Implied Question: The Gemara could have asked this on our Mishnah ...

Answer: ... only it waited until it had cited the Beraisa and asked on both.)

Question: According to the opinion that holds 'Techilaso bi'Peshi'ah ve'Sofo be'Oneis Chayav', why is he not Chayav to pay full damages, seeing as it was Poshe'a initially, as regards 'Urcheih', and Oneis at the end - with regard to 'La'av Urcheih'?

Answer: We do not say 'Techilaso bi'Peshi'ah' with regard to 'Regel' to render him Chayav because of 'Keren'.

Answer (cont.): ... seeing as even in a case of complete Poshe'a regarding 'Keren', the Torah only obligates a payment of Chatzi Nezek.

Proof: ... because otherwise, if a lion would enter the Chatzer of the Nizak and kill an animal and eat it (See Hagahos ve'Tziyunim), the owner ought to be Chayav Nezek Shalem, seeing as it was 'Techilaso bi'Peshi'ah' regarding 'D'risah'.

Proof (cont.): In fact, this is what the Din ought to be in all cases of Keren in the Chatzer ha'Nizak, which is always 'Techilaso bi'Peshi'ah' regarding 'Shen va'Regel'?

Clarification: That it dug its claws into the ground and jumped like a dog.

Clarification (cont.): And it is not comparable to where it 'clutched and climbed' - where it clutched onto the barrel and climbed up it until it reached the turnip.

Implied Question: Even though someone who 'sends out his fire' (See Amud 'Beis') is not Chayav until he hands over the flame, according to Resh Lakish, and according to Rebbi Yochanan, the dry twigs as well)?

Answer: ... sometimes the cake contains many coals, and it is as if he handed him the twigs according to Rebbi Yochanan, and the fire according to Resh Lakish.

Clarification: This does not mean that he has to actually burn the object, but that wherever he is negligent and does not guard his coal, it is 'his arrows'.

Clarification: This means that his Chiyuv is one of Mamon, and not that the fire must belong to him.

Clarification (cont.): ... because he is liable even if he sets fire to the object with somebody else's fire ...

Precedent #1: ... like we find in Perek ha'Koneis (later on Daf 56.) where someone bends his friend's standing corn in front of a fire, which reaches it by means of a regular wind ...

Precedent #2: ... and in the case of a spark which flies from underneath a hammer, even though presumably, he rendered it Hefker.

Proof: Moreover, nobody would then ever be Chayav for lighting a fire, seeing as he would declare his coals Hefker and set fire to his friend's haystack.

Not Like Rashi: ... who explains that the difference between them is where he lights the fire with a coal that does not belong to him.

Implied Question: Even though Rebbi Yochanan Darshens his opinion from a Pasuk ...

Answer #1: ... he ought to have learned something else from the Pasuk ...

Reason: ... since the logic lies with Resh Lakish.

Answer #2: Alternatively, the Gemara currently thinks that the opinion that holds 'Isho Mishum Chitzav' does not hold 'Isho Mishum Mamono' ...

Answer #2 (cont.): . and it is now asking why, in a case where 'the Chitzim are finished', he does not then become Chayav because of 'Mamono'.

Implied Question: Even though a pit is not an actual object, seeing as the Torah renders one Chayav on account of the (foul) air and not the knock ...

Answer #1: ... nevertheless his Mamon is similar to his arrow, which is its way to go and damage, is a tangible object.

Answer #2: Alternatively, a pit too, is considered an a tangible object, inasmuch as it is through digging the pit, its base changes and becomes a hole.

Answer #2 (cont.): As opposed to the area of the moving flame, which does not change its composition, but merely becomes a flame and burns.

Question: His Mamon is also not an actual object - such as Tzeroros in a case where chickens damage with the wind caused by their wings flapping, at the beginning of the Perek (Daf 17b), where Sumchus obligates the owner to pay full damages?

Answer: Nevertheless, the Mamon on which the owner was negligent is an actual object, which he is obligated to guard against damaging, irrespective of whether it does so via wind or anything else.

Answer (cont.): And there is no Mamon that is not an actual object on which the owner is negligent ...

Answer (cont.): Though there is an arrow which is not an actual object in the form of where the animal breaks a vessel with the breath of its mouth; likewise there is a fire which is not an actual object, in the form of a flame without a coal - as the Gemara states at the end of 'Beitzah' (Daf 39a).

Answer (concl.): That is why they are compared to one another, seeing as both are not actual objects on which the owner is negligent, only the owner's body.

Alternative Answer: The Gemara could have established it where he placed it with a Shinuy, as the Gemara said at the beginning of the Perek.

Refuted Explanation: The Gemara could not have established the case where he kicked it up, and that he is Chayav Chatzi Nezek on the entire haystack ...

Refutation: ... because if Ko'ach Kocho is not like Kocho, he will be Patur on all the rest of the haystack.

Clarification: Seeing as he did not set fire to it, and the Torah does not render a person Chayav for the 'Eish' of his dog.

Implied Question: ... and even though with regards to 'Bor' the Gemara requires a Miy'ut - "Ish Bor", 've'Lo Shor Bor', as the Gemara states in 'Shor she'Nagach es ha'Parah' (later on Daf 48a & 48b), the Torah writes "Ish" twice ...

Answer: ... it is nevertheless obvious to the Gemara, on account of some D'rashah or other, that one is Patur on the 'Eish' of one's animal ...

Reason: ... because there are only three Avos mentioned in connection with 'Shor', and no more..

Clarification: Since it is all the location of the coal.

Clarification: Why is the storekeeper liable for the entire amount? Why does the owner of the camel not share the liability, since he too was negligent with the igniting.

Clarification (cont.): ... But if is speaking where it did not actually scorch the entire store, there would be no problem, since there is no reason for it to enter the mind of the camel owner that there was a lamp outside the store.

Clarification (concl.): ... whereas now that the Gemara established the case where the camel actually ignited the fire, it is impossible for him not to see the conflagration, seeing as it is burning to the extent that it is igniting the entire building. That being the case, he ought to have distanced the camel from it, to prevent it from walking and igniting it more.

Refuted Explanation: One cannot however, explain 'Why is the storekeeper Chayav at all; Let the camel be liable for all the damage?'

Refutation: ... because later, on Daf 23a, the Gemara asks 'Let the owner of the coal be Chayav?' even though it is the owner of the dog who was negligent, the owner of the coal is also Chayav since he did not guard his coal ...

Refutatin (cont.): .. and the Gemara answers 'ke'she'Amdah' - When it stood still, and not when it kindled the flame as it walked along, but where it stood in one place, and where he had overloaded the animal to the extent that it scorched the entire building from where it stood.

Refutation (cont.): And when the Gemara asks that Kal va'Chomer the shop-keeper ought to be Patur, it does not mean that he should be completely Patur, but that he should be Patur from the portion of the owner of the camel, since it scorched whilst standing more than it would have had it walked without stopping ...

Refutation (concl.): ... and the Gemara replies that it speaks where the camel stopped to urinate, in which case, he is an Oneis for stopping.

Implied Question: Even though initially too, this was the reason both in the Reisha and in the Seifa?

Answer (Isho Mishum Chitzav): ... only at first, the reason was more obvious, according to the opinion 'Isho Mishum Chitzav' ...

Answer ([Isho Mishum Chitzav] cont): ... where the owner of the camel was Chayav on the initial setting fire to the flax, and in spite of the fact that the fire moves on its own via a regular wind.

Answer (Isho Mishum Mamono): But according to the opinion 'Isho Mishum Mamono', where he is only Chayav if he brushes against the building, where he is not considered quite so negligent, since he did not see the conflagration until he was standing close to it ...

Answer (Isho Mishum Mamono [cont.]): ... and at that stage, he is no longer able to move the camel away, seeing as it stopped to urinate.

Conclusion: Therefore the Gemara needed to explain that he is nevertheless Chayav ...

Reason: ... ecause he should not have loaded the camel to that extent. He should have realized that if his flax enters the store and catches fire on the lamp, and if the camel then stops to urinate, he will be unable to move it away.

Question: Why does the Tana not learn in the Reisha 'G'di ve'Eved Samuch' and in the Seifa 'G'di ve'Eved Kafus', which is a bigger Chidush?

Answer #1: The Rashbam explains that the kid-goat too, should have run away ...

Reisha: And when the Reisha says 'G'di Kafus ve'Eved Samuch', it is specifically in such a case that one is Chayav.

Seifa: ... whereas in the Seifa, where it says 'G'di Samuch ve'Eved Kafus', it means 'O Eved Kafus', since, even though 'Kam leih be'de'Rabah Mineih' does not apply, he is Patur, because it ought to have run away.

Conclusion: Whereas where both the Eved and the kid-goat are tied, like in the Reisha, he is Patur, even though it could not have run away, due to the principle 'Kam leih be'de'Rabah Mineih'.

Sugya, End of Perek: And the case at the end of the Perek (Daf 27a) 'Avdo ke'Gufo, Shoro ke'Mamono' speaks where the Eved and the Shor are both tied, but where the owner is standing beside them, and when he places the coal on the heart of the Eved, he is Patur ...

Reason: ... because he thinks to himself that the owner will remove it, and not rely on payment.

Reason (cont.): ... whereas if he places it on the heart of the ox, the master does not bother to remove it, since he will pay him the value of the ox.

Answer #2: Rabeinu Tam on the other hand, explains that the Tana needs to teach us that 'G'di Kafus' is Chayav, even though we exempt Tamun by Eish, due to the D'rashah 'Mah Kama be'Galuy, Af Kol be'Galuy', which prompts us to think that anything that is unusual, is not like Kamah and is therefore Patur ...

Reisha: Consequently, a kid-goat is not usually tied, and we would have thought that he is Patur; so the Reisha now comes to teach us that he is nevertheless Chayav.

Seifa: Whereas the Seifa comes to teach us that although it is close, which is normal, he is Patur.

Juxtaposition: And that explains why the Mishnah in ha'Koneis (later, Daf 61:) juxtaposes the current Sugya after the Machlokes Rebbi Yehudah and the Rabbanan regarding Tamun.

Juxtaposition (cont.): And after the section of 'G'di Kafus' it continues 'And the Chachamim concede to Rebbi Yehudah by 'Madlik ha'Birah' - that he is obligated to pay for whatever is inside it, since people tend to place things inside their houses ...

Juxtaposition (concl.): After having interrupted with the current section, as Tosfos explained, to teach us that, even though people do not generally tend to tie kid-goats, he is nevertheless Chayav.

Implied Question: ... and even according to those who hold 'Isho Mishum Chitzav', according to whom one cannot exempt 'Tamun'?

Answer: The Tana nevertheless needs to teach us that he is Chayav, there where his arrows terminated, after the Eved burned to death.

Implied Question: And even though the burning of the Eved was on account of 'Chitzav', that of the kid was on account of 'Mamono'?

Answer: 'Kam leih be'de'Rabah Mineih' nevertheless applies, since they were both the result of the same action ...

Support: ... as we see by the fact that the Gemara establishes the case where he set fire to the body of the Eved, and the Tana exempts him (from the kid-goat) even though he did not set fire to its body of the kid-goat.

Conclusion: According to both Rabeinu Tam and the Rashbam the Tana is justified in mentioning the 'G'di' and not the 'Gadish'.

Rashi: .. however explains that it is because we conclude that the kid belongs to one person and the Eved, to another, whereas presumably the Eved belongs to the owner of the haystack, as people tend to leave their Avadim to guard their haystacks.

Rashi (cont.): Accordding to him, one needs to explains that, when the Gemara asks 'What is the Chidush', it could well have answered 'According to you, one can ask on Rebbi Yochanan why he mentions 'G'di'?

Explanation #1: Rashi explains 'Does the Torah not write "Kesef Sheloshim Shekalim Yiten la'Adonav"?

Question #1: If the Gemara means to say that if his fire damages, he is also Chayav to pay thirty Shekalim - it is impossible to say that ...

Question #1 (cont.): ... since we learned in the first Perek (Daf 9b) that 'Whereas "Shor" pays the thirty Shekalim of an Eved, "Eish" does not'?

Question #2: And if it means to say that just as there he pays K'nas, so too here, must he pay for the kid-goat, we have a principle that 'One cannot learn Mamon from K'nas'?

Explanation #2: The Ri therefore explains the question as follows: Will you say that here too, he will not be liable for the Mamon that he damaged as he killed the Eved? ... because we do not apply 'Kam leih be'de'Rabah Mineih' with regard to the actions of his Mamon?

Precedent: Rava too said in Perek ben Sorer u'Moreh (Sanhedrin, Daf 74a) 'If Reuven, who is chasing Shimon to kill him breaks vessels, he is Patur, irrespective of whether they belong to Shimon or to someone else.

Question: In the first Perek of Sanhedrin (Daf 10a & 10b) Rava himself says 'Mamon la'Zeh u'Nefashos la'Zeh, Chayav'?

Answer #1: Rebbi Yitzchak bar Mordechai answers that every case of 'Rodef achar Chaveiro' is considered to be death and payment to the same person ...

Reason: ... because he is Chayav Misah to everybody, since everybody is obligated to kill him in order to save the person who is being chased.

Answer #2: Whereas Rabeinu Tam explains (See Maharam) that 'Misah la'Zeh' ve'Tashlumin la'Zeh' is always Patur, with the exception of Eidim Zomeminn ...

Reason: ... where we need to fulfill "ka'Asher Zamam" by each one.

Implied Question: Even though by Eidim Zomemin too, when it is 'Misah ve'Tashlumin le'Echad', he is Patur?

Answer: ... that is only because by the man himself "ka'Asher Zamam" is fulfilled.

Proof #1: And he supports it from the Gemara in Kesuvos (Daf 35a), which learns that one is not Chayav Misah and Tashlumin from "Lo Yih'yeh Ason, Anosh Ye'anesh", implying that if there would be an accident (with the woman), he would not have to pay ...

Proof #1 (cont.): ... even though the Misah is for the woman and the payment to the husband.

Refutation: This is no proof however, since one has to admit that this is considered 'Misah ve'Tashlumin le'Echad' ...

Reason: ... seeing as they (a husband and a wife) are considered one body.

Reason (cont.): Otherwise, according to what the Gemara initially wants to say in Perek ben Sorer u'Moreh (Sanhedrin, Daf 74a) in the case of 'Rodeif' that 'Misah la'Zeh and Tashlumin la'Zeh, Chayav', how will it explain the Pasuk?

Proof #2: He brings a second proof from the Mishnah in this Masechta (Daf 34b) 'If , on Shabbos, he set fire to the haystack or wounded his friend, he is Patur because of 'Kam leih be'de'Rabah Mineih', even though it is Misah to Hash-m and Mamon to his friend.

Refutation: This is no proof however, since this is considered Misah and Tashlumin to the same person.

Question: The Ri asks what is the Chidush of 'G'di de'Chad ve'Avda de'Chad' any more than if they belonged to the same person, seeing as he is not Chayav Misah for depriving him of his Eved ...

Proof: ... bearing in mind that he would be Chayav even if he killed his own Eved?

Answer: One is forced to 'push' however and to say that, according to the Tana, it is a bigger Chidush.

Question: The Ri asks that if handing it over to a Cheresh is considered a regular wind, he ought to be Chayav even according to Rebbi Yochanan.

Question (cont.): And if it is not, then what is the Kashya on Resh Lakish, since it is not then comparable to 'Masar Shoro' ...

Reason: ... seeing as, according to all opinions, one is not Chayav for 'Eish' unless it is able to damage with a regular wind?

Answer ('Isho Mishum Chitzav'): The Ri answers that according to the opinion 'Isho Mi'shum Chitzav', one is only Chayav by a fire that can damage with a strong regular wind, where it is virtually certain that it will Damage, like one's arrows ...

Answer (cont.): ... unlike the current case, where the act of the sender is by no means close to certain that it will damage. Consequently, it is not comparable to 'Chitzav', since it is the arrows of the Cheresh.

Answer ('Isho Mishum Mamono'): Whereas according to the opinion 'Isho Mishum Mamono', he is Chayav even though it is not so certain that it will damage ...

Reason: ... similar to the case where one hands a well-tied ox to a Cheresh, where he is Chayav, since it is the way of the ox to break loose by means of its actions, despite the fact that it is not as certain to damage as 'Chitzav'.

Refuted explanation: And when Rebbi Yochanan declares Patur even someone who hands the Cheresh a flame, it is not because he follows his reasoning, in that he holds 'Isho Mishun Chitzav' ...

Refutation: ... since the Gemara concludes that he also holds ' ... Mishum Mamono'.

Authentic Explanation: ... It is because he holds that a flame is not bound to damage like the ox ...

Source: ... as the Gemara stated in the first Perek (Daf 9b).