Describing a case where Reuven and Shimon are fighting, and Reuven strikes a pregnant woman and kills the babies, the Torah, in Mishpatim rules "ve'Im Ason Yiheyeh, ve'Nasata Nefesh Tachas Nafesh". Rebbi Elazar interprets "Nefesh Tachas Nafesh" literally, that Reuven is actually Chayav Misah for killing the woman (even though he did not intend to strike her).

The Pasuk must be speaking where Reuven actually intended to kill Shimon, and not just wound him - because otherwise, he would not be Chayav Misah.

The problem with the continuation of the Pasuk, obligating Reuven to pay for the babies, should the woman not die is - that since he is 'Nitan Lehatzilo be'Nafsho', why should he have to pay?

Rebbi Yonasan ben Shaul therefore establishes the Pasuk - where Shimon or a third person, is able to stop Reuven by incapacitating him, without actually killing him, in which case he maintains, Reuven is not 'Nitan Lehatziko be'Nafsho' and is therefore Chayav to pay.

To reconcile the Mishnah in Kesuvos (which includes Chayvei Kareis in the Din of K'nas), with our Mishnah (which includes them in the Din of 'Matzilin Osan be'Nafshan') even if it is speaking about an Anusah (and not by a Mefutah), Abaye establishes it - where it was possible to save the woman without killing the rapist, like Rebbi Yonasan ben Shaul.

We query Abaye's answer however, on the grounds that maybe in the case of Rebbi Yonasan ben Shaul , the Rodeif is Chayav to pay, because his Chiyuv Misah is to Shimon, whereas his Chiyuv Mamon is to the woman's husband, assuming he is not Shimon (and not because there was another way of saving Shimon). And, based on a statement of Rabah or Rava, we answer that - this distinction is unfounded, since it makes no difference whether the two Chiyuvim are to two different people or to the same person. Either way, he will be Patur from paying.

Rava (or Rabah) rules that, in a case where Reuven is chasing Shimon and breaks vessels belonging to Shimon or to Yehudah (anybody else) - is Patur (because he is 'Nitan Lehatzilo be'Nafsho'), and we apply the principle 'Kam leih be'de'Rabah mineih'.

In a case where ...

... Shimon breaks vessels belonging to Reuven - he is Patur (because it makes no sense to say that Reuven's money is more valuable than his body).

... Shimon breaks vessels belonging to Yehudah - he is Chayav (because someone who saves himself or someone else with the money of a third person, is Chayav to pay.

... Levi, who is chasing Reuven, in an attempt to save Shimon, breaks vessels belonging to Shimon or to anybody else - he is Patur ...

... mi'de'Rabbanan - so that people should not be discouraged from saving the lives of others who are under threat.

Rebbi Shimon includes a person who is about to worship idols in 'Nitan Lehatzilo be'Nafsho', because, he argues - if for P'gam Hedyot, we say 'Nitan Lehatzilo be'Nafsho', how much more so for P'gam Gavohah (where Hash-m's Name, Kevayachol, will be stained).

Rebbi Shimon has no problem of 'Ein Onshin min ha'Din' - since he holds 'Onshin min ha'Din'.

And his son Rebbi Elazar includes someone who is about to be Mechalel Shabbos in the same category - because he agrees with his father with regard to the 'Kal va'Chomer', only in addition, he holds of the 'Gezeirah-Shavah' "Chilul" "Chilul" (comparing Shabbos to Avodah-Zarah).

The decision which the Chachamim, quoted by Rebbi Yochanan citing Rebbi Shimon ben Yehotzadak arrived at in the attic of Beis Nitzah in Lod was - that the principle of 'Ya'avor ve'Al Yehareg' applies to all Mitzvos, with the exception of the three cardinal sins, Avodah-Zarah, Giluy Arayos and Shefichus Damim.

The source for the principle is the Pasuk in Acharei-Mos - "va'Chai bahem" ('ve'Lo she'Yamus Bahem').

Based on the same Pasuk, Rebbi Yishmael in another Beraisa, disagrees with the Chachamim - in that he includes Avodas Kochavim in the Din of 'Ya'avor ve'Al Yehareg'.

He learns from the Pasuk "ve'Lo Sechalelu es Shem Kodshi ve'Nikdashti be'Soch b'nei Yisrael" that - that leniency is confined to contravening Avodah-Zarah be'Tzin'ah (in private), but be'Farhesya, one is obligated to sanctify Hash-m's Name.

The exact definition of 'be'Farhesya' is - in front of ten Yisre'elim.

The Chachamim, we conclude, hold like Rebbi Eliezer, who in turn, learns like Rebbi in a Beraisa, who derives from the Hekesh ("Ki ka'asher Yakum Ish al Re'ehu u'Retzacho Nefesh, kein ha'Davar ha'Zeh") comparing ...

... Rotze'ach to Na'arah ha'Me'urasah that - 'Nitan le'Hatzilo be'Nafsho' applies to the former, just as it does to the latter (as we learned earlier).

... Na'arah ha'Me'urasah to Rotze'ach - that 'Yehareg ve'Al Ya'avor' applies to the former, just as it does to the latter.

Rebbi learns 'Yehareg ve'Al Ya'avor' by Retzichah - from a S'vara (as we shall now see).

Rebbi Eliezer learns from the Pasuk "ve'Ahavta es Hash-m Elokecha ...

... "u've'Chol Nafsh'cha" (bearing in mind that the Torah will anyway write "u've'Chol Me'odecha") that - even if his body is dearer to him than his money, he must still give it up for love of Hash-m.

... "u've'Chol Me'odecha" (bearing in mind that the Torah has already written "u've'Chol Nafshecha") that - even if his money is dearer to him that his body (like the b'nei Gad and the b'nei Reuven), then he must give that to Hash-m, too).

Rabah (or Rava) forbade the man who had been ordered by the mayor of his town to murder a fellow-Jew on pain of death - to comply, because 'who said that his blood was any redder than the other man's?

Ravin Amar Rebbi Yochanan corroborates what we learned earlier in the Beraisa (with regard to the Chumra of be'Farhesya). Rav Dimi Amar Rebbi Yochanan further qualifies the Torah's concession of "va'Chai bahem" 've'Lo she'Yamus Bahem" - by precluding there where the ruling power has issued a decree negating any Mitzvah. In such a case, he rules, one is obligated to give up one's life even for a 'minor Mitzvah', and even in private.

Rava bar Rav Yitzchak defines the 'minor Mitzvah' of Rav Dimi - as changing the way that one ties one's shoe-laces (which is no more than a custom), provided the way we do it is due to its spiritual content (for reasons of modesty [see Tosfos DH 'Afilu']).

Rebbi Yochanan learns from the words "B'nei Yisrael" (in the Pasuk in Emor "ve'Nikdashti be'Soch b'nei Yisrael") - that 'Farhesya' means in front of ten Yisre'elim (and not Nochrim).

Rebbi Yirmiyah asked whether it was sufficient to have nine Yisre'elim and to complement the ten with one Nochri (see Aruch le'Ner).

Rav Yanai the brother of Rebbi Chiya bar Aba learns from the 'Gezeirah-Shavah' "Toch" "Toch" (from the Pasuk "Hibadlu mi'Toch ha'Eidah ha'Zos", in connection with the ten spies) - a. that ten people constitute Farhesya, and b. that they must all be Yisre'elim.

We query what we just learned from Queen Esther - who was Farhesya (seeing as everyone knew about her relationship with Achashverosh [see N'siv Meir]), yet she did not sacrifice her life to avoid it, a proof that regarding other Mitzvos, we apply the principle 'Ya'avor ve'Al Yehareg', even be'Farhesya.

We do not rather ask that it was Giluy Arayos, which should therefore have been forbidden, even if it had been be'Tzin'ah - because Bi'ah with a Nochri is not considered Giluy Arayos (see Tosfos DH 've'Ha').

When Abaye answers 'Esther Karka Olam Haysah' he means that - as long as a woman is totally passive (without performing any act), she is not subject to 'Yehareg ve'Al Ya'avor'.

Rava (who, some commentaries explain, does not disagree with Abaye) - adds that since Achashverosh's previous demands (to which Esther was now acquiescing) had been for his own pleasure, and not in order to make her sin, 'Yehareg ve'Al Ya'avor' did not apply. (Note, Rava's answer, like Abaye's would not have applied had it been a question of Giluy Arayos).

Rava proves his point from 'Hani K'vaki ve'Dimoniki' - tall copper vessels, which they would fill with burning coals and which they would normally place on the royal table ...

... where the priests would demand fire from every household for this purpose, and the vessels containing them they would place in front of their idols. Since the Yisre'elim complied and were not Moser Nefesh, Rava proves from here that when the Nochrim's intention is not in order to make the Yisrael sin, 'Yehareg ve'Al Ya'avor' does not apply (see also Chidushei ha'Ran).

Rava follows his own reasoning. In a case where a Nochri threatens to kill a Yisrael unless he cuts on Shabbos some Aspasta (a grass used for animal fodder) and throws it ...

... to his animals - he rules 'Ya'avor ve'Al Yehareg' (since it is for the benefit of the Nochri).

... into the river - he rules 'Yehareg ve'Al Ya'avor (since the Nochri's sole intention is to make him sin).

They asked Rebbi Ami whether a Nochri is subject to Kidush Hash-m. Abaye tried to resolve the She'eilah from the Beraisa, which lists seven Mitzvos b'nei No'ach - and not eight, to preclude 'Kidush Hashem'.

Rava refuted Abaye's proof with the words 'Inhu ve'Chol Abizraihu', by which he meant that - the seven Mitzvos incorporate all their branches and accessories - of which Kidush Hash-m) may well be one.

After having undertaking not to worship idols, Na'aman (the Syrian general) asked Elisha - to forgive him when, in his capacity as general of the army, he would have to accompany the King once a year on his visit to the Temple of beis Rimon, where he would be forced to bow down to the idol together with the king, as the latter leaned on him for support.

Rav Ada bar Ahavah Amri bei Rav Kahana tries to prove from there that - a Nochri is not commanded on Kidush Hash-m, because otherwise, how could Elisha grant him permission to disregard it.

The proof from there lies - in the fact that Elisha gave him his blessing ...

... and not in the fact that he did not obligate him to give up his life, since based on the Pasuk "Hoche'ach Tochiach es Amisecha" ('ve'Lo es ha'Ger [Toshav]'), a Yisrael is not Chayav to rebuke a Nochri.

We refute Rav Ada bar Ahavah's proof however on the grounds that - Na'aman's act constituted a Davar she'be'Tzin'ah (since the Torah writes "be'Soch b'nei Yisrael", as we learned earlier, and ten Jews were hardly likely to have been found in beis Rimon in Syria), and the Sugya is discussing Kidush Hash-m be'Farhesya, and not be'Tzin'ah.