(a)According to the Tana Kama of our Mishnah, what is the Halachic difference between a new earthenware lamp and an old one?
(b)Which sort of lamp is Muktzah even according to Rebbi Shimon, and why is that?
(c)In which point is ...
1. ... Rebbi Meir more stringent than Rebbi Shimon?
2. ... Rebbi Elazar b'Rebbi Shimon more lenient than his father?
(a)According to the Tana Kama of our Mishnah, an old earthenware lamp is Muktzah because, due to its ugliness, one pushes it aside (the literal meaning of 'Maktzeh', which describes the person, whilst 'Muktzah' describes the article), in a form of unspoken decision not to use it for anything else. On the other hand, one is not Maktzeha a new earthenware lamp, which is fit to use for other purposes, and is not disgusting, so its remains fit for use, and is not Muktzah.
(b)Rebbi Shimon agrees that a lamp that is actually burning is Muktzah, because one may, in the process of moving it, extinguish it (despite the fact that, even if the lamp were to go out, he would only have transgressed an Isur de'Rabbanan, this is not considered a Gezeirah li'Gezeira, because Chazal were more stringent by the Melachah of 'Mechabeh' [due to its closeness to an Isur d'Oraysa] than by other Melachos de'Rabbanan.
1. Although Rebbi Meir disagrees with the Tana Kama of our Mishnah, who forbids an old earthenware lamp, even when it was not lit that Shabbos, he nevertheless does not go as far as Rebbi Shimon to permit any lamp that is not actually burning - Rebbi Meir forbids a lamp that was lit that Shabbos, even though it is no longer burning. This is because, since it was 'Muktzah Machmas Isur' when Shabbos came in, it remains Muktzah the whole Shabbos, because of 'Migu de'Isketza'i le'Bein Hashsmashos, Isketza'i le'Kula Yoma' (something that is Muktzah at dusk, remains Muktzah the whole of Shabbos - a principle with which Rebbi Shimon does not agree.
2. Rebbi Elazar b'Rebbi Shimon maintains - that even whilst the lamp which is actually burning it is not Muktzah. That explains why he permits even the oil that drips from the lamp whilst it is burning, whilst his father permits the lamp and the oil to be moved, only after it has gone out.
(a)Ula tries to establish the Seifa of the Beraisa, which writes 'Aval Kos, Ke'arah ve'Ashashis Lo Yazizam mi'Mekoman', like Rebbi Yehudah. What does Rebbi Yehudah say?
(b)How does Mar Zutra reject this on the basis of the word 'Aval'?
(c)So like whom does Mar Zutra establish the Beraisa?
(d)How do we reconcile this with another Beraisa, which writes 'Mosar ha'Shemen she'be'Ner ve'she'bi'Ke'arah ... ve'Rebbi Shimon Matir'?
(a)The Gemara tries to explain that the author of the Beraisa, which writes 'Aval Kos, Ke'arah ve'Ashashis Lo Yazizam mi'Mekoman', is Rebbi Yehudah, who forbids an old earthenware lamp even after it has gone out, because of its ugliness (and who is therefore also the Tana Kama of our Mishnah).
(b)Mar Zutra rejects this on the basis of the word 'Aval' Kos ... ' which suggests that the old lamp in the Reisha is permitted (whereas Rebbi Yehudah is stringent there too).
(c)So Mar Zutra establishes the Seifa of the Beraisa like Rebbi Shimon, who is lenient in the Reisha, but who now concedes that lamps with large oil containers remain Muktzah - even after they have gone out.
(d)We reconcile this with another Beraisa, which writes 'Mosar ha'Shemen she'be'Ner ve'she'bi'Ke'arah ... ve'Rebbi Shimon Matir' - by establishing the latter ruling in the case of a 'small' lamp-holder, which is not Muktzah because a person has in mind, that, when the lamp blows out, he will use the oil; whereas the former ruling speaks in the case of a large lamp-holder, which the owner expects to burn through Shabbos, he designates for the Mitzvah for the entire duration of Shabbos, and so, it remains Muktzah.
(a)Rebbi Zeira is initially quoted as saying that those who forbid the lamp in our Mishnah (Rebbi Yehudah), permit a metal lamp (and that Rebbi Meir, who permits it, forbids a metal lamp). What is wrong with this statement?
(b)How do we therefore amend Rebbi Zeira's statement?
(a)Rebbi Zeira is initially quoted as saying that those who forbid the lamp in our Mishnah (Rebbi Yehudah), permit a metal lamp (and that Rebbi Meir, who permits it, forbids a metal lamp). But how can he say that Rebbi Yehudah permits a metal lamp (in other words, that he holds of 'Muktzah Machmas Mi'us', but not 'Machmas Isur'? That cannot be correct, in view of the Beraisa that we learnt above, in which Rebbi Yehudah forbids even metal lamps that were lit that Shabbos, proving that Rebbi Yehudah holds of 'Muktzah Machmas Isur', too.
(b)What Rebbi Zeira actually said was - a metal lamp that was lit on that Shabbos, is Muktzah according to everyone; whereas if it was not, they all agree that it is not Muktzah.
(a)Rav Yehudah Amar Rav forbids a couch or a bed that one designated for money, to be moved because it is Muktzah. What is the Kashya on this from our Mishnah, which permits a new lamp?
(b)According to the final version of Rav, when does placing money on a couch render it Muktzah - even on the Shabbos on which money was not placed on it?
(c)And when is a couch which was not designated for money Muktzah on Shabbos, even when there is no money on it?
(d)How will Rav explain the Mishnah in Keilim, which declares the wheel of a wagon Muktzah, only as long as there is money on it - irrespective of whether there was money on it during the period of dusk or not?
(a)Rav Yehudah Amar Rav forbids a couch or a bed that one designated for money, to be moved because it is Muktzah. Now if a new lamp, which is made for lighting, does not become forbidden through designation, (even according to Rebbi Yehudah, who holds of Muktzah) unless it has actually been used for that purpose, then how can Rav forbid a bed (or a couch - which is made for sleeping) that one designated to put money on it, to become Asur through designation alone?
(b)According to the final version of Rav, money lying on a couch renders the couch permanently Muktzah, provided a. it was lying there for the entire duration of Bein-ha'Shemashos, and b. the owner designated the couch for that purpose.
(c)A couch is Muktzah, even if it was not designated for money, if there was money on it during the entire period of Beis-ha'Shemashos of that Shabbos - even if the money was subsequently removed during the course of that day, because of the principle 'Migu de'Isketza'i le'Bein Hashemashos, Isketza'i le'Kula Yoma'.
(d)Rav explain the Mishnah in Keilim, which declares the wheel of a wagon Muktzah, only as long as there is money on it, irrespective of whether there was money on it during the period of dusk or not - by establishing it like Rebbi Shimon, who does not hold of most kinds of Muktzah (including 'Migu de'Iskatza'i ... ').
(a)How does the Gemara prove that Rav holds like Rebbi Yehudah, from the fact that he permits the placing of a lamp on a tree on Shabbos, but forbids it on Yom-Tov?
(b)Why does Rebbi Shimon not differentiate between Shabbos and Yom-Tov?
(c)Then how did Rav permit the removal of a Chanukah-Menorah (after it went out), to prevent the 'Chavrei' from discovering that it had been lit?
(d)Which two possible decrees may this be referring to?
(a)Rav must hold like Rebbi Yehudah - because he permits the placing of a lamp on a date-palm before Shabbos (where, despite the fact that it will continue to burn on Shabbos, we are not afraid that he will come to move it, thereby transgressing the Isur of using a tree) because, since the lamp is Muktzah, even after it goes out - like Rebbi Yehudah - he will not be able to remove it) ; whereas on Yom-Tov, he forbids it, because, since a lamp is not Muktzah on Yom-Tov, we are afraid that he may come to remove it from the tree.
(b)According to Rebbi Shimon, who permits the lamp even on Shabbos once it has gone out - Rav would have forbidden placing the lamp on the tree even on Erev Shabbos as well, for fear that he may remove it on Shabbos.
(c)Nevertheless, the Gemara explains, Rav permitted the removal of a Chanukah-Menorah, even according to Rebbi Yehudah, because of the danger of being discovered by the Chavrei, which involved an element of danger.
(d)The decree of the Chavrei may have been the prohibition of lighting the Chanukah-lights, or it may have been the prohibition to kindle any lights at all on the day of their festival.
(a)What are the ramifications of the following statements?
1. 'The detachable wheel of a wagon is not considered joined to the wagon'.
2. 'Nor is it measured together with it' (i.e. the rest of the wagon).
3. 'And it does not save in an Ohel ha'Mes' together with it.
(a)The ramifications of ...
1. ... 'The detachable wheel of a wagon is not considered joined to the wagon' are - that if the one has contact with Tum'ah, the other remains Tahor. And that even if the wagon is too large to receive Tum'ah (as we learnt above on 35a), the wheel can nevertheless become Tamei.
2. ... 'Nor is it measured together with it' are - that although (with regard to the Din that we just mentioned) the wagon is measured from the outside, we do not incorporate the wheel in the measurements, so that, if the wagon holds less than forty liquid Sa'ah - without the wheel - it is subject to Tum'ah.
3. ... 'And it does not save in an Ohel ha'Mes' together with it are - that if the wagon holds more than forty liquid Sa'ah (or two Kur be'Yavesh - which is itself not subject to Tum'ah) it serves as an Ohel to divide between graves in a graveyard and objects that are above it - to prevent them from becoming Tamei. The detachable wheel however, will not prevent objects that protrude from the top of the wagon over the wheel, from becoming Tamei (even when the wheel is actually attached).