Clarification: Even on the same day. Since Rebbi Meir does not penalize Shogeg on account of Meizid at all, as is evident in 'ha'Nizakin' (Gitin 53b). In Perek Kirah (Shabbos 38a) too it is implied that it is permitted on the same day, in connection with the She'eilah that they asked Rebbi Chiya b'Rebbi Aba about the pot that was left on the oven ... .

Clarification (Part 1): 'be'Meizid Lo Ye'acheil' - neither by him nor by anybody else on the same day; On Motza'ei Shabbos however, even he is permitted to eat it - which is evident from the fact that the Gemara tries to establish our Mishnah like Rebbi Meir, and be'Meizid ...

Proof #1: ... and our Mishnah compares Shabbos to Yom Kipur, which is Asur during the day both for him and for others, yet his Shechitah is Kasher for him as well as for others, as the Gemara will state shortly.

Proof #2: And besides, if Meizid would be forbidden forever, that would be the same as Rebbi Yehudah, as Tosfos will shortly explain.

Clarification (Part 2): And the same applies to Shogeg of Rebbi Yehudah, since the Gemara establishes the Mishnah be'Shogeg like Rebbi Yehudah.

Proof #1: ... but be'Meizid, he is never permitted to eat it' - but others may eat it on Motza'ei Shabbos - because if even they would never be permitted to eat it, then that would be the same as the Meizid of Rebbi Yochanan ha'Sandlar.

Proof #2: Morover, the Gemara in Merubah (Bava Kama 71a) establishes the Rabbanan there, who exempt someone who Shechts on Shabbos from paying four or five times, like Rebbi Yochanan ha'Sandlar, but not like Rebbi Yehudah.

Proof #3: Furthermore, the Gemara there asks what is Rebbi Yochanan ha'Sandlar's reason but not what is Rebbi Yehudah's reason.

Conclusion: The outcome of all this is that the Meizid of Rebbi Meir is equivalent to the Shogeg of Rebbi Yehudah, and the Meizid of Rebbi Yehudah is equivalent to the Shogeg of Rebbi Yochanan ha'Sandlar.

Clarification: This implies that it is Halachah, and indeed, Rava in Perek Kirah (Shabbos 38a) rules like Rebbi Meir.

Question (Part 1): This poses a Kashya on Ra4shi at the beginning of Perek Ein Tzadin (Beitzah 2b), where the Gemara rules that if a Nochri brought a gift for a Yisrael, if there is more of that species still attached to the ground, then the Yisrael is forbidden to benefit from the gift for as long as it would take to pick it and bring it; and Rashi attributes this to the prohibition of deriving benefit from a Melachah that has been performed on Yom-Tov ...

Question (Part 2): ... But in the case of 'Mevashel be'Shogeg', we just ruled that be'Shogeg, it is permitted on the Shabbos, even though one derives benefit from it.

Answer: One could however answer that in our case, one does not derive so much benefit, seeing as even without cooking, one could have eaten it raw.

Question: The Kashya on Rashi remains however, on the case of 'ha'Shochet be'Shabbos be'Shogeg', which one may eat according to Rebbi Meir, there where one had a sick person in the house on Erev Shabbos, who recovered, as the Gemara will explain shortly, seeing as it is not Muktzah, and the Gemara did not forbid it because one benefited from it on Shabbos?

Answer: The Rabbanan did not decree on something that is unusual.

Question: Why does the Gemara not establish our Mishnah be'Shogeg according to Rebbi Meir, even where there was no sick person in the house?

Answer: The Mishnah learns Shabbos, similar to Yom-Kipur, where it is Asur to eat it on that day even where there is a sick person in the house.

Question: In any event, it cannot be exactly the same as Yom-Kipur, seeing as on Shabbos, there where he did not recover, it is permitted even according to Rebbi Yehudah (but not on Yom Kipur)?

Answer: There where 'Chiyuv' is applicable, it compares Shabbos to Yom-Kipur, as the Tana states "even though he is Chayav Misah".

Question #1: If we hold that something can be Muktzah for half of Shabbos, then why does Rebbi Meir permit by Shochet be'Shabbos, where the sick person recovered?

Question #2: And why does Rebbi Yehudah only forbid because he penalizes Shogeg because of Meizid, as the Gemara explains in 'ha'Nizakin' (Gitin 53:), and not because of Muktzah?

Source: ... because whether there is Muktzah for half of Shabbos or not, is a She'eilah in 'Ein Tzadin' (Beitzah 26b).

Answer #1: Since it is common for the sickness to return, it is not Muktzah, much in the same way as 'Gamro bi'Yedei Adam' (where the Muktzah was completed by a person), which the Gemara there permits.

Answer #2: Rav himself is not certain and holds that perhaps there is no Muktzah for half of Shabbos, which is why he does not establish it like Rebbi Meir, only like Rebbi Yehudah, who forbids it because of 'Koneis Shogeg Atu Meizid.

Explanation #1: Rashi explains that the fact that the Gemara mentions 'Katzatz', implies that it is speaking about 'Mechubar'.

Question: If that is so, then why does the Gemara need to then mention 'Mevashel', seeing as it is Asur even if was not cooked?

Explanation #2: Rabeinu Tam therefore explains that it is speaking about 'Talush'; nevertheless the Lashon 'Ketzitzah' is applicable ...

Source: ... just like we find in 'Bameh Madlikin' (Shabbos 34a) 'Here ben Azai cut (Kitzetz) Turmus beans of Terumah; and in Perek Echad Dinei Mamonos (Sanhedrin 33b) 'As long as the fire is still burning, cut (Kotz) your pumpkin and roast it!'

Question: So why did the Gemara not use the word 'Chatichah', like we learned in the Mishnah in Shabbos (156b) 'Mechatchin es ha'Delu'in'?

Answer: Because when one comes to cook, one tends to cut it into small pieces, the word 'Kotz' is fully applicable.

Implied Question: ... and Mevashel is Asur ... ?

Answer: ... because pumpkin is not fit to chew raw, like we learned in Maseches Tamid (27b) 'One should avoid spitting out anything in the presence of one's Rebbe, with the sole exception of raw pumpkin, which is as dangerous as a thread of lead.

Question: But it is fit to feed one's animals, and whatever is fit for animals is fit for humans, as the Gemara concludes in the first Perek of Beitzah (Daf 6b), in the case of a chick that is born on Yom-Tov.

Answer: Since a pumpkin stands to be eaten by man, but it is not fit for him to eat, it is Muktzah even though it is fit for animals.

Question: Perhaps the Tana mentioned a Lashon of Bedi'eved because of a hand-scythe ...

Precedent: ... like we find at the beginning of 'Kol ha'Pesulin' (Zevachim 32a), where it mentions 'she'Shachat' (Bedi'eved) because of 'Tamei', even though Zarim, women and Avadim may Shecht even Lechatchilah.

Answer (Part 1): The Tana there is content to mention all those who are Pasul to do the Avodah together, to teach us that their Shechitah is nevertheless Kasher - some of them Lechatchilah, some of them Bedi'eved ...

Answer (Part 2): ... but here, what is the point of bunching together those that are Kasher Lechatchilah together with those that are Kasher Bedi'eved?

Question: In Perek Chavis (Shabbos 147a) the Tana mentions 'ha'Rochetz' Bedi'eved, because of Mei Me'arah (cave-water), even though bathing in the Chamei Teveryah (the Hot Springs of Teverya) is permitted even Lechatchilah?

Answer: The Tana deliberately mentions 'Chamei Teverya' together with 'Mei Me'arah', to teach us that 'Mei Me'arah' is speaking about hot water, just like 'Chamei Teverya' is.

Clarification: The Gemara could have answered that 'Kaneh' and 'Kaneh' do not clash, since one of them is referring to 'Simunya de'Agma' (a specific kind of cane known as 'sedge'), the other, to other kinds of cane (as the Gemara will differentiate later [16:]), but 'Tzur' on 'Tzur' remains difficult.

Implied Question: Why did the Gemara not take the trouble to teach us the extent of Rebbi Chiya's leniency?

Answer: Because the Beraisa has already taught us that one may Shecht with anything, both with Talush and with Mechubar.

Implied Question: Earlier regarding the case of Rebbi Chiya, why did the Gemara not give this answer?

Answer: Because, since what is initially attached, is Kasher Bedi'eved, why should he forbid it Lechatchilah? If it is because we are afraid that he may be Doreis (press the neck on to the knife), then the same ought to apply even to what is first detached and then became attached?

Refutation: It is not coming to preclude a cane that a person planted, since that too, is considered 'initially attached' ...

Proof: ... since we see that even those who forbid the house to which somebody prostrated himself, permit the tree to which somebody prostrated himself, forbidding only what grows afterwards.

Explanation: And the reason that the Tana mentions 'Oleh me'Eilav' is to indicate that 'Tzur ha'Yotzei min ha'Kosel' is speaking about the wall of a cave just like 'Kanah ha'Omeid me'Eilav'.