Explanation #1: Rashi explains that then the Chachamim are pleased with him.

Introduction to Question: In Perek Mi she'Meis (Bava Basra, Daf149a) in the case where Isur Giyora, who had deposited thirteen thousand Zuz with Rava, died, Rava queried how to return them to Rav Mari (Isur Giyora's son) ...

Introduction to Question (cont.): Implying that Rava did not want to pay Rav Mari bar Rachel, but to keep them for himself ...

Question: Did he not want the Chachamim to be pleased with him, seeing as Rav Mari bar Rachel was conceived before the conversion and born afterwards?

Answer: Rabeinu Tam answers that it is specifically by a loan, where he (the Ger) did him a favor, that the Chachamim are pleased with him, in order not to repay evil for good ...

Answer (cont.): Whereas there it was a deposit, and to the contrary, it was Rava who did Rav Mari bar Rachel a favor by looking after the money.

Refutation: However, the Ri does not agree with the distinction between a loan and a deposit.

Explanation #2: He therefore explains that where he was conceived before the conversion and born afterwards the Chachamim are not pleased with him ...

Reason: Since he is close to being a proper Yisrael, and one will therefore consider him a Yisrael ...

Reason (cont.): With the result that if he performs Yibum with his brother's wife, people will say that she is no longer obligated to perform it once again with a brother who was conceived and born after the conversion.

Explanation #1: Rashi explains that in this case, he cannot be sold again, meaning that he can be sold once for one theft, but not twice ...

Explanation #1 (cont.): But he can be sold twice for two thefts, even if he did not appear in court until after the second theft and he is only worth the value of one of them, he can be sold twice ...

Reason: Since each theft falls under the heading of "Genevaso" ...

Explanation #1 (cont.): The Gemara asks - "bi'Genevaso" implies 'many?' - So if he stood in Din on both of them simultaneously, they both fall under the heading of "bi'Genevaso" - like we find "u'Veheimah Rabah" and "ve'ha'Dagah asher ba'Ye'or", nevertheless there is only one "ve'Nimkar"?

Explanation #1 (cont.): 'We must therefore differentiate between one person' - where he stood in Din simultaneously, even for many thefts, in which case he cannot be sold twice, since that would be considered half a Geneivah ...

Explanation #1 (cont.): But where two people took him to court on two occasions, he can be sold for each one independently ...

Explanation #1 (concl.): And the same will apply if he stole, and after standing in Din and being sold, he steals again after going free. Up to here is the Lashon of Rashi.

Question: What Rashi wrote that he cannot be sold twice for one theft goes neither like the Rabanan nor like Rebbi Eliezer.

Question (cont.): Since in the Beraisa that the Gemara will shortly cite, the Tana Kama specifically rules that 'in the event that what he stole is worth a thousand Zuz and he is worth five hundred, he is sold and sold again'? ...

Question (concl.): Nor does it conform to Rebbi Eliezer, who says that 'If the theft is equivalent to his sale value, then he is sold, otherwise he is not, implying that he is not sold even once?

Explanation #2: Therefore the Ri explains 'One speaks by one theft' - that is where he is sold and sold again until he has paid for the theft, since "Nimkar bi'Genevaso" implies that he is sold a number of times until the theft is paid off ...

Explanation #2 (cont.): But for two thefts he can only be sold once ...

Explanation #2 (cont.): The Gemara then asks "bi'Genevaso" implies many thefts - so where he steals twice from one person it falls under the heading of "bi'Genevaso", so why should he not be sold until he has paid for everything?

Explanation #2 (concl.): And it answers that 'By one owner' - where he stole and stole again, he is indeed sold until he has paid off all the thefts, since that is included in "bi'Genevaso", but 'by two owners' - he cannot be sold twice.

Explanation #1: Rashi explains that if he has money, we force him to redeem her.

Question: The Ram queries this however, in that, if so, why will the Gemara say shortly 'Indeed he goes and sells her'? What is the point of selling her, if we will then force him to redeem her?

Explanation #2: Perhaps what it therefore means is that we force the members of his family to redeem her against the father's wishes, who does not want to take her back and be obligated to feed her.

Conclusion: Now it makes sense to say that he will sell her again.

Clarification: Rashi explains that in Rebbi Akiva, the text is 'Since he spread his Talis'.

Reason: Since, based on the Gemara in the first Perek of Sanhedrin (Daf 4a), we are forced to establish 'Yesh Eim le'Mikra' like him, and consequently, 'Yesh Eim le'Masores' like Rebbi Eliezer ...

Proof: As the Gemara Darshens in Bechoros (Daf 34a) where it queries a different Sugya from this Beraisa ...

Proof (cont.): When it establishes there that Rebbi Eliezer holds 'Yesh Eim le'Mikra', and queries it from here, where he holds 'Yesh Eim le'Masores'.

Explanation #1; Rebbi Akiva: Rebbi Akiva holds that, since he spread his Talis over her for the sake of Yi'ud, should he then divorce her and she returns to her father, the latter may no longer sell her, since he holds that 'A man is not allowed to sell his daughter to Shifchus after Ishus' ...

Reason: Because he holds 'Yesh Eim le'Mikra' - meaning that we read it 'be'Vigdo', which is an expression of 'Beged'.

Proof: Because if it was an expression of 'Begidah' (treachery), it should have said 'be'Vagdo' - like 'be'Sham'o' (Devarim, 29).

Implied Question: And even though elsewhere (in Bamidbar, 35) we read "be'Fig'o" ...

Answer: There is no room there for error, unlike here, where it is possible to err.

Explanation #1; Rebbi Eliezer: Whereas Rebbi Eliezer holds 'Yesh Eim le'Masores' - and since it does not write "be'Vigdo" with a 'Yud', it implies a Lashon of 'Begidah' ...

Proof: Because had it been one of 'Beged', it should have written it with a 'Yud' ...

Implied Question: And even though the Torah writes (in Bereishis, 39) "va'Tispeseihu be'Vigdo" (without a 'Yud') ...

Answer: That is because there (too) is no room there to err.

Question #1: How can one extrapolate from the fact that it does not write "be'Vigdo" with a 'Yud' that the Masores is an expression of Begidah? On the contrary, we can extrapolate that it is an expression of spreading a Talis from the fact that it does not write 'be'Vogdo' with a 'Vav'?

Question #2: Moreover, it is not customary to insert either a 'Yud' or a 'Vav' in a verb?

Explanation #2: One must therefore explain that the Mikra definitely implies spreading a Talis, like "va'Tispeseihu be'Vigdo" ...

Proof: Because had it been an expression of 'Begidah', it ought to have been read 'be'Vegdo' ...

Explanation #2 (cont.): Whereas the Masores is one of 'Begidah' ...

Proof: Because had it been one of spreading a Talis, it ought to have written 'be'Vigdo alehah', and not "be'Vigdo vah".

Question: Rabeinu Tam however, asks that it is not the way of the Gemara to state Rebbi Akiva's opinion before that of Rebbi Eliezer, who was his Rebbe?

Another Text: Rabeinu Tam therefore amends the text to read 'Since he spread his Talis over her; the words of Rebbi Eliezer; Rebbi Akiva says since he behaved treacherously towards her'. In this way, Rebbi Eliezer's words precede those of Rebbi Akiva his Talmid.

Explanation #3; Rebbi Eliezer: And the explanation is as follows: 'Rebbi Eliezer holds "Yesh Eim le'Masores", which is an expression of 'Beged' - spreading a Talis ...

Proof: Seeing as it does not write 'be'Vogdo' - with a 'Vav' or 'be'Vigdo' - with a 'Yud' (See Maharsha) ...

Implied Question: Even though it writes "be'Sham'o" without a 'Vav' ...

Answer: There is no room there for error.

Explanation #3; Rebbi Akiva: Whereas Rebbi Akiva holds 'Yesh Eim le'Mikra' which is an expression of 'Begidah'

Proof: Because if it was one of 'Beged', it ought to have said 'be'Vegdo', since the derivative of 'Beged' is 'Begdo', just as that of 'Neged' is 'Negdo', and that of 'Cheilev', 'Chelbo'.

Implied Question: And although we read "va'Tispeseihu be'Vigdo" and not 'be'Vegdo' ...

Answer: There is no room there for error.

Explanation #4: Others explain that they are arguing over the Pasuk "asher Lo Ye'adah" (written with an 'Alef'), which we read 'Lo' with a 'Vav' ...

Rebbi Akiva: Rebbi Akiva holds 'Yesh Eim le'Mikra' - "Lo" with a 'Vav' ...

Rebbi Akiva (cont.): And this indicates that "Bigdo" is an expression of 'Beged' - spreading one's Talis ...

Rebbi Eliezer: And Rebbi Eliezer holds 'Yesh Eim le'Masores', and "Lo" is written with an 'Alef', an indication that "be'Vigdo" is an expression of 'Begidah'.

Explanation #1: La'av Davka that he sells her for Yi'ud with her, but that he may betroth her ...

Proof: Because if he was not permitted to betroth her, why does the Tana need to then say that 'he cannot sell her'? Is it not obvious that if he is not even able to betroth her, how much more so to sell her?

Explanation #2: Some commentaries justify the text - 'He cannot sell her', but other things he can do with her ...

Explanation #2: And on that the Gemara wonders - 'But how can one say that he can do other things?' Bearing in mind that she is already betrothed via Yi'ud; And if Yi'ud makes marriage, her father has no more jurisdiction over her?

Refutation: But this a Dochek.

Clarification: Her betrothal is different, because, since he did not betroth her, he can sell her, but in what way is one marriage different than another? ...

Explanation: Rashi explains 'Since min ha'Torah she leaves his domain completely'.

Question: But betrothal too, is min ha'Torah?

Refuted Answer: And to suggest that one can differentiate between betrothal and marriage, inasmuch as by marriage she leaves his domain completely, as Rashi actually explains ...

Refutation: .... is incorrect, because will you also then say that if a Ketanah hands herself over for Chupah, she will leave her father's domain? Obviously not!

Answer: One can however, resolve Rashi in the following way - We can understand how one betrothal differs from the other, inasmuch as she is still under her father's jurisdiction regarding all issues - to inherit her, to bury her and to nullify her vows together with her husband, with the sole exception of selling her, which he cannot do once he has accepted the money of her Kidushin.

Answer (cont.): That being the case, it is a Chidush, and one can apply the principle 'to limit it to that case only' - specifically by his Kidushin, where the father received the Kidushin ...

Answer (cont.): Wherever by Nisu'in which takes her out of the father's jurisdiction completely, there is no justification in drawing a distinction between her Nisu'in and his Nisu'in, and following her Nisu'in he cannot sell her either ...

Answer (concl.): Whereas by a Ketanah who hands herself over to Chupah, there is no case where it takes her out of her father's domain.