MUST INTENT FOR PIGUL BE SPOKEN? [Pigul: speech]
27a (Reish Lakish): The Beraisa is Machshir when he was silent. The Mishnah discusses when he said (that he intends Chutz li'Zmano).
29b (R. Yanai): One who offers Kodshim with improper intent is lashed - "Lo Yechashev".
Question (Rav Ashi): One is not lashed for a Lav without an action!
30a (Abaye): The Mishnah discusses one who said that he slaughters the first Siman Chutz li'Zmano, and the second Siman Chutz li'Mkomo.
41b (Mishnah - R. Meir): If a Kohen was Mefagel in the Kometz (of a Minchah) but not the frankincense, or vice-versa, the Minchah is Pigul, and one (who eats it) is Chayav Kares;
Chachamim say, there is no Kares unless he was Mefagel in all the Matirim (things that permit it, in this case, the Kometz and frankincense).
(Reish Lakish): R. Meir does not say that intent to be Mefagel in one of the Matirim makes Pigul. He agrees that one must be Mefagel in all the Matirim;
The case is, the Kohen verbalized his intent (Chutz li'Zmano) in the Kometz, then offered the frankincense silently;
R. Meir says that we assume that (unless he specifies otherwise,) he does all Avodos according to his initial intent.
Pesachim 63a (Rabah): The Beraisa discusses one who did not finish saying the second intent until after slaughter. R. Meir does not require equality of (words uttered by his) mouth and heart (intent). Therefore, the first intent (which he said before slaughter) takes effect by itself, even though he did not want this. Chachamim require equality of mouth and heart, therefore, his words do not take effect.
Bava Metzia 44a (Beraisa - Beis Shamai): "Al Kol Devar Pesha" obligates for intent like for action.
Gitin 54b (R. Yitzchak bar Bisna): The Chata'os offered in the Kodesh ha'Kodoshim on Yom Kipur show that the Torah believes one witness. How could we know that they became Pigul (through Zerikah)? "No (other) man will be in the Ohel Mo'ed (when the Kohen Gadol offers these)"! We must say that the Kohen Gadol is believed!
Objection: Perhaps someone saw the Kohen Gadol through an opening in the wall of the Heichal (and heard him say that he intends Chutz li'Zmano during Zerikah)!
Chulin 39a (Mishnah - R. Yosi): In Kodshim, (improper) intent disqualifies a Korban. In Chulin, intent does not disqualify Shechitah.
Question: What do the last words mean?
Suggestion: Any intent at all does not forbid Chulin.
Rejection: If so, how does an animal offered to idolatry become forbidden?!
Answer: Rather, Chulin are not disqualified if one Avodah (e.g. Shechitah) was done with intent to do another Avodah for idolatry. In Kodshim, one Avodah done with intent to do another Avodah with improper intent disqualifies a Korban.
Rambam (Hilchos Pesulei ha'Mukdashim 13:1): Three intents disqualify Korbanos - Lo Lishmah, Chutz li'Mkomo and Chutz li'Zmano. What is intent Lo Lishmah?...
Mishneh l'Melech: The Rambam connotes that intent in Kodshim is even without speech.
Rambam (18:1): Anyone who has an improper intent in Kodshim transgresses a Lav "Lo Yechashev." This forbids disqualifying Kodshim through intent. It is like blemishing a Korban.
Tiferes Yisrael (Kelim 25:9, Bo'as 10): Rashi (Kidushin 41b DH she'Ken) holds that 'Machshavah' refers to intent without speech. (Note: the Maharshal deletes from Rashi words that say so explicitly about Pigul.) The Rambam agrees. A Magihah wanted to prove from Zevachim 29 that it is through speech, for surely one is not lashed for mere intent! This is no proof. The Gemara means that if he said the intent he is lashed, but mere intent suffices to make Pigul!
Beis Mordechai (2:5): Many say that the Rambam holds that Pigul is even without speech. The Chafetz Chayim (Likutei Hilchos Zevachim 21, Zevach Todah) and Yad Malachi (Klalei ha'Rambam) say that the Rambam is wont to cite the Gemara verbatim: Therefore, there is no proof from here or other places that the Rambam holds that mere intent forbids. One can say so also about Sefer ha'Chinuch (brought below), who goes in the footsteps of the Rambam. Further, the Rambam (14:10) says 'one who intended to eat half a k'Zayis outside and to burn half a k'Zayis outside... if Hotzi'u (he expressed) both of these in an expression of eating, e.g. he said 'I will eat...', they join. The Rambam uses interchangeably 'intent' and 'speech'. The Sifri on Devarim 17:1 learns from "Kol Davar" that it depends on Dibur. The Malbim says that Chachamim always expounded "Davar" to refers to speech.
Rosh (Hilchos Sefer Torah 3,4): Regarding Pigul it says "Lo Yeratzeh (some texts - Lo Yechashev)", and speech is required (Zevachim 27a).
Rashi (41b DH Kegon): Every intent in Kodshim is spoken.
Rashi (Menachos 2b DH Machshavah): Intent in Kodshim is spoken, like it says in Bava Metzia that "Al Kol Devar Pesha" obligates for intent like for action. If he did not say anything, for what can we obligate him?!
Tosfos (Bava Metzia 43b DH ha'Choshev): Intent refers to speech, like we learn from "Al Kol Devar Pesha." Likewise, intent for Pigul is through speech, like is proven in Zevachim 30a, Menachos 2b, Pesachim 63a, and Gitin 54a.
Tosfos (Chulin 39a DH Ela): If Pigul forbids even without speech, why didn't we explain 'in Kodshim, unspoken intent disqualifies a Korban, but in Chulin, it does not'?
Tosfos Yom Tov (Bava Metzia 3:12 DH ha'Choshev): Why is Tosfos unsure? In Bava Metzia, he was sure that speech is required. This is clear from Zevachim 30. Devarim 17:1 says "do not slaughter... any Davar Ra." Rashi explains that this forbids being Mefagel Kodshim through an evil Dibur. The Mizrachi says that really, it does not depend on Dibur. He erred.
Note: Maharil (Chadashos 211, and so connotes Maharsha Gitin 74a) says that Tosfos in different Masechtos had different authors (editors), so we do not ask contradictions between them. (Perhaps Tosfos Yom Tov knew that Bava Metzia and Zevachim had the same author.) The Magihah in Teshuvas ha'Rid (below) says that Tosfos' intent is to prove that Pigul forbids only through speech.
Teshuvas ha'Rid (87): Pigul forbids only through speech. If even unspoken intent forbade, the same would apply to idolatry. There would be no source to distinguish them.
Magihah: Our Sugya (Chulin 39a), and the Sugya of an animal crouched in front of idolatry (40a) connote that even unspoken intent for idolatry forbids. This is difficult for all the Rishonim who hold that intent for Pigul must be spoken (for there is no source to distinguish them).
The questioner in Noda b'Yehudah (2 YD 168): We can prove from Zevachim 29b that Pigul does not require speech. Rav Ashi said that one is not lashed for Pigul, for there is no action. We hold like R. Yochanan, that speech is an action! Even though Tosfos says that this is only when his speech does something, here it disqualifies the Korban!
Noda b'Yehudah (2 YD 168): The Rambam rules like speech is an action only regarding Temurah, swearing and cursing. Meforshim ask why the Rambam rules unlike R. Yochanan. I say that he learns from Rav Ashi! Even though Pigul is only through speech, it is not considered an action. Disqualifying an animal is not as much of an action as Temurah, which makes a Chulin animal Kodesh.
Sefer ha'Chinuch (144): Pigul is when the Kohen offering a Korban had a Pasul intent at the time of Shechitah or Hakravah. It is when he resolved in his mind at the time of Avodah to eat from the Korban after the permitted time.
Me'iri (Pesachim 63a): Intents in Kodshim, of Pigul, Pasul, and who will eat from Korban Pesach need not be spoken. If he resolved in his mind, it is Pasul.
Shulchan Aruch (YD 274:1): When a scribe begins to write a Sefer Torah, he says 'I write this l'Shem Kedushas Sefer Torah.'
Be'er ha'Golah (1): It seems that b'Di'eved, intent suffices, for the Rambam and Semag say that Pigul is through intent without speech, and the Ra'avad did not disagree.