Implied Question: Here, too, the Gemara could have asked a question from Shevuas ha'Eidus. [Why did it ask instead from Megadef?]

Answer: It asked instead from Megadef because one even has to bring a Chatas if he is accidentally Megadef.

Question: This is difficult. What is the Gemara's question? We can say that our Mishnah means as follows. Where do we find someone who speaks, and because of this speech he must bring a Korban without having done any action? This is the case here, as someone who swears that he will eat something and does not must bring a Korban. However, regarding Hekdesh we can say that the person brings a Korban because of his actions, namely eating Hekdesh. [Why, then, does the Gemara ask a question from Hekdesh?]

Question: This is difficult. How can the term Konam be more stringent than Hekdesh, as the Gemara states that Konam is even on the slightest amount while Hekdesh is on a minimum of a Perutah, when the source of the prohibition effected by Konam is Hekdesh itself?

Explanation: Rashi explains that if someone benefits multiple times from something he is forbidden from due to a Konam, and during this entire time he did not realize he was forbidden to that item, he is only liable to bring one Korban. It is considered one act of Meilah, as the Mishnah in Meilah (20a) states that one can combine amounts for Meilah for a long time.

Implied Question: It does not seem that there is any proof from that Mishnah. The Mishnah (ibid.) is merely citing a stringency that if a person benefitted from one half Perutah and then, after a long time, benefitted from another half Perutah, these half Perutos combine as if he had benefit from them at the same time.

He only had to explain that regarding a Korban Chatas the items are different (and two Korbanos can be brought for two different acts of transgressing a Shevuah, even though he did not realize he was sinning the entire time), because regarding Shevuos the Pasuk says, "For one of these." However, regarding Meilah there is no such Pasuk (and we therefore revert to the rule that one Korban is brought for each time that the person forgot.)

Explanation: According to Ravina as well, the reasoning of the Rabbanan is that of Rav Pinchas, as the Gemara concludes later.

Ravina comes to teach that there is no need to say that the opinions should be reversed, being that Rebbi Meir is not saying his own reason, but rather is addressing the reasoning of the Rabbanan.

It is easier to reverse the opinions of Rebbi Meir and the Rabbanan in the second Beraisa that is quoted here, than to edit and reverse their opinions in this first Beraisa. This is because the Tanna who wrote this Beraisa would probably not mix up the order of the words Shevuos and Konamos, or Konamos and Shevuos.

Observation: This Beraisa implies that everyone agrees that one cannot redeem Konamos (like one can redeem Hekdesh). Even Rebbi Meir who says that there is Meilah in Konamos admits there is no redemption for such items.

Question: Rabeinu Yitzchak ben Rabeinu Meir asks that in Yevamos (88a) the Gemara says that if one holds that there is Meilah when misusing Konamos, this is because one is allowed to redeem it! [This implies that one can redeem Konamos!]

Answer: Rabeinu Tam answers that things that are forbidden through Konamos that are forbidden to the entire world can be redeemed according to Rebbi Meir, as this is similar to Hekdesh.

Proof: This is clearly true, as the part of the Mishnah where Rebbi Meir says there is no redemption talks about a case where he forbade a loaf specifically "upon himself" (as opposed to the first case where he forbade it in general).

Question: Why don't they argue about Konam itself?

Answer#1: In fact they do argue about Konamos. The first part of the Beraisa is discussing Konam, and saying that this loaf is Hekdesh means it is like Hekdesh. This is because Rebbi Meir does not differentiate between the term "Korban" and "like a Korban" or "Imra" and "like an Imra" as stated in Nedarim (13a). He similarly does not differentiate between "Hekdesh" and "like Hekdesh" being that his mindset is on Konam.

Answer#2: Alternatively, the case is where he explicitly said, "like Hekdesh." Being that the second case had to mention a case where he said "Kikar Zu Alay Hekdesh," and there was no need to say "like Hekdesh" being that he said "Alay," the Tana also said in the first part of the Beraisa "Kikar Zu Hekdesh."

The Chachamim who say that both he and his friend cannot transgress Meilah argue on the first part of the Mishnah as well.

Text#1: Most Sefarim in Nedarim (35a) have the text, "Either way he was not Moel."

Text#2: There are some Sefarim that have the text, "Each one was not Moel." They also have the text there in the first part of the Beraisa, "Konam Kikar Zu Hekdesh."

Observation: Being that he was talking about Chartzanim (grape pips), he asked the question about Chartzanim. In fact, he could have asked this question about forbidden fats and Neveilos for any person (not just regarding a Nazir).

However, one cannot explain that the reason Chartzanim is discussed is because there are two factors involved. One factor is that he is commanded from Har Sinai not to eat them, and the other is that they are not eaten as is, and therefore there is more reason to say that his mindset was that he cannot even eat a small amount.

This is because the answer to the question is from the topic of Neveilah and Treifah. (This clearly shows it has nothing to do with specific characteristics of Neveilah and Treifah.)

Implied Question: This question of Rav Ashi is even according to Rebbi Yochanan, who says in Yoma (73b) that even half of the amount forbidden by the Torah is forbidden according to Torah law. [Why should we assume this is true if Rav Ashi seems to be saying that less than the amount forbidden by the Torah is permitted according to Torah law?]

Answer#1: Rav Ashi must hold like Rebbi Yochanan, as we rule like Rebbi Yochanan. Rav Ashi's logic in the question is still intact, as being that there is only a mere prohibition (but the transgression is not punishable by Beis Din) it is not considered that he is sworn from Har Sinai not to do this.

Answer#2: Alternatively, according to Rebbi Yochanan we should explain that (Rav Ashi's question is regarding a case where) he is swearing about something permitted, for example to have benefit in an abnormal way. In Pesachim (24b), the Gemara rules that one only receives lashes for any Torah prohibition if he benefits in a normal way from that sin. There is no Torah prohibition at all, only a Rabbinic prohibition, when benefiting in an abnormal fashion.

Explanation: If drinking would not be included in eating, he would have had to explicitly mention drinking as well.

Text: According to the Sefarim that only have the text, "They went and drank" it is more understandable (as a term of eating translated directly into only drinking).

Question: What does (the fact that this is the definition of) tasting have to do with (the definition of) eating?

Answer: Perhaps in their language eating and tasting were synonymous.

Observation: This is stated in Kidushin (35b) regarding whoever is commanded in not destroying etc. and in many other places.

Question: This is difficult. Once there is a logical reason for this, why does the Torah bother to state a Pasuk teaching this lesson? The Gemara in Kesuvos (22a) indeed asks regarding Rav Huna's question about the source of the law, "the mouth that forbids is the mouth that can permit," why do we need a Pasuk to tell us this law? It is logical that if he forbids her he can permit her!

Answer: It is possible to differentiate that there are some things that are not so simple, and the Pasuk does need to explain the reasoning (as in the case of our Gemara).