1)

(a)Having just queried Rebbi Elazar from the Beraisa, we now query Shmuel (who, like Rebbi Elazar, establishes the Beraisa where the debtor denies the Shtar's validity, as we explained above). Shmuel rules that someone who finds Shtarei Hakna'ah in the street should return them, and we do not suspect that they may already have be paid (even if the debtor claims that they have).

(b)This clashes with the Beraisa 'Af-al-Pi she'Sheneihem Modim Lo Yachzir Lo la'Zeh ve'Lo la'Zeh' because if when the debtor admits that he has not yet paid, we are afraid that perhaps he has (and that he is in cahoots with the creditor), how much more so when he claims that he has.

2)

(a)The reason Shmuel gives for the Rabanan, who rule that one may claim from Meshubadim even with a Shtar that does contain Achrayus is the principle 'Achrayus Ta'us Sofer Hu', as we explained above.

(b)Shmuel said that before entering 'Shevach, Sh'far and Shibud' into a Shtar, the Sofer must first consult the debtor (which seems to clash with his other statement 'Achrayus Ta'us Sofer Hu'), which means that Shibud is mandatory.

(c)

1. 'Shevach' is any improvement which the 'creditor' claims together with the Meshubadim.

2. 'Sh'far' is the right to claim them from the best of the debtor's fields.

3)

(a)Rav Idi bar Avin reconciles the seeming discrepancy in Shmuel without turning it into a Machlokes Amora'im by establishing the latter statement specifically with regard to a purchaser (whereas his former statement pertains to a creditor).

(b)The reason for this distinction is because a creditor gains nothing from the loan, and is not willing to lose his money (so he expects a guarantee in the way of Achrayus, which will enable him to retrieve it). A purchaser on the other hand, may be willing to take a risk, and buy a field from whose fruit he stands to benefit, perhaps for a long time, on the off-chance that the seller's creditor will claim it from him the very next day and he loses it all.

(c)We cite an incident in support of this distinction, where Avuhah bar Ihi purchased an attic from his sister, and her creditors then came and claimed it from him. When he came before Shmuel with the intention of claiming from his sister's Meshubadim (which she had sold after his purchase), Shmuel asked him whether she had written Achrayus into his Shtar Mechirah. When he replied in the negative, Shmuel sent him home empty-handed (because he had foregone his right to claim from Meshubadim by not demanding that the Sofer does so).

(d)And he justifies this in spite of his earlier ruling 'Achrayus Ta'us Sofer Hu' by differentiating between a loan and a sale, as we just explained.

4)

(a)Abaye rules that if Reuven sold Shimon a field with Achrayus, he is permitted to appear in Beis-Din on Shimon's behalf, should the creditor claim the field. We might have thought otherwise because the creditor can argue 'You are not my disputant! My claim from Shimon is none of your business!'

(b)He is permitted to do so however because he can counter that if Shimon loses the field, he will have to reimburse him (in which case it is his business).

(c)Besides claiming that he already paid the debt, he might argue that his creditor also owes him money and that he is holding this field as payment of that debt.

(d)Others permit it even if he sold him the field without Achrayus because he can say that he doesn't want Shimon to bear him any grudges.

5)

(a)If Reuven sells a field to Shimon without Achrayus, and someone claims that it is his, Shimon may retract, according to Abaye, as long as he has not made a Chazakah, which in this regard means if the purchaser has walked round the borders of the field (see Tosfos DH 'Ad').

(b)He can no longer retract, once he has made a Chazakah because the seller can say to him that even if he bought a sack-full of knots. that was his decision. He thought it over and accepted it! And, in the event that he has not yet paid, he remains obligated to do so.

(c)But if Shimon purchased the field with Achrayus he may retract even after having made the Chazakah.

(d)Others disagree. They maintain that even then the sale is valid until the claimant produces a Shtar to substantiate his claim. At that point, Reuven claims, he will reimburse Shimon. Meanwhile, the latter is obligated to pay.

6)

(a)According to Rav, if Reuven sells Shimon a field which is then discovered to have been stolen from Levi, he is obligated to reimburse him, not only for the cost of the field, but also for any improvements for which he (Shimon) was responsible. Although Levi is the one to benefit from the improvements, he does not pay for them because we are speaking in a case where Reuven spoiled the field (which he stole from Levi in good condition [see also Rosh Siman 39]).

(b)Shmuel rules that Shimon may claim the cost of the field, but not of the improvements.

(c)They asked Rav Huna what Shmuel would hold if the Shevach was specifically included together with the Achrayus in the Shtar. The reason that he might even then not be permitted to claim is because seeing as the field never belonged to Reuven, the money he received is a loan, in which case, giving Shimon the Shevach looks like Ribis.

(d)Rav Huna wasn't too sure. First he said 'Yes', then he said 'No'. According to Rav Nachman Shmuel specifically ruled that Shimon could claim the cost of the field, but not of the improvements.

7)

(a)The Mishnah in Gitin rules that one cannot claim Achilas Peiros, Shevach Karka'os or Mazon ha'Ishah ve'ha'Banos from Meshubadim because in all these cases, Chazal made a Takanah safeguarding the purchasers, since the claim from the 'creditor' is not fixed, and is unknown at the time of the field's purchase.

(b)Based on the inference (that they can claim from Bnei Chorin), Rava asked Rav Nachman from this Mishnah from the case of 'Shevach Karka'os', which he established by someone who purchased from a Gazlan (in which case, one should not be able to claim at all, according to him.

(c)What made him learn 'Shevach Karka'os' that way is the fact that 'Achilas Peiros' clearly speaks in such a case, as we shall now see. Presumably then, 'Shevach Karka'os' speaks in the same case.

(d)Rav Nachman replied however that there is no reason not to establish 'Achilas Peiros' by someone who purchased from a Gazlan, and 'Shevach Karka'os where he purchased from a debtor (a Ba'al-Chov), 'Ha ke'de'Isa, ve'Ha ke'de'Isa'.

8)

(a)'Achilas Peiros' in the Mishnah in Gitin cannot refer to a case of a Ba'al-Chov because if, as we currently understand, the Tana speaks about a purchaser reclaiming the field together with the fully-grown produce which the Ba'al-Chov took from him, since when is a Ba'al-Chov entitled to take the fully-grown produce from the purchaser?

9)

(a)In a Beraisa which comes to explain the above Mishnah, the Tana, explaining 'Shevach Karka'os', writes that when the field is reclaimed from the Gazlan, he claims the Keren from Meshubadim, and the Shevach from Bnei Chorin. What forces us to amend the Beraisa to refer to a case when the Gazlan sold it and it is the purchaser who improved it is the fact that, as it stands, since when does a Gazlan claim anything?

(b)In any event, we see that the Mishnah is speaking about a case of a Gazlan and not of a Ba'al-Chov, as Rav Nachman explained earlier. Rav Nachman refutes this Kashya however by saying that if one needs to amend the Beraisa anyway, then there is no reason why one cannot also amend the Mishnah in the same way.

10)

(a)We query Rav Nachman further from the above-mentioned Beraisa, which explains 'Achilas Peiros' to mean that when the owner reclaims his field from the Gazlan 'he claims the field from Meshubadim and the Peiros from Bnei-Chorin. Here too, we amend the Beraisa for the same reason that we amended the previous quotation from the same Beraisa to a case where the Gazlan sold the field, and it is the purchaser who improved it.

(b)This again poses a Kashya on Rav Nachman (according to whom the purchaser from a Gazlan does not receive Peiros). To answer the Kashya, Rava reinstates the original wording of the Beraisa. The claimant is now the owner but he cannot simply take his field, because the Tana is speaking in a case where, after stealing the field and eating the fruit, the Gazlan dug pits all over it.

11)

(a)Rabah bar Rav Huna establishes the Beraisa where Nochrim confiscated the stolen field from the Gazlan. Here too it is the owner who is now claiming from the Gazlan, from whom he takes a field from Meshubadim and Peiros from Bnei-Chorin.

(b)We obligate him to pay the owner on condition that the Nochrim confiscated the field specifically on his account (e.g. because he owed them money).

(c)Both Rava and Rabah bar Rav Huna base their respective opinions on the Lashon ' ... Yotzei mi'Tachas Yado'. The reason that ...

1. ... Rava declines to learn like Rabah bar Rav Huna is because 'Yotzei mi'Tachas Yado' implies legally (through Beis-Din and not through Anasim Nochrim).

2. ... Rabah bar Rav Huna declines to learn like Rava because, in his opinion, 'Yotzei mi'Tachas Yado' implies intact (and not full of pits).

12)

(a)Rav Ashi explains the Beraisa 'li'Tzedadin', by which he means that the Beraisa is speaking about two different claimants (as we shall now see).

(b)The case then is where the Gazlan stole the field full of fruit, ate the fruit, and, then the owner's creditor claimed it from the purchaser.

(c)The one who claims ...

1. ... the field (from Meshubadim) is the purchaser.

2. ... the Peiros (from Bnei Chorin) is the owner.

(d)By explaining the Beraisa in this way Rav Ashi gains what disturbed Rava and Rabah bar Rav Huna, since according to him, the field is claimed from the purchaser both legally and intact.