OPINIONS: The Tana'im disagree about whether one may benefit from the result of a Melachah performed by a Jew on Shabbos.

Rebbi Meir maintains that food cooked on Shabbos accidentally (b'Shogeg) may be eaten on Shabbos by anyone, even by the person who cooked it. Food cooked intentionally (b'Mezid) may not be eaten on Shabbos by anyone, but it may be eaten after Shabbos.

Rebbi Yehudah maintains that food cooked on Shabbos b'Shogeg may be eaten only after Shabbos, by anyone. Food cooked b'Mezid may never be eaten by the person who cooked it, but it may be eaten after Shabbos by one who did not cook it.

Rebbi Yochanan ha'Sandlar rules that the transgressor may never eat food he cooked on Shabbos, whether he cooked b'Shogeg or b'Mezid. Others may eat the food after Shabbos if it was cooked b'Shogeg, but they may not eat it if it was cooked b'Mezid.

The Gemara in a number of places (see, for example, Shabbos 18b, 151a) teaches that when a Jew wrongfully instructs a Nochri to perform Melachah on Shabbos, the Jew may not benefit from that Melachah until "bi'Chedei she'Ya'asu" -- until enough time has passed for the Melachah to be done after Shabbos. When the Tana'im here rule that one may not benefit from Melachah wrongfully performed by a Jew on Shabbos, do they require that one wait "bi'Chedei she'Ya'asu" or do they permit one to benefit from the Melachah immediately after Shabbos?

(a) RASHI (DH Lo Yochal, and throughout the Sugya) writes that one must wait "bi'Chedei she'Ya'asu" whenever he is required to wait until after Shabbos to eat the food. Since one may not benefit from a Melachah performed on Shabbos, he obviously must wait "bi'Chedei she'Ya'asu." This is also the opinion of the BEHAG (Hilchos Shabbos 22b) and the RAMBAN. The Ramban adds that this requirement applies only to a Melachah which was performed wrongfully by a Jew, but not to a Melachah which was permitted on Shabbos because of Piku'ach Nefesh. A vegetable picked on Shabbos for a deathly-ill person may be eaten by a healthy person immediately after Shabbos.

(b) However, the RAMBAM (Hilchos Shabbos 6:23) rules that when a Jew performs Melachah from which one may benefit after Shabbos, he is permitted to benefit from it immediately after Shabbos. This is also the opinion of RABEINU YONAH (cited by the MAGID MISHNEH), the ROSH, RAN, and many other Rishonim (see BEIS YOSEF OC 318:1).

Why, according to the ruling of these Rishonim, is the Halachah more stringent with regard to a Melachah performed by a Nochri for a Jew on Shabbos (which constitutes an Isur d'Rabanan according to most opinions) than with regard to a Melachah performed by a Jew on Shabbos (which is an Isur d'Oraisa)?

The BEIS YOSEF and others explain that the reason why the Halachah is more stringent with regard to a Melachah performed by a Nochri is that people tend to be more lax with the prohibition against benefiting from a Nochri's Melachah, since it is only mid'Rabanan. If one would be allowed to benefit from a Nochri's Melachah immediately after Shabbos, he might openly ask the Nochri to do Melachah for him on Shabbos. In contrast, when a Jew accidentally does Melachah on Shabbos, there is no concern that if he is permitted to benefit from the Melachah immediately after Shabbos he will do Melachah on Shabbos again. Also, there is no concern that a Jew will tell another Jew to do Melachah for him on Shabbos. Therefore, there is no requirement to wait "bi'Chedei she'Ya'asu" in order to benefit from a Melachah done by a Jew on Shabbos.

The SHITAH MEKUBETZES points out that there is a case in which waiting "bi'Chedei she'Ya'asu" is necessary in order to permit one to benefit from a Melachah done by a Jew. The Gemara in Shabbos (18b) discusses a case in which a woman filled a pot with legumes and put it in the oven right before Shabbos, and thereby transgressed the Isur d'Rabanan of Shehiyah. The Gemara rules that one is permitted to benefit from the legumes after Shabbos, but only after he waits "bi'Chedei she'Ya'asu." How do the Rambam and other Rishonim understand the Gemara there?

The Shitah Mekubetzes answers that when a person performs a Melachah before Shabbos and the effects of that Melachah occur on Shabbos, it is not obvious to everyone that benefiting from the Melachah is prohibited (or that the Melachah itself is even prohibited to do in the first place). Therefore, the Rabanan were stringent in such a case and instituted the requirement to wait "bi'Chedei she'Ya'asu," just as they were stringent and prohibited benefiting from Melachah performed by a Nochri on Shabbos. The Isur that was done is not so obvious, and thus there is a concern that people might continue to do this form of Melachah on Shabbos. The Rabanan instituted the requirement to wait "bi'Chedei she'Ya'asu" so that it would be clear to everyone that such a Melachah is forbidden.

QUESTION: Rebbi Meir maintains that food cooked on Shabbos accidentally (b'Shogeg) may be eaten on Shabbos by anyone, even by the person who cooked it. Food cooked intentionally (b'Mezid) may not be eaten on Shabbos by anyone, but it may be eaten after Shabbos. RASHI (DH Yochal) explains that the person who transgressed b'Shogeg may eat the food himself on Shabbos. He must wait until after Shabbos only if he "transgressed an Isur [and cooked] intentionally (b'Mezid)."

Rebbi Yehudah maintains that food cooked on Shabbos b'Shogeg may be eaten only after Shabbos, by anyone. Food cooked b'Mezid may never be eaten by the person who cooked it, but it may be eaten after Shabbos by one who did not cook it. Rashi (DH Rebbi Yehudah) explains that the reason why Rebbi Yehudah requires that one wait until after Shabbos is that "an Aveirah nevertheless was done," even though the act is not punishable with Sekilah since it was done b'Shogeg. In order not to derive benefit from an Aveirah, one must wait until after Shabbos.

Why does Rashi first refer to the act of cooking on Shabbos as an "Isur," and then refer to the same act as an "Aveirah"?

ANSWER: Perhaps one may answer as follows. Every transgression a person commits involves two components: a transgression of the specific, prohibited act, and a general rebellion against the word of Hash-m (see RAV ELCHANAN WASSERMAN Hy'd in CHIDUSHEI AGADOS, in the name of the RAMCHAL).

Accordingly, Rashi explains the argument between Rebbi Meir and Rebbi Yehudah as follows. When a person sins b'Shogeg, he performs a violation of a specific, prohibited act (and therefore he must attain atonement by bringing a Korban Chatas). However, he has not rebelled against Hash-m, because he did not commit the act intentionally. Rebbi Meir maintains that when there is no element of rebellion in the person's transgression of the laws of Shabbos, there is no need to prohibit benefiting from the result of his Melachah.

Rebbi Yehudah argues and maintains that since an unintentional sin still constitutes transgression of a prohibited act (as is evident from the fact that it needs atonement), it is also sufficient grounds to penalize the person and to prohibit him benefiting from his act until after Shabbos.

Rashi uses the word "Isur" when explaining the opinion of Rebbi Meir, and he uses the word "Aveirah" when explaining the opinion of Rebbi Yehudah. Perhaps Rashi uses the word "Isur" to refer to the element of rebellion in the sin, and he uses the word "Aveirah" to refer to the specific prohibition that was transgressed. Rebbi Meir permits benefiting from the Melachah on Shabbos itself because no "Isur" was done (there was no element of rebellion in his sin), while Rebbi Yehudah prohibits benefiting from the Melachah on Shabbos because an "Aveirah" was done (a transgression nevertheless was committed). (Z. Wainstein)

QUESTION: Rebbi Yehudah maintains that food cooked on Shabbos unintentionally (b'Shogeg) may be eaten only after Shabbos, by anyone. Food cooked intentionally (b'Mezid) may never be eaten by the person who cooked it, but it may be eaten after Shabbos by one who did not cook it. RASHI (DH Rebbi Yehudah) explains that the reason why Rebbi Yehudah requires that one wait until after Shabbos is that "an Aveirah nevertheless was done," even though the act is not punishable with Sekilah since it was done b'Shogeg. In order not to derive benefit from an Aveirah, one must wait until after Shabbos.

Rashi asks that perhaps Rebbi Yehudah maintains that the food is prohibited on Shabbos only to the person who cooked it, but others are allowed to eat it on Shabbos. It is prohibited to the one who cooked it because of a "Gezeirah Shogeg Atu Mezid" -- if the person himself would be permitted to eat the food that he cooked b'Shogeg on Shabbos, then in the future he might cook b'Mezid on Shabbos and claim that he cooked b'Shogeg. If this is the intention of Rebbi Yehudah, why does the Gemara say that the Mishnah follows the view of Rebbi Yehudah? The Mishnah, according to Rav's explanation, prohibits anyone from eating the food on Shabbos, but Rebbi Yehudah maintains that only the sinner himself is penalized on Shabbos, while others may eat the food even on Shabbos!

Rashi answers that Rebbi Yehudah does not maintain that the food is prohibited only to the sinner because of a "Gezeirah Shogeg Atu Mezid," because such a Gezeirah would equate a person who cooked b'Shogeg with one who cooked b'Mezid. Rebbi Yehudah, however, does not equate them; he allows the food to be eaten after Shabbos in a case of Shogeg, and prohibits it forever in a case of Mezid.

Rashi's explanation seems to contradict the Gemara in Gitin (53b), which explicitly states that Rebbi Yehudah's opinion is based on a "Gezeirah Shogeg Atu Mezid." How are Rashi's words here to be reconciled with the Gemara in Gitin?

(a) The MAHARSHAL explains that the Gemara in Gitin means that Rebbi Yehudah makes a "Gezeirah Shogeg Atu Mezid" even with regard to others, who did not cook on Shabbos. The Rabanan prohibited everyone from benefiting from the result of a Melachah that was done on Shabbos, equating Shogeg with Mezid with regard to everyone else benefiting from the Melachah on Shabbos. However, they did not equate Shogeg with Mezid with regard to the sinner himself. Unlike Melachah done b'Mezid, the Rabanan did not prohibit food cooked b'Shogeg to the sinner forever, but only for the duration of Shabbos. (As the MAHARSHA points out, although this appears to be the approach of TOSFOS (15b, DH Kegon), it is not entirely consistent with the words of Rashi.)

(b) The MAHARSHA explains that Rashi maintains that the Gemara here has a different understanding of Rebbi Yehudah's opinion, and in this regard it disagrees with the Gemara in Gitin. The Mishnah here, according to Rav's understanding, maintains that an animal slaughtered on Shabbos may not be eaten by anyone until after Shabbos (Rashi to 14a, DH v'Nasvin). This prohibition can apply only if Rebbi Yehudah maintains that a general prohibition against benefiting from an act done on Shabbos prohibits the meat, and not merely a "Gezeirah Shogeg Atu Mezid." Such a Gezeirah would prohibit the meat only to the sinner himself (since it is only he who deserves to be penalized). The Gemara in Gitin argues and prohibits the meat only to the sinner himself because of a "Gezeirah Shogeg Atu Mezid." (Z. Wainstein)

QUESTION: The Gemara concludes that according to Rebbi Meir, an animal that was slaughtered on Shabbos is Muktzah Machmas Isur, even though it was not actively excluded from use on Shabbos. TOSFOS (14b, DH Eimar) adds that Rebbi Yehudah also maintains that an object can be prohibited because of Muktzah Machmas Isur without being actively excluded from use, contrary to the Gemara's original assumption (beginning of 15a).

If the animal slaughtered on Shabbos can be prohibited to eat on Shabbos because of Muktzah Machmas Isur, then why is this not the reason for why the animal is prohibited for the duration of Shabbos according to the Mishnah (and not because the act of Shechitah involved a desecration of Shabbos)? (TOSFOS 15a, DH Ki)

(a) TOSFOS answers that the Mishnah compares an animal slaughtered on Shabbos to an animal slaughtered on Yom Kippur. On Yom Kippur, a slaughtered animal may not be eaten even when the laws of Muktzah do not apply (such as when there was a deathly-ill person nearby at the start of Yom Kippur, and the animal was designated to be slaughtered if the need would arise). This implies that an animal slaughtered on Shabbos is also prohibited to be eaten for reasons other than Muktzah.

(b) The BA'AL HA'ME'OR answers that the Mishnah's wording, "even though he is liable for death [for slaughtering on Shabbos and on Yom Kippur]," implies that his act of transgression is what causes the meat to be prohibited, and not the laws of Muktzah.

OPINIONS: Rebbi Yitzchak bar Ada in the name of Rav says that if one slaughters an animal for a sick person on Shabbos, the meat is forbidden to a healthy person. If one cooks meat on Shabbos (from an animal that was slaughtered before Shabbos) for a sick person, the food is permitted to a healthy person. Rebbi Yitzchak explains that the difference is that the animal that was slaughtered on Shabbos was not able to be eaten before Shabbos when it was alive, while the meat that was cooked on Shabbos was able to be eaten in its pre-cooked form before Shabbos.

The Gemara later quotes Rav Dimi, who seems to say the exact opposite of Rebbi Yitzchak bar Ada. Rav Dimi says that a healthy person is permitted to eat from an animal that was slaughtered on Shabbos for a sick person. However, a healthy person is not permitted to eat from food that was cooked on Shabbos for a sick person, lest one add food to the pot for the healthy person.

Does Rav Dimi argue with Rebbi Yitzchak bar Ada, or is there some way to reconcile their opinions?

(a) RASHI (DH ha'Shochet l'Choleh, DH Hilchesa) explains that although Rav Dimi argues with Rebbi Yizchak bar Ada with regard to food cooked on Shabbos for a sick person, he agrees with regard to an animal slaughtered on Shabbos for a sick person. When Rav Dimi says that a healthy person may not eat from the animal slaughtered for a sick person, he refers to a different case. Rebbi Yitzchak is discussing a case in which the person became sick on Shabbos, while Rav Dimi is discussing a case in which the person was sick before Shabbos. There is a significant Halachic difference between the two cases.

The RAN in Shabbos (17a of the pages of the Rif) explains that in the case in which the person becomes sick on Shabbos, the animal attained a status of Muktzah at the onset of Shabbos. In the case in which the person becomes sick before Shabbos, the animal does not become Muktzah because it is ready to be slaughtered for the sick person if the necessity arises. The BEIS YOSEF (OC 318:2) understands from the Ran's comments that the Ran learns, like Rashi, that Rav Dimi does not argue with Rebbi Yitzchak with regard to the case of Shechitah done for a sick person on Shabbos.

(b) The RIF records only the statement of Rav Dimi and entirely omits Rebbi Yitzchak bar Ada. The ROSH (1:20) explains that the Rif understands that Rav Dimi argues with Rebbi Yitzchak in both cases, food that was cooked and an animal that was slaughtered on Shabbos. Rav Dimi is discussing a case of a person who became sick on Shabbos, as Rebbi Yitzchak is discussing, and nevertheless he permits a healthy person to eat from the Shechitah. Why is the animal not Muktzah in such a case (at least for the healthy person)?

The Halachah in the laws of Muktzah follows the opinion of Rebbi Shimon in Shabbos (45a; see Rif there) who maintains that the only thing that is prohibited as Muktzah Machmas Isur (Muktzah because an Isur was done with it) is a thing that a person actively excludes from use on Shabbos ("Docheh b'Yadayim"), such as a candle that was lit before Shabbos. According to Rebbi Shimon, only things that one actively excludes from use on Shabbos have a status of Muktzah for the duration of the entire Shabbos when they were Muktzah during Beis ha'Shemashos. While other types of objects can also be considered Muktzah, once they change into a permitted object on Shabbos (such as an animal that changes into Kosher meat), they no longer are considered Muktzah (see SHEMIRAS SHABBOS K'HILCHASAH 1:22:1, who discusses this concept at length). Since the Halachah follows the opinion of Rebbi Shimon, it is logical that the Halachah also follows Rav Dimi, who says that one is permitted to eat from meat that was slaughtered on Shabbos for a sick person, whether the person became sick before or during Shabbos.

This also seems to be the opinion of the RAMBAM (Hilchos Shabbos 2:9), who permits eating such meat and does not differentiate between whether the person became sick before or during Shabbos.

The Beis Yosef asks that if, as the Rosh explains, since the Halachah follows Rebbi Shimon it is logical to rule also like Rav Dimi, then what is the meaning of the Ran's explanation? How can the Ran say that both Rav Dimi and Rebbi Yitzchak agree that meat from an animal that was slaughtered for a person who became sick on Shabbos is prohibited to a healthy person? That meat does not fall into the category of Muktzah items that remain prohibited throughout all of Shabbos!

The Beis Yosef answers that the Ran maintains that such an animal is also considered to have been actively excluded from use on Shabbos, such that it remains Muktzah throughout all of Shabbos. This is based on the Gemara in Beitzah (24b). The Gemara there teaches that when a Nochri gives a present of fruit to a Jew on Shabbos (or Yom Tov), the fruit is Muktzah if that type of fruit is attached to the ground in the Jew's locale. RASHI (DH Im Yesh) explains that because the Jew did not pick the fruit on Erev Shabbos, it is as if he has excluded it from use on Shabbos, effectively making the fruit Muktzah. Even when the Nochri later picks the fruit, the fruit remains Muktzah since it was excluded from use. Similarly, an animal that was not slaughtered on Erev Shabbos is considered to have been excluded from being used on Shabbos, and thus it remains Muktzah for the duration of Shabbos. This is how the Beis Yosef explains the view of the Ran.

The Rosh in Beitzah (3:2) agrees with Rashi's explanation there (in contrast to the explanation of TOSFOS to Beitzah 3a, DH Gezeirah, who explains that the reason why the Jew may not accept the present from the Nochri is the concern that the Jew might eventually pick the fruit from the tree himself). Why, then, does the Rosh not explain the Gemara here in the same way that the Ran explains it?

The Beis Yosef answers that the Rosh maintains that Shechitah is not comparable to picking a fruit from a tree. It is easy to pick fruit from a tree, and, therefore, not doing so can be considered tantamount to excluding the fruit from use on Shabbos. In contrast, slaughtering an animal is very difficult. Even if a person wants to slaughter an animal before Shabbos, it is likely that he will not be able to do so, since it is very difficult to find a Shochet who will take the time, before Shabbos, to examine his knife, prepare for Shechitah, perform the Shechitah, and then cut up the animal to prepare it for consumption. The lack of Shechitah, therefore, does not constitute excluding an animal from use, according to the Rosh. (Y. MONTROSE)