Observation: This implies that Ravina here and Rebbi Pedas later do not hold of the answer quoted earlier in the Gemara that a Nochri is careful not to have relations with his animal (so that it should not become barren). Otherwise, they would not have to give a different answer.

Question: This is difficult. If so, how do they answer the contradiction between the two Mishnayos, one being our Mishnah and the other being the Mishnah earlier (14b) that in a place where the custom is to sell them animals, we sell them animals?

Question (cont.): One cannot say that they will give the first answer given by Rav earlier (ibid.) that wherever they permitted selling they permitted seclusion, being that they are not suspected to have relations with their animals. This answer did not remain established, as even Rav retracted this answer, for the reason we explained earlier (see Tosfos 22b, DH "u'Riminhi").

Answer: Both according to Ravina and Rebbi Pedas, the reasoning that a Nochri does not have relations with his animal is viable regarding not forbidding selling to them. Even in a place where they had a custom not to sell, this is only a custom, not a prohibition, as we have explained (see Tosfos ibid.).

Answer (cont.): However, it is logical that regarding a Korban we should be stringent, and forbid using an animal purchased from Nochrim, even in a place where the custom is to sell them animals. We should not rely on the reasoning that a Nochri does not have relations with his animal, if it were not for the reasoning that b'Dieved this is permitted according to Ravina. Similarly, according to Rebbi Pedas who established this Beraisa according to the Rabbanan, we do not suspect that they have relations with their animals at all.

Question#1: Rebbi Yochanan later (24b) answers that if the animal is less than three years old it becomes barren if a man has relations with it, as opposed to an animal older than three years old that does not become barren. How will he answer the Mishnah that in a place where the custom is to sell (animals to Nochrim), they are allowed to sell? This implies that one is allowed to sell all animals to Nochrim, even if they are older than three years old! (It would seem that this should be forbidden, as now they will certainly have relations with this animal!)

Question#2: Additionally, they should have forbidden selling a Nochri an animal that is less than three years old, as perhaps he will keep it in his possession until it turns three, and he will then have relations with it!

Answer: Rebbi Yochanan means that if the animal is less than three years when he has relations with it, it certainly will become barren. If it is already three years old, it usually does not become barren, but sometimes does become barren. Therefore, in a place where the custom was to sell animals to Nochrim, they even sell three year old animals to Nochrim. This is because the Nochri will not have relations with his animal, as he is scared that it might become barren.

Answer (cont.): Regarding a Korban, we can establish the Beraisa that we buy animals for Korbanos from Nochrim as only regarding animals that are less than three years old. It is not only permitted to buy these animals for Korbanos in a place where the custom is to sell animals to them, but it is even permitted in a place where the custom is not to sell them animals. Being that it will certainly become barren (when it is less than three), he does not have relations with the animal.

Answer (cont.): The custom not to sell them animals due to the suspicion that they will have relations with the animal is only when the animal is older than three years old, as we have explained. However, we do not buy an animal from them (for a Korban) that is three years old or older, as it usually does not become barren due to relations at this age, and therefore we should suspect that he had relations with it.

Explanation#1: Rashi explains that this refers to the wife of a Yisrael.

Question: If so, how is it apparent that she is permitted b'Dieved, due to our assumption that they did not have relations with her? Perhaps they did have relations with her!

Question (cont.): She is permitted for a different reason, namely because she is the wife of a Yisrael who was raped, and is therefore permitted to her husband! There is no reason to forbid her because she may have wanted to have relations with him. Being that she is not being held captive in order to kill her, she is not scared of him, and will not react positively towards his advances.

Explanation#2: It therefore appears that this is certainly referring to the wife of a Kohen, who is forbidden to her husband even if she is raped. She is permitted in this case, as we assume that they did not have relations with her.

Proof#1: This is also implied in Kesuvos (26b), where it is obvious to the Gemara that the Mishnah refers to the wife of a Kohen. The Gemara there quotes an incident involving a woman who was redeemed in Ashkelon, and whose family distanced themselves from her. If she was the wife of a Yisrael, why would they say that her family distanced themselves from her? Only her husband should have distanced himself from her (if he thought that she had relations with her captors willingly)! (If she was the wife of a Kohen, "her family," meaning all Kohanim, would distance themselves from her, as they would not be allowed to marry her because she had relations with a Nochri.)

Proof#2: Additionally, one can prove from the Mishnah that this is referring to the wife of a Kohen. This is as the Mishnah states that if this was regarding money, she is permitted to her husband. The reason that if this was regarding money it means she was not touched is because the captor is scared he will lose his (ransom) money. This implies that if she was not captured to extort money she is forbidden, even if there is no reason to say that she acquiesced, being that she was not captured in order to kill her (i.e. where she was captured to be sold as a slave she is not held for ransom, but is also not meant to be killed, see Avodah Berurah).

Proof#2 (cont.): If this is referring to the wife of a Yisrael, why is she forbidden? Rather, it must be discussing the wife of a Kohen. The reason it says that she is permitted to her husband and it does not say she is permitted to Kohanim in general is because of the second part of the Mishnah that if this was in order to kill her she is forbidden to her husband. In that case she is even forbidden to her husband if he is a Yisrael, as we assume that being that she was scared she willingly acquiesced to the Nochri (in the hope that this would spare her life).

Question: How could Ravina have thought to prove that b'Dieved the animal is permitted from this Mishnah? The reason here (regarding the wife who is held captive) is clearly because of the captor's loss of money!

Answer: Ravina understands that being that she is a captive and in his possession, we should forbid her if she is the wife of a Kohen, and we should suspect that her captor raped her despite the fact that he may lose money because of this. Being that we permit the wife of a Kohen b'Dieved, we can similarly say in a case where there is no loss of money that this will be permitted b'Dieved. The Gemara concludes that this logic is flawed, and that there is a difference between a possible loss and where there is no loss.

Question: This is difficult. Why does the Gemara say "you should know etc.?" Perhaps a case where they captured her to kill her is different, as it is possible that out of fear she would willingly seduce him (to keep herself alive). However, if they did not intend to kill her she should be permitted, even when there is no loss of money!

Answer: It is possible that as long as she is not captured for ransom she is forbidden. If she is permitted, why would the first case say that if it was for money she is permitted? It should merely say that as long as she was not captured in order to be killed, she is permitted! This indicates that only if she was captured for ransom is she permitted.

Answer (cont.): The second case that says that if she was captured to be killed she is forbidden could mean that even if she was not captured to be killed (but captured to be sold as a slave) she is forbidden to her husband who is a Kohen, as we are discussing the wife of a Kohen. Rather, this comes to teach us that she is even forbidden to her husband if he is a Yisrael, as it is possible that out of fear she willingly had relations with him.

Explanation: In other words, certainly a case of monetary loss is different. However, regular seclusion (without a possible loss) should possibly even make a woman forbidden to her husband b'Dieved.

Question: If so, you will not allow regular Jewish girls to stay married to their Kohen husbands! It is almost impossible that she will never be secluded with a Nochri for a small amount of time. Based on this logic, we should suspect that he had relations with her if there was no monetary loss preventing him from doing so!

Answer#1: Our Gemara's answer is merely pushing aside Ravina's proof. Ravina's words are still true.

Answer#2: Alternatively, it is possible that even according to the conclusion of the Gemara there is no reason to forbid a woman (to her Kohen husband) if she is secluded for a small amount of time with a Nochri. Specifically in a case where she is being held captive we suspect they had relations, as she is his possession like our case of a Nochri and his animal, who has the ability to have relations with his animal whenever he wants. However, a regular Jewish woman is not in the possession of any Nochri who she would happen to be secluded with at all, and she can therefore scream if he tries to rape her, and someone will come to her rescue. In such a case, certainly the Nochri is scared to do anything, and we therefore have no reason to forbid her due to this seclusion. This is the main answer to this question.

Observation: The Yerushalmi pushes aside the comparison between a woman and an animal altogether, as a woman is different, as she will normally scream. Even a deaf woman will normally hint that she is distressed (to anyone present).

Question: This is difficult. Earlier, Rav said that a Nochri has pity on his animal and therefore does not have relations with it. Rebbi Pedas also holds of this answer, as we explained earlier (DH "Ravina"). Why don't we say that he will have relations with his animal anyway using a Kal v'Chomer from Parah Adumah, where we say that he cannot defeat his evil urge? If we established regarding Parah Adumah that he will even have relations with a red heifer due to this urge, and risk losing a lot of money, he will certainly have relations with any other animal!

Answer: The case of Parah Adumah is different. Being that it is worth a lot of money to a Jew, he is certainly going to sell it to a Jew. As he is selling the Parah anyway, he will hide when having relations with the animal and he does not care that it will become barren (even though he risks losing the deal if Jews find out), being that he has an evil urge to do so.

Question: The Rivam has difficulty with this. How do we know that a Parah Adumah is Kodshei Mizbe'ach, and the reason is due to relations? Perhaps it is Kodshei Bedek ha'Bayis, and the reason is (not because of the relations, but of what the relations mean) because relations are considered "a yoke upon it," which makes it invalid? This is as the Mishnah states in Parah (2:4) that relations with a male ox make it invalid to be used as a Parah Adumah.

Answer#1: It is possible to answer that being that a man would be standing while having relations with a Parah, it does not constitute a yoke, as opposed to relations of an ox with a cow (where the male ox would be partially on top of the cow).

Answer#2: Additionally, being that the Mishnah states that Rebbi Eliezer says all animals of Nochrim cannot be used for Korbanos, it is apparent that the reason is not because a yoke was upon it (as this only applies to Parah Adumah, not to other Korbanos).

Explanation#1: It seems that the Gemara is addressing the answer, "a Parah is different as the Torah called it a Chatas." The Gemara means to ask that if you will say the reason that a man having relations with a Parah makes it forbidden is because it is Kodshei Mizbe'ach, it is possible to say that Rebbi Shimon argues and says that it is actually Kodshei Bedek ha'Bayis. Therefore, it does not become invalid through a man having relations with it or through being born through a Caesarian section birth.

Explanation#1 (cont.): However, if you say the reason for the Parah being invalid if a person had relations with it is because the Torah calls it a Chatas, it should become invalid if was born via Caesarian section as well! We can assume that the Gemara does not argue on the derivation that an animal cannot be a Chatas if it is born through Caesarian. The Gemara therefore asks, "Why does the Beraisa say etc." It then answers that a Parah is different, as a blemish renders it invalid (and therefore so do idolatry and relations).

Explanation#1 (cont.): According to this text, the Gemara implies that it is retracting the reasoning that a Parah Adumah is called a Chatas. Rebbi Shimon in fact considers this Kodshei Bedek ha'Bayis, and only holds that relations with it make it invalid because a blemish makes it invalid (and therefore so do idolatry and relations). However, it is not invalid if it was born via Caesarian section. The Rabbanan only say it is invalid if born in this fashion because they hold that it is Kodshei Mizbe'ach.

Question#1: This is difficult, as the Gemara at the end of Shevuos (11b) regarding a Beraisa discussing (redeeming a) Parah Adumah answers that a Parah Adumah is different, as it is Kodshei Bedek ha'Bayis. It is difficult to say that we should establish the Beraisa as only being according to Rebbi Shimon.

Question#2: Additionally, the Gemara in Zevachim (14b, 68b), Menachos (6b), Bechoros (25a), Yoma (42a), and Temurah imply that a Parah Adumah is indeed Kodshei Bedek ha'Bayis. There is no reason to establish all of these Gemaros as being solely according to Rebbi Shimon, and not according to the Rabbanan.

Question#3: Additionally, the Gemara in Chulin (11a) proves that a Parah Adumah cannot be a Treifah because it is called a Chatas (showing that we do not retract from the concept that a Parah Adumah is called a Chatas).

Explanation#2: It therefore appears that the explanation of the Gemara's question that the Parah should be invalid if born through Caesarian is not being asked on the concept that the Torah called a Parah Adumah a Chatas. Rather, it is being asked on the conclusion that it becomes invalid if it had relations with a man, either because it is Kodshei Mizbe'ach or because the Torah calls it a Chatas. It should therefore be invalid if it is born through Caesarian. One cannot say that Rebbi Shimon argues on his Rabbeim, Rebbi Eliezer and the Rabbanan, in order to say that it should be valid if a man had relations with it. Why, then, does the Beraisa state that Rebbi Shimon indeed says it is valid if it was born through Caesarian?

Text#1: We do not have the text "Ela," and in the Sefarim it was not written Ela (when it answered "Shani Parah Ho'il etc.").

Text#2: Rashi edited the text by stating that it should say, "Ela Shani Parah etc." This means that it is actually Kodshei Bedek haBayis according to everyone. The reason why it is invalid if it has relations with a man according to Rebbi Shimon is because it is invalid if it receives a blemish (which means it should also be invalid if it has relations). The Rabbanan hold the reason is because it is called a Chatas by the Torah (despite the fact that it is Kodshei Bedek ha'Bayis).

Answer: This is now understandable, as all of the Gemaros (quoted above in questions b,c,d) can also be according to the Rabbanan. The conclusion of the Gemara in Chulin (11a) is also according to the Rabbanan.

Text#3: After the Gemara says, "Rebbi Shimon admits regarding Kodshim," there are Sefarim that have the text, "What must it be? It must be Kodshei Mizbe'ach. It should then be invalid if it is born through Caesarian! What is the case? If you say that it is Kodshei Mizbe'ach, this is why Rebbi Shimon and the Rabbanan argue. If you say it is Kodshei Bedek ha'Bayis, does it become invalid through having relations? I will tell you that it really is Kodshei Bedek ha'Bayis. Regarding relations, even Rebbi Shimon admits it is invalid because the Pasuk says, For their destruction is within them etc." This text is seemingly explained using the first explanation I have given above.

Opinion: Dama Ben Nesinah must have lived in the times of the second Beis Hamikdash.

Proof: This is apparent from the fact that the Beraisa states that a year afterwards, a red heifer was born to him. We understand that there was no red heifer burned in the times of the first Beis Hamikdash, as they had enough ashes from the one that Moshe Rabeinu made. This sufficed for the entire period of the first Mikdash until the times of Ezra, who made the second Parah Adumah in history.

Observation: Being that the Eifod was in the second Mikdash, there must also have been a Shamir (special stone cutting worm).

Proof: The Gemara in Gitin (68a) implies that the stones of the Eifod can only be cut through using the Shamir, as the Gemara there states that the Shamir that Moshe used for the stones of the Eifod were present (to cut the stones of the Mizbe'ach).

Proof (cont.): Even though Rebbi Nechemiah in Sotah (48b) holds that a Shamir was not required for the stones of the Mikdash, but rather they would work on the stones normally (using metal tools) outside the Mikdash and bring them into the Mikdash afterwards, he agrees that a Shamir was required for the stones of the Eifod. This is because the Pasuk says, "b'Miluosam" - "in their fullness." This indicates that a person would write the names that were supposed to be on the stones with ink, and the worm would see the ink and travel on its path, causing the stone to split like a fig in the sun which does not lose any mass (and just opens up).

Implied Question: One cannot ask that the Mishnah in Sotah says, "When the first prophets died, the Urim v'Tumim stopped. When the Beis Hamikdash was destroyed, the Shamir stopped." This implies that it is referring to the first Beis Hamikdash. (How can we say the Shamir was extant during the second Beis Hamikdash?)

Answer: Certainly this is incorrect. When the Mishnah says that when the Beis Hamikdash was destroyed the Shamir was destroyed, it means the second Beis Hamikdash.

Proof: If it meant the first Beis Hamikdash, it should mix these statements together by saying, "When the Beis Hamikdash was destroyed, the Urim v'Tumim and Shamir stopped." The Gemara quotes a Beraisa that the Urim v'Tumim was not extant after the first Beis Hamikdash. They indeed were one of five things that was lacking in the second Beis Hamikdash (that were extant in the first).

Question: There is a difficulty. Being that the Shamir was in the second Beis Hamikdash, it is difficult to understand the Gemara's discussion later (52b) regarding the stones of the Mizbe'ach that the kings of Greece made disgusting. The Gemara asks, "What should we do? Should we break them? We cannot, as the Torah says the stones must stay whole (no break should be apparent). Should we cut them [meaning with metal, in order that there should not be any break marks]? The Torah says, you should not wave metal upon them!" Why did the Gemara have this difficulty if they could have merely used the Shamir?

Answer: It is possible to answer that the Shamir would not have left the stones even. While its nature is to split the stones like a fig in the sun, it does not leave them whole in a manner where there are no rough edges enough to nick one's nail. Nicking one's nail on a stone means that it is invalid for use as part of the Mizbe'ach, as stated in Chulin (18a). [Tosfos in Chulin 18a, DH "v'Kamah" explains that the Mizbe'ach originally was built from small smooth stones.]