1)

(a)Rav Chiya bar Avin Amar Rebbi Yochanan learns from the Pasuk in Devarim "Ki li'Venei Lot Nasati Es Ar Yerushah" that a Nochri inherits his father.

(b)The reason that ...

1. ... Rav Chiya bar Avin is forced to discard the initial source for this (the Pasuk in Devarim "Ki Yerushah l'Esav Nasati Es Har Se'ir") is because Esav falls under the category of a Yisrael (albeit a Yisrael Mumar [though one might query this from the Derashah "Ki b'Yitzchak Yikarei Lecha Zara", 'be'Yitzchak, v'Lo Kol Yitzchak'. See also Rashash).

2. ... he declines to learn it from Rava's source ("v'Chishav Im Koneihu", 've'Lo Im Yorshei Koneihu') is because the Torah does not write 've'Lo Im Yorshei Koneihu' (see Rashash).

(c)Rava, on the other hand, declines to learn like Rav Chiya bar Avin because it may be in honor of Avraham that the Torah granted Lot's descendents the institution of inheritance.

2)

(a)We can extrapolate from the Mishnah that we learned earlier ('Yeseirah Alav Amah Ivriyah ... ') that there is nothing that sets free an Eved Ivri but not an Ivriyah.

(b)Rav Sheshes therefore establishes the Beraisa 'Yesh b'Ivri she'Ein b'Ivriyah ... she'Hu Yotzei b'Shanim, b'Yovel u've'Misas ha'Adon, Mah she'Ein Kein b'Ivriyah' where the master has already performed Yi'ud with her.

(c)Even though the Tana is speaking in the Reisha when the master performed Yi'ud ...

1. ... he needs to preclude from the possible theory that Yi'ud runs concurrently with the six-year period of work. He teaches us that it actually negates it.

2. ... in the Seifa, where he goes on to say that she goes out with Simanim (which the Eved Ivri does not) he is speaking where there was no Yi'ud.

(d)We can infer from the Seifa of the Beraisa, which states that an Amah Ivriyah cannot be sold twice that an Eved Ivri, can.

3)

(a)The Darshens "bi'Geneivaso", 've'Lo bi'Kefeilo' and "bi'Geneivaso", 've'Lo bi'Zemamo' and "bi'Geneivaso", 'Keivan she'Nimkar Pa'am Achas, Shuv I Atah Rashai l'Moshro'.

(b)Rava reconciles the previous inference with this Beraisa by differentiating between one theft (where he cannot be sold twice) and two thefts (where he can, even if the two were judged simultaneously and he was found guilty in the same sitting).

(c)Abaye disagrees with Rava on the grounds that, in his opinion, "bi'Geneivaso" implies any amount of thefts.

(d)He therefore explains that as long as he stole from one person, he can only be sold once, whereas if he sold from two people (or even from one person, but he took him to Beis-Din on two separate occasions), he can be sold for each theft.

4)

(a)The Tana Kama of the Beraisa rules that, if ...

1. ... someone stole a thousand Zuz, but his assessed value was only five hundred Zuz he is sold twice.

2. ... he stole five hundred Zuz, whereas his assessed value is a thousand he cannot be sold at all.

(b)The Tana Kama's reason for the latter ruling is based on the fact that "v'Nimkar" implies "v'Nimkar (Kulo)", 've'Lo Chetzyo'

(c)According to Rebbi Eliezer a thief cannot be sold unless his value tallies with the amount that he stole.

(d)Rava declares that Rebbi Eliezer's reasoning is more correct than the Chachamim's because, by the same token "bi'Geneivaso" implies 've'Lo b'Chatzi Geneivaso' (like Rebbi Eliezer).

5)

(a)The Beraisa quoted earlier, listing the differences between an Amah Ivriyah and an Eved Ivri, states 'u'Mefadin Osah Be'al-Korchah'. Abaye dismisses Rava's interpretation of 'Be'al-Korchah d'Adon' (by which he must have meant that the father writes a credit note for her assessed value, and hands it to the Adon), on the same grounds that we dismissed this suggestion earlier in the Sugya, namely, because it would be inconceivable to expect anyone to give away 'a jewel for a currently worthless piece of paper'.

(b)So Abaye explains it to mean 'Be'al-Korchah d'Av' (due to the stigmatization of his family that his daughter's status causes).

(c)We do not force the members of the Eved Ivri's family to redeem him because he will only sell himself again.

(d)Ultimately, the difference between the Eved Ivri and the Amah Ivriyah is the fact that a father cannot sell his daughter a second time, whereas an Eved Ivri is permitted to sell himself twice. The author must therefore be Rebbi Shimon (as we shall now see).

6)

(a)The Tana Kama permits a man to sell his daughter for Ishus after Ishus and for Shifchus after Shifchus. He ...

1. ... permits Ishus Achar Shifchus ...

2. ... but forbids Shifchus Achar Ishus.

(b)Rebbi Shimon forbids Shifchus Achar Shifchus just like Shifchus Achar Ishus.

7)

(a)Rebbi Akiva holds that once the father spreads his Talis over his daughter, he is no longer permitted to sell her which is the equivalent of 'Ein Mochrah l'Shifchus Achar Ishus' (like the Tana Kama of the previous Beraisa).

(b)Rebbi Eliezer says 'Keivan she'Bagad Bah, Ein Rashai l'Mochrah' (the equivalent of 'Ein Rashai l'Mochrah l'Shifchus Achar Shifchus' [the second of Rebbi Shimon's statements]).

(c)Rebbi Eliezer holds 'Yesh Eim li'Mesores' (we go after the way the word is spelt, not pronounced). That explains why he explains "b'Vigdo" (in the Pasuk "Lo Yuchal l'Mochrah b'Vigdo Vah") as if it was written "b'Vogdo Bah" (he betrayed his daughter by selling her). Because, if the Torah really meant "b'Vigdo" (in the way that Rebbi Akiva explains the word), then it should have written it with a 'Yud'.

(d)Rebbi Akiva argues with Rebbi Eliezer inasmuch as he holds 'Yesh Eim l'Mikra' (we go after the way the word is pronounced), in which case, we have to leave "b'Vigdo" as it is (and Darshen it as a Lashon Beged).

8)

(a)Rebbi Shimon holds 'Yesh Eim l'Mikra u'li'Mesores'.

(b)The reason that in Sukos (in connection with "ba'Sukos", "ba'Sukos", "ba'Sukos", he Darshens 'Yesh Eim l'Mikra' (and not 'li'Mesores') is because there it is not possible to Darshen 'Yesh Eim l'Mikra u'le'Mesores', since the two clash (whereas in our Sugya, it is possible to Darshen both).

9)

(a)We ask whether Yi'ud makes Nisu'in (in which case her new 'husband' will immediately be obligated to bury her, will inherit her should she die, and will be permitted to annul her Nedarim in the event that she lives) or Erusin (in which case, all of these will only take effec after he marries her).

(b)We extrapolate from Rebbi Akiva, who says in the above Beraisa 'Keivan she'Piresh Taliso Alehah, Shuv Eino Rashai l'Mochrah' that the father cannot sell her, but that he can betroth her.

(c)This appears to resolve our She'eilah, in that Yi'ud must make Erusin, because otherwise, her father could not possibly betroth her after Yi'ud.

(d)To refute the proof Rav Nachman bar Yitzchak establishes 'Keivan she'Piresh Talisah Alehah' by ordinary Kidushin but not by Kidushei Yi'ud (which may well make Nisu'in).

10)

(a)In another Beraisa, Rebbi Eliezer permits a father to sell his daughter to relatives. The Tana Kama ...

1. ... forbids it because in his opinion, every sale of an Amah Ivriyah must carry with it the possibility of Yi'ud for the sale to be valid.

2. ... concedes to Rebbi Eliezer that he is permitted to sell her if she is an Almanah to a Kohen Gadol, or a Gerushah or a Chalutzah, to a Kohen Hedyot because there, seeing as the Kidushin takes effect b'Di'eved, she is considered fit for Yi'ud.

(b)The Almanah just referred to cannot be speaking when she arranged her own Kidushin because, based on the principle 'Ein b'Ma'aseh Ketanah Klum', the Tana would not refer to her as an Almanah.

(c)On the other hand, the problem with saying that her father arranged the Kidushin is that how could he possibly then sell her 'seeing as, in the opinion of Rebbi Akiva, 'Eino Mochrah l'Shifchus Achar Ishus'?

(d)Rav Amram Amar Rebbi Yitzchak therefore establishes the case when she became an Almanah following Yi'ud, according to Rebbi Yosi b'Rebbi Yehudah who says that it is not the original money that makes the Yi'ud, but the last few minutes of work (which are effected by her and not by her father).

11)

(a)We prove from Rav Amram Amar Rebbi Yitzchak's explanation that Yi'ud makes Erusin, because if it made Nisu'in, then once she was married, her father could no longer sell her.

(b)The problem with 've'Shavin she'Mochrah ... ' even if we say that Yi'ud makes Erusin is that according to Rebbi Akiva 'Eino Mochrah l'Shifchus Achar Ishus'.

(c)Despite the fact that, at the end of the day, we differentiate between Erusin which the father arranges (where we say 'Ein Adam Mocher Es Bito ... ') and Erusin which she herself arranges (where it does not apply), we cannot make the same distinction between Nisu'in which the father makes and Nisu'in which she herself makes (refuting the proof that 'Yi'ud Erusin Oseh') because logically, Nisu'in takes her out of her father's domain irrespective of who arranged it.

(d)Rav Nachman bar Yitzchak disagrees with Rav Amram Amar Rebbi Yitzchak. In his opinion, Rebbi Yosi b'Rebbi Yehudah concedes that 'Ma'os ha'Rishonos l'Kidushin Nitnu' (as we will see later). He explains the Beraisa's concession for the father to sell his daughter who is an Almanah l'Kohen Gadol ... (despite the fact that it is a case of 'Shifchus Achar Ishus' (which Rebbi Akiva forbids) by establishing the author as Rebbi Eliezer (who permits it).