1)

(a)What causes us to comment that according to both Rava and Rabah bar Rav Huna, who establish the Beraisa by a Gazlan and Nigzal, the loan is only an oral one is the fact that nobody would write a Shtar for a Ganav.

(b)The problem then is that one cannot claim an oral loan from Meshubadim (so how can the Nigzal claim his stolen field from Meshubadim?)

(c)We answer that, before selling the field (or before the Nochrim claimed it) they had been to Beis-Din. Bearing in mind that the reason that one cannot claim an oral loan from Meshubadim is because there is no 'Kol' (and the purchaser has no way of safeguarding himself against the Ba'al-Chov) going to Beis-Din creates a 'Kol', giving subsequent claims the strength of a written loan.

(d)And the reason that the owner may claim the Peiros only from Bnei-Chorin is because, at that stage, the claimant had only claimed the Keren, but not the Peiros We justify establishing the Beraisa like this on the grounds that it is not unusual to first claim on the Keren and only later on the Peiros.

2)

(a)The three things Shmuel instructed Rav Chinena bar Shilas (who was a Sofer) to consult with the debtor before inserting them in the Shtar were Shufra (Idis), Shevach and Peiros.

(b)This cannot be referring to a case of Ba'al-Chov because Shmuel holds that a Ba'al-Chov claims the Shevach, but not the Peiros.

(c)He must therefore be referring to a purchaser from a Gazlan.

(d)Rav Yosef reconciles this with Shmuel's own ruling that a purchaser from a Gazlan does not take the Shevach by establishing the case where the Gazlan had Karka at the time of the sale and that is what now he subsequently gives him ...

(e)... and since he gave him Karka and not money it does not look like Ribis.

3)

(a)Abaye objects to Rav Yosef's answer however inasmuch as if, Lechatchilah, Chazal forbade 'Sa'ah be'Sa'ah (lending a Sa'ah against the value of a Sa'ah) due to the fact that the price might rise, and it looks like Ribis, then it should certainly be forbidden in our case to give the purchaser more than he received.

(b)To answer Abaye's Kashya, Rav Yosef explains that it is only by Sa'ah be'Sa'ah, which is in the form of a loan (whose basic Ribis is d'Oraisa), that Chazal decreed in all cases, but not by the case of Shmuel, which is in the form of a purchase (whose basic Ribis is d'Rabanan). There, Chazal permitted such a transaction provided the 'seller' does not give the purchaser money.

(c)Alternatively, Rav Yosef establishes the case where they made a Kinyan when obligating the 'seller' to accept Achrayus, which will be effective here, but not in the case of Sa'ah be'Sa'ah.

4)

(a)The seller writes in the Shtar of sale 'Ana Eikum, ve'Ashpi, ve'Adki, ve'Amrik Zevini Ilein'.

1. 've'Ashpi' means 'and I will silence (any claimant).

2. 've'Adki '(which is similar in meaning to 've'Amrik') means 'and I will cleanse it (of any protestations').

(b)We prove from the continuation 'Inun, ve'Amleihon u'Shevacheihon' that the creditor claims the Shevach (because otherwise, why would the seller need to compensate him).

(c)And from the fact that this is omitted from a Shtar Matanah Rava extrapolates that he cannot claim it from the recipient of a gift.

(d)Rav Chiya bar Avin asked Rava whether a gift was really more powerful than a sale in this regard to which Rava replied in the affirmative.

5)

(a)Rav Nachman proves Shmuel right from a Beraisa which rules (in connection with a field that is taken away from Shimon, after he bought it from Reuven) that he Shimon claims from Reuven, the Keren from Meshubadim and the Shevach from Bnei Chorin.

(b)Rav Huna explains the Beraisa in connection with someone who purchased from a Gazlan, and it is the purchaser who is now claiming from the Gazlan.

(c)According to Rav Huna, the purchaser would not claim in the case of a Ba'al-Chov because it would not be necessary, seeing as the Ba'al-Chov is not permitted to claim the Shevach from him.

(d)What gives a Nigzal more rights than the Ba'al-Chov (according to Rav Huna) is the fact that the Nigzal previously owned the field, in which case he can claim that it is his field which improved; whereas the Ba'al-Chov never owned the field.

6)

(a)Another Beraisa discusses a case where a purchaser had improved the field, when the Ba'al-Chov claimed it together with the Shevach. The Tana rules, assuming that ...

1. ... the Shevach amounts to more than the expenses that the purchaser claims the Shevach from the owner, and the Shevach from the Ba'al-Chov.

2. ... the expenses amount to more than the Shevach that he claims the expenses to the value of the Shevach from the Ba'al-Chov.

(b)The Kashya on Shmuel from the Reisha ...

1. ... if we establish the case by a purchaser from a Gazlan is that according to Shmuel, someone who purchases from a Gazlan is not entitled to claim the Shevach.

2. ... and from the Seifa, if we establish it by a Ba'al-Chov is that a Ba'al-Chov is entitled to the Shevach (so why should he have to pay the purchaser his expenses to the value of the Shevach)?

(c)The two possible conditions under which we might establish the Beraisa by a purchaser from a Gazlan are if either the Gazlan gave him Karka, or if they made a Kinyan (as we explained above).

7)

(a)Alternatively, we even establish the Beraisa by a Ba'al-Chov. To reconcile Shmuel with the Tana, we differentiate between 'Shevach ha'Magi's li'Kesafim' (Shevach which still needs the ground but which has almost attained its full ripeness, and is therefore considered Peiros) and 'Shevach she'Eino Magi'a li'Kesafim.

(b)And we establish ...

1. ... the Beraisa by 'Shevach ha'Magi's li'Kesafim', which the Ba'al-Chov is not entitled to claim unless he pays the expenses. Note, that the Sugya is speaking exclusively about Shevach that is attached to the ground and that still needs the ground. The Ba'al-Chov has no claim whatsoever on detached crops, and crops that no longer need the ground are considered as if they were detached.

2. ... Shmuel by 'Shevach she'Eino Magi'a li'Kesafim', which the Ba'al Chov takes as part of the field.

(c)When Shmuel would regularly authorize the Ba'al-Chov to claim even 'Shevach ha'Magi'a li'Kesafim' without having to pay the expenses that was where the debt amounted to the combined value of the field plus the Shevach, whereas our Sugya is talking when the debt is covered by the value of the field alone.

(d)The reason the Tana say that the purchaser takes the Yetzi'ah ... (rather than that he takes the equivalent of his debt from the owner and the rest from the Ba'al-Chov) is to teach us that even though the expenses exceed the Shevach, he only takes as much of the expenses as are equivalent to the Shevach.

8)

(a)Some say that even if the purchaser has money, he is obligated to give the Ba'al-Chov the field that is Meshubad to him. Others say that he has the right to pay the Ba'al-Chov money.

(b)The problem this creates with the Beraisa's ruling (that the Ba'al-Chov takes the field and pays the purchaser money for his Shevach) is why the purchaser cannot then claim part of the field in lieu of the Shevach, on the grounds that if he would have had money, he could have given him money and retained the field.

(c)We answer by establishing the Beraisa, 'K'gon she'As'o Apotiki'- a field which the debtor specifically designated for the creditor to claim.

(d)This answers the Kashya inasmuch as everyone agrees that the purchaser cannot pay the Ba'al-Chov money, there where the field that is Meshubad is an Apotiki. Consequently, he has no claim to Karka whatsoever.

9)

(a)According to Rav, if the purchaser bought the field from the 'seller' knowing that it was stolen, he is entitled to claim the value of the field but not the Shevach. According to Shmuel he cannot even claim the value of the field.

(b)The basis of their Machlokes is whether the money that he paid is considered a Pikadon (Rav), or a gift (Shmuel).

(c)According to ...

1. ... Rav, the purchaser did not say that he gave the money as a Pikadon because he figured, the seller would decline to accept it.

2. ... Shmuel, he did not say that he gave the money as a gift because he was too embarrassed to say so.

10)

(a)We find the same Machlokes between Rav and Shmuel in connection with someone who betroths his sister (where everyone knows that such a Kidushin is not valid).

(b)Had they only presented their Machlokes ...

1. ... here, we would have thought that, in the case of Kidushin, Rav would concede that the money is a gift because it is only in our Sugya that he considers the money a Pikadon, because one doesn't tend to give gifts to a stranger, whereas in Kidushin, it is his sister who is involved, and not a stranger.

2. ... in Kidushin, we would have thought that Shmuel would concede here that the money is a Pikadon using the reverse logic (because whereas there it is his sister who is involved, here it is a stranger).

(c)When we ask, according to both Rav and Shmuel, how the purchaser can possibly eat the fruit we are actually querying the basis of their Machlokes, because if it is a question of what we consider the money to be, how will that authorize the purchaser to eat the fruit?

(d)And we reply that the purchaser eats the fruit (not because it is legal to do so, but) because he thinks that he is no worse than the Gazlan, who also ate it.

11)

(a)We conclude 've'Hilch'sa Yesh lo Ma'os, ve'Yesh lo Shevach' (like Rav) with regard to the first Machlokes between Rav and Shmuel, in the case where someone purchased a field which was subsequently found to have been stolen.

(b)With regard to ...

1. ... our current Machlokes between Rav and Shmuel, we rule that the money is a Pikadon (like Rav).

2. ... Achrayus we rule 'Achrayus Ta'us Sofer Hu' (not like Shmuel, who holds that the Sofer must also consult the debtor about Shibud) ...

3. ... irrespective of whether it is a loan or a purchase.

(c)Shmuel asked Rav what the Din will be if, after selling the stolen field to the purchaser, the Gazlan buys it from the owner whether the Gazlan's initial sale will be invalid (as would be the case if a third person were to purchase the field from the owner), or whether for some reason, the sale will remain valid.

(d)We conclude that the Gazlan cannot claim the field from the purchaser (like the second side of the She'eilah) because the Gazlan sold the purchaser all the rights (not only those that he already had, but also those) that he himself had in the field.

12)

(a)According to Mar Zutra, the reason for the previous ruling is based on the Chazakah that he does not wish to be called 'a Gazlan' for taking back the field that he sold him.

(b)Rav Ashi says that it is because he wants to remain on good terms with the purchaser.

(c)Initially, we assume the ramifications of this Machlokes to be when the purchaser died, where, we think, the first reason will no longer apply (and the Gazlan will then be able to take the field), whereas the second one will. We refute ...

1. ... this suggestion however, on the grounds that if the sale were to be nullified, then the purchaser's heirs would refer to the 'seller' as a Gazlan (no less than the purchaser himself). So either way, the sale will stand.

2. ... the suggestion that the difference will be when the Gazlan died, where again the first reason will no longer apply, but the second one will (since the children will still want to be in the good books of the purchaser), on the grounds that here too, if the sale were to be annulled, the purchaser would still refer to the heirs as 'sons of a Gazlan'. So in this case too, either way, the sale will stand.

(d)The ramifications, we finally conclude of the Machlokes between Mar Zutra and Rav Ashi are manifest in a case where the Gazlan (did not sell the field to the recipient, but) gave it to him as a gift. In that case, he will still want to remain on good terms with the purchaser (by not negating the sale when he buys the field from the owner) on the one hand, but on the other, he has no reason to be afraid of being called a Gazlan, since he has not stolen anything from him.