Question: The Ri asks, why does the Gemara now ask, "If so, etc.?" It could have asked on Rebbi Shimon ben Elazar's law itself, "Why wouldn't we know this is forbidden due to Lifnei Iver?"

Answer: Rabeinu Elchanan answers that it would be understandable if we would say that Rebbi Shimon says a case of a Kusi in order to include a Nochri. He therefore said the reason that it is considered as if the Jew's name is on the work, as this will even forbid a Nochri. However, if you say that he specifically said Kusi, why not suffice with the reason of Lifnei Iver?

Observation: This question is according to Rebbi Shimon ben Elazar, who is cited in Chulin (6a) as holding that Kusim are real converts. The Gemara there says that Rebbi Shimon was sent by Rebbi Meir to buy wine from the Kusim (indicating he obviously held they were true converts at this point in time).

Proof#1: We can bring proof from here to Rabeinu Tam's explanation that Lifnei Iver even applies to a Rabbinic prohibition. This is apparent from our Gemara, as doing work on Chol ha'Moed is only prohibited according to Rabbinic law, as explained by Rabeinu Tam (see Tosfos in Chagigah 18a, DH "Cholo").

Proof#2: There is also proof from the Gemara earlier (15b) which stated that it is forbidden to sell (items one is not allowed to sell to a Nochri) to a Jew who is suspected of selling these items to a Nochri (due to Lifnei Iver), even though this is only forbidden according to Rabbinic law.

Question: However, Rabeinu Elchanan asked that according to Rabeinu Tam who explains that work on Chol ha'Moed is only forbidden according to Rabbinic law because the Gemara in Moed Katan (11b) asks, "Does it make sense that the Mishnah starts off with a case of mourning and finishes with Chol ha'Moed?" The Gemara answers, "This was said in a manner of, "not only." Not only is this true regarding one's days of mourning when one is prohibited from doing work according to Rabbinic law, but it is also true regarding Chol ha'Moed when one is forbidden from doing work according to Torah law." (This clearly shows that the prohibition against working on Chol ha'Moed is a Torah prohibition!)

Answer#1: Rabeinu Tam answers that this is called "Torah law" because there is an Asmachta from the Torah that one should not do work (see Chagigah 18a). This is as opposed to the laws against one working while mourning, which only has an Asmachta from Divrei Kabalah (words of the prophets). This is as the Pasuk says, "And I will turn your festivals into mourning."

Answer#2: Alternatively, Chol ha'Moed has a source in the Torah, as we can decree that it is forbidden due to Yom Tov.

Opinion: It appears that for this reason (Lifnei Iver) it can also be forbidden for a person to accept a partnership with a Kusi in a field (as this empowers the Kusi to put in his share of work on Shabbos, as opposed to the Jew who only works during the week, see Avodah Berurah).

Observation: There was once an incident in the days of Rabeinu Tam where a Jew collected an oven as payment for a debt owed to him by a Nochri. The baker who used to light the fire of the oven used to have the right to a certain amount of days, and the Jew was supposed to take a similar amount of days as payment. They did not originally make any condition that the Nochri baker should take his day on Shabbos and instead the Jew will take a day during the week.

Opinion#1: The Ri understood that this is permitted. It is unlike a case of a field, as regarding a field the portion of the Jew improves during the week due to the work that the Nochri did to it on Shabbos. However, there is no improvement in the oven at all when the Nochri uses it on Shabbos, and the Jew uses it during the week. It is therefore permitted even if they did not make a condition (this is the text of the Avodah Berurah quoting the Be'aros ha'Mayim).

Opinion#2: Rabeinu Tam did not admit to this. It appears to him that there is no reason to differentiate between an oven and a field. Even though the oven does not improve because it is being used on Shabbos, it is as if he physically set up a worker to work on Shabbos.

Opinion#3: Rabeinu Elchanan understands that regarding an oven, even if they made a condition originally (that the Jew will take an extra weekday and the Nochri will take Shabbos) it should not help. Being that the entire oven belongs to a Jew, it is like a Jew renting an oven on Shabbos, and saying to theNochri renter that he should take the wages of Shabbos in exchange for the Nochri lighting the oven during the week.

Implied Question: This is incomparable to the case where a Jew and Nochri buy a field together. (Why?)

Answer: In that case, the Nochri owns part of the land (and is therefore just trying to improve his land).

Proof: The Ri retracted his opinion, and brought proof to Rabeinu Tam's opinion that there is no difference between an oven and a field.

Proof (cont.): This is evident from the fact that a bathhouse is like an oven. The Tosefta in Dmai (ch. 6) says that if a Jew and Nochri bought a field and bathhouse as partners, the Jew should not tell the Nochri, "Take etc." In short, whether they buy a vineyard, field, bathhouse, or oven together, the Jew should not tell the Nochri, "Take your share etc." unless they made a condition before they bought this together that the Jew has no portion in this investment on Shabbos.

Opinion: Rabeinu Tam instructed in the incident regarding the oven that the Jew should accept the debt (i.e. in cash) from the Nochri, and then to go back and lend him the money with a condition (that he will take the oven as payment if he can take a weekday, and the Nochri will take Shabbos as one of the days).

Opinion (cont.): However, if the Jew took the oven as collateral, it would seem that he does not have to make a condition, being that the oven still belongs to the Nochri, and the wages from the oven are being given to the Jew as interest on the loan. In this case, the Jew does not own any part of the oven. A condition is only required in a case where the Jew is considered to have bought the oven. This is a copy from the text written by Rabeinu Yehudah.

Question: Why doesn't the Gemara make the opposite deduction from the first case of the Beraisa? (The deduction being that the Jew can take a regular day while the Nochri takes Shabbos, if nothing is stated.)

Answer: It is possible to answer that one cannot assume the first part of the Beraisa implies that if nothing was stated, the Jew can take a regular day while the Nochri takes Shabbos. (If you ask, if this is indeed forbidden, why would the Beraisa bother to state that if he explicitly makes this condition (after they make the purchase) it is forbidden? It is even forbidden if the condition is not explicit!) The Beraisa wanted to teach that even if they originally made a condition (before the purchase), this is permitted (despite the fact that they are making an explicit condition that the Jew will take a weekday in exchange for the Nochri taking Shabbos). (This is the way the Maharsha explains Tosfos.)

Question: Why don't we say that if they make an understanding that includes Shabbos this should be forbidden, even if they made this condition before making the purchase?

Answer: The Gemara understands that certainly if they made a condition originally, they are permitted to do so.

Observation: The Gemara says that we cannot even give an animal over to a Nochri shepherd.

Implied Question: We must give a reason why we allow our animals to be secluded with Nochrim, and why we even give them to Nochri shepherds. (Why is this standard practice when the Mishnah and Gemara imply it is forbidden?)

Implied Question (cont.): One cannot say as Rav stated earlier (14b) that in a place where they permitted selling animals to Nochrim, they also allowed their animals be secluded with Nochrim. This position of Rav was not established, and even Rav retracted his statement.

Answer: Rather, Rabeinu Tam explains, we rely on the answer of Rebbi Pedas (23a) who establishes that the Mishnah is according to Rebbi Eliezer who suspects that Nochrim will have relations with animals. The Beraisa that states that we take an animal for Korban from Nochrim, indicating that we do not suspect they had relations with the animal, is according to the Rabbanan. We hold like the Rabbanan.

Implied Question: This is despite the fact that Ravina, who is considered the last word in the Gemara regarding Halachah, argues on Rebbi Pedas and gives a different answer. Even so, Rebbi Pedas answer seems to be the main answer. (How can this be when Ravina argues?)

Answer#1: Firstly, being that Ravina's answer is before the answer of Rebbi Pedas in the Gemara, the indication is that the answer of Rebbi Pedas is the main answer. Rebbi Pedas lived a long time before Ravina, as he was the son of Rebbi Eliezer, as stated in Berachos (11b), "Rebbi Eliezer instructed Rebbi Pedas, his son."

Answer#1 (cont.): We also see that Rebbi Pedas was a contemporary of Rebbi Zeira, as stated in Nidah (8a) that Rebbi Zeira said to Rebbi Pedas, "I see that between you and your father the Katfra fruit is being permitted." Rebbi Eliezer, the father of Rebbi Pedas, was a student of Rebbi Yochanan (who was a contemporary of Rav who was a Tana, see Kesuvos 8a and Tosfos there DH "Rav").

Answer#2: Additionally, regarding Rabbinic matters we say that one should follow the lenient opinion.

Implied Question: Even though the Stam Mishnah here (22a) is according to the opinion of Rebbi Eliezer, the law does not follow him. (Doesn't the law usually follow a Stam Mishnah?)

Answer: There is an argument regarding this topic in Parah (2:1). Everyone agrees that there is no specific order of Mishnayos in two different Mesechtos (and we know that if there is a Stam Mishnah and then an argument regarding that topic, the law does not necessarily follow the Stam Mishnah, see 7a).

Question#1: This is difficult. Instead of asking from the Beraisa on our Mishnah, we should ask a contradiction in Mishnayos, as one Mishnah says, "We do not give our animals etc." and the other says, "In a place where the custom is to sell, we sell!" This latter Mishnah implies that we clearly do not suspect the Nochrim will have relations with the animals. We could even give the same answer that the Gemara gives there for our Gemara!

Question#2: There is another difficulty. Why doesn't our Gemara give the first answer of Rav earlier (14b), that in a place where they permitted selling (they permitted seclusion, as opposed to a place that forbade seclusion) etc.? (The Maharam explains that both of these questions boil down to one essential question: Why doesn't the Gemara here set up the discussion about this topic in the same manner as it did earlier on 14b?)

Answer#1: The Gemara already asked this question in the first Perek (14b) and answered it successfully. Even though our Gemara could have also given Rav's first answer, that where they permitted selling animals to Nochrim they permitted buying animals from Nochrim, it did not give this answer due to its implication (and this is also why it asked the question differently instead of setting up the discussion the same way). This answer implies that in a place where they prohibited selling to Nochrim, it is forbidden to buy from Nochrim, implying that there are places where Nochrim are suspected.

Answer#1 (cont.): If this implication is true, one would then ask all of the questions that the Rabbanan ask on Rebbi Elazar later in the Gemara (24ab) that imply that one can buy animals from Nochrim to offer as a Korbanos. We would have to say that all of these Pesukim are referring to a place where they has a custom to sell animals to Nochrim, because they are not suspected to have relations with the animals.

Answer#1 (cont.): This cannot be, as many of these Pesukim deal with nations such as Egypt, Canaan, and the Philistines who were known to be suspected of having relations with their animals, as is implied later in the Gemara where it says, "An arab bought a thigh in the market etc."

Answer#1 (cont.): Additionally, one would ask, should we establish the Pesukim as being written in a place where the custom was to sell them animals?!

Answer#1 (cont.): It appears that for this very reason Rav retracted his earlier answer that in a place where the custom is to sell etc., as he could not establish it as being correct in our Gemara.

Answer#2: Alternatively, it is possible that our Gemara knew the answer that a Nochri has pity on his animal. Even so, it asked from the Beraisa that one can buy an animal from Nochrim. One would think that we should suspect his having relations with the animal, being that he is selling it! The Gemara answers that a Nochri always refrains from having relations with his animal, as he sometimes cannot find a buyer, or he changes his mind about selling it. (According to this answer, the Maharam explains, the Gemara is actually trying to ask a better question than it did earlier, as opposed to the first answer where it merely records the same discussion in an adjusted manner in order that we should not be mislead.)

Answer#2 (cont.): This is also understandable according to Ravina and Rebbi Pedas (23a) later (as they said their answers because one may suspect that the Nochri will indeed have relations with an animal before he sells it).

Question: Being that we see that one is allowed to buy an animal to use for a Korban from Nochrim in any place, even in a place where they had a custom not to sell animals to Nochrim, we should ask that if we do not give animals to shepherds due to a concern they might have relations with the animal, how indeed can we buy animals from them to use as Korbanos?

Answer: It is possible to answer that in a place where they had a custom not to sell animals to Nochrim, they only had such a custom, but did not have such a prohibition. Regarding (purchasing animals to be used for) a Korban, they did not even have a custom. If they had a custom to refrain purchasing animals for Korbanos from Nochrim, this decree would never end. It would be impossible to ascertain that animals from a place where we do not sell them animals did not mingle with animals from a place where we do sell them animals through some sort of business deal. Any standard setting (which has a possibly doubtful status) is considered to have a fifty-fifty status, and is therefore forbidden (see Yoma 84b where this is derived from a Pasuk, although the Avodah Berurah says that regarding an animal in our case, it would only apply according to Rabbinic law).

Answer (cont.): It is not enough to only buy animals born and raised by Jews, as there are many common blemishes that make animals invalid, such as cataracts.

Explanation: This means that they set it aside to be a sacrifice for idolatry. They then gave it to the priests, who fed it animal food of idolatry. However, just setting it aside for idolatry (without giving over to the priests etc.) is nothing, as there is no law of Hekdesh when it comes to idolatry. This is as stated later (44b) and in Temurah (29a).

Explanation: The Gemara is saying this as an extra reason. It means to say that even in a place where they often set aside animals for sacrifices and serve animals, there is no reason to suspect this is the case with an animal that they are selling. Even without them selling it, we would not suspect that a regular animal belonging to a Nochri is set aside to be a sacrifice or served as an idol. This is apparent from the fact that we forbid selling animals to them because we suspect they will have relations with it, not because we suspect they will set it aside as a sacrifice or worship it.

Text#1: Rashi has the text of "Rigla" with a Reish, meaning common Lashon Hara, as in "he did not commonly speak (i.e. Lashon Hara) with his tongue" (Tehilim 15:3).

Text#2: Rabeinu Tam's text is like that of the Aruch, which is "Digla" with a Daled. This means a liar, as the Targum explains the Pasuk, "With judgment he will not usurp his mouth," (Mishlei 16:10) to mean "Lo Yidgal Pumei" - "he will not cause his mouth to lie." The Gemara means that a liar knows his friend.

Text#2 (cont.): Similarly, the Gemara in Shabbos (63a) says that two Talmidei Chachamim who are "Madgil" each other in Halachah are loved by Hash-m. This is as the Pasuk says, "v'Diglo Alay Ahavah." Rabeinu Tam explains that this means they contradict each other, and do not understand the main point. Even so, Hash-m loves them. This is why the Gemara there says, "This is if they know the basic Gemara, and they do not have a teacher from whom they can learn."

Text#2 (cont.): The Medrash also implies that "v'Diglo" implies usurping. This is as the Medrash states, "How do we know that if someone is reading the Torah, and he reads, "Aharon" as "Haran" that he fulfills his obligation?" This means that even though he does not read the Alef of Aharon, he fulfills his obligation. "This is as the Pasuk states, "v'Diglo Alay Ahavah."

Explanation: However, Rashi in Shabbos (ibid.) explains that this is from the root of the word "a flag," meaning that they gather people in public to learn Torah.

Question: This explanation is difficult. Why would we need proof (i.e. have to bring a Pasuk) to say that these people are loved by Hash-m?

Implied Question: The Ri is unsure how the Gemara knows this (that Nochrim are more fond of Jewish animals than their wives). (What is the source for this remark?)

Text: It appears that the text is that, "converts also had their (spiritual) filthiness stopped," meaning that even though they were not at Har Sinai, their Mazal was at Har Sinai. [This is the way the Maharam understands Tosfos. According to him, the correct text in Tosfos is "v'Nireh d'Garis Geirim etc." See Avodah Berurah for explanations of Tosfos.]