QUESTION: The Gemara attempts to prove from the Mishnah that with regard to an animal of Chulin, intention to perform one act for Avodah Zarah with the animal while doing another act does not prohibit the animal. Rebbi Yosi in the Mishnah (38b) derives from a Kal va'Chomer that when one slaughters an animal for an idolater, the Shechitah is valid. The Kal va'Chomer teaches as follows: For Kodshim, an improper thought can disqualify the Korban, and yet when one slaughters a Korban for a person who has improper intentions, the Korban is valid, because only the intention of the one who slaughters the Korban matters. Accordingly, with regard to the Shechitah of Chulin, which does not become disqualified through an improper thought, certainly only the intention of the slaughterer should matter.

The Gemara asks what Rebbi Yosi means when he says that a "Machshavah does not disqualify an animal of Chulin." The Gemara asks that he cannot mean that Machshavah never disqualifies the Shechitah, because the law is that if the slaughterer intends to slaughter the animal for Avodah Zarah, then the animal certainly becomes prohibited.

The TIFERES YAKOV asks why the Gemara does not ask a more basic question. Rebbi Yosi derives from a Kal va'Chomer from Kodshim that just as the intention of the one offering the Korban is the only intention that matters, so, too, the intention of the one slaughtering the Chulin animal is the only intention that matters. The basis of the Kal va'Chomer is that Machshavah does not disqualify the Shechitah of Chulin. However, if Machshavah does not disqualify the Shechitah of Chulin, then how can Rebbi Yosi say that the intention of the slaughterer is effective? Machshavah does not affect the Shechitah of Chulin at all!

ANSWER: The TIFERES YAKOV learns from here an important principle involving the Pesul of Machshavah with regard to Chulin. He writes that there are two ways to understand how an animal of Chulin can become prohibited through a Machshavah of Avodah Zarah. The first way is that the Machshavah makes the animal into Tikroves Avodah Zarah, an object offered as a sacrifice to an idol. When it is offered to an idol, the animal becomes "Zivchei Mesim" (Tehilim 106:28), which is Asur b'Hana'ah.

The second way in which an animal becomes prohibited through a Machshavah of Avodah Zarah is that the Machshavah invalidates the Shechitah, leaving an animal that was not slaughtered properly. There is no actual Isur of Avodah Zarah that takes effect on the animal; it is merely the Heter of Shechitah that does not take effect to permit the animal. Consequently, one is forbidden to eat the animal, but one is permitted to derive benefit from the animal. The Tiferes Yakov finds support in the words of the RAN (8b of the pages of the Rif, DH Garsinan b'Gemara Rav Nachman) for these two ways of understanding how Machshavah for Avodah Zarah disqualifies the Shechitah.

The Tiferes Yakov proves this from the opinion of Rebbi Yosi in the Mishnah. Rebbi Yosi says that only the Machshavah of the Shochet matters, implying that a Shochet can prohibit the animal with his thought of Avodah Zarah even though he is not the owner of the animal. However, Rebbi Yosi himself says in Kil'ayim (7:4) that if one spreads his grapevines over the wheat field of his neighbor, the field does not become prohibited as Kil'ayim, because "a person cannot prohibit something that does not belong to him" ("Ein Adam Oser Davar she'Eino Shelo"). Why, then, does Rebbi Yosi say that the Shochet is able to prohibit another person's animal?

It must be that, indeed, the animal does not become Asur b'Hana'ah as Tikroves Avodah Zarah, according to Rebbi Yosi, because "Ein Adam Oser Davar she'Eino Shelo." However, the animal will not be permitted to eat because the Shechitah was not a valid Shechitah due to the invalidating thought of the Shochet.

Accordingly, the Gemara is not bothered with the inherent contradiction in the words of Rebbi Yosi in the Mishnah for the following reason. When Rebbi Yosi says that Machshavah does not disqualify the Shechitah of Chulin, he may mean simply that Machshavah cannot make the animal into a Neveilah by disqualifying the Shechitah. However, Machshavah can actively prohibit the animal by making it Asur b'Hana'ah as Tikroves Avodah Zarah. Rebbi Yosi seeks to prove that Machshavah can make Tikroves Avodah Zarah only when it is the slaughterer's Machshavah, and not the Machshavah of the one for whom he is slaughtering. His proof is based on a Kal va'Chomer. If the Shechitah of a Korban -- which becomes disqualified by a Machshavah ha'Poseles -- can be disqualified only by the one who slaughters it, then certainly the Shechitah of Chulin -- which cannot become disqualified by a Machshavah of Avodah Zarah (such that it will be considered a Neveilah) -- can be rendered Tikroves Avodah Zarah only by the one who slaughters it.

The Gemara asks, however, that if Machshavah of Avodah Zarah cannot make an animal of Chulin become a Neveilah, then why does Rebbi Yosi prohibit the animal when the Shochet intends to slaughter the animal for Avodah Zarah, if the animal is not his? According to Rebbi Yosi, a person cannot prohibit something that does not belong to him, so he cannot make someone else's animal into Tikroves Avodah Zarah! If Rebbi Yosi prohibits it, then it must be because the Shechitah is not valid and the animal is a Neveilah. Thus, his Kal va'Chomer (in which he states that Shechitah for Avodah Zarah does not make an animal into a Neveilah, but rather the animal becomes Tikroves Avodah Zarah) contradicts his words at the end of the Mishnah (where he implies that the Shochet can prohibit another person's animal by slaughtering it for Avodah Zarah).

It is because of this that the Gemara concludes that Chulin indeed can become Asur as Neveilah according to Rebbi Yosi, and Rebbi Yosi means only that there is no concept of "Mechashev me'Avodah l'Avodah" for Chulin.

QUESTION: The Gemara teaches that an animal slaughtered for Avodah Zarah becomes prohibited. However, this applies only when the animal is slaughtered for Avodah Zarah, or when its blood is sprinkled for Avodah Zarah. If a person has intention to offer the animal for Avodah Zarah at any other time during its preparation -- such as while collecting its blood in a cup or while carrying its blood -- the animal does not become prohibited.

The Gemara quotes a Beraisa that teaches that if a person performs the Shechitah of an animal with intent to sprinkle its blood for Avodah Zarah, then the animal becomes prohibited even if its blood is not actually sprinkled for Avodah Zarah. This is a proof for Rebbi Yochanan's principle of "Mechashvin me'Avodah l'Avodah" for Chulin. However, if the person announced his intention to sprinkle the blood for Avodah Zarah only after the Shechitah was completed, then the animal is prohibited only mi'Safek, out of doubt, for the following reason. If the person decided to sprinkle the blood for Avodah Zarah only after the Shechitah was completed, then the animal is not prohibited (since there was no intention of Avodah Zarah during the Shechitah, and the Zerikah for Avodah Zarah never actually took place). However, there is a concern that perhaps "Hochi'ach Sofo Al Techilaso" -- his final action reveals his original intent. Since the person announced (after the Shechitah) that he intends to perform Zerikah for Avodah Zarah, perhaps it should be assumed that he already had this thought in mind at the time of the Shechitah, and the animal should be forbidden.

How can "Hochi'ach Sofo Al Techilaso" be applied with regard to a person who sins? A person who sinned now is never assumed to have been a sinner previously. A Jew has a "Chezkas Kashrus" and is assumed to be a G-d-fearing Jew until the moment that it is known for certain that he transgressed. If it is assumed that the person who sins now always was a sinner, then all of the animals which this person ever slaughtered should retroactively become prohibited! (SEFER HA'ESHKOL)

(a) The SEFER HA'ESHKOL asserts that the principle of "Hochi'ach Sofo Al Techilaso" applies only in this case, because the person intended to sprinkle the same animal's blood for Avodah Zarah. Since, at some point, he intended to perform the Zerikah of this animal for Avodah Zarah, it may be assumed that the Shechitah was done with this intention as well.

The OR SAME'ACH (Hilchos Shechitah 2:16) explains this point further. The Sefer ha'Eshkol means not that it is assumed that the Shochet had a second intention to sin just because he had one intention to sin in this case, the extrapolated intention would be for an earlier act, not a later one, which is not logical). Rather, when the person announces his intention to perform the Zerikah for Avodah Zarah, although it is not assumed that the Shechitah was performed with intent to perform the Shechitah for Avodah Zarah, it is assumed that when the Shechitah was performed, he planned to do the Zerikah for Avodah Zarah, just as he later announced. Obviously, this logic cannot be applied to invalidate the person's earlier Shechitos, since it can be assumed only that he wanted to perform this Zerikah for Avodah Zarah. (Even if he slaughtered some previous animal with intent to sprinkle this animal's blood to Avodah Zarah, it presumably will not be Pasul. The principle of "Mechashvin me'Avodah l'Avodah" applies only when both Avodos are done with one Korban.)

(b) RAV YOSEF SHALOM ELYASHIV shlit'a (quoted in HE'OROS L'MASECHES CHULIN) points out another reason why "Hochi'ach Sofo Al Techilaso" may be applied in this case. RASHI in Sanhedrin (61a, DH v'Ovdeihem) explains that an animal becomes prohibited if its Shechitah is performed with intent to perform Zerikah of its blood for Avodah Zarah because "Shechitah is a necessary prelude to Zerikah," and "Zerikah cannot be done without Shechitah." That is, the Shechitah is viewed as the beginning of the Zerikah process.

Accordingly, perhaps "Hochi'ach Sofo Al Techilaso" applies only in this case because the Shechitah and Zerikah are considered part of the same, single act. Therefore, if it is known that the one who performed the Shechitah intended to perform the Zerikah of this animal for Avodah Zarah at some time, it may be assumed that he had this intention from the point that is considered the beginning of the Zerikah process -- from the time of the Shechitah. In contrast, it cannot be assumed that a person had intention to perform a sin at an earlier time, before he started the sinful act in which he is presently involved. (M. KORNFELD, Mordechai Zvi Dicker)