Inference: Rashi's Perush connotes that Shmuel knew that the question is whether he may make Nisu'in after Bagrus.

Implied question: Our Mishnah does not discuss the Isur of marriage!

Answer: In any case, Shmuel compares the Isur of marriage to the Isur of Chalalah.

Question #1 (Ri): Initially, Shmuel answered that it depends on Nisu'in, and afterwards he answered that it depends on Eirusin!

Question #2: He (R. Chiya bar Yosef, who asked) should not have said "I did not ask to make her a Chalalah", since also Shmuel knew that he did not ask this, rather, about marriage;

Shmuel [understood the question, just he] equated these.

He (R. Chiya) should have said "the Isur of marriage is unlike the Isur of Chalalah!"

Explanation #2 (Ri): Shmuel thought that he asked whether R. Meir considers this awaiting a Bi'ah Pesulah, or not, for the Kidushin was permitted.

He could have answered that this is a permitted Bi'ah, for he is permitted to make Nisu'in, like he says below;

Rather, he answered him according to his (R. Chiya's) opinion, who held that Nisu'in is forbidden. Shmuel answered that the Mishnah teaches that from Nisu'in, they are Pesulos;

Since Chalalus is primarily from Nisu'in, it is reasonable that it depends on Nisu'in, even if the Kidushin was permitted.

Explanation: [Her body did not change] before Nisu'in, after he was appointed to be Kohen Gadol.

Assertion: The same applies if he was Mekadesh a Bogeres, or a minor and she became a Bogeres, and then he was appointed to be Kohen Gadol.

It is only when he was appointed and afterwards she became a Bogeres, that he may not make Nisu'in, because her body changed after he was appointed.

Question: If after he was appointed she became a Mukas Etz (a stick broke her Besulim) or a Be'ulah, is this considered that her body changed so he may not make Nisu'in, or not?

Partial answer: In Kidushin (10a), it connotes a little that becoming a Be'ulah is not considered that her body changed. It says that if the beginning of Bi'ah acquires, a Kohen Gadol may be Mekadesh through Bi'ah;

If it were considered that her body changed, how can he make Nisu'in? She is a Be'ulah at the time of Nisu'in, if you will say that Bi'ah [of Kidushin] makes [only] Eirusin.

Objection: However, in Kesuvos (38b) Be'ulah is considered that her body changed, regarding the question that we should use "Besulah-Besulah" for a Gezeirah Shavah [and even a Be'ulah receives a fine], for "Na'arah Asher Lo Orasah" applies to her [but not one who was divorced from Eirusin];

We answer that her body (the one who became a Be'ulah) changed, but her body (the one who was divorced from Eirusin) did not change.

Implied question: In Kesuvos (45a), we say "perhaps the Torah taught a Chidush when her body did not change, i.e. she did not become a Bogeres!

Answer: There, she was already a Be'ulah from the Bo'el, so it is not considered that her body changed through Bi'ah of her husband;

Implied question: Her body changed through Bi'ah of the Bo'el!

Answer: There we discuss only a change in her body after the Aveirah.

Question: Just the contrary! We should say that a divorcee is like a widow, i.e. only from Nisu'in!

Answer #1: We equate them [only] to be stringent [but not to permit from Eirusin].

Answer #2 (Ri): Gerushah is even from Eirusin, just like Gerushah who is forbidden to a Kohen Hedyot.

Implied question: In Gitin (41a), we say that all hold that a Gezeirah Shavah is stronger than a Hekesh! (If so, the Gezeirah Shavah to Tamar should override the Hekesh to divorce.)

Answer: There is different, for we know a document [that it frees an Eved Kena'ani] only from a Gezeirah Shavah.

Explanation: It does not literally mean that they are finished. Rather, they were diminished a little.

Implied question: Why can't we say that R. Meir holds that "Besulah" connotes totally, both Darkah and Lo k'Darkah, Besuleha is Machshir [even if she had Bi'ah] Lo k'Darkah, and bi'Vsuleha excludes a Bogeres?

Answer #1: [The Gemara] holds that we expound the prefix "Beis" (in bi'Vsuleha) only regarding Lo k'Darkah. Bi'Vsuleha connotes in the place of her Besulim.

Answer #2: R. Meir must hold that "Besulah" connotes a partial Besulah, for he holds (Kesuvos 97b) that some money is like all the money! (If a widow is still owed part of her Kesuvah, it is as if she is owed the entire amount, and she is fed.)

Answer #3: He cannot hold that "Besulah" connotes totally, to exclude [one who had Bi'ah] Lo k'Darkah, for we cannot exclude Lo k'Darkah from "Besulah";

Proof #1: Regarding Kenas (for rape or enticement) of a Besulah, it says Besulah, and even so she receives a fine, like it says in Kidushin (10a) that (if several men raped her Lo k'Darkah) Rebbi agrees that all of them pay Kenas.

Proof #2: Similarly, regarding Skilah for a Na'arah Me'orasah, Rebbi argues only because it says "Levado." (If not, he would agree that all who raped her Lo k'Darkah get Skilah, i.e. she is still called Besulah.)

Question (Ri): According to the opinion that "Besulah" connotes totally, regarding Kenas, why do we need "Na'arah" to exclude a Bogeres? We should already know this, for it says Besulah, which connotes totally!

We can ask similarly regarding [the Parshah of Skilah for] a Na'arah Me'orasah.

Partial answer: However, regarding Na'arah of Kenas, we can say that we need it like we expound in Kesuvos (29b, to include Chayavei Lavin or Chayavei Kerisos for Kenas, or to exempt if the Na'arah's father died before he was brought to Din).

Inference: She is forbidden to him, even though [only] he himself had Bi'ah with her.

Support: In Kesuvos 30a, we say that Tana'im argue about a Be'ulah to a Kohen Gadol (whether or not he pays a fine for raping her).

Explanation #1: This means that she became Be'ulah from the Bi'ah itself in which he raped her. (It forbids her to him.) Also R. Chananel explained like this, unlike Rashi's difficult Perush there.

Explanation #2 (Rashi): She had Bi'ah with someone else Lo k'Darkah. (Rashi holds that she is not forbidden due to Bi'ah with the Kohen Gadol himself. He needed to say that the Bi'ah was Lo k'Darkah, for if not, surely there is no Kenas!)

Rejection: Also, if so [the Gemara] should have asked "we understand according to R. Elazar, who says that one who had Bi'ah Lo k'Darkah is Pesulah [to a Kohen Gadol], but according to R. Meir, how can we answer?

Inference: He pays a Kenas for Bi'ah Lo k'Darkah.

Support - Citation (Kidushin 10a): Rebbi agrees about Kenas (if several men raped her Lo k'Darkah), that all of them pay.

Question (Riva): In Sanhedrin (73a), regarding one who pursues Chayavei Lavin and Chayavei Kerisos (to rape them), Rashi explained that one may kill him to save them.

Citation (73a) Question: One pays a Kenas for the following Na'aros - one who has Bi'ah with his sister...

Citation (cont.) Answer: He tainted her from the time of Ha'ara'ah; he may not be killed from them. The Chiyuv to pay money is only from when he finished the Bi'ah.

Explanation #1 (Rashi): The Chiyuv to pay Kenas is not until full Bi'ah, which removes the Besulim.

Explanation #2 (R. Tam and Riva): Surely, he pays Kenas for Ha'ara'ah and Lo k'Darkah, even though it does not remove Besulim;

Only there we say that he does not pay until full Bi'ah, for initially Kam Lei bid'Rabah Minei, since people may kill him to save her. (Since he could be killed, he is exempt from paying money.)

Citation (cont.) Answer: The case is, he had Bi'ah with her Lo k'Darkah, and had Bi'ah a second time k'Darkah.

Observation: We could have said he had Bi'ah with her again Lo k'Darkah, since one is liable a Kenas [even] Lo k'Darkah.

Distinction: We can say that even though there is a Kenas for Lo k'Darkah, there is no Kenas for Ha'ara'ah, for Ha'ara'ah was not included to be like a full Bi'ah regarding Kenas.

Source: For Arayos, Chayavei Lavin, Chayavei Aseh, Kidushei Bi'ah and Yibum, we require verses above (55a) to include Ha'ara'ah.

Support: Our Sugya connotes like this. If there is Kenas for Ha'ara'ah, it should have answered that he did only Neshikah, which does not remove Besulim, like it connotes in Sanhedrin (73b)! (Therefore, if she were not a widow, she would be permitted to him.)

Question: If there is no Kenas for Ha'ara'ah, how is one liable a Kenas according to the opinion that Ha'ara'ah is entrance of the crown?

Entrance of the crown removes Besulim. This is clear from Sanhedrin (73b). After this, she is already Be'ulah, and the Torah said [to pay a Kenas for a] Besulah, and not [for] a Be'ulah!

Answer: The Torah taught that one is liable for this, since through the Bi'ah she becomes a Be'ulah, even though the Chiyuv Kenas comes only afterwards.

Proof: If you would not say so, why did the Torah write Ha'ara'ah at all in Arayos? We should learn Ha'ara'ah from Na'arah Me'orasah, for all of them are equated to each other, like it says above (55a);

Regarding Na'arah Me'orasah, you are forced to say that he is liable for Ha'ara'ah.

If he were liable only for full Bi'ah, he already removed her Besulim through entrance of the crown, and the Torah said [that there is Skilah for also Besulah, and not for a Be'ulah, like we expound in Sanhedrin (66b)!

Conclusion: You are forced to say that even if he is not liable until full Bi'ah, since through the Bi'ah she becomes a Be'ulah, the Torah obligates for it.

Question: If there is no Kenas for Ha'ara'ah, what was the question in Sanhedrin "this is fine for the opinion that Ha'ara'ah is Neshikah. However, according to the opinion that Ha'ara'ah is entrance of the crown, how can we answer?"

Also according to him (the latter opinion), it is fine. One is not liable Kenas for entrance of the crown, only for a truly full Bi'ah!

Implied question: R. Meir holds that Chayavei Lavin and Kerisos pay Kenas. Rav himself establishes the Mishnah in Kesuvos (29a) like R. Meir!

Answer: Here he does not exclude them from Kenas, rather, that he may not keep her for a wife.

Support (Seifa, Kesuvos 39a): If she was not permitted to marry into Yisrael, he may not keep her, for it says "Lo Sihyeh l'Ishah" - a woman proper for him.

Question: There (40a) we ask against this "the Aseh [Lo Sihyeh l'Ishah] should be Docheh the Lo Sa'aseh!"

What was the question? Here is different, for the Torah revealed (that he may not keep her)!

Answer #1: We ask that the Aseh [should be Docheh the Lav]. And if you will say that here is different, for the Torah revealed, we should learn from here to everywhere, that Ein Aseh Docheh Lo Sa'aseh!

Answer #2: We ask that he should not have established the verse to discuss Chayavei Lavin, rather, only Chayavei Kerisos;

One might have thought that one may keep her, since they were included for Kenas from "ha'Besulos" and "ha'Na'arah", in Kesuvos (29b);

The verses connote that when there is a Kenas, there is Nisu'in.

However, regarding Chayavei Lavin, we should say that Ein Aseh Docheh Lo Sa'aseh.

Question: We answer that we say that Aseh Docheh Lo Sa'aseh in cases like Bris Milah that overrides Tzara'as (on the foreskin; a Lav forbids cutting it off). However, here, if she says "I do not want [to be married to] him", is there any Aseh at all?! (This is not considered an Aseh to override a Lav.)

If so, why do we need a verse to exclude [that when she is forbidden to him] he may not marry her?!

Answer #1 (Ri): We do not expound an extra verse here. Rather, Lo Sihyeh l'Ishah discusses a woman proper for him. This excludes a widow [to a Kohen Gadol], because we expound "Sihyeh" - willingly;

Since we require her consent, if so we require a woman proper for him, since it is not considered an Aseh, for if she says "I do not want him", there is no Aseh at all!

Initially, he asked that the Aseh should be Docheh Lo Sa'aseh. We thought that when she says "I want him", Aseh Docheh Lo Sa'aseh;

It did not cross his mind that Aseh Docheh Lo Sa'aseh only in cases like Bris Milah with Tzara'as...

Answer #2: Initially, he thought that he expounds an extra verse.

Clarification: Rav does not hold like R. Elazar.

Proof: Rav and Shmuel both say that [a Kohen Gadol] may not marry a Bogeres or Mukas Etz, and R. Elazar permits a Bogeres. (Be'er ha'Mayim - Tosfos text below (60a) says "Rav and Shmuel." Mar'eh Kohen corrects the text of Tosfos to say "Rav and R. Yochanan", like the Gemara says below.)

Explanation: Rather, it means that Rav said that according to R. Elazar, one who had Bi'ah Lo k'Darkah is Pasul for a Kohen [Gadol], since he is Machshir a Bogeres, but Rav himself does not hold like this.

Support #1: The Gemara asks "if this is like R. Elazar, why does it mention that she is Be'ulah? In any case she is disqualified due to Zonah, for R. Elazar says that if a bachelor [had Bi'as Zenus with a single woman, she becomes a Zonah].

If Rav gave his own opinion, what is the question? Just because Rav holds like R. Elazar in one matter (how to expound bi'Vsuleha), must he hold like him in everything?!

These two matters do not depend on each other. They have no connection to each other!

Support #2: You are forced to say that Rav does not hold like R. Elazar, who said that a bachelor who had Bi'ah with a single woman makes her a Zonah;

Below (60a, Rav said that R. Eliezer ben Yakov holds like R. Elazar, and) we challenge Rav because [the Halachah always follow R. Eliezer ben Yakov, and] Rav Amram said that the Halachah does not follow R. Elazar! (If Rav rules like R. Elazar, we cannot ask from Rav Amram, who disagrees!)

Support #3: In Kesuvos (15a), regarding a girl who was raped, [Rav] rules like R. Yosi, who is Machshir her [to marry a Kohen, if most men of the city have proper lineage].

How could he be Machshir, even if there were two majorities (most men of the city have proper lineage, and also most men who passed by), if he holds that a bachelor who had Bi'ah with a single woman makes her a Zonah?!

It would be difficult to say that he needed to rule like him only in a case when he had Bi'ah with her for Kidushin (not for Zenus)!

Conclusion: Rather, Rav taught according to R. Elazar, but Rav himself disagrees.

Question: Why would we have a Hava Amina to forbid [the hire of a dog for bestiality, or what is traded for a Zonah], that we require a verse to exclude them?

Answer: One might have thought that to forbid because they [a dog and a Zonah] are equated [to each other].

Question: If also these (the hire of a dog, and Chalifei Zonah) were forbidden, the Torah should have written "Esnan u'Mechir Kelev v'Zonah"!

Answer: It could not, for then we would think that each is permitted by itself (we forbid only the hire or Chalipin of a dog and Zonah together).

Question: According to the opinion that [a Vov] connotes both of them together, or each by itself, until the Torah specifies "together", [if all are forbidden,] it should have written so! (According to him, the question remains.)

Answer: In Temurah (30b), from this Drashah "two, and not four", we derive that Zenus does not apply to animals. (Maharsha - there, Rav Ashi learned from the fact that the Torah did not disqualify "Esnan Zonah v'Kelev." The Gemara supports him from a Beraisa that expounds "two", and not four. I.e. Rav Ashi answered like the opinion that Vov connotes also each by itself. The Beraisa holds that Vov connotes only both together, so the Torah could not have written Esnan Zonah v'Kelev, therefore it must learn from Shnayim v'Lo Arba'ah.)