QUESTION: The Mishnah (35a) states that one does not fulfill the obligation to eat Matzah on Pesach night with Matzah of Tevel or Ma'aser Rishon from which Terumah was not separated, or with Matzah of Ma'aser Sheni or Hekdesh that was not redeemed.

The Gemara concludes that this Halachah is derived from a verse that teaches that only a type of wheat that can become forbidden on Pesach as Chametz may be used for the Mitzvah of Matzah. Wheat that is forbidden because of another prohibition, such as wheat of Tevel, cannot become forbidden on Pesach because of Chametz (according to Rebbi Shimon, who maintains that once an object is prohibited with one Isur, it cannot become prohibited again with another Isur; see following Insight). Consequently, such wheat may not be used for the Mitzvah of Matzah.

RASHI on the Mishnah (DH veha'Kohanim) cites this reason. In the Gemara, however, Rashi (DH Tavul mid'Rabanan) says that the reason why one does not fulfill his obligation to eat Matzah with fruit of Tevel that was grown in an unperforated pot (an "Atzitz she'Eino Nakuv," the content of which is only Tevel mid'Rabanan) is because of the principle of "Mitzvah ha'Ba'ah b'Aveirah," one cannot fulfill a Mitzvah (eating Matzah) by committing a sin (eating Tevel). Why does Rashi ignore the Gemara's reason, which is the reason that Rashi himself mentions in the Mishnah?

There is another difficulty in the words of Rashi. The Gemara asks why one is able to fulfill his obligation to eat Matzah by eating Matzah of Demai. Rashi explains that one should seemingly be unable to either because of the Derashah (that teaches that one fulfills the Mitzvah only with wheat that can become forbidden because of Chametz), or because of the principle of "Mitzvah ha'Ba'ah b'Aveirah." Why does Rashi mention both reasons here, while in his comments on the Mishnah he mentions only the reason of the Derashah, and in his comments later in the Gemara he mentions only the reason of "Mitzvah ha'Ba'ah b'Aveirah"?

ANSWER: The MAHARSHA explains that the Derashah of the Gemara applies only when an Isur d'Oraisa forbids the food item and prevents the Isur of Chametz from taking effect. When, however, the food is prohibited only because of an Isur d'Rabanan, the food may be used for the Mitzvah of Matzah, according to the Torah. The Derashah does not teach that such Matzah may not be used for the Mitzvah, since it has no other Isur d'Oraisa other than the Isur of Chametz. Rashi on the Mishnah mentions the Gemara's reason (the Derashah), because the Mishnah is discussing an Isur d'Oraisa.

Rashi later in the Gemara explains why Tevel in an unperforated pot may not be used for the Mitzvah of Matzah. Tevel in an unperforated pot is prohibited only mid'Rabanan, and thus the Derashah does not exclude it from being used for the Mitzvah of Matzah. Therefore, Rashi says that it may not be used for a different reason -- because of the principle of "Mitzvah ha'Ba'ah b'Aveirah."

When Rashi discusses Demai, however, Rashi is uncertain about the Gemara's intention. When the Gemara says that it is obvious that Demai may not be used, does the Gemara mean that it is obvious because it is a Safek Isur d'Oraisa of Tevel, or because it is a Vadai Isur d'Rabanan of Demai? If Demai may not be used for the Mitzvah of Matzah because it is a Safek Isur d'Oraisa, then the reason is because of the Derashah mentioned in the Gemara. If Demai may not be used because it is a Vadai Isur d'Rabanan, then the reason of the Derashah does not apply, and the reason must be because of the principle of "Mitzvah ha'Ba'ah b'Aveirah." Therefore, Rashi mentions both reasons with regard to Demai in order to cover both possible ways of understanding the Gemara's statement.

QUESTION: The Gemara concludes that the reason why Tevel may not be used for the Mitzvah of Matzah is because of a Derashah that teaches that only food that can become forbidden because of Chametz may be used for the Mitzvah of Matzah. Tevel does not become forbidden with the Isur of Chametz, because "Ein Isur Chal Al Isur," once an object is prohibited with one Isur, it cannot become prohibited again with another Isur. This is the opinion of Rebbi Shimon.

There is a more obvious reason for why one may not use Matzah of Tevel to fulfill the Mitzvah of Matzah -- it is a "Mitzvah ha'Ba'ah b'Aveirah," as Rashi mentions numerous times in the Sugya! Why does the Gemara make no mention of this principle? (TOSFOS to Sukah 30a, DH Mishum)

Another difficulty is that the Halachah does not follow the opinion of Rebbi Shimon. Rather, the Halachah follows the opinion of the Rabanan who maintain that an object can become forbidden with an additional Isur ("Isur Chal Al Isur") when the second Isur is a greater Isur (such as an "Isur Kolel"). According to the Rabanan, wheat that is forbidden because of Tevel can become forbidden because of Chametz as well. Does the Mishnah's statement follow only the opinion of Rebbi Shimon and not the opinion of the Rabanan?

(a) TOSFOS RABEINU PERETZ and TOSFOS SHANTZ (as well as the "Ba'alei ha'Tosfos" cited by the RAMBAN and RITVA here and in Sukah 31a) explain that, indeed, the Halachah does not follow the Mishnah's statement. Hence, one who eats Matzah of Tevel does fulfill the Mitzvah to eat Matzah. Why, though, is there no problem of "Mitzvah ha'Ba'ah b'Aveirah"?

The principle of "Mitzvah ha'Ba'ah b'Aveirah" applies only to an object which serves to be "Meratzeh Hash-m" (to "appease" Hash-m, as it were, to forgive a person for his misdeeds) or to praise Hash-m. This is evident from the fact that the Gemara applies the principle of "Mitzvah ha'Ba'ah b'Aveirah" in only three cases:

1. A stolen animal that is brought as a Korban is invalid. A Korban is brought to be Meratzeh Hash-m.

2. A stolen Lulav is invalid, because a Lulav is used to be Meratzeh and praise Hash-m. (See Rashi to Sukah 36b, DH Ela l'Rav.)

3. A Shofar that is Asur b'Hana'ah may not be used, because of "Mitzvah ha'Ba'ah b'Aveirah" (Rosh Hashanah 28a, according to some Rishonim). The Gemara (Rosh Hashanah 26a) says that the sounding of the Shofar is Meratzeh Hash-m.

Only when the objective of the Mitzvah is to be Meratzeh Hash-m does the principle of "Mitzvah ha'Ba'ah b'Aveirah" apply, but not for any other Mitzvah.

(b) The RITVA here (and in Rosh Hashanah 28a and Sukah 30b) gives a different reason for why the principle of "Mitzvah ha'Ba'ah b'Aveirah" does not apply in the case of one who eats Matzah made from Tevel wheat. The Ritva proves from the Yerushalmi that the principle of "Mitzvah ha'Ba'ah b'Aveirah" applies only when the performance of the Mitzvah itself causes the transgression of an Aveirah. For example, when one consecrates someone else's animal as a Korban, or he designates someone else's branch as a Lulav, he acquires the object through a "Shinuy ha'Shem," a change in the name of the object (from "animal" to "Korban," or from "branch" to "Lulav"), and he thereby transgresses the Isur of stealing. The very act of making the object into one of a Mitzvah was what "stole" the object. Had no Mitzvah been done, no Aveirah would have been committed. In such a case, the Mitzvah is a "Mitzvah ha'Ba'ah b'Aveirah."

In contrast, when one eats Matzah of Tevel, the Aveirah that he commits is unrelated to the Mitzvah. Even if he would not fulfill the Mitzvah when he eats the Matzah of Tevel, he would still transgress the Isur of eating Tevel. Since the Mitzvah does not play a role in the transgression of the Aveirah (which he would transgress by eating the Tevel, regardless of whether he fulfills a Mitzvah), the rule of "Mitzvah ha'Ba'ah b'Aveirah" does not apply.

(The Ritva agrees with Tosfos Rabeinu Peretz that the Mishnah here follows only the opinion of Rebbi Shimon. According to the Rabanan, one fulfills the Mitzvah when he eats Matzah of Tevel.)

(c) Some Acharonim suggest that the principle of "Mitzvah ha'Ba'ah b'Aveirah" applies only when the Aveirah that is done with the object leaves an impression on the object. For example, when one steals an object, that object remains affected by the Kinyan Gezeilah on it, even after the act of stealing has been completed. Similarly, if an object is worshipped as Avodah Zarah, the item remains forbidden as Avodah Zarah even after the act of the transgression has ended. The effects of the Aveirah remain on the object.

An object of Tevel, in contrast, is not an object of Aveirah. Tevel is merely the status of produce before its Terumos have been separated. The Aveirah occurs only when Tevel is eaten. Since the object of Tevel itself is not an object of Aveirah, one is able to fulfill a Mitzvah with it (b'Di'eved), and the Mitzvah is not a "Mitzvah ha'Ba'ah b'Aveirah." (CHEMDAS SHLOMO OC #30. Tosfos to Sukah 30a, DH Mishum, considers this approach but rejects it. However, support can be drawn for this approach from the Yerushalmi cited by the Ritva.)

Alternatively, the RAMBAN here (see also Milchamos in the beginning of Pesachim) suggests that perhaps "Mitzvah ha'Ba'ah b'Aveirah" does not apply to a relatively "weak" prohibition like that of Tevel. Tevel is considered a "weak" prohibition because a person has the ability to remove it (by separating Terumah from the produce).

(According to this approach as well, the Mishnah expresses only the opinion of Rebbi Shimon.)

(d) The RAMBAN concludes that the principle of "Mitzvah ha'Ba'ah b'Aveirah" does not have the status of a Torah principle, because it is derived not from a verse in the Torah but from a verse in Malachi (Sukah 30a). It is considered a principle derived from "Divrei Kabalah."

Consequently, according to the Rabanan (who maintain "Isur Chal Al Isur"), there is no source in the Torah to teach that one does not fulfill the Mitzvah to eat Matzah with Matzah of Tevel. That one does not fulfill the Mitzvah with Tevel is only mi'Divrei Kabalah and is not mid'Oraisa.

However, the Gemara wants to show that at least according to one Tana, Rebbi Shimon, there is a source in the Torah that prevents one from using Tevel for the Mitzvah of Matzah. (The Ramban's disciple, RABEINU DAVID, also gives this explanation.)

This may be the opinion of RASHI as well, who repeatedly mentions "Mitzvah ha'Ba'ah b'Aveirah" throughout the Sugya (and on 39a, DH u'Demai).

(e) Others suggest that the principle of "Mitzvah ha'Ba'ah b'Aveirah" applies in every case in which an Aveirah is committed at the same time the Mitzvah is performed. However, it does not apply in the case of the Mishnah here, because in this case a different principle applies -- the principle of "Aseh Docheh Lo Ta'aseh." The performance of a Mitzvas Aseh overrides a Lo Ta'aseh, and thus one may -- and is bidden to -- perform the Mitzvah and he is not considered to have transgressed the Aveirah. (In fact, TOSFOS in Kidushin (38a) cites the Yerushalmi that says that one should be permitted to eat Matzah of Chadash for this reason.) Therefore, the principle of "Mitzvah ha'Ba'ah b'Aveirah" does not apply here, because the Aveirah is permitted for the sake of the Mitzvah.

However, others argue and mention a number of reasons why the principle of "Aseh Docheh Lo Ta'aseh" does not apply in this case.

1. The Aveirah of eating Tevel is punishable with Misah, and a Mitzvas Aseh cannot override a Lo Ta'aseh which is punishable with Misah (SHA'AGAS ARYEH #96).

2. RABEINU DAVID explains that the principle of "Aseh Docheh Lo Ta'aseh" applies only when the Torah itself forces the Aseh and the Lo Ta'aseh into opposition. If the confrontation between the Aseh and the Lo Ta'aseh comes only as a result of one's particular situation and circumstances (for example, he has no other Matzah available other than Matzah of Tevel), then "Aseh Docheh Lo Ta'aseh" does not apply. In such a situation, the Torah does not tell the person to eat Tevel in order to fulfill the Mitzvah.

(This is in contrast to other instances of "Aseh Docheh Lo Ta'aseh," such as the Aseh of Milah which overrides the Lo Ta'aseh of cutting Tzara'as from the body (Shabbos 132b). In that case, the confrontation between the two is created by the Mitzvah of Milah itself. The Mitzvah commands, "Cut this skin even though it has Tzara'as." With regard to Matzah, the Mitzvah never commands, "Eat this Tevel.") (A similar answer is suggested by the SHA'AGAS ARYEH (#96) when he discusses the opinion of the BEIS YOSEF OC #11.)

3. The MINCHAS CHINUCH (10:13) points out that the Mitzvah to eat Matzah requires that one eat only a k'Zayis of Matzah. After the initial k'Zayis, there is no longer a Mitzvas Aseh to eat Matzah. Consequently, while the Mitzvah of Matzah overrides the Isur of Tevel for the first k'Zayis that one eats, it does not override the Isur after the first k'Zayis. Therefore, Matzah of Tevel may not be used even for the first k'Zayis, because the Gemara says that the Matzah used for the Mitzvah must be Matzah which is fit for all seven (or eight) days of the festival. Matzah of Tevel cannot be eaten after the first k'Zayis on the first night of Pesach.

4. Finally, it appears that the principle of "Aseh Docheh Lo Ta'aseh" does not apply here, simply because one is not permitted to do a Mitzvah at the expense of someone else! If one eats Tevel in order to fulfill the Mitzvah of Matzah, he steals from the Kohen's portion of Terumos and Ma'aseros that has not been separated from the Tevel. It is obvious that one may not steal someone else's Lulav in order to fulfill the Mitzvah if he has no other Lulav. Similarly, one may not steal the property of Kohanim (Terumos and Ma'aseros) in order to fulfill a Mitzvah. (M. KORNFELD)