies that the six oaths of Nezirus actually take effect on one person at the same time.

(b) When the person says that he will be a Nazir if the Koy is a Chayah, he does not intend to make his Nezirus dependent on the Koy being a full-fledged Chayah. Rather, he means that if the Koy is a Vadai Chayah, he will be a Vadai Nazir, and if the Koy is a Safek Chayah, he will be a Safek Nazir. His Nezirus does not depend on whether the Koy is actually a Chayah or not; he made his Nezirus dependent only on the status with which the Koy is treated (which is the status of a Safek) and not on the actual (unknown) status of the Koy. Therefore, his conditional oath makes him a Safek Nazir (a Nazir whose true status is known only to Hash-m, just as the true status of a Koy is known only to Hash-m), since the Safek is indeterminable. Accordingly, each of the six conditions makes him a Safek Nazir (unless he states two of the oaths in a single sentence, such as, "I am a Nazir if the Koy is or is not a Chayah," which obviously will make him a Vadai Nazir).

This interpretation is supported by the Gemara's conclusion that if nine people express the nine conditional oaths mentioned in the Mishnah, and then a single person comes and accepts all of the oaths of Nezirus that the nine people accepted, he becomes a Safek Nazir with nine sets of Safek Nezirus. Since the Koy either is a Chayah or is not a Chayah, only one of the two people who made those two conditional oaths becomes a Nazir. Why, then, should the single person who accepted to be a Nazir like all nine people become a Nazir Safek for both of the people who accepted contradictory conditions? It must be that the Safek Nezirus of each person does not depend on whether the Koy actually is or is not a Chayah. Rather, the Safek Nezirus is an indeterminable Safek (the same way the Koy is treated as an indeterminable Safek). Perhaps this is the Chidush of the Beraisa which teaches that a person can accept nine sets of Safek Nezirus in this manner. Although the person accepts all nine sets of Safek Nezirus in one sentence, he is not treated like one who says, "I am a Nazir whether a Koy is a Chayah or is not a Chayah," but rather as one who makes nine separate oaths of acceptance of Nezirus conditional on the status of the Koy.

(c) The RAMBAM (Hilchos Nezirus 2:10, and Perush ha'Mishnayos) rules that in the case of the Mishnah, all of the people who accept conditional oaths of Nezirus become ordinary, Vadai Nezirim, and not Safek Nezirim. The person who makes his Nezirus dependent on the Koy being a Chayah means that even if it only has some of the laws of a Chayah, he will be a Nazir. Similarly, the person who makes his Nezirus dependent on the Koy not being a Chayah means that he will be a Nazir even if it is only unlike a Chayah in some of its laws.

According to this view, the answer to the original question is obvious. When a single person accepts Nezirus with the six conditions of the Mishnah, each of the conditions is fulfilled and thus he becomes a Nazir with six sets of Nezirus.

QUESTIONS: The Gemara cites a Beraisa in which Rebbi Elazar teaches that a Nazir is prohibited from eating even "Alin v'Lulavin" (soft leaves and young sprouts) of the grapevine. The Gemara points out that the Tana of the Mishnah argues and permits a Nazir to eat Alin v'Lulavin. The Gemara explains that the dispute revolves around a more general dispute about exegetical methodology.

The verse first mentions a specific category ("mi'Yayin v'Shechar") of grape products prohibited to a Nazir (Bamidbar 6:3). It then mentions a general category ("mi'Kol Asher Ye'a'seh mi'Gefen") of all grape products prohibited to a Nazir (Bamidbar 6:4). Finally, the verse (ibid.) mentions another specific category ("me'Chartzanim v'Ad Zag").

The Gemara explains that Rebbi Elazar expounds this type of verse by classifying the phrase of the specific category as a "Mi'ut" (a term which excludes) and the phrase of the general category as a "Ribuy" (a term which includes). He takes into account only the first two of the three phrases in the verse and classifies the verse as a Limud of "Mi'ut v'Ribuy," a Mi'ut followed by a Ribuy. Such a Limud teaches that the verse intends to include in the general category everything that can possibly be included except for one specific thing (in this case, Shevishta, branches (or hard leaves; see Tosfos 35b, DH Ika)). Why Rebbi Elazar does not take into account the third phrase will be discussed below.

In contrast, the Tana of the Mishnah takes into account all three phrases and classifies the verse as a Limud of "Prat u'Chlal u'Frat." Such a Limud teaches that the general category mentioned in the verse includes only those objects which are similar to the Prat (see Chart). Hence, the verse excludes not only branches and hard leaves, but also Alin v'Lulavin (soft leaves and young sprouts).

TOSFOS (DH mi'Yayin) asks why Rebbi Elazar does not take into account the third phrase (a Mi'ut) of the verse. Tosfos answers that Rebbi Elazar uses that phrase to teach the Halachah of Rebbi Elazar ben Azaryah: a Nazir is punished only if he eats two grapeseeds ("Chartzanim") and one peel ("Zag"). The Gemara later (35a) indeed suggests that Rebbi Elazar ben Azaryah himself follows the view of Rebbi Elazar (that the Limud of the verse is a Mi'ut v'Ribuy).

What is the Gemara's reason for assuming that Rebbi Elazar follows the view of Rebbi Elazar ben Azaryah? Perhaps Rebbi Elazar uses the third phrase of the verse as the Rabanan use it and expounds the Limud of the verse as a "Mi'ut Ribuy u'Mi'ut!" Presumably, a "Mi'ut Ribuy u'Mi'ut" is equivalent to a "Ribuy Mi'ut v'Ribuy" which includes everything except for one item, like a "Miut v'Ribuy" (this assumption is based on the fact that according to the Rabanan, a "Klal Prat u'Chlal" and a "Prat Klal u'Frat" are almost identical forms of Limud in that both types include items which are "k'Ein ha'Prat," similar to the Prat).

If Rebbi Elazar does not expound the last phrase as a Mi'ut, why does he prefer to use that phrase to teach Rebbi Elazar ben Azaryah's Halachah over using it as a Mi'ut?

(b) Why does the Gemara assume that Rebbi Elazar, who includes Alin v'Lulavin in the Nazir's prohibition of grape products, expounds verses as "Mi'ut v'Ribuy"? Perhaps he agrees with the Rabanan who use the approach of "Prat u'Chlal," and he merely explains that the first two phrases are a "Prat u'Chlal" which teaches that everything is included in the Halachah of the verse (since the Klal adds to the Prat), and this is why Alin v'Lulavin are included, and he does not take into account the last phrase (the second Prat) of the verse because he uses it for Rebbi Elazar ben Azaryah's teaching!

Similarly, why does the Gemara (35a) assume that Rebbi Elazar ben Azaryah must follow the approach of "Mi'ut v'Ribuy"? Perhaps he follows the approach of "Prat u'Chlal" and disregards the last phrase of the verse (since it is already used to teach his Halachah of "two Chartzanim and one Zag").

(a) The Gemara knows that Rebbi Elazar does not take into account the third phrase to make the verse a "Mi'ut Ribuy u'Mi'ut" because all Tana'im agree that there is no such Limud as a "Mi'ut Ribuy u'Mi'ut," as the Gemara later (35a) teaches. Even those who normally expound a verse as "Mi'ut v'Ribuy" agree that when the verse contains a limiting clause, a broader clause, and then another limiting clause, it is expounded as a "Prat Klal u'Frat" (and not a "Mi'ut v'Ribuy") and the second limiting clause is taken into account (thus including in the verse only things that are similar to the Prat; in the case of the Gemara here, Alin v'Lulavin would be excluded from the Isur).

Why, though, would Rebbi Elazar prefer to use the last clause of the verse for Rebbi Elazar ben Azaryah's teaching rather than to view it as the second limiting clause and make the verse a Limud of "Prat Klal u'Frat"?

TOSFOS (35a, DH Rebbi Elazar) suggests two different approaches. In his second approach (that of the RI), Tosfos suggests that there is an accepted tradition (Kabalah) that it is always preferable to expound a verse as a "Mi'ut v'Ribuy," the more common exegetical method, than to expound it as a "Prat Klal u'Frat," a rare and unusual exegetical method. This is why Rebbi Elazar prefers to expound the verse as a "Mi'ut v'Ribuy" and use the third clause as the source for the teaching of Rebbi Elazar ben Azaryah. However, when there is a choice between viewing the clauses of a verse as a "Mi'ut v'Ribuy" or using each clause independently to teach a specific Halachah, it is preferable to view the clauses as parts of a series of a single Limud (such as a "Mi'ut v'Ribuy").

In his first approach, Tosfos apparently understands that it is always preferable to use each clause to teach a specific Halachah than to view it as part of a series of a Limud (Klal u'Frat, or Ribuy u'Mi'ut).

The two approaches in Tosfos may disagree about the same issue which is the subject of dispute between Rashi and Tosfos in Sukah (31a; Tosfos DH v'Rebbi Yehudah). Rashi writes that one is not permitted to apply the thirteen exegetical methods with which laws are derived from the Torah ("13 Midos sheha'Torah Nidreshes ba'Hen," as listed in the beginning of Toras Kohanim, and as printed in the Sidur before the Shacharis service) to derive a Halachah on his own (except for the principle of Kal va'Chomer). There must be a Kabalah (tradition) to apply any of these principles. Tosfos disagrees and says that one may apply any of the principles on his own, with the exception of Gezeirah Shavah.

The argument seems to depend on the definition of a "Klal u'Frat." Tosfos maintains (like the Ri) that it is always preferable to view a clause as part of a series of a single Limud rather than use it for a specific Halachah. Rashi, on the other hand, maintains that a clause is considered a Klal or Prat only when no specific Halachah can be derived from it. Since it is never known whether a clause teaches a specific Halachah or whether it teaches a "Klal u'Frat" (or similar Limud), a Kabalah is necessary in order to expound the verse as a "Klal u'Frat" (or similar Limud), just as a Kabalah is necessary in order to expound a verse as a Gezeirah Shavah. (This limitation does not apply to the Midah of a Kal va'Chomer, which one may derive on his own without a Kabalah.)

(b) The reason why the Gemara does not suggest that Rebbi Elazar includes Alin v'Lulavin through a "Prat u'Chlal" is that a "Prat u'Chlal" includes every object in the Klal without exception, and thus a "Prat u'Chlal" would prohibit a Nazir from eating all parts of the vine, even the branches. It is clear from Rebbi Elazar's words that he maintains that a Nazir is liable only for eating edible parts of the grapevine, like Alin v'Lulavin. Therefore, the only way to include everything in the general prohibition except for one object is by expounding the verse as a "Mi'ut v'Ribuy."