Clarification: The Gemara wants to establish it even be'Meizid.

Question #1: In that case, on what grounds is his Shechitah Kasher, seeing as one is forbidden to eat from the Shechitah of a Mumar (apostate) in Chilul Shabbos, as is evident in the Gemara that we learned earlier (5a)?

Question #2: Moreover, the Gemara wants to establish it be'Meizid and according to Rebbi Meir, and Rebbi Meir holds in Perek 'ad Kamah' (Bechoros 30a) and in 'Zeh Borer' (27a) that 'a Mumar for just one thing is automatically a Mumar for the entire Torah'?

Answer #1: That speaks specifically about someone who transgresses in public, whereas our Sugya is speaking about someone who transgresses in private.

Reservation: According to the Gemara's attempt to establish it like Rebbi Meir however (according to whose opinion, be'Meizid is forbidden even in private), the question remains.

Answer #2: Alternatively, a person is not considered a Mumar for transgressing only once.

Proof #1: And so the Gemara later (on Daf 39a) implies, when Resh Lakish validates the Shechitah (even to eat, explains Rashi) of an animal that someone Shechted having in mind to sprinkle its blood to Avodah-Zarah - despite the fact that, even according to him (Resh Lakish) the person who Shechted it is Chayav Misah ...

Precedent: Just like the Gemara in Perek Arba Misos (Sanhedrin 61a), which rules that if somebody prostrates himself before a mountain, the mountain is permitted, even though the person who worshipped it is Chayav Misah.

Proof #2 (Part 1): Furthermore, the Gemara in the second Perek (41a) rules that even according to the opinion that validates the declaration of someone who declares forbidden something that is not his, that refers specifically to a Nochri; whereas a Yisrael certainly has in mind merely to tease.

Proof #2 (Part 2): The Gemara then asks from a case where two people are holding a knife and Shechting together, only one of them is Shechting in the name of the forbidden things listed there; the other, in the name of what one is supposed to have in mind, which the Gemara renders invalid. And the Gemara answers that it is speaking about a Yisrael Mumar ...

Proof #2 (Part 2): ... Now since he is a Mumar, he ought to be Pasul for that alone, without any other P'sul being taken into consideration. The problem dissipates however, if the Shechitah of a just one time Mumar is not forbidden.

Question (Part 1): It is implicit throughout Shas that Rav Huna was greater than him (Chiya bar Rav)?

Question (Part 2): ... as in 'Yesh be'Erchin' (Erchin 16b) where 'Rav Huna caused Chiya bar Rav pain'; and in Perek ha'Lokei'ach Beheimah (Bechoros 22a) where 'Rebbi Chiya bar Rav said to Rav Huna "Rebbi, explain your words!"

Clarification: According to the Rabbanan however, one may eat it even on the same day.

Question: But one cannot salt it on Shabbos?

Answer #1: It speaks where one transgressed and did salt it.

Answer #2: Alternatively, it is permitted to eat it raw, even without salting it.

Implied Question: ... even though the blood that is absorbed in the limbs is subject to a La'av, as the Gemara explains in Perek Dam Shechitah (Kerisus 21b) ...

Answer: That is only once it leaves the flesh, but as long as it has not, it is permitted.

Proof #1: ... as is evident in Perek Kol ha'Basar (Daf 111a) where it states that they would eat the liver before it had exuded its blood, by placing it in vinegar, thereby causing it to contract, so that both it and the vinegar were permitted. Since if the vinegar had been forbidden, it would have been forbidden too, because just if the flesh would exude (the blood), it would also absorb (the vinegar).

Proof #2: It also rules on Daf 112.) 'that a loaf of bread on which one cut (roasted) meat, may not be eaten, even though the meat itself is permitted.

Proof #3: Moreover, the Gemara in Perek Mefanin (Shabbos 128a) declares raw meat Muktzah, but not duck-meat, which is fit to be eaten raw.

Proof #4: And later in the Sugya (15b) the Gemara rules that if someone Shechts for a sick person on Shabbos, a healthy person is permitted to eat the meat raw.

Halachah (Part 1): As a result, it would seem that meat that one intends to roast does not require salting at all, since (as we just explained) blood that has not emerged is permitted. Rabeinu Tam too, concurs with this opinion. And this speaks (not only where the meat is well roasted, so that all the blood is drained from the meat that it is permitted to eat Lechatchilah; but even where it is only slightly roasted, even then, it is permitted.

Halachah (Part 2): ... and despite the fact that the blood inside the flesh moves from one side to the other, it does not become Asur until it leaves the flesh, as the Gemara says in 'Kol ha'Basar' (112a) which (in a case where someone cut a piece of roasted meat on top of a loaf) permits the meat, even though all the blood has not yet drained from it.

Implied Question: Then why does the Gemara say there (on Daf 113a) that Rav Sheishes salted meat piece by piece; not two at a time, because the blood will then emerge from one piece and enter the other. So why, asks the Gemara, are we not concerned that, even by one piece, the blood will emerge from one side and become absorbed by the other side?

Answer: What the Gemara there means is that the blood will emerge completely from one side and become absorbed by the other side.

Implied Question: And when the Beraisa says in the first Perek of Beitzah (11a) 'And they (Beis Shamai and Beis Hillel) agree that one is permitted to use it (a chopping-board) to salt meat for roasting' (implying that meat for roasting requires salting) ...

Answer: ... that is not because roasting meat is forbidden if it is not first salted, but because it is nevertheless customary to salt meat for roasting.

Explanation: And in 'ha'Kometz Rabah' (Menachos 21a) where, on the ruling that 'after salting the meat, one needs to turn it over and salt it the other side', Rabah comments that 'the same applies to meat for the pot' (the text 'and the same applies to roasting' is incorrect).

Explanation #1 (Part 1): Rabeinu Tam explains that the Tana is speaking where the gourds were picked on Shabbos, similar to the animal that became a Neveilah on Shabbos. And we will need to say according to Rabeinu Tam, that it speaks in a case where one cannot declare the gourds forbidden, neither because 'one is liable to climb the tree and detach it', nor because 'they are similar to dried figs and raisins' ...

Clarification (Part 1): ... the two reasons to prohibit something that has been detached on Shabbos. Because so we find at the beginning of Maseches Beitzah (3a), where the Gemara forbids fruit that falls from the tree 'in case one comes to climb the tree and detach it ...

Clarification (Part 2): Whereas at the beginning of 'Ein Tzadin' (Beitzah 24b) regarding a Nochri who brought a gift for a Yisrael, which the Gemara forbids if there is more fruit of that species still on the tree. And, as Rashi explains, even Rebbi Shimon concedes that it is Muktzah, since it is comparable to dried figs and raisins (which by virtue of the fact that one did not pick them yesterday, he has pushed them out of his mind ('Aktzinhu mi'Da'ato').

Explanation #1 (Part 2): It also seems that the entire Sugya is speaking about Safek Muchan (prepared), whereas this case speaks where he has an animal, rendering the gourds Muchan even when they were attached.

Implied Question: And when the Gemara in Perek Kol Kisvei forbids placing one's animal on top of Muktzah' - (grass that was detached on Shabbos [implying that, because it was attached when Shabbos came in, it is Muktzah]) ...

Answer: ... Rashi explains there that it speaks where the grass was growing, where th animal could not go there.

Alternative Answer: It speaks here where the owner is waiting in anticipation for the gourds to be picked; and regarding the animal too, he is waiting for 'Chashu' to come and Shecht it whilst others look on to check.

Proof: In fact, we have to learn like that, because at the beginning of 'ha'Meivi' (Beitzah 30b) it is clear that wherever the owner is not waiting in anticipation, Rebi Shimon considers it Muktzah.

Clarification: The Chashash (suspicion) that one may detach the fruit, applies specifically to the fruit of a tree which is easy to pick, and what's more, a person has a desire for them, in which case he will forget about Shabbos and pick it. And the same applies to the Chashash that one might squeeze the fruit to obtain its juice. It does not apply to something that needs a hoe or a spade to obtain.

Clarification: Similarly, fish that are caught on Yom-Tov are forbidden, not because of the Chashash that one might catch them, but because they are Muktzah, like dried figs ... .

Proof: Proof of this lies in the Gemara in 'Kol Kisvei' (Shabbos 122b), where the Gemara does not forbid descending a ramp that a Nochri made for a Yisrael because he might then make it himself.

Question: And when the Gemara later compares the Chashash 'that one might Shecht to the Chashash that one might squeeze the fruit (clashing with what Tosfos just explained) ...

Answer: ... Tosfos will clarify the issue there.

Explanation #2: Alternatively, our Sugya speaks where the gourds were picked on Erev Shabbos ...

Question: What is the Tana then coming to teach us?

Answer: He is coming to teach the concession of bothering to prepare food or to make something into a food (a point over which Rav Huna [in the last Perek of Shabbos 155a] and Rav Yehudah argue.

Question: And the reason that the Tana did not insert this Halachah there together with the Din of bundles of fodder and the other cases mentioned there ...

Answer (Part 1): ... is because he prefers to learn all the cases that concern cutting together on their own ...

Answer (Part 2): ... and he mentions gourds independently, because they are exceptionally hard.

Clarifying Text: This is the correct text, and not 'me'Erev Yom-Tov' ...

Proof: ... as is evident at the beginning of Maseches Beitzah (2a), where the Gemara stats that with regard to Shabbos, Rebbi learned a S'tam Mishnah like Rebbi Shimon, as we learned 'Mechatchin es ha'Delu'in' (the current Mishnah).

Implied Question: Then why does it refer to it as 'Muchan le'Adam' (bearing in mind that on Shabbos, one is forbidden to Shecht it)?

Answer: Because it it is automatically designated to be eaten by man.

Question (Part 1): In the first Perek of Beitzah (6a), we learned that when they asked Rav, who forbids a chick that is hatched on Yom-Tov, how that differs from a calf that is born from a T'reifah, they remained silent.

Question (Part 2): And in reply to the question as to why Rav was silent; why he did not answer that the latter is permitted 'since it is prepared via its mother for the dogs, the Gemara replies that 'Now that Muchan le'Adam is not Muchan li'Beheimah', as we learned in the Mishnah "If it was not Neveilah on Erev Shabbos ... ", how can we say that 'Muchan li'Kelavim is Muchan le'Adam'?'

Question (Part 3): Why does the Gemara there not answer that it is Muktzah because it is Muktzah Machmas Isur (since it is Asur to Shecht it on Shabbos)?

Suggested Answer: Perhaps the Mishnah is talking about a bird and a lamb, that are fit to feed live to a hawk or a lion ...

Refutation: Why establish it like that, and not where it is simply unfit to be eaten raw, when it is Muktzah Machmas Isur?

Answer (Part 1): Rav Yosef answers that the Gemara extrapolates this from the extra wording, because, after saying 'Asur', why does the Tana find it necessary to add 'because it is not Muchan'?

Answer (Part 2): It must be R. Yoshiyah teach us, that even if the reason of Muktzah Machmas Isur does not apply (such as something that is fit to be eaten raw or on Yom-Tov), it is nevertheless forbidden - because it is not Muchan for the Same thing as it was at first.

Clarification: This implies that, according to Abaye, an animal is generally designated for eating, even though regarding a chicken, Abaye says at the beginning of Beitzah (4a) that it stands both to be eaten and to lay eggs.

Clarification: The text cannot read 'di'Tenan', since the Mishnah is only discussing the opinion of Rebbi Meir.

Statement: Tosfos has discussed the issue of B'reirah at length in Perek Kol ha'Get (Gitin 25a), in 'Merubeh' (Bava Kama 69b) and in Perek ba'Kol Me'arvin (Eruvin 36b).

Question #1: This Sugya goes according to Rav, who does not hold of the reason of 'Beki'as ha'Nod', as we find in Perek ba'Kol Me'arvin (Eruvin 36b), where the Gemara rejects the Mishnah before Ayo and the Beraisa of 'ha'Loke'ach Yayin', but who holds that the reason of Rebbi Yehudah is because of 'Ein B'reirah'?

Question #2: ... And Rebbi Shimshon mi'Coucy asks how the Gemara here can cite the case of 'Ayo', after rejecting the Beraisa of 'ha'Loke'ach', seeing as the Gemara there implies that, were it not for the Beraisa of 'ha'Loke'ach', we would have rejected Ayo in light of the Mishnah

Source: ... because the Gemara refutes the suggestion to reject Ayo in light of the Mishnah on the basis of the Beraisa of 'ha'Loke'ach', according to which Rebbi Yehudah does not hold of B'reirah?

Answer (Part 1): It therefore seems that the Gemara's statement here 'Hasam ke'de'Katani Ta'ama ... is really merel a 'Dichuy' (a put-off), and that really the Gemara relies on Ayo ...

Answer (Part 2): ... because one cannot prove from the Beraisa of 'ha'Loke'ach' that Rebbi Yehudah does not hold of B'reirah, as long as it has not cited Ayo, which does not hold of the Mishnah in Eruvin; That is why the Gemara goes on to cite Ayo, since now we do not hold like the Mishnah in light of both of them.

Question #1: Without this answer, why does Rebbi Yehudah not compare the animal to liquid, inasmuch as just as we decree that one might squeeze the fruit to obtain its juice, so too, he might come to Shecht the animal?

Question #2: Furthermore, why did the B'nei Yeshivah establish the ruling (forbidding the animal that was Shechted on Shabbos for the duration of Shabbos) like Rebbi Yehudah? It will certainly go like the Rabbanan, who forbid even other fruit (besides olives and grapes), in case one comes to squeeze them?

Question #3: Moreover, how can one compare 'Shema Yischot' to 'Shema Yishchot' anyway, seeing as it is much easier to squeeze than it is to Shecht?

Answer (Part 1): Indeed they are not comparable, which explains why we do not compare the animal to other liquids. It does however, compare 'Shema Yishchot' - in that the animal stands to be Shechted to 'Shema Yischot' - in that the fruit stands to be eaten.'

Answer (Part 2): It cannot go like the Rabbanan, since they only decree 'Shema Yischot' by fruit that is designated for liquid ...

Answer (Part 3): ... whereas Rebbi Yehudah who permits other fruits that are designated for eating, forbids olives and grapes, despite the fact that they are designated for eating, in case the owner changes his mind and decides to squeeze them. And it is by the same token that he forbids the animal that was Shechted (even though it was not designated to be Shechted).

Clarification (Part 1): This is merely a 'Dichuy', seeing as in reality, Muktzah Machmas Isur is more stringent than Muktzah Machmas Miy'us ...

Source (Part 1): ... because later the Gemara will say that Rebbi Meir only permits by cooking, but not by Shechting, since the animal was not fit to chew.

Source (Part 2): Whereas in Perek Kirah (Shabbos 44a) Rebbi Meir specifically does not hold of Muktzah Machmas Miy'us ... , when he permits moving all lamps on Shabbos, even an old lamp, except for one that was lit that Shabbos ...

Question: ... and the reason that Rav Ashi establishes the Mishnah like Rebbi Yehudah of 'Mevashel' (see Maharam) ...

Answer: ... is because the Mishnah cannot be established by Muktzah Machmas Isur, since he extrapolates from the Mishnah 'Shabbos like Yom Kipur', where it speaks even where there is a sick person in his house who recovered, as Tosfos will explain shortly.