Answer #2: Alternatively, it (the condition) is more Chashuv since he stipulated whether it rains or not.

Refutation: This answer however is not correct, since in the case 'If the Chacham arrives ... ' too, his stipulation covers all contingencies, yet it is considered B'reirah.

Implied Question: And when the Gemara asks in 'Merubeh' (Bava Kama, Daf 69b) from Rebbi Yochanan on Rebbi Yochanan - on the case of 'Kol ha'Mislaket' from that of 'Achin she'Chalku Lekuchos hein', and does differentiate in that manner ...

Implied Question (cont.): Inasmuch as 'Kol ha'Mislaket specifically clarifies his words and and relies on clarifying his intentions by means of his stipulation ...

Answer #1: Because the Gemara prefers to establish the case by 'Kol ha'Nilkat' to conform with the wording in the Beraisa.

Answer #2: Furthermore, it prefers to conclude that really we do not reverse the wording.

Answer 3. Moreover, even if it were to make the above-mentioned distinction, there would still be a Kashya from Rebbi Yochanan's statement at the beginning of 'Kol ha'Get' (Gitin, Daf 25a) that where he writes 'whichever one I want I will divorce' 'Also the last one does not render Pasul', because of 'Ein B'reirah'

Answer 3 (cont.): In spite of the fact that he clarifies his words when he says that he will divorce her with whichever one he pleases?

Question: When however, the Gemara at the beginning of 'Kol ha'Get (Ibid.) requires Rebbi Yochanan's two statements, it ought to have made a Tz'richusa (to explain why both are needed), seeing as from the ruling of 'Lekuchos hein; we would not have known that 'also the last one does not render Pasul', for the reason that Tosfos just gave.

Answer #4: One can also answer that, when the Gemara extrapolates that Rebbi Yehudah hols 'B'reirah' from his ruling 'When he dies the Get will be valid' ...

Answer #4 (cont.): It is because the Gemara in Perek Mi sh'Achzo (Ibid, Daf 73b) establishes it where he stipulates 'Whilst I am still alive'.

Answer #4 (concl.): In which case the time was not clarified, and when he eventually dies, we establish that moment as the time.

Conclusion: According to this answer, there is no Kashya on Shmuel.

Conclusion (cont.): Nevertheless, Rashi's explanation is the correct one ...

Reason: Since at the beginning of 'Kol ha'Get' (Ibid. Daf 25a) in the case of 'I will marry you on condition my father agrees' and in the case in 'ba'Kol Me'arvin' (Eruvin, Daf 36b) 'If the Chacham arrived in the east', even though it is a stipulation, it is implied that it is not effective according to the opinion that holds 'Yesh B'reirah'.

Question: Here Rebbi Meir is not concerned about Misah, whereas in Perek Arba'ah Achin (Yevamos, Daf 26a) in a case where there are four brothers, and where the two who are married to two sisters died, the Mishnah rules that the remaining brothers must make Chalitzah and not Yibum ...

Question (cont.): And the Gemara there explains that this is because the Tana prohibits the negation of the Mitzvah of Yibum, and 'Perhaps before the one brother performs Yibum, the other one will die, and the Mitzvah of Yibum will be negated ...

Question (concl.): And that Mishnah goes like Rebbi Meir, as is evident in the second Perek of Yevamos - since 'The author of a S'tam Mishnah is Rebbi Meir'.

Answer: Everyone agrees there that we are concerned about Misah, since as it sometimes happens that, after one of the brothers performs Yibum, the second one waits a long time before making Chalitzah or Yibum, and when a long period of time elapses, we are afraid that the first one will die in the interim ...

Answer (cont.): But we are not afraid that he might die if only a short period of time is involved - such as the breaking of the flask in the current case.

Question: However, in Perek Kol ha'Get (Gitin, Daf 28a) Rebbi Meir is not worried that he might have died, even after a long period of time, since the Mishnah there rules that 'A Bas Yisrael, whose Kohen husband went overseas may eat T'rumah on the assumption that her husband is still alive' ...

Question (cont.): And Abaye does not draw a distinction between 'Maybe he died' and 'Maybe he will die' - And the Sugya in the second Perek of Yevamos goes according to Abaye ...

Proof: Since it implies that Abaye accepted Rabah's explanation this ought to be Rava - See Gitin, Daf 28a & 28b).

Answer: Abaye, in Perek Kol ha'Get compares the concern that 'He might have died' after a long time to 'he might die' immediately, inasmuch as whoever holds of the one holds of the other ...

Answer (cont.): But it is obvious that he does not compare them uncondionally ...

Proof: Since we find that Rebbi Yehudah, who is concerned that 'He may die immediately - in connection with 'The breaking of the flask', and if he were to hold that he may have died 'immediately' ...

Proof (cont.): Then the moment a Kohen would exit the door of his house, wife (who is a Bas Yisrael would be forbidden to eat T'rumah, seeing as he is out of her eyesight ...

Proof (concl.): And he would always need to be in front of her whenever she eats T'rumah.

Implied Question: The fact that the Gemara here, in Eruvin (36b), in Gitin (25a) and in 'Merubeh' (Bava Kama, 69a) gives Rebbi Yehuah's reason as 'because he does not hold of 'B'reirah', even though the Tana specifically states that it is because 'the jar may break' ...

Answer: It is common for the Gemara to not consider the reason that the Mishnah gives as the main reason ...

Example #1 & #2: Such as in Perek ha'Ta'aruvos (Zevachim, Daf 77b) in connection with 'The limbs of blemishless animals that became mixed up with animals that are blemished and in the third Perek of Shevu'os (Daf 21b) where Rebbi Akiva declares Chayav someone who makes a Shevu'ah that he will not eat, who then eats a minimal amount ...

Example #3: And in the second Perek of Makos (Daf 17a) where Rebbi Shimon declares Chayav someone who eats a minimal amout of Tevel.

Question: If Rebbi Yehudah does not hold of 'B'reirah', it means that he concurs with Rebbi Yochanan, who says at the beginning of Kol ha'Get' (Gitin, Daf 25a) and in Perek Ma'aser Beheimah (Bechoros, Daf 57a) that 'Brothers who divide their father's property are purchasers, who must return their portion to the kitty in the Yovel' ...

Question (cont.): In that case, how can he justify his opinion, in that due to it, it is only a single son of a single son ... going back to Yehoshua bin Nun who brings Bikurim? ...

Question (cont.): Due to the fact that, Perek ha'Chovel (Bava Kama, Daf 90a) he says that 'A Kinyan on the Peiros is not like a Kinyan on the Guf'.

Question (Extention): And the same Kashya will pertain to Rebbi Yossi, who has a Safek there as to whether it is like a Kinyan on the Guf or not, whilst here he too does not hold of 'B'reirah'?

Precedent: And the Gemara asks the same Kashya at the end of 'ha'Shole'ach (Gitin, Daf 48a)

Answer #1: One can only learn from the Din of 'Yom O Yomayim' on to cases that concern the Din of an Eved , since that is where the Torah writes :Kaspo" and "Tachas Yado".

Support: And that explains why the Gemara does not cite it in 'h'Shole'ach', when it cites the case of 'Sadeh Achuzah'.

Answer #2: Furthermore, it is only Rebbi Yochanan who holds the S'vara that, because they are purchasers, they must return it to the kitty, but other Amora'im maintain that even they need not return it even if we say 'Ein B'reirah'.

Proof: As the Gemara says at the beginning of 'Kol ha'Get' (Ibid., Daf 25a) and in Perek Ma'aser Beheimah (Bechoros, Daf 57a) that it is specifically a sale that the Torah requires to be returned in the Yovel, but not an inheritance or a gift.

Refuted Question: On the other hand, one cannot query Rebbi Yochanan from Rebbi Yehudah ...

Refutation: Since according to him, the reason (of Rebbi Yehudah) is because the jar might break.

Reservation: This reason is not however applicable according to Rebbi Yossi, who cannot hold of 'B'reirah', as Tosfos will now explain.

Question: Here Rebbi Yossi does not hold of 'B'reirah', whereas in Perek Mi she'Achzo (Gitin, Daf 53b) he does ...

Question (cont.): As the Mishnah, citing Rebbi Yossi, states 'She is Safek Megureshes, and when her husband dies, the Get is valid'.

Answer: According to the opinion at the beginning of 'Kol ha'Get' (Ibid., Daf 25a) that draws a distinction between someone who depends on himself and someone who depends on others, the question is answered.

Alternative Explanation #1: And Rava who does not differentiate there, gives the reason because 'the flask might split'.

Alternative Explanation #2: And Rabah, in Perek ba'Kol Me'arvin (Eruvin, Daf 37b) ascribes it to the fact that 'We need "Reishis" (i.e. 'What is left must be recognizable').

Question: The question remains however, that in Perek be'Kol Me'arvin (Ibid.) it implies that Rebbi Yossi does not hold of 'B'reirah' - in connection with 'The Ma'aser that I have at home should be transferred on to the Sela that I take out of the purse', where he says that it (the Ma'aser) is not redeemed.

Answer: One can however, differentiate, inasmuch as in the case in 'Mi she'Achzo', the matter stands to definitely become clarified, seeing as the person will either live or die, and he holds of 'B'reirah' there more than the case of the coin, which may well never become clarified.

Conclusion: And one can answer the Kashya on Shmuel (See beginning of previous Dibur) in the same way.

Question #1: Why do we not say that "ve'Kasav" is a 'K'lal', "Seifer" is a 'P'rat' - and 'The K'lal is confined to what is in the P'rat'?

Question #2: Moreover, the Gemara says in Perek Hayah Meivi (Sotah, Daf 17a) that 'One writes (the Parshah of Sotah), not on a board, not on paper and not on unfinished parchment, only on a Megilah (a scroll of parchment), since the Torah writes "ba'Seifer"; here too, the Torah writes "Seifer", in which case we ought to also disqualify anything other than a Megilah?

Refuted Answer: Nor can one differentiate between "Seifer" and "ba'Seifer".

Refutation (cont.): Furthermore, here too, the Gemara, explaining the Rabanan, says 'Had it written 'ba'Seifer', it would be as you said' - implying that then we would incorporate anything that is not alive?

Answer: It is specifically by Sotah, where the Pasuk (in Bamidbar 5) writes (only) "ve'Kasav es ha'Alos ba'Seifer" that it is a 'K'lal u'Perat'; but here, "ve'Nasan be'Yadah", it is adding a K'lal - even though the Beraisa does not mention the latter K'lal.

Precedent: And similarly we find in the first Perek of Kidushin (Daf 21b) where the Beraisa states 'I only know "an awl";From where do we know a peg, a thorn and a Sul (a kind of borer) and a stylus? Therefore the Torah writes "And you shall take" - to include anything that one takes in one's hand'.

Precedent (cont.): And it is clear in the Sugya that it learns it from a 'K'lal u'Perat u'K'lal, since "ve'Nasata be'Ozno u'va'Deles" adds a K'lal.

Explanation: In Perek ba'Kol Me'arvin (Eruvin, Daf 27b) in connection with Ma'aser Sheini, where the Torah writes "ba'Bakar u'va'Tatzon", the Tana uses the Lashon 'P'ri mi'Peri ve'Gidulei Karka' ...

Explanation (cont.): Whereas earlier, in the first Perek (Daf 11a) he says 'Mah Chagigah Davar she'Ein Mekabel Tum'ah ve'Gidulo min ha'Aretz' ...

Explanation (concl.): In each case the Chachamim use the Lashon which they consider the most appropriate to it.

Implied Question: Even though it is needed to teach us 'li'Shemah' (that it must be written for the sake of the woman) ...

Answer: The word is written twice.

Question: According to Rebbi Yossi ha'Gelili why do we need both of them, seeing as from the one of 'li'Shemah', we can learn the 'K'lal u'Perat'.

Answer: In Perek ha'Megaresh (Gitin, 87a) the Gemara Darshens "ve'Kasav lah", 'for her, but not for her and for her friend'.

Clarification: This D'rashah goes according to Rava, whereas Abaye learns it from a S'vara at the beginning of Kidushin (Daf 5a) - 'People will say "money brings in and money takes out! How can the defence also be a prosecutor?'

Abaye: Abaye nevertheless needs "ve'Kasav lah", to teach us that 'A woman can be divorced via a written document, but not via Chalitzah', which the Gemara at the beginning of Maseches Kidushin learns from "Seifer Kerisus", a document cuts her off and nothing else'.

Abaye (cont.): And that D'rashah goes according to Rebbi Yossi ha'Gelili, as is implied here.

Question: Why does the Gemara there not cite the Limud regarding Chalitzah of "ve'Kasav", according to the Rabanan?

Answer: It is the way of the Gemara throughout Shas to cite the most obvious D'rashah (exclusively) ...

Example #1: As we find in Perek ha'Chovel (Bava Kama, Daf 87a), where it cites "bi'Ne'urehah Beis Avihah", 'Kol Sh'vach Ne'urim le'Avihah' with regard to a wound ...

Example #1 (cont.): Whereas in Kidushin (Daf 3b) it implies that "bi'Ne'urehah Beis Avivah refers specifically to Hafaras Nedarim.

Example #2: Likewise in Perek Echad Dinei Mamonos (Sanhedrin, Daf 34b) and in Perek Ba Si'man (Nidah, Daf 50a & 50b) it Darshens that 'A Kohen may only examine Nega'im by day' - from "be'Yom Hera'os bo Basar Chai, Yitma" ...

Example #2 (cont.): Like Abaye in the first Perek of Mo'ed Katan (Daf 8a and 8b), whilst ignoring the D'rashah of Rava, who learns it from "Li", 've'Lo le'Ori'.

Example #3: And similarly in Perek ha'Korei es ha'Megilah Lemafre'a (Megilah, Daf 20a), where it Darshens that 'One may only perform the Milah by day' from "u'va'Yom h'Shemini Yimol" ...

Example #3 (cont.): Whereas in Perek Rebbi Eliezer de'Milah (Shabbos, Daf 132a & 132b) it learns it from "ben Shemonas Yamiam", 've'Lo Leilos', whilst from "ba'Yom" it learns "Ba'yom", 'even on Shabbos'.

Question: If her father dies, it is no longer considered 'her father's house'? ...

Source: As we learned in the Mishnah in Nedarim (Daf 46a) 'Konem le'Beischa she;Eini Nichnas, Sadcha she'Eini Loke'ach, Meis O she'Mochro le'Acher, Mutar'.

Answer: ;His father's house incorporates all his father's descendants, even after his death ...

Proof: As we fnd by Tamar who was the daughter of Shem, about whom the Torah writes (in Bereishis, 38) "Remain a widow in your father's house", even though her father had already died, as is evident from the Pesukim (See Mesores ha'Shas).

Question: Rabeinu Tam asked that, in Perek ha'Megaresh (Gitin, Daf 83b) the Gemara says that the Rabanan of Rebbi Eliezer do not Darshen "Kareis" "K'risus", and Rebbi Yossi ha'Gelili is one of those Rabanan?

Answer: It does not say that they do not Darshen the word at all, but that they do not learn that particular D'rashah.

Question: In the first Perek of Eruvin (Daf 15a) Rava says that 'A Mechitzah that stands automatically is not considered a Mechitzah'. And in answer to the Kashya from our Sugya, it answers that it speaks (here) that 'He planted it initially for that purpose'.

Question (cont.): But since it was forced to establish the case where he filled it in with foliage, it is no longer necessary to have planted it for that purpose?

Answer: Both here and there the Gemara asks because it assumes that it is speaking under all circumstances ...

Answer (cont.): Whether the majority of the wall is made of the wood of the tree, which is hard and which does not move around in the wind or whether it is made of branches ...

Answer (concl.): It therefore asks there from the bark and here from the branches.

Question: And the reason that, in answer to the Gemara's Kashya here 'If so, what is the Chidush?' , it does not answer that it comes to teach us that a Mechitzah that stands automatically and which he did not plant initially for that pupose is nevertheless considered a Mechitzah ...

Question (cont.): Since that is the Maskana there, in that they all agree by a Mechitzah ...

Answer: That would not be a Chidush, because, since we Pasken like Abaye that 'A post that stands automatically is considered a post'; how much more so a Mechitzah.