Opinion: Rashi explains that Rebbi Eliezer does not hold like Shmuel. He holds that collateral that is not worth the entire amount of the loan is only accepted in order to remember the loan. This implies that Rebbi Eliezer would agree that if it is worth the entire loan, the lender loses his money (if he loses the collateral).

Text#1: Some Sefarim explicitly contain the text, "What is the case? If it (the collateral) is equivalent to the loan, what is Rebbi Eliezer's reasoning?"

Question: This is difficult. In Bava Metzia (82a), the Gemara concludes that the Mishnah (that a lender who takes collateral is a Shomer Sachar on that collateral) is not according to the opinion of Rebbi Eliezer (as he holds it is merely to remember the loan, not for collection). Why don't we say that it is according to everyone, and is in a case where the collateral is equivalent to the loan (and therefore it is for collection, as stated above)?

Answer: The Gemara's conclusion there is that Rebbi Yitzchak is only discussing a case where the collateral is not taken at the time of the loan. Accordingly, there is no reason to differentiate between whether or not the collateral is equivalent to the loan. If he would be held liable when it is equivalent based on the law of Rav Yosef (that he is considered a Shomer Sachar), then even if it is not equivalent he should still have to lose the value of the collateral. However, here we originally think that Rebbi Yitzchak is even referring to collateral taken at the time of the loan. This is why Rebbi Eliezer would agree if the collateral is equivalent to the loan. However, if it is not equivalent, it is merely to remember the loan, and has nothing to do with the law of Rebbi Yitzchak.

Question#1: However, this is difficult. Being that Rebbi Yitzchak's law (that a creditor acquires collateral) is a Torah derivation, why should it matter if the collateral is equivalent to the loan or not? Just because it is not equivalent does not mean that the Pasuk, "You shall surely return the collateral and for it will considered charity" does not apply!

Question#2: Additionally, the Gemara concludes, "And do you think this is so? Perhaps Rebbi Yitzchak says etc." Originally, it was obvious to the Gemara that if it is equivalent Rebbi Eliezer will admit due to Rebbi Yitzchak's law!

Text#2: It therefore appears that the correct text is like the Sefarim that say, "Mai Lav? b'di'Lo Shavi." This means, "What must the case be? The case is even when the collateral is not equivalent to the loan." Rebbi Akiva will hold that if he loses the collateral he loses the loan as stated by Shmuel, and Rebbi Eliezer will not hold like Shmuel. He will hold that even if it is equivalent he can keep all of his money.

Text#2(cont.): In the second part of the Beraisa regarding lending one thousand Zuz with a document, Rebbi Eliezer admits that his money is lost. This is because it is normal that when someone borrows with a document, he does not give collateral at that time. Accordingly, the collateral is not given at the time of the loan, and the collateral is acquired by the lender according to Rebbi Yitzchak.

Text#2(cont.): When we say that they argue regarding the law of Rebbi Yitzchak, we mean that Rebbi Eliezer will only argue on Rebbi Yitzchak when the collateral is taken at the time of the loan. However, when it is not taken at the time of the loan, Rebbi Eliezer admits.

Text#2(cont.): Accordingly, the case of his losing his money in the second part of the Beraisa is not the same as his losing his money according to Rebbi Akiva. The case of Rebbi Akiva is that he even loses the money that is more than the value of the collateral. The second part of the Beraisa means that he only loses the value of the collateral. This is because the reasoning is due to Rebbi Yitzchak's law that he acquires the (value of the) collateral, as we have explained.

Explanation: Rashi explains that in the second part of the Beraisa where there is a document, there is no need for the collateral to serve as a remembrance of the loan (as there is a document). However, in the first part where there is no document the collateral serves as a remembrance and not for collection.

Question: It does not seem that this is correct. According to what we have established that they argue regarding a case where the collateral is equivalent to the loan, one cannot say that he took it for a remembrance. This is because everyone holds that the loan is not taken away by Shemitah, even if he took collateral at the time of the loan, as is apparent in Gitin (37a, DH "Shani") and Pesachim (31b, DH "b'd'Rebbi Yitzchak").

Question: This is difficult. We should that they argue as follows. One (Rebbi Akiva) holds that being that it is equivalent to the loan, he seized the collateral for the debt. Rebbi Eliezer holds that even though it is equivalent to the loan, he did not take it in order to be able to lose the loan. However, if it is not equivalent to the loan, everyone agrees that we do not hold like Shmuel (that he loses the loan).

Answer: According to Rabeinu Chananel who says that Shmuel is discussing a case where it is clear the collateral is opposite the loan, this is understandable. Being that even if he explicitly stated this they do not hold like Shmuel, it is logical that if the collateral is equivalent to the loan and nothing was specified, he did not seize the collateral in order to lose the loan if he loses the collateral.

Explanation: Rebbi Yitzchak means that this should only be called charity if he makes the lender lose money.

Opinion: It appears that he is not liable for forced circumstances, but rather is like a Shomer Sachar. This is apparent in Bava Metzia (82a), where the Gemara wants to say that when the Mishnah says that if one lends another person money he is a Shomer Sachar, it is only speaking about a case where he did not take the collateral at the time of the loan, and is according to the opinion of Rebbi Yitzchak. It is also apparent from the Bahag that he is considered a Shomer Sachar.

Opinion#1: Rabeinu Chananel rules that the law follows Rav Yosef. This is as the Gemara says in Nedarim (33b) that everyone holds of the law, "Perutah d'Rav Yosef."

Question: There is no proof from that Gemara. Rabah agrees that if a poor person comes while he is taking care of the object that he does not have to give him charity. After all, doesn't he also hold that one who is involved in a Mitzvah is exempt from performing another Mitzvah? Rather, Rabah holds that being that this is a very small benefit that is uncommon, one is not called a Shomer Sachar due to that uncommon and small benefit.

Proof: The Gemara in Bava Metzia (31a) implies somewhat that the law follows Rav Yosef. The Gemara quotes a derivation from the Pasuk, "You shall surely return." I only know this means it should be returned to his house. How do I know it can even be returned to his garden or ruin? The Pasuk says, "You shall return them" implying in anyway (and to anyplace).

Proof(cont.): The Gemara there asks, what is the case of the Beraisa? If the garden and ruin are guarded, obviously he can return the object there! If they are not guarded, why would he be allowed to return it there? The Gemara answers that the Beraisa is talking about a case where they are guarded, and is teaching that one does not need to tell the owner about the object's return. The Gemara is according to Rebbi Elazar (who says that the owner does not have to know that his lost object has been returned).

Proof(cont.): This means it is according to Rav Yosef, as is apparent in Bava Kama (57a). In that Gemara, Rabah asked a question on Rav Yosef, and wanted to deduce that one can even return a lost object to a yard that is not guarded. If it is guarded, this is the same as his house! This implies he is a Shomer Chinam (as he can just drop the animal off and his guarding is finished)! Rav Yosef answers that the case is where they are guarded, and is according to Rebbi Elazar. (The fact that the Gemara in Bava Metzia (31a) essentially quotes Rav Yosef's position without even presenting any other opinion indicates we rule like Rav Yosef.)

Answer: Rabah accepted this answer from Rav Yosef, as in fact this was difficult to him as well. Rabah admitted to Rav Yosef (in Bava Kama ibid.) that being that animals tend to wander away they require closer guarding (and therefore cannot just be dropped off in the owner's yard without his knowledge). The Pasuk regarding lost objects is discussing returning lost objects, as it says, "Do not see the ox of your brother...you shall surely return it to your brother."

Answer(cont.): (If Rabah would stick to his position) He would have to say that the Pasuk is including the context of the Pasuk, "And so you should do to your dress (which does not wander)." Alternatively, the Pasuk would be referring to animals that are tied up (and cannot wander).

Answer(cont.): Additionally, Rabah would have to say this is not a real derivation and is only an Asmachta, as Rabah's reason is that he is a Shomer Chinam, and that he does not receive any benefit.

Answer(cont.): Alternatively, the Pasuk would be needed to say that we should not consider the finder of a lost object as having the status of a Shomer Sachar due to Perutah d'Rav Yosef, being that the Torah obligated him to (pick it up and) watch it.

Answer#2: Alternatively, it is possible that Rabah did not accept this teaching from Rav Yosef. Rather, he originally did not think to prove his poingt from a Pasuk, and only thought to quote this Pasuk as an Asmachta. The Beraisa in Bava Kama (ibid.) that quotes this derivation must be doing so as an Asmachta (according to Rabah).

Answer(cont.): Rabah also admits that the main gist of the Pasuk is according to Rebbi Elazar, as the Gemara concludes in Bava Metzia (29a). The Gemara in Bava Metzia (ibid.) is also according to Rebbi Elazar. The Gemara there means that if the yard is guarded, according to one from stealing and according to the other from negligence, this is obvious (that he can return it there)! We do not need a Pasuk to say he is a Shomer Chinam, as I have explained. The status of an object being guarded according to Rabah in Bava Metzia is equal to the status of not being guarded (as much as in his house) in Bava Kama (57a). (See Maharshal in Bava Metzia 29a on Tosfos who explains this at length.)

Opinion#1(cont.): Rashi implies that the law follows Rav Yosef. This is because he explains the question as, "Let us say Rav Yosef's opinion is an argument among the Tanaim and Rabah's opinion is certainly an argument among Tanaim." This would mean that Rebbi Akiva would not agree with Rabah, and we rule like Rebbi Akiva.

Question: However, one cannot explain the Gemara this way. On the contrary, we should say that Rabah's opinion is certainly not an argument among Tanaim. Rather, everyone agrees with Rabah, and they argue regarding Shmuel's law. Rebbi Akiva admits that he is a Shomer Chinam on the part of the collateral that is more than the value of the loan. However, he loses the amount of the loan that is equivalent to the value of the collateral based on Shmuel's reasoning. This is even according to the opinion of Rabeinu Chananel, as even if it was not explicitly stated it is as if it was explicitly stated, as I explained earlier.

Implied Question: The Mishnah says that in a case where a person lent a Sela and the collateral was worth more, he is liable. (This is unlike Rebbi Akiva, who we just said only holds he is liable up to the value of the collateral!)

Answer: It must be that the case of the collateral being lost was with negligence (and even a Shomer Chinam is liable for that part of the value). If it were not, he would not be liable for the amount of value that is more than the value of the collateral.

Opinion#2: On the contrary, from here we can prove that the law follows Rabah.

Proof#1: The Gemara concludes in Bava Metzia (82a) that the Mishnah (that someone who takes collateral for a loan is a Shomer Sachar) does not follow Rebbi Elazar. We should establish that everyone holds like Rav Yosef, and the Mishnah is discussing a case where the lender does not need to use the collateral at all (and therefore even Rebbi Elazar would agree he is a Shomer Sachar, as stated by the Mishnah)! (Why did the Gemara have to say the Mishnah is unlike Rebbi Elazar?) Rather, it must be that we rule like Rabah, and we are concluding the Gemara according to the law.

Proof#2: Additionally, there is proof from Bava Metzia (29a) regarding the argument between Rebbi Tarfon and Rebbi Akiva about what is going to be with the money (in the Mishnah, 28b). The Gemara clearly understands that Rav Yosef would say that because he is allowed to use the money, he is considered a borrower. Later in Bava Metzia (43a), regarding a person who deposited money by a moneychanger, Rav Nachman [whom we rule according to in money matters] holds that even if he uses them he is not liable for forced circumstances. This is clearly unlike the position of Rav Yosef.

Implied Question: One cannot differentiate that regarding a lost object he is a Shomer Sachar without permission to use the object, and that he only becomes a borrower through the ability to use the item. (Why not?)

Answer: Does a person become a borrower just because he receives a raise in his salary?!

Proof#3: Additionally, we rule like Rabah when he argues with Rav Yosef, besides for the cases of a field (see Bava Basra 12b), topic (see Bava Basra 114a), and half (see Bava Basra 143a).

Implied Question: This is despite the fact that some explain that this is only in regards to cases in Bava Basra.

Answer: This is incorrect, as in Gitin (74b) the Gemara asks that we rule like Rabah (as opposed to Rav Yosef).

Opinion#1: According to the above, when we say in Pesachim (5b) regarding Chametz that being that if it was stolen or lost it would be in your possessions, and therefore it is considered yours, this means that it would be stolen or lost due to forced circumstances. If they would not be liable for forced circumstances, even if they would be responsible for it being stolen or lost they would not have to burn the Chametz. If not, a Jew who lent money to a gentile, and took the gentile's Chametz as collateral would have this forbidden from benefit, even without Rebbi Yitzchak's law (that a lender acquires collateral).

Opinion(cont.): Why would the Rabbanan argue (that the Chametz does not become forbidden), as he is liable for being responsible that it should not be stolen or lost? They hold this way because they rule like Shmuel due to their holding like Rabah. Rather, it must be that because he is not liable for forced circumstances, it is not called his Chametz.

Opinion(cont.): However, according to Rebbi Yitzchak, even if he is not liable for forced circumstances as I have explained above, the Chametz still becomes forbidden from benefit, being that he has acquired it and it is considered his. However, a guardian would not be obligated to burn it unless he accepted upon himself to be liable in a case of forced circumstances.

Opinion(cont.): However, if we would rule like Rav Yosef we would not need to say that one requires being liable for forced circumstances in order to consider this Chametz. Rebbi Yitzchak's law would be required to forbid Chametz of a gentile that is collateral in the hands of a Jew. This is because Perutah d'Rav Yosef does not apply to a gentile, as there is no Mitzvah.

Opinion(cont.): Additionally, even an actual Shomer Sachar for a gentile is not liable. This is because regarding Shomrim the Pasuk says, "his friend" implying that these laws apply to Jews, as opposed to gentiles. This is similar to the exclusion of Hekdesh.

Opinion#2: The Bahag in Hilchos Pesach says that one must burn Chametz if he accepted liability for it being stolen or lost (not in forced circumstances).

Question: We say in Rosh Hashanah (28a) that if someone swears he will not benefit his friend, he is allowed to blow Shofar for him on Rosh Hashanah. A person who swears not to have benefit from a stream can dip in it if it is for the purposes of a Mitzvah (i.e. when it is considered going to the Mikvah). Why is this so? He is having benefit according to Rav Yosef, who due to this benefit declares this person to be a Shomer Sachar!

Answer: It is possible to say that people watching a lost object or collateral are different, as they will often be exempt from giving charity when they are dealing with the item, laying it out for its own need, and putting it away. However, in the cases in Rosh Hashanah he can ascertain not to blow Shofar or dip in a place when a poor person will approach (and he therefore will not benefit from not having to give a poor person bread on Rosh Hashanah, or money while dipping during the year).

Opinion#1: Rashi explains that he uses the collateral, and subtracts from the loan the amount that it would cost him to rent the collateral. This is like the Gemara says in Bava Metzia (80b) that a person can rent the collateral of a poor person, as he is like a person who is returning a lost object to its owner (as he is enabling him to pay off his loan).

Opinion#2: Rabeinu Chananel explains that this means the lender requires collateral in order to give the loan.

Question: This is difficult. Even if he requires collateral, does this mean that he is not doing a Mitzvah?!

Implied Question: This is despite the fact that the one who does not hold like Shmuel regarding the collateral being lost holds that the lender does not even lose the value of the collateral. (How can the Gemara say they are arguing whether or not he loses the loan? The opinion that says he does not lose the loan does not even hold he loses the value of the collateral, and therefore should say the loan is certainly taken away by Shemitah!)

Answer: In our case, however, the amount of the loan that is equal to the collateral would not be taken away by Shemitah. Regarding him losing the collateral, certainly it did not say that he took collateral in order that he should lose anything, being that he does not hold of Shmuel. (In other words, this opinion holds merely that he does not agree to lose anything, not that he cannot benefit by having Shemitah not take away the value of the collateral.)

Question: This is difficult. The Mishnah does not add the case in the Mishnah earlier (43a) that the one who swears is the one who has the collateral. It should be added based on the Gemara's understanding that it is referring to the last part of the first half of the Mishnah there (where the lender swears).

Question(cont.): Additionally, all of the cases in the Mishnah later (45a) regarding a woman who blemishes her Kesuvah (by admitting that she already collected some of the money) and a witness testifies that her Kesuvah has already been paid etc. should also be listed in our Mishnah.

Question(cont.): One cannot say that the Mishnah merely left these cases out, as (after stating the rule) the Mishnah says, "And these" as said in Kidushin (16b).

Answer: It is possible to answer that the Mishnah only listed cases where the person opposite the person swearing was not fit to swear.

Explanation: The Mishnah implies that a golden dinar is worth twenty-five silver dinar. This is also apparent from the Mishnah in Bava Metzia (44b).

Question: This is difficult according to Rabeinu Tam. How could things have changed so drastically? Nowadays, a golden Zakuk (measurement) is not worth more than ten silver Zakuks.

Answer: Rabeinu Tam says that a golden dinar is thicker than a silver dinar, and weighed twice as much.

Proof#1: The fact that it was different in its thickness (than a silver dinar) is also implied in Chulin (55b). The Gemara there says that if the amount of "the thickness of a golden dinar was left" regarding a spleen that had a hole in it. (This shows that there was a special thickness to a golden dinar.)

Proof#2: This is why it was worth twenty-five silver dinars, as gold was worth twelve times (not twelve and a half times, see below) more than silver. This is also apparent from the (Medrash) Aggadah of Shmuel (a compilation of Beraisos regarding Sefer Shmuel). It asks that one Pasuk (in Shmuel 2:24) says regarding the silo of Aravnah ha'Yevusi, "Silver fifty Shekel." Another Pasuk (in Divrei Hayamim 1:21) describes this same amount as, "Shekalim of gold six hundred." (Obviously, silver fifty shekel are not worth six hundred gold shekel!)

Proof#2(cont.): In Zevachim (116b), the Gemara answers this question by saying that he (David Hamelech) collected fifty Shekel from each tribe (equaling six hundred, see Gemara there at length).

Proof#2(cont.): However, the Medrash answers that he gave to him six hundred Shekel of silver which equal fifty shekel of gold. The Pasuk in Shmuel (ibid.) means that he gave so much silver that it was equivalent to fifty golden Shekalim. The Pasuk in Divrei Hayamim (ibid.) means that he gave six hundred silver Shekalim which are fifty golden Shekalim, as each Shekel of gold is worth twelve Shekel of silver.

Implied Question: There is an extra dinar. (Tosfos stated above that gold was worth twelve times more than silver. This would make twenty-four silver dinarim in a double thickness golden coin. Why, then, do we say a golden dinar is worth twenty-five silver dinarim?)

Answer: Rabeinu Tam explains that this extra dinar was given as a Hechra (an extra insignificant amount, see Tosfos Yom Tov in Shekalim 1:6, DH "Kolbon").

Proof#1: This is as is apparent in Bechoros (50a) regarding Pidyon ha'Ben (redeeming a firstborn son). The Gemara says that a person should give the Kohen a dinar that is sold for twenty-five dinar of silver, minus a (silver) dinar and one sixth of its value (equaling twenty). The rest is for the Pidyon ha'Ben. Why didn't the Gemara merely say he gives the Kohen the dinar minus one fifth of its value (as this is a simpler way of saying twenty)? Rather, it must be that because the extra zuz is a Hechra, the Gemara mentions it on its own.

Proof#2: It is also apparent from the Mishnah in Shekalim (2a) that a Hechra is one in twenty-five. The Mishnah explains, how much is a Kolbon? The Chachamim say it is half of a Ma'ah. Half of a Shekel is twelve Ma'ah. (This half of a Ma'ah is added onto the other twelve Ma'ah, meaning that the Kolbon (Hechra) was one twenty fifth of the value of a half Shekel.) This is apparent from the fact that the Shekel mentioned in the Pasuk is a Sela (and half of a Sela is twelve Ma'ah).

Observation: When Chazal say that one must pay a Sela and Pundyon for every year that he redeems an area that can grow a Beis Zera of barley, which equals a Pundyon more than the fifty Shekalim mentioned in the Pasuk for forty nine years, this Pundyon is not acting as a Hechra. (There are forty-eight Pundyon in a Shekel. Paying the fifty Shekalim mentioned in the Torah would therefore warrant paying a total of one Pundyon less than a Pundyon and a Sela per year. It therefore follows that the extra Pundyon might be a Hechra, just as we have seen earlier. Tosfos teaches us that this is not the case, and in fact, one only must pay a total of forty-nine Sela and forty-eight Pundyon.)

Observation(cont.): Rather, it says a Sela and a Pundyon because it is not possible to be exacting and say, "A Sela and a little less than a Pundyon" as that amount would only be less than a third of a Perutah.