Support (for Rav Asi - Mishnah): If Reuven gave wool to a dyer, and it was ruined, he pays the value of the wool.

He does not pay the higher value of dyed wool!

Suggestion: It was ruined after the wool absorbed the dye.

Rejection (Shmuel): No, it was ruined the moment the wool entered. The wool was never improved.

Inference: Had it become ruined after the wool absorbed the dye, he would pay for the improved wool.

Suggestion: Shmuel argues with Rav Asi.

Rejection #1: No. The case is, Reuven owns the wool and the dye. The dyer is paid only for his labor.

Objection: If so, the dyer should pay for the wool and dye!

Rejection #2: Rather, Shmuel merely shows that there is no proof from our Mishnah (but he could agree with Rav Asi).

Question (Beraisa): If Reuven gave his garment to a craftsman (Levi), who finished it and informed Reuven, even if Reuven does not come for 10 days (to take and pay for it), he does not transgress keeping a worker's wages overnight;

If Levi returned the garment during the day, if Reuven does not pay before sundown, he transgresses.

If a craftsman acquires ownership in a Kli that he improves, why does Reuven transgress? (Levi acquired the garment, and sold it to Reuven. Reuven does not owe wages, rather, for a sale!)

Answer #1: Levi only smoothes the garment. There is no improvement.

Objection: If so, why did he give the garment to him?

Answer #2: Rather, the worker is paid a set wage for each time he presses it. Only a Kablan (a worker contracted for an entire job) acquires ownership in a Kli that he improves.

Originally, we thought that he was hired for the whole job. This supports Rav Sheshes;

Question: If one hired a Kablan, does the transgression of keeping wages overnight apply?

Answer (Rav Sheshes): It applies.

Suggestion: Rav Sheshes argues with Rav Asi (if a craftsman acquires ownership in a Kli that he improves, he already has his wages)!

Rejection (Shmuel bar Acha): The case is, he was contracted to deliver a letter (there is no improvement to acquire).

Suggestion: Tana'im argue about whether or not a craftsman acquires ownership in a Kli that he improves.

(Beraisa - R. Meir): If Leah told a man 'make for me bracelets and rings and I will be Mekudeshes to you', once he makes them, she is Mekudeshes;

Chachamim say, she is not Mekudeshes until money comes to her.

Question: What money is this?

Suggestion: It is the bracelets and rings.

Rejection: If so, R. Meir holds that she is Mekudeshes even without getting them. What made the Kidushin?!

Answer: Rather, it is additional money.

We are currently holding that both Tana'im agree that wages are due only at the end of the job, and that Kidushin with (pardon of) a loan is invalid.

Suggestion: R. Meir holds that Uman Koneh bi'Shvach Kli (so giving her the jewelry is like giving his money), and Chachamim hold that Ein Uman Koneh bi'Shvach Kli.

Rejection #1: No. All hold that Ein Uman Koneh bi'Shvach Kli;

R. Meir holds that wages are due only at the end of the job (so it is as if he gives her the value of all his work when he gives her the jewelry. This makes Kidushin);

Chachamim hold that wages accrue from the beginning of the job until the end (so she owes him for his work. Giving her the jewelry is like pardoning the debt, and this does not make Kidushin).

Rejection #2: All hold that wages accrue from the beginning of the job until the end (so giving her the jewelry is like pardoning what she owes him);

R. Meir holds that Kidushin with a loan takes effect;

Chachamim hold that the Kidushin is void.

Rejection #3 (Rava): All hold that wages accrue from the beginning of the job until the end, and that Kidushin with a loan is invalid, and that Ein Uman Koneh bi'Shvach Kli;

The case is, he added material to what she gave him to make the jewelry;

R. Meir holds that if one is Mekadesh with a loan and a Perutah, she intends to be Mekudeshes through the new money (and this works);

Chachamim hold that she intends to be Mekudeshes through the loan (and this does not work).

The following Tana'im also argue about this.

(Beraisa): (If one was Mekadesh) 'with the wages for what I worked for you', she is not Mekudeshes. If he said 'with the wages of what I will work for you', she is Mekudeshes;

R. Nasan says, (if he said) 'with the wages of what I will work for you', she is not Mekudeshes, and all the more so if he said 'with the wages of what I worked for you.'

R. Yehudah ha'Nasi says, whether he said 'with the wages of what I will work for you' or 'what I worked for you', she is not Mekudeshes;

If he added his own material, she is Mekudeshes.

R. Nasan argues with the first Tana about wages (R. Nasan holds that wages accrue from the beginning, and the first Tana holds that wages are due only at the end);

R. Nasan and Rebbi argue about Kidushin with a Perutah and a loan (R. Nasan holds that she intends to become Mekudeshes through the loan, and Rebbi holds that she intends for the Perutah).

(Shmuel): A slaughterer who slaughtered improperly is liable. He is a damager, he is negligent;

It is as if he was told to slaughter in one place, and slaughtered elsewhere.

Question: Why did Shmuel say he is a damager and he is negligent?

Answer: Had he said only that he is a damager, one might have thought that that is only when he slaughtered for wages, but if he slaughtered for free, he is exempt. 'He is negligent' teaches that he is liable even if he slaughtered for free.

Question (Rav Chama bar Gurya - Beraisa): If a slaughterer slaughtered improperly, if he is a professional, he is exempt. If not, he is liable;

If he was paid, in either case he is liable.

Shmuel: Your brain should be clouded (for asking such a question)!

One of the Rabanan asked the same question.

Shmuel: You deserve what I told Rav Chama! You should have understood that my law is like R. Meir. Why do you ask from a Beraisa that is like Chachamim?!

'He is a damager, he is negligent. It is as if he was told to slaughter in one place and slaughtered elsewhere' is like R. Meir, who says that one must watch what he does.

Question: Where did R. Meir say this?

Answer #1 (Mishnah - R. Meir): If the owner of an animal tied or locked in front of it properly, and it escaped and damaged, whether it is Tam or Mu'ad, he is liable.

Rejection: There, R. Meir and Chachamim argue about how to expound the verses.

Answer #2 (Mishnah - R. Meir): If Reuven gave wool to Shimon to dye red, and he died it black, or vice-versa, Shimon pays to him the value of the wool he received.

Rejection: There, he intentionally changed from what he was told.

Answer #3 (Beraisa - R. Meir): If his jug broke and he did not clear away the fragments, or his camel fell, and he did not stand it up, he is liable for damage that they caused;

Chachamim say, Beis Din does not make him pay, but Heaven holds him accountable.

R. Meir holds that one who trips is considered negligent. Chachamim hold that he is not.

(Rabah bar bar Chanah, citing R. Yochanan): If a slaughterer slaughtered improperly, even if he is a professional like the slaughterers of Tzipori, he is liable.

Question: Did R. Yochanan really say that?!

R. Yochanan once ruled that a butcher (who improperly slaughtered a chicken) will be exempt if he can prove that he is an expert to slaughter chickens.

Answer: A professional is exempt if he slaughtered for free. He is liable if he was paid.

(R. Zeira): If one wants the slaughterer to be liable if the slaughter will be invalid, he should pay him beforehand.

Question (Beraisa): In the following cases, one is liable for substandard work, because he is like one who receives wages (even though he works for free):

A grinder received wheat to grind, and he did not moisten it first, and he made coarse flour;

A baker received flour to make bread, and he made bread that crumbles;

A slaughterer did an invalid slaughter.

Answer: The Beraisa means that he is liable because he (truly) receives wages.

A case occurred in which a man slaughtered through Hagramah (the knife left the ring (of the windpipe) during the Shechitah; Tana'im argue about whether or not this is valid). Rav ruled that the animal may not be eaten, but the slaughterer is exempt.

Rav Kahana and Rav Asi (to the animal's owner): Rav made two (contradictory) rulings in your case!

Question: What did they mean?

Answer #1: He made two (contradictory) rulings to your detriment:

He should have permitted the slaughter, like R. Yosi b'Rebbi Yehudah;

If he forbids it like Chachamim, he should obligate the slaughterer to pay!

Rejection: It is forbidden to say such a thing!

(Beraisa): A judge may not say, 'I wanted to acquit you, but the other judges outnumbered me' - "One who goes tale-bearing reveals secrets".

Answer #2: Rather, he made two (contradictory) rulings to your benefit:

He prevented you from eating a Safek Neveilah;

He prevented you from Safek theft (taking money from the slaughterer. Perhaps he is exempt!)