Explanation: He ruled after Abaye and Rava, as is apparent from Moed Katan (should say Ta'anis 9b). The students did not know if he said this on his own or in the name of his Rebbi.

Implied Question: The Gemara could have said that this excludes something that cannot be both negative and positive (i.e. that one has the option not to do or to do it). According to Shmuel, it could have said this excludes something that is not in his control in the future.

Answer: One must say that these are equal possibilities. However, according to the opinion that we derive using the "Ribah-Mi'eit-Ribah" method, one can only exclude one thing.

Explanation: This Pasuk comes to reveal that the Pasuk, "to do bad or good" excludes things that happened in the past. However, this Pasuk itself (without "to do bad or good") would not have been enough.

Explanation: It appears that Rav did not say that he does not have to write in his notebook that he must bring a fat Korban Chatas when the Beis Hamikdash is built in order to exclude him from having to bring a Korban. Rather, he meant that he will not receive any punishment whatsoever for having done so.

Proof: This is apparent from the Gemara in Nedarim (25b). The Gemara there says that just as accidental Nedarim are permitted, so too accidental Shevuos are permitted. The Gemara asks, what is an example of accidental Shevuos? The Gemara answers that this is like Rav Kahana and Rav Asi, as each honestly swore based on his recollection.

Implied Question: This is incomparable to the Gemara in Gitin (35a) where a woman honestly swore that if she had the deposit one of her children should be poisoned, and it happened that she was mistaken and therefore punished. (Why was she punished if her false oath was an honest mistake?)

Answer: Money is different, as she should have originally been careful with the deposit, as she knew that she would have to take an oath if she indeed lost the deposit.

Question: However, there is a difficulty. Why don't we require two Pesukim, one to exclude a person who makes such an oath from being obligated to bring a Korban, and one to exclude a person from receiving any punishment? This is as we find in Nedarim (17a) regarding a person who swears to nullify a Mitzvah, that we require one Pasuk to exclude the person from having to bring a Korban, and a second Pasuk to exclude him from receiving lashes.

Answer: It is possible to answer that the cases are totally incomparable. The Gemara there clearly must have two Pesukim. One excludes him from having to bring a Korban if he swore accidentally, and one to exclude him from lashes if he did so on purpose. However, when our Gemara says such a person is excluded, it means that he is excluded if he does so by accident from either having to bring a Korban or getting a punishment. (Our Gemara is only discussing an accident, while the Gemara there discusses an oath that was either accidental or on purpose.)

Implied Question: The Gemara in Yevamos (33a) where the Gemara asks according to Rebbi Chiya, "Is Bar Kapara lying?!" and it asks according to Bar Kapara, "Is Rebbi Chiya lying?!" is not difficult. (Why? Doesn't this imply they cannot be lying or else they would be deserving of punishment?)

Answer: This is not discussing how they could possibly be guilty and deserving to receive punishment for lying when swearing. Rather, the Gemara there is asking, how is it possible that he would make a mistake to say that he heard from his Rebbi as he said (and not as the other opinion said)?

Question: This is difficult. Instead of asking this question on the braisa, it should ask this question on the Mishnah later (30a) that says that one is liable on an accidental Shevuah if he purposely did not give testimony!

Answer: Perhaps it is obvious to the Gemara later that not knowing that one is liable to bring a Korban for such a sin is considered accidental. This is because even one who does so on purpose (knowing the punishment) is liable to bring a Korban. However, the Gemara thinks that a Shevuas Bituy is not called accidental. Being that one would not bring a Korban if he swore a Shevuas Bituy on purpose, we require a genuine accident (he did not realize) in order for him to have to bring a Korban.

Implied Question: The Gemara later (30a) understands that it is obvious that a victim of forced circumstances (i.e. he forgot the truth) is exempt. (Why is this obvious?)

Answer: It appears that it is obvious due to Shevuas Bituy. Even though regarding a Shevuas Bituy the Pasuk says, "And it was hidden," and yet a victim of forced circusmstance is deemed exempt, certainly Shevuas ha'Eidus which does not have this Pasuk is exempt under forced circumstances!

Observation: In Shabbos (69b), Abaye says that everyone admits regarding a Shevuas Bituy that one is not liable to bring a Korban until he accidentally transgresses the negative prohibition. The Gemara asks that the Beraisa states, what is a Shevuas Bituy regarding something that happened in the past? The case is where the person says, "I know that for me to take this oath is forbidden, but I do not know if one is liable to bring a Korban for this or not."

Text#1: The Sefarim there state, "Who is this like? This cannot be like Munbaz. In the entire Torah where there is no novel aspect to the law, Munbaz holds that not knowing that one is liable to bring a Korban is called "an accident." Certainly here, where this is a novel law, he will say that not knowing that one is liable to bring a Korban is called "an accident." It therefore must be the opinion of the Rabbanan. The Rabbanan only argue on Munbaz in the entire Torah where there is no novel law. However, here that this is a novel law, they agree that this is called accidental. This is a very strong question on Abaye.

Question: Rashi does not have this text, as he has the following difficulty. The Beraisa is not coming to teach that not knowing that one is liable to bring a Korban is called "an accident." Rather, it is coming to teach that where we find an accidental Shevuas Bituy regarding something that happened in the past. The Gemara also has difficulty understanding the case, as it asks what is the case etc.

Text#2: Rashi has the text, "Who is this? It is the opinion of Munbaz." He explains that according to the Rabbanan there is no Shevuas Bituy regarding something that happened in the past.

Question: Rebbi Eliezer from Magentza asked that according to Rashi's explanation, the Tana who is arguing on Munbaz is Rebbi Akiva. However, Rebbi Akiva holds one is liable for a Shevuas Bituy regarding something that happened in the past, as stated earlier!

Answer: The Rashbam answered him that Rashi means as follows. Who is this? It is Munbaz. However, according to the Rabbanan the case can be in a different manner, for example if he said that I know that this Shevuah is forbidden, but I do not know if there is a negative prohibition involved or not. The person knows that there is a positive commandment against doing so.

Question: Rabeinu Tam has difficulty with this. In our Gemara, we conclude that even the Rabbanan hold that if one does not know that he is liable to bring a Korban for this, it is called an accident!

Answer: Our Gemara does not hold of Abaye. According to Abaye, we can find a case according to the Rabbanan, as I have explained above. This will also explain the first text (rejected by Rashi). The Gemara now implies that the Beraisa is coming to teach that if one does not know that he is liable to bring a Korban for this, it is called an accident. This is indicated by the fact that it did not say that the person did not know if there was a negative prohibition involved or not.

Opinion#1: Rashi explains that even if he had remembered (he had made the oath), he would have eaten it.

Question: This is difficult. If so, why does it say that he was in pain?

Opinion#2: It appears that he was in pain because he did not forget that he had made an oath. He wanted to forget, in order that he would be able to eat. However, he would not have eaten on purpose. It is obvious that this is not called "returning from his state of mind" as he wanted to forget in order to be able to eat.

Observation: It appears that Shmuel is understanding that this is the simple meaning of the Pasuk, and not deriving this because one of these words is extra for this purpose. This is why when the Gemara asks later that we should derive from the Pasuk "All those who are generous of heart (that even thoughts should be binding oaths)," the Gemara answers that Terumah and Kodshim are two Pesukim that come together, and we therefore cannot learn from them.

Proof: If Shmuel's Pasuk was a derivation, why do we require such a derivation by Shevuas Bituy of "l'Vatei b'Sefasayim?" (Being that one's thoughts are clearly only binding by Terumah and Kodshim, why would the Torah have to state an extra word to teach that one's thoughts are not binding?) Rather, it must be that it is not an extra word.

Question: Why don't we explain that this is also Shmuel's intent, that he did not decide that he would speak this out?

Answer: It is possible to answer that an Amora should have explained clearly that this is what he meant (if he indeed had meant this).

Observation: The Gemara currently implies that it derives from a Pasuk why he is only forbidden in wheat bread. This is because we follow his intent in his heart, as long as his words do not contradict his intent.

Implied Question: Shmuel says that one must verbalize his intent. (How could we explain his oath based on intent?)

Answer: This just means he must mention bread. He does not have to mention wheat bread.

Question: This is difficult. In Nedarim (27b), the Mishnah states that one can swear to killers, bandits, and tax collectors that his produce is Terumah etc. or that it belongs to the king. The Gemara explains that the case is where he says that all of the fruits in the world should be forbidden to him if this produce does not belong to the kings house. The Gemara concludes that the case is where he thinks in his heart that he will only be forbidden for one day, while he says the oath in a general manner. Even though we usually hold that one's intent is irrelevant, regarding bandits this is possible (see below).

Question(cont.): This implies that this is only permitted under forced circumstances, even though he thinks that he is only forbidden from fruits today. In our Gemara as well, why don't we forbid him to have all bread even though he thought in his heart that he only forbids himself from wheat bread?

Answer#1: The Gemara in Nedarim (ibid.) is referring to an Am ha'Aretz. They only permitted him to use this leniency when he encountered bandits, in order that he should not treat Nedarim in a lightheaded manner. However,for a Talmid Chacham this is permitted, even when he is not under duress.

Proof#1: It is indeed apparent that the reason for this law is because we do not believe him that he thought that he is only forbidden today. The Gemara there says, "regarding forced circumstances this is possible." This implies that it is possible that he is telling the truth that he indeed thought that he is only forbidden for today.

Proof#2: This is also found in Nedarim (20a). The Gemara there makes a distinction between a Talmid Chacham and Am ha'Aretz regarding someone who made a Neder with the term Cheirem, and explains that he only made a Neder regarding a fishing net (called "Chermo Shel Yam").

Proof(cont.): If we would say that regarding forced circumstances, even if the bandit made him swear on his own (the bandit's) understanding it is permitted, this would be understandable. Without forced circumstances this is forbidden, even if he does have a different intent in his heart, as is implied later (29a) regarding Moshe who made Bnei Yisrael take an oath based on Hash-m and on his understanding.

Answer#2: Additionally, it seems that being that bread in general refers to wheat bread, it is therefore permitted to swear in this fashion even when a person is not under duress.

Question: In Nazir (2b), the Mishnah says that if someone says, "I will be" he is a Nazir. The Gemara asks, perhaps he means that he will be fast? Shmuel establishes that the case is where a Nazir is walking by him. The Gemara asks, perhaps he just means that he will pay for the Nazir's Korbanos? The Gemara answers, the case is where he said in his heart that he will be a Nazir. If he thinks in his heart that he will be a Nazir, why does he need to have a Nazir pass by him? We do not require in our Gemara that a loaf of bread walk past him while he is making the Neder!

Answer: In that case, when he says, "I will be" there is no implication in his words that he is referring to Nezirus, if it would not be that a Nazir was passing by him. [Without the Nazir passing by] It is as if he concluded in his heart that he will be a Nazir, and did not say anything. However, here bread in general means wheat bread.

Observation: The Gemara here implies that Shmuel admits that one does not have to verbalize a Neder regarding Terumah and Kodshim.

Implied Question: The Mishnah in Chagigah (10a) says that the permission of Nedarim is "floating in the air." In the Gemara there, Rebbi Yitzchak says that they have what to rely upon, as the Pasuk says, "And everyone who is generous of heart." The Gemara pushes aside that perhaps Rebbi Yitzchak is merely coming to exclude Shmuel's law that one must verbalize vows. (This implies Shmuel argues by Kodshim as well!)

Answer: This is not because Rebbi Yitzchak argues on Shmuel. Rather, the Gemara means that Rebbi Yitzchak is merely showing that Shmuel's law does not apply to Terumah and Kodshim. (Shmuel himself agrees this is true.)

Explanation#1: Regarding Kodshim the Pasuk says, "Anyone who was generous of heart" brought Olos in the Azarah. Regarding Terumah the Pasuk says, "And your Terumah is considered for you" implying that Terumah is taken by thought alone.

Implied Question: This is despite the fact that Terumah is considered mundane compared to Kodshim, as stated in Kidushin (41b), and we do not derive laws regarding Terumah from Kodshim. (If so, how can we say that the rule of Shnei Kesuvim etc. applies here? We need the Pasuk regarding Terumah, as we would not have been able to derive from Kodshim to Terumah!)

Answer: Even so, we can derive Kodshim from Terumah. This is why the rule of Shnei Kesuvim still applies.

Explanation#2: Rashi explains that Terumah refers to the Terumah of the Mishkan, as the Pasuk says, "And anyone generous of heart brought etc."