Question: But we can demonstrate that, according to R. Eliezer, speech alone is not Kove'a!?

R. Eliezer holds that whatever may be returned to the storage bin is not Kavu'a.

One may dip olives in salt (an act which is Kove'a) yet still snack them one at a time (and they are not Nikba for Ma'aseros).

If one takes ten olives from a Ma'atan, the Tana Kama (in Ma'aseros) obligates separating Ma'aseros while R. Eliezer distinguishes between when the Ma'atan is Tahor or not.

If the Ma'atan from which he removed the olives was Tahor then he is obligated.

If it was Tamei then he is Patur from Ma'aseros.

Question: Why the distinction?

Answer: We are dealing with a Tamei person (who cannot return the olives to a Ma'atan which is Tahor, but may return them to a Ma'atan Tamei).

Thus, even the action of removing the olives is not Kove'a according to R. Eliezer; is there even a question about mere speech!?

Answer: Our Mishnah is dealing with a Muktzah Tahor and a Tamei person, such that he cannot return them, and they are Nikbah.

Question: But they are already "returned" in our Mishnah (since he only spoke regarding them; he did not take any out at all and, seemingly, our Mishnah cannot regard speech as a Kove'a, and the factor which creates Kevi'us in our Mishnah must be Shabbos, thus supporting R. Nachman)!?

Answer (R. Simi b. Ashi): R. Nachman cannot be supported by our Mishnah because that is the unique, position of R. Eliezer that removing Terumah from food is Kove'a (all the more so Shabbos, whose meals are Chashuv [v'Karasa laShabos Oneg]).

The Chachamim (in the cited Mishnah hold that Terumah is not Kove'a.

Rava asked his original question of R. Nachman according to the Chachamim.

The Seifa of our Mishnah (where the Chachamim permit him to mark the fruit in the Muktzah during Shemitah) implies that, in other years of the cycle, the fruit would be forbidden, presumably because Shabbos is Kove'a, like R. Nachman!

No, it is not Shabbos which is Kove'a according to the Chachamim, but the fact that he both designated and marked the fruit.

Question: Then why speak of Shabbos?

Answer: To teach that Tevel is Muchan on Shabbos.

Question: But R. Eliezer seems to contradict himself!?

In Terumos, R. Eliezer (against R. Yehoshua) holds that if someone enters a Chatzer eating a cluster of grapes, he may continue to eat and the same applies to someone who is eating a cluster of grapes and Shabbos enters.

Yet earlier we understood R. Eliezer to teach that Shabbos is Kove'a for Ma'aseros!?

Answer: The Mishnah in Terumos must be understood as explained by R. Nasan (that he must exit the Chatzer and wait until after Shabbos).

(Ravin citing R. Yochanan): Shabbos, Terumah, Chatzer and Mekach each are Kove'a only that which is ready to eat.

He specified Shabbos, in order to differ with Hillel; he mentioned Chatzer to disagree with R. Ya'akov and Terumah to disagree with R. Eliezer.

Hillel forbade fruit that was put out to dry and Shabbos arrived.

R. Ya'akov forbade the family of someone who put out fruit to dry in his Chatzer to eat of it without separating Ma'aseros.

R. Eliezer forbade someone who separated Terumah before the Gemar Melachah to eat from it, even casually.

He specified Mekach conforming with the Beraisa which is lenient regarding the figs of an Am ha'Aretz if figs are generally pressed (and fresh figs are thus not at Gemar Melachah), thus teaching us three Halachos:

Mekach is only Kove'a after Gemar Melachah.

The majority of Amei ha'Aretz tend to separate Ma'aseros.

The obligation to separate D'mai from the produce of an Am ha'Aretz extends even to something that has not yet reached the stage when it is ready to eat (since the Tana says Me'asran D'mai (which implies a leniency), and not just Me'asran).

He specified Mekach to (side with R. Yehudah and) argue with the Tana Kama in Ma'aseros who says that if two friends exchange fruit, they are both obligated to separate Ma'aseros, irrespective of whether they both intended to eat the fruit, to put it out to dry (which renders it not ready to eat) or if one of them intends to eat it, and the other, to put it out to dry.

R. Yehudah holds that only if the person who exchanged fruit intends to eat it must separate Ma'aseros, but not if he intends to put it out to dry (Mekach is only Kove'a once it is ready to eat).

One may throw grain down through a skylight (but not through a window) to the floor below on Yom Tov (not on Shabbos) to protect it from the coming rain.

If rain threatens to spoil one's fruit, jars of wine or oil, one may cover them with overturned vessels.

If water is dripping into one's house one is permitted to place a vessel underneath the leak (even on Shabbos) in order to keep one's house clean.

R. Yehudah and R. Nasan argue whether the first word of our Mishnah is Mashilin or Mashchilin.

(Mar Zutra): There is a Pasuk to support one and a reference in a Mishnah to support the other.

(R. Nachman b. Yitzchak): Other wordings are also correct, and each mean casting something down as we find support in various Mishnayos.

Question: At what point will the pushing constitute undue Tirchah?

Answer (R. Zeira citing R. Asi): Until (the amount referred to in Shabbos) four or five boxes of straw (which the Mishnah permits clearing either out of deference to the guests or because of Bitul Beis ha'Midrash).

Question: But perhaps the limit there is higher owing to the good reasons cited for the permission!?

Question: Perhaps the higher limit is due to Shabbos (where we are confident that no Zilzul will result) but would not apply to Yom Tov!?

Question: Perhaps that is a lower limit since no monetary loss is involved, but a higher limit would apply where the potential loss of grain is at stake!?