QUESTION: A Beraisa derives from the verse, "b'Shevu'ah v'Ne'elam" -- [... whatever a man will utter] with an oath, and it is later concealed from him" (Vayikra 5:4), that one is obligated to bring a Korban for transgressing his Shevu'ah only when he forgot about his Shevu'ah. The words "b'Shevu'ah v'Ne'elam" teach that he is obligated only when he forgot the Shevu'ah, but not when he remembered the Shevu'ah but forgot merely on which object he made the Shevu'ah.

The Gemara relates that they laughed about this law in Eretz Yisrael. They argued that it is possible to find a case in which a person forgot about the Shevu'ah but did not forget the object. For example, the person swore, "I will not eat wheat bread," and afterwards he mistakenly thought that he had taken a Shevu'ah that, "I will eat wheat bread." In such a case, he forgot his Shevu'ah but remembered the object on which it had been made. How, though, is it possible to find a case in which a person forgot the object but not the Shevu'ah? The Gemara suggests that such a case exists when a person swore, "I will not eat wheat bread," but thought he had said, "barley bread"; he remembered the Shevu'ah but forgot the object.

The Gemara refutes this suggestion and says that if he forgot the object on which he had made the Shevu'ah, then he forgot the very Shevu'ah itself. Therefore, Rebbi Elazar says, "Da v'Da Achas Hi" -- "Both this and this are the same thing."

RASHI (DH Achas) explains that indeed there is no case in which a person forgot the object without forgetting the Shevu'ah. Therefore, the Beraisa which states that one is exempt when he forgot only the object is "Einah Mishnah" and is unreliable.

However, the CHIDUSHEI HA'RAN records an opinion that explains that it is possible that the Beraisa indeed is correct. "Both this and this are the same thing" means that "both this" -- if one forgot the Shevu'ah and not the object, "and this" -- if one forgot the object alone, "are the same thing" -- in both cases the person is considered as though he forgot the Shevu'ah. If, however, one forgot both the Shevu'ah and the object he is exempt. Accordingly, the Halachah does follow the Beraisa, which teaches that if one forgot only the Shevu'ah he is liable, while if one forgot both the Shevu'ah and the object, he is exempt.

However, the Chidushei ha'Ran's explanation seems problematic according to the continuation of the Gemara (end of 26a). The Gemara relates that Rava asked Rav Nachman what the Halachah is in a case in which he forgot both the Shevu'ah and the object. Why does Rava ask this question if this is the exact law taught by the Beraisa?

This question is not problematic according to Rashi, because he maintains that the Beraisa discusses forgetting the Shevu'ah alone or forgetting the object alone. However, according to the Chidushei ha'Ran who explains that the Beraisa discusses forgetting both the Shevu'ah and the object when it says that one is exempt, why does Rava not answer his own question from the Beraisa?

ANSWER: The CHIDUSHEI HA'RAN explains that Rava asked his question according to the opinion of Rav Yosef, whose opinion is expressed in the Gemara here immediately after Rebbi Elazar's statement that, "Da v'Da Achas Hi." Rav Yosef understood that according to Rebbi Elazar, there is no case in which one forgot the object but not the Shevu'ah. Rav Yosef challenged this by suggesting that such a case indeed exists, where a person swears, "I will not eat wheat bread," and then he stretches his hand into a basket to take out barley bread and inadvertently takes out wheat bread, which he thinks is barley bread, and eats it. In this case, he remembered the Shevu'ah but did not know about the object.

Rav Yosef therefore understood that the Beraisa discusses a person who either forgot the Shevu'ah and remembered the object, or forgot the object and remembered the Shevu'ah. The Beraisa does not discuss a person who forgot both the Shevu'ah and the object. The question that Rava asked Rav Nachman -- what is the law in the case of a person who forgot both the Shevu'ah and the object -- therefore is a valid question according to Rav Yosef's understanding. (See also RAMBAN and RASHBA.) (D. BLOOM)

OPINIONS: Ravina asked Rava what the law is in the case of a person who made a Shevu'ah not to eat a loaf of bread and then became dangerously ill. Rava replied that in a case of mortal danger, Ravina certainly would agree that one is permitted to eat the bread. Ravina explained that his question involved a person who was not in danger but was "Mitzta'er" -- he was suffering from not being able to eat the bread, who ate the bread when he forgot his Shevu'ah.

(a) RASHI (DH Mitzta'er) writes that the person was hungry, and even if he would have remembered his Shevu'ah he still would have eaten the bread. (The CHOCHMAS SHLOMO emends the text of Rashi so that it does not mention hunger, but rather that the person was "Mitzta'er" on the matter.) However, since he indeed forgot his Shevu'ah and ate the bread inadvertently, he is exempt. (The reason why the Gemara says that he forgot his Shevu'ah is that Gemara earlier (26a) states that one is obligated to bring a Korban only when he forgot about his Shevu'ah and then transgressed it.)

Rava answered Ravina's question on the basis of the Beraisa that says that only when a person is "Shav mi'Yedi'aso" must he bring a Korban for an inadvertent violation of a Shevu'ah. This means that a person must bring a Korban only when he originally knew about the prohibition and then became unaware of it.

In contrast, in the case of the Gemara here, even if the person would have known about his Shevu'ah that prohibited the bread, he still would have eaten it.

(b) TOSFOS (DH Mitzta'er) disagrees with Rashi's explanation. If the Gemara refers to a person who would have eaten the bread even if he had remembered his Shevu'ah, there is no need for Ravina to mention in his question that the person was suffering as a result of the prohibition against eating the bread. (See TOSFOS HA'ROSH who asks a different question on Rashi: since the person would have eaten the bread even if he had remembered the Shevu'ah, it is obvious that his act is not considered "Shav mi'Yedi'aso," and therefore Ravina would not have asked such a question.)

Tosfos explains instead that when the Gemara mentions "Mitzta'er," it means that the person who made the Shevu'ah was upset at the fact that he could not forget his Shevu'ah. He wished that he could forget it so that he could eat the bread. However, as long as he remembered the Shevu'ah, he would not deliberately eat it.

Tosfos writes that Rava answered this question that this is not considered "Shav mi'Yedi'aso" because he deliberately wanted to forget in order to eat the bread. (According to our text of Tosfos, Rava said, "u'Peshita" -- "and it is obvious." However, the text of the Tosfos ha'Rosh reads "u'Pashit" -- "and he answered.")

The Tosfos ha'Rosh adds that the person's desire was eventually fulfilled; he eventually forgot his Shevu'ah and ate the bread. However, Rava ruled that he is exempt from a Korban, because although he forgot his Shevu'ah, he wanted to forget it and thus he is not considered "Shav mi'Yedi'aso," unaware of the Shevu'ah at the time he violated it.

(c) The RAMBAM (Hilchos Shevu'os 3:11) explains that the person who ate the bread did so because he was in pain as a result of not being able to eat it, and therefore he wrongly assumed that because of his discomfort he in fact was permitted to eat the bread. Rava ruled that he is exempt from a Korban because he is not "Shav mi'Yedi'aso." The Rambam explains that this is because he knew that the bread was forbidden but he mistakenly assumed that he was permitted to eat it.

The LECHEM MISHNEH writes that this is not considered "Shav mi'Yedi'aso" because nothing changed in the person's awareness about the forbidden loaf. Rather, the only thing that changed was the person's knowledge of the law; initially he knew that the bread was forbidden, and later -- when he was suffering from not being able to eat it -- he mistakenly thought that the law permits him to eat it. This is not considered "Shav mi'Yedi'aso," a status which applies only when the person originally knew that the object was forbidden and then forgot that the object was forbidden. (D. BLOOM)