Question: When he says "on condition" and we say that he may give them to the Kohen of his choice, this should mean that the transaction is invalid, as he only gave him the animal on condition that the Matanos will be his!

Answer #1: The case is where they made a condition that the Matanos should be his, and that even so if he does not give it to him, the transaction will not become invalid.

Answer #2: Alternatively, it is like a condition against the Torah (and therefore the condition is invalid while the sale remains valid), as the Torah allowed him to give it to the Kohen of his choice.

Observation: One cannot explain that Rav holds like Rav Chisda, and when he says, "with the first one" he means even with the first one.

Question: If this is correct, according to Rav Asi he could only claim from the second one and not the first one in a case where a person stole and the owner did not have Yiush, and then another person came and ate it.

Question (cont.): Nobody holds that he cannot collect from the first person who stole and that one can only collect from the one who ate it, because they do not agree with Rav Chisda.

Explanation: Rather, the opposite is correct. Rav does not agree with Rav Chisda, as he holds that the Kohen must only deal with the butcher. Rav Asi agrees with Rav Chisda that he can deal with either one.

Explanation (cont.): The Gemara pushes this aside by saying that everyone agrees with Rav Chisda. The argument is regarding whether Matnos Kehunah can be stolen. Rav holds they can as per the opinion of Rav Chisda, and therefore his issue is with the butcher, meaning even with the butcher. Rav Asi holds that his claim is specifically from the buyer since the Matanos are not in fact stolen. This is the opposite of what the Gemara originally thought.

Question: This is difficult, as what is the case? If the Matanos are not extant, we said in the beginning of the chapter that one who damages Matnos Kehunah or eats them is exempt!

Question (cont.): If they are extant, how can the Gemara say that they argue regarding Rav Chisda's law? The Gemara implies in Bava Kama (111b) that where they are extant, nobody argues on Rav Chisda! This only applies when they were eaten, as Rebbi Oshiya states that if someone steals and feeds his children, the children do not have to pay. If he put what he stole in front of them and they ate it, they must pay. If what was stolen is no longer extant, they do not have to pay etc.

Question (cont.): The Gemara (ibid.) asks, this should be a strong question on Rav Chisda's law! This implies that there is no question on whoever argues on Rav Chisda's law, as they are only exempt when what was stolen is no longer extant. However, if what was stolen is extant, they are obligated to pay! This requires further study.

Explanation: The question of Reish Lakish is from the opinion of the Rabbanan as well. The Rabbanan only argue because they understand that the ants certainly gathered whatever is there. This is why that grain belongs to the landowner. This implies that if it would be unclear how the grain got there, they would agree that it is Leket just like what is on top, as possible Leket is ruled to be Leket.

Question: This is difficult according to the opinion earlier (132b) that says that before one takes Matanos the meat is Tevel. It should also say that one must be stringent in a doubt regarding Matanos before the Matanos were taken, and he can be lenient after the Matanos were taken as it is now his! This is just as it lists the firstborn of an impure animal (i.e. donkey) as both a case where one must be stringent and where one may be lenient.

Explanation: It is the round ring (of tissue surrounding the trachea, known in anatomy as the cricoid cartilage), which is round like a type of weight (used in knitting).

Explanation: Even the Rabbanan who derive (96b) from "the thigh" that the prohibition spreads through the entire thigh will agree that one cannot make the same derivation here.

Explanation: The Aruch explains in the name of Rav Saadyah Gaon that this means one who is making something, as in Aramaic the question "What is Chamorcha?" means "What do you do?"