QUESTIONS: The Mishnah discusses a case in which a woman accepted upon herself Nezirus and designated animals as her Korbanos. Before she brought her Korbanos, however, her husband annulled her Nezirus. The Mishnah teaches that her Korban Chatas must be left to die, while her Olah and Shelamim are offered as Nedavos, freewill offerings. The Korban Shelamim, however, is eaten for only one day like a Shalmei Nazir, but it does not require the Lechem of a Shalmei Nazir.
There are several difficulties with the Mishnah's ruling.
(a) If the husband's Hafarah annuls his wife's Neder of Nezirus by repealing the Neder from now on ("Meigiz Gayiz"), the Mishnah's logic is straightforward. Since the woman was a Nazir until the time her husband annulled her Nezirus, the Olah and Shelamim she designated are indeed Kadosh. The Lechem, however, is not brought with the Shelamim because Lechem is only brought when the person is still a Nazir at the time he brings the Korbanos (excluding a case of a Nazir who died (24b), or a case in which the Nezirus was repealed).
However, according to the opinion that the husband's Hafarah uproots the Neder retroactively ("Meikar Akar"), why should the Olah and Shelamim be brought altogether? The woman was never a Nazir, and thus the animals should not be Kadosh. Her act of Hekdesh was a Hekdesh Ta'us -- she sanctified the animals thinking she was a Nazir, but she in fact was not a Nazir. (This case is comparable to the Mishnah in Nedarim (66a) which discusses the case of a "Neder u'Pischo Imo." For example, a man vows that he will not marry a certain woman because she is ugly, and he then discovers that she is not ugly. The Mishnah there states that the Neder is a Neder Ta'us, a Neder made in error, which does not take effect at all and needs no Hatarah. See Ran there.)
The Gemara itself (21b) implies that her Hekdesh is a Hekdesh Ta'us. The Gemara says that if the husband's Hafarah is "Meikar Akar," her Korban Chatas should have no Kedushah and should not have to die. The only reason it must be left to die is Rebbi Elazar ha'Kapar's principle which says that the woman needs atonement, and therefore her consecration of an animal as a Korban Chatas was valid. This implies that the Korban Olah and Korban Shelamim -- which are not brought because of the sin (see Tosfos here, DH veha'Olah) -- are not Kadosh at all.
Similarly, Tosfos (DH Hachi Garsinan v'Einan) writes that if the husband's Hafarah is "Meikar Akar," even if she already consecrated the Lechem before her husband annulled her Nezirus, the Lechem is not Kadosh mid'Oraisa at all. It is Kadosh only mid'Rabanan, lest people think that an object of Hekdesh is becoming Chulin without Pidyon. Why, then, does the Mishnah state that one must bring a Korban Me'ilah if he derives benefit from the Olah or Shelamim, which implies that they are Kadosh mid'Oraisa? (See ARZEI HA'LEVANON.)
(b) Even if the woman's act of Hekdesh is not considered to have been done in error, the animal she chose to be a Korban Shelamim was not designated to be an ordinary Korban Shelamim, but to be a Shalmei Nazir. A Shalmei Nazir differs from an ordinary Shelamim (it is eaten for one day and not for two, the Nazir brings a special Minchah (the Lachmei Nazir) with it, and its forearm is treated like Kodshei Kodshim and is given to Kohanim). Only a Nazir may designate an animal to be a Shalmei Nazir. It is a specific obligation of a Nazir and is not the type of Korban which may be brought voluntarily. Why, then, does the woman's animal have the status of an ordinary Korban Shelamim? Since she intended to consecrate it as a Shalmei Nazir and her husband annulled her Nezirus, it should not be able to be offered as an ordinary Shelamim. Since the woman was not a Nazir (retroactively) at the time she sanctified it, it should not be Kadosh as a Shalmei Nazir. (See Insights to 22:1 in the name of the Brisker Rav, whose approach there may answer this question.) Tosfos (DH Shelamim), however, implies that even if the husband's Hafarah is "Meikar Akar," the animal is still considered a Shalmei Nazir. How is that possible?
(a) The reason why the Hekdesh of the Olah and Shelamim is not considered a Hekdesh Ta'us is as follows. Since the woman voluntarily accepted upon herself to bring a Korban when she made herself a Nazir, once she sanctifies an animal for her Korban she shows that she is willing to bring a Korban regardless of whether she remains a Nazir. It is assumed that she decided unequivocally that even if her husband eventually annuls her Neder of Nezirus, she still wants these animals to be sanctified as an Olas Nedavah and a Shalmei Nedavah. Hence, the Mishnah states that one who benefits from these animals is liable for Me'ilah. The same applies to money she designated for the purchase of a Korban Olah and Shelamim. The Mishnah states that one who benefits from the money is liable for Me'ilah even if the husband's Hafarah is "Meikar Akar" and removes her Neder retroactively.
In contrast, a Korban Chatas and Lachmei Nazir cannot be brought voluntarily as a Korban Nedavah. Accordingly, her desire to bring those Korbanos even if she is not a Nazir is irrelevant; she cannot bring them if she is not a Nazir. This is why the Gemara mentions Rebbi Elazar ha'Kapar's principle as the reason for why the Chatas must die. Similarly, a Shalmei Nazir cannot be brought as a Korban Nedavah, and thus the money the woman designated for a Korban Shelamim is used for an ordinary Shelamim and not for a Shalmei Nazir.
(b) What does Tosfos mean when he implies that the Shelamim is actually a Shalmei Nazir and is treated with all of the Chumros of a Shalmei Nazir since the woman sanctified it with the Kedushah of a Shalmei Nazir? How can the Korban have the Kedushah of a Shalmei Nazir if the husband's Hafarah is "Meikar Akar" and removes her Nezirus retroactively?
The answer is that Tosfos does not mean that the Korban is actually a Shalmei Nazir. Rather, the Korban is an ordinary Shelamim mid'Oraisa, but the Rabanan decreed that it should have all of the Chumros of a Shalmei Nazir (the Zero'a (forearm) is Kadosh, and the Korban may be eaten for only one day and not two). The Rabanan made this decree in order to prevent people from thinking that the Korban is a genuine Shalmei Nazir and that a Shalmei Nazir may be eaten for two days and that a non-Kohen may eat the Zero'a of a Shalmei Nazir (similar to their decree which requires Pidyon for the Lechem of a woman whose husband annulled her Nezirus, so that people not say that Hekdesh is becoming Chulin without Pidyon). (See KEREN ORAH in the name of the Yerushalmi.)


QUESTION: The Gemara teaches that even if the husband is not obligated ("Meshubad") to provide his wife with animals to bring for her Korbanos (the opinion of the Rabanan who disagree with Rebbi Yehudah), after he annuls his wife's Nezirus any animals which he gave to her to bring for her Korbanos become Chulin and are not sanctified. The Gemara explains that when he gave her the animals, he gave them on condition that she would need them. If she later has no need for them, his Kinyan to her does not take effect.
Why is the husband able to give the animals to his wife on condition that the Kinyan will take effect only if she will need them? Many Tana'im maintain "Ein Bereirah" -- when the status of an object is unknown at the present time, a future event cannot determine its status retroactively. Similarly, TOSFOS (22a) explains why a person's Nezirus is annulled when he accepts Nezirus by being "Matfis" to a woman's acceptance of Nezirus by saying, "Hareinu Kemosech" ("I am like her") and then the woman's husband annuls her Nezirus. Tosfos asks that Hafarah works only from now on ("mi'Kan ul'Haba"), and it works only for the wife and not for the person who was "Matfis" to her Nezirus. Tosfos (DH Ta Shema) answers that it is as though the person who was "Matfis" made his Nezirus conditional: if the husband will annul his wife's Nezirus, he does not want to accept Nezirus upon himself, and if the husband does not annul her Nezirus, he wants his Nezirus to take effect. Accordingly, if the husband annuls his wife's Nezirus, the person who was "Matfis" to her Nezirus never accepted upon himself Nezirus. if the law is "Ein Bereirah," how can the person who was "Matfis" make his status dependent on a future event (which is not in his control)?
These two cases are not comparable to an ordinary case of a Tenai, in which a person makes a Kinyan dependent on an event which has not yet happened, which is not considered a case of "Bereirah." RASHI in Gitin (25b, DH ul'Chi Mayis) writes that a condition, a Tenai, works only because the ability to fulfill the condition is in the hands of one of the parties involved, and it was the person's intention that the condition be fulfilled at the time that he stipulated the Tenai. (That is, because he plans to fulfill it and he wants the transaction to be consummated, the event that is contingent upon the fulfillment of the Tenai takes effect immediately, even before the Tenai is executed. If the Tenai ends up unfulfilled, the event is uprooted retroactively. It is not possible to cause an event to take effect retroactively.) In contrast, when a condition makes a Kinyan dependent on an external action (not within the power of any of the parties involved), the Kinyan does not take effect at all because of "Ein Bereirah."
The Halachah is "Ein Bereirah" with regard to all matters which are mid'Oraisa. Why, then, is no mention made by the Gemara or Rishonim that the condition in the case of the Gemara here works only according to the opinion that maintains "Yesh Bereirah" but not according to the Halachic opinion (since the Korbanos of a Nazir are a matter of a Halachah d'Oraisa)?
(a) The RAN and RAMBAN in Gitin (25b) differentiate between a Tenai "on condition that something happens," and a Tenai "on condition that something does not happen." A Kinyan which depends on the active occurrence of some event is considered Bereirah. A Kinyan which depends on the passive lack of occurrence of some event is not considered Bereirah (since it is only "Shev v'Al Ta'aseh"). (For example, a case in which a man says to a woman, "You are married to me on condition that your father does not protest," is not a case of Bereirah, but, "You are married to me on condition that your father grants permission," is a case of Bereirah.)
According to the Ran, the gift of animals which the husband gives to his wife on condition that she will need them (i.e. that he will not annul her Nezirus) might not be Bereirah since the condition -- that he not annul her Nezirus -- is a passive event, a "Shev v'Al Ta'aseh." Similarly, when a person accepts Nezirus on condition that a woman's husband will not annul her Nezirus, his condition is not a case of Bereirah.
(b) A Tenai involves Bereirah only when it is contingent on an event which did not yet occur. If it is contingent on an event which already occurred -- but the person does not know (and cannot know) what occurred, the Tenai is valid. For example, if a person points to a pomegranate and says, "I will be a Nazir on condition that there are more than 500 seeds inside that fruit," his statement does not constitute Bereirah. Even though he does not know the number of seeds in the pomegranate at that moment, the number already exists and he simply needs to verify the number. (See Eruvin 26b, and Tosfos to Bava Kama 69a, DH Kol ha'Nilkat.)
Perhaps this is also the reason why the Tenai in the case of the Gemara here is not considered Bereirah. When the husband annuls his wife's Neder of Nezirus, although the Hafarah removes her Nezirus from now on ("mi'Kan ul'Haba"), nevertheless it affects the entire period of Nezirus which his wife observed even before the Hafarah. The Hafarah changes that Nezirus to a different type of Nezirus. A Nezirus period has a minimum time limit: Stam Nezirus is 30 days, and if the Nazir specifies another amount of time, he must observe Nezirus for the specified number of days. If a Nazir has observed less than 30 days (or less than the specified number of days) when his Nezirus comes to a sudden end, none of the days of Nezirus he observed are part of an actual Nezirus since they did not continue for the duration that was established. The Gemara in Nedarim (83a) refers to this as a "Chatzi Nezirus," a half-Nezirus. Similarly, if a woman's husband annuls her Nezirus before she completes it, she cannot bring the Korbanos of Nezirus even though her Nezirus came to an end because, qualitatively, the Nezirus she observed did not have the full quality of Nezirus since it was not part of a 30-day period of abstention from wine. Although the Gemara in Nazir (22a) seems to disagree with the Gemara in Nedarim (see Insights to Nedarim 83:1) and says that a woman brings her Korbenos Tum'ah if her husband's Hafarah is "Meigiz Gayiz" after she becomes Tamei (that is, there are Korbenos Tum'ah for a "Chatzi Nezirus"), nevertheless the Gemara certainly agrees that the Nezirus is qualitatively different from an ordinary Nezirus and one does not bring Korbenos Taharah for such a Nezirus. This is clear from the fact that if the husband gives animals to his wife for her Korbenos Nezirus and then annuls her Nezirus, the animals return to the flock of Chulin animals and she is not obligated to bring the Korbanos of a Nazir Tahor (even though she is obligated to bring the Korbanos of a Nazir Tamei if she became Tamei). The difference between Nezirus Taharah and Nezirus Tum'ah is that the Korbanos of Nezirus Tum'ah are not brought for ending the Tum'ah and continuing the Nezirus, but they are brought for the Tum'ah which made her stop her Nezirus and which occurred at a time when she was still practicing a normal Nezirus (before the Hafarah). Korbenos Taharah are brought only for the completion of a Nezirus, at the end of a Nezirus (and at that time, in the case of the Gemara here, it is a "Chatzi Nezirus" and not a complete Nezirus). Accordingly, when the husband annuls the Neder and is "Meigiz Gayiz," although the Hafarah works from now on, it also works retroactively in the sense that it makes her Nezirus into a "Chatzi Nezirus" retroactively. Hence, at the time her husband gave her the animals for the Korban, her Nezirus was either a full Nezirus already (if, in the future, the husband does not annul it) or it was a half-Nezirus (if, in the future, the husband does annul it). Although which one it is cannot be determined at present, it is similar to the case of the number of seeds in the pomegranate which cannot be determined now but which already exists, and thus a Tenai which depends on such a situation does not involve Bereirah.