1)

(a)The Beraisa discusses a case when someone steals a sheep which is with fleece or which is pregnant, and the animal is subsequently shorn or gives birth. According to Rebbi Meir, the Ganav must return everything to the owner not necessarily because he holds 'Shinuy Eino Koneh', but perhaps because we fine the Ganav, so that he should not benefit from his ill-gotten gains.

(b)The difference whether Rebbi Meir's reason is because of 'Shinuy Eino Koneh' or because of Knas will manifest itself in a case where the stolen article deteriorated, where Knas is not applicable, which he will have to replace with a new animal (or with the value thereof) should he hold 'Shinuy Koneh', but which he will be able to return as is should he hold 'Shinuy Eino Koneh'.

(c)Rebbi Yehudah says 'Gezeilah Chozeres be'Einehah', by which he means that he returns the animal as it is plus the difference between it and that of an animal in full fleece or which is pregnant, then he pays that, too (because he holds Shinuy Koneh, like the Tana of our Mishnah (though he uses a different Lashon than him because he is speaking in slightly different case [see Sugya Amud Beis]).

(d)Rebbi Shimon says 'Ro'in Osah Ke'ilu Hi Shuma Etzlo be'Kesef' (we consider the animal as if it was assessed with him from the time of the theft). He basically agrees with Rebbi Yehudah, and we shall see later in which point they argue.

2)

(a)In a case where someone steals an animal or Avadim and they grow old ('Gazal Beheimah ve'Hizkinah, Avadim ve'Hizkinu'), the Tana Kama of the Mishnah (later in the Perek) rules 'Meshalem ke'Sha'as ha'Gezeilah' because he holds 'Shinuy Koneh'.

(b)Rebbi Meir says 'ba'Avadim Omer lo Harei she'Lecha Lefanecha'.

(c)We infer from the fact that he confines this ruling to Avadim, that with regards to the animal, he agrees with the Tana Kama. Avadim are different, he holds, because Avadim are like Karka, which cannot be stolen (even with a Shinuy).

3)

(a)According to this interpretation of Rebbi Meir, we have proved that Rebbi Meir too, holds 'Shinuy Koneh', and that his reason in the previous Beraisa is because of K'nas.

(b)We refute this proof however. Really, we say Rebbi Meir disagrees with them even in the case of a stolen animal too, because he holds 'Shinuy Eino Koneh'.

(c)And when we say 'Rebbi Meir le'Divreihem d'Rabanan Ka'amar l'hu', we mean that Rebbi Meir was asking them whether they will not at least agree with him that he can return the Avadim as is, because Avadim are compared to Karka.

(d)To which the Rabanan's replied that in their opinion, Avadim are not compared to Karka in this regard, and that just as Shinuy is Koneh in the case of a stolen animal, so too is it Koneh in the case of a stolen Eved.

4)

(a)We will learn in another Mishnah later, that if Reuven gives Shimon a garment to dye red and he dyes it black, or vice-versa, Rebbi Meir obligates Shimon to pay only the value of Reuven's wool. We finally prove from there that Rebbi Meir holds 'Shinuy Koneh' (otherwise he ought to pay him for the improved garment).

(b)Alternatively, we arrive at the same conclusion by citing Rav's version of the previous Mishnah ('Gazal Beheimah ve'Hizkinah ... ') Rav switches the opinions there and quotes Rebbi Meir as saying 'Parah ve'Hizkinah, Avadim ve'Hizkinu, Meshalem ke'Sha'as ha'Gezeilah', proving once and for all that Rebbi Meir holds 'Shinuy Koneh', and that his reason in the Beraisa above (where he obligates the Ganav to return the babies too) is because of Knas.

(c)In fact, on account of Rav's version of the Mishnah, that was not the She'eilah in the first place. The She'eilah was whether the K'nas extends to a case of Shogeg (i.e. someone who purchased the stolen property from the Ganav without knowing that the goods were stolen) or not.

5)

(a)The Beraisa discusses Peiros, Shevach Peiros, ha'Mekabel Alav La'zun ben Ishto, u'bas Ishto, Get Chov she'Ein bo Achrayus and Kesuvas Ishah she'Ein bo Ach'rayos all of which, the Beraisa permits the owner to claim from Bnei Chorin (property actually in the defendant's domain), but not from Meshubadim (that he has sold).

(b)'Peiros' and 'Shevach Peiros' are the fully-grown fruit which grew in the field and the various improvements that the purchaser made in the field that he bought from the Ganav, respectively

(c)Despite the fact that the purchaser has the authority to claim the Keren from Meshubadim, he may not do so from the Peiros and Shevach Peiros in order to safeguard the purchaser (because the amounts are not fixed).

(d)The same reason pertains to the third case ('ha'Mekabel Alav La'zun ben Ishto ... '). And the reason for the last two cases in the Beraisa ('Get Chov she'Ein bo Achrayus and Kesuvas Ishah she'Ein bo Acharayos') is because Acharayos was not written in the Shtar.

6)

(a)The author of the Beraisa must be Rebbi Meir because in the last two cases the Tana specifically stated that Acharayos was simply omitted from the Sh'tar (as opposed to when the Sofer specifically wrote 'without Acharayos'), and Rebbi Meir is the one who holds 'Ach'rayos La'av Ta'us Sofer Hu' (the omission of Acharayos is deliberate, and was not just omitted erroneously by the Sofer).

(b)We attempt to resolve our current She'eilah (whether the Chachamim extended the K'nas to Shogeg as well, or not) from this Beraisa, from the case of 'Sh'vach Peiros' where the purchaser bought the stolen field and then improved it.

(c)We assume that he is an Am ha'Aretz, who does not know that 'Karka Einah Nigzeles' ...

(d)... yet Rebbi Meir obligates him to pay the Sh'vach Peiros to the owner (which is only a K'nas).

(e)In order to refute this suggestion, we establish the Beraisa by a Loke'ach Talmid-Chacham, who knows that 'Karka Einah Nigzeles'.

7)

(a)The Mishnah later discusses the Din with regard to Shimon, who dyed Reuven's garment black instead of red, or vice-versa. According to Rebbi Meir Shimon is obligated to pay only for the wool.

(b)This proves that the Rabbanan did not fine the Ganav (or the one who bought from him) be'Shogeg, only be'Meizid (otherwise, Shimon would have had to pay the Sh'vach, too).

8)

(a)We learned in the Beraisa above 'Rebbi Yehudah Omer, Gezeilah Chozeres be'Eineihah; Rebbi Shimon Omer, Ro'in Osah Ke'ilu Hi Shuma Etzlo be'Kesef'. Both Tana'im hold 'Shinuy Koneh'.

(b)According to Rav Z'vid, they argue over a case where the stolen animal's value increased (e.g. it became pregnant) whilst in the domain of the Ganav Rebbi Yehudah holds that this too (the difference between the sheep before the pregnancy and after it ['Sh'vach she'al-Gabei Gezeilah]) is returned to the owner (should he subsequently claim it); whilst according to Rebbi Shimon, it belongs to the Ganav.

(c)Rav Papa disagrees. According to him, Rebbi Yehudah concedes that 'Sh'vach she'al-Gabei Gezeilah belongs to the Gazlan.

(d)When he establishes their Machlokes by 'le'Mechtzah, li'Shelish ve'li'Revi'a' ...

1. ... Rebbi Yehudah will hold that the entire Sh'vach goes to the Gazlan (as is implied in his words 'Gezeilah Chozeres be'Einehah' [but no more]).

2. ... Rebbi Shimon will hold that basically, the Sh'vach on the Gezeilah belongs to the owner. However, the Gazlan receives a half, a third or a quarter, in accordance with the local custom concerning animal handlers.

9)

(a)We learned in our Mishnah 'Gazal Parah ve'Nis'abrah Etzlo ve'Yaldah ... Meshalem ke'Sha'as ha'Gezeilah', from which we can infer that had the animal not given birth, he would have had to return it to the owner as is.

(b)This concurs with the opinion of Rebbi Yehudah, according to the explanation of Rav Z'vid, exclusively.

(c)Rav Papa therefore disagrees with this inference. According to him, the Tana mentions 'Yaldah' (not to preclude a case where the animal did not give birth [which in fact, has the same Din as when it did, but]) in order to balance with the Reisha of the Mishnah, which talks about Yaldah.

(d)The Chidush of 'Yaldah' in the Reisha is that the Ganav does not pay the value of the stolen animal as much as it is worth now, but as much as it was worth when he stole it (to teach us that 'Shinuy Koneh').

10)

(a)We support Rav Papa's opinion with a Beraisa, where the Tana quotes Rebbi Shimon as saying 'Ro'in Osah ke'Ilu Hi Shuma Etzlo be'Kesef, le'Mechtzah, li'Shelish ve'li'Revi'a'.

(b)Rav Ashi and his colleagues once asked, when they were learning by Rav Kahana whether, according to Rebbi Shimon, one is permitted to pay the Ganav his half, third or quarter with cash, or whether he is entitled to demand part of the animal.

11)

(a)Rav Nachman Amar Shmuel says that in the case of 'Bechor le'Pashut, Ba'al-Chov le'Loke'ach and Ba'al-Chov li'Yesomim' the former may compensate the latter with money, should they so wish.

(b)All three are reclaiming the Sh'vach, to which the former are not entitled.

(c)The case of 'Bechor le'Pashut' is where the Sh'vach is worth, shall we say, twelve Zuzim, of which the Bechor, who has one brother, claimed eight (which grew on the double portion of land to which he is entitled), he must return two.

(d)Rav Ashi resolved Rav Kahana's She'eilah from here because although Shmuel specifically said 'Sheloshah Shamin ... ', his ruling incorporates all similar cases, even those that are a number not mentioned by him (see Tosfos DH 'Sheloshah'). Consequently, we see that someone who is obligated to pay for Sh'vach is permitted to return money and not necessarily Karka.

12)

(a)Ravina queries Rav Ashi regarding a discrepancy in Shmuel. When Shmuel says 'Ba'al-Chov Govah es ha'Shevach', he means that the creditor may claim the Sh'vach from the purchaser without having to recompense him at all.

(b)Rav Ashi reconciles this statement with Shmuel's previous ruling, where he obligated the Ba'al-Chov to recompense the purchaser by establishing the earlier ruling by 'Sh'vach ha'Magi's li'Kesafim' (when the produce had all but fully-grown, and was sufficiently ripe to be picked), and the later ruling to where the crops still needed to remain in the ground (in which cae it is still considered part of the ground).

(c)When Shmuel regularly claimed even Sh'vach ha'Magi'a li'Kesafim from the purchaser without charging compensation he did so in cases where the creditor was owed the combined value of the field plus the Sh'vach (whereas whenever he did charge, it was when the creditor was only owed the value of the field but not of the Sh'vach).

13)

(a)One opinion holds that a purchaser is obligated to give the creditor the portion of land that is Meshubad to him, and not money. Others permit him to settle with money, should he so wish.

(b)This second opinion poses a Kashya on Shmuel's previous ruling (that the creditor is permitted to compensate the purchaser with money) because if the purchaser has the basic right to pay the creditor money when he has it, why can he not then demand of the creditor, who has claimed the Sh'vach (because he did not have money to give him) at least to leave him land as compensation?

(c)To answer Ravina's Kashya Rav Ashi establishes Shmuel's case by an Aputiki Mefurash (where the debtor was initially Meshabed specifically this piece of land, and which consequently, the purchaser could not have settled with money even if he had had it).