QUESTION: The Gemara discusses the case of the Mishnah later (26a) of four brothers, two of whom married sisters and then died childless. The two surviving brothers must do Chalitzah with the two sisters; they may not do Yibum. Neither brother may do Yibum with the first sister because she is "Achos Zekukaso," the sister of a woman with whom he needs to do Yibum.

After the first brother does Chalitzah with the first sister, why is the second brother still prohibited from doing Yibum with the second sister? Since the first sister has already done Chalitzah, there is no more Zikah with that sister and the second sister is no longer an "Achos Zekukaso" to the second brother!

RASHI explains that the reason why the second sister may not do Yibum is based on the rule that once she became prohibited for one moment, she remains prohibited forever ("Ne'esrah"). What made her prohibited for one moment?

Rashi mentions two possible reasons for why she was prohibited for one moment. The first reason is that the Mishnah maintains "Yesh Zikah," and thus the Zikah which requires the first brother to do Chalitzah with the first sister renders the second sister prohibited to the second brother (as well as to the first) as "Achos Zekukaso." Alternatively, the prohibition against forfeiting the Mitzvah of Yibum ("Isur Bitul Mitzvas Yevamim") prohibits her, because when both sisters fall to Yibum neither brother is able to do Yibum lest he forfeit the Mitzvah of Yibum of the other sister in the event that the other brother dies before he does Yibum. Thus, even after Chalitzah is done with one of the sisters, the other sister remains prohibited to the second brother (because of the return of the Isur of "Eshes Ach") since she was prohibited for one moment.

In contrast, in the case of the Mishnah earlier (23b) in which only one of the two sisters who fell to Yibum is the real Yevamah (and the other was not married to the deceased brother at all and does not need Yibum), Rashi writes that once one brother does Chalitzah with one of the sisters, the second brother may do Yibum with the second sister because she was not prohibited in the first place. If she is not the real Yevamah, she cannot become prohibited (since she has no connection at all to any of the brothers), and if she is the real Yevamah, she was permitted to the brothers all along (we just did not know it).

Rashi's explanation implies that in the case of four brothers (26a), even when one brother does Chalitzah the Zikah to the other brothers is not retroactively removed. If the Chalitzah would remove the Zikah retroactively, the second brother would not be prohibited to the second sister in the first place since, retroactively, she was not an "Achos Zekukaso" (the first sister's Chalitzah with the first brother shows that she was Zekukah only to the first brother and not to the second, and thus her sister was never the sister of someone who was Zekukah to the second brother). Rather, the Zikah is not removed until the moment at which one brother does Chalitzah; until that time, there was a Zikah to all of the brothers and it is not removed retroactively.

This is also evident from the words of Rashi in the end of the Mishnah. Rashi there writes that in a case of "Kadmu v'Kansu," in which the two brothers of the deceased man both did Yibum with the two sisters (when they were not permitted to do so because of the Safek Isur involved), b'Di'eved they are permitted to remain married. This is because after the first brother did Yibum, one of the two women fulfilled the Mitzvah of Yibum and her Zikah to the other brother was removed; consequently, the second sister is not forbidden to that brother as "Achos Zekukaso." Rashi adds, "Isura d'Avad Avad" -- even though he transgressed an Isur (of marrying "Achos Zekukaso"), the act is already done. If the Zikah is removed retroactively, Rashi should not call the act an Isur at all; the first sister (who did Yibum with the first brother) was never Zekukah to the second brother and thus her sister was completely permitted to him!

The words of Rashi here are difficult to reconcile with the words of Rashi earlier in the Mishnah (DH Ein Motzi'in). Rashi there writes that when two brothers do Yibum with two sisters, when the second one does Yibum he removes the Zikah and the Isur of "Achos Zekukaso" from the first brother retroactively, such that the first brother was never Zekukah to the second woman (and thus when he did Yibum with the first sister, he did not transgress the Isur of "Achos Zekukaso"). Rashi clearly says that the Zikah is removed retroactively. If he means that the Zikah is merely removed from the point of Yibum onwards (and until that point she was considered Zekukah to each brother), why should her Yibum (or Chalitzah) permit her sister to marry the other brother? The other brother should be prohibited to her, just as a man who was once married to a woman and divorced her remains prohibited to her sisters (the marriage bond that once existed between the man and the woman is not removed retroactively).

Moreover, the Gemara earlier (17b) teaches that when a man betrothed (with Kidushin) the sister of his Yevamah (his "Achos Zekukaso"), he is instructed to wait until his brother does Yibum with the Yevamah. Once Yibum is done, the Isur of "Achos Zekukaso" is removed because the Yevamah is no longer Zekukah to the first brother. The Gemara there clearly teaches that once Yibum is done, no Isur of "Achos Zekukaso" remains. It must be that the Zikah is uprooted retroactively.

Why, then, does Rashi here write that the reason why the second woman is prohibited to the second brother is that she became prohibited for one moment and thus remains so forever? Why is the Zikah not removed retroactively?

(a) Perhaps the Zikah indeed is removed retroactively, as Rashi writes earlier (23b). Why, then, does Rashi write in the end of the Mishnah that one of the brothers transgressed an Isur ("Isura d'Avad Avad") when he did Yibum with one of the sisters before the other brother did Chalitzah with the other sister, if the Zikah is removed retroactively when Chalitzah is done? At the moment the brother did Yibum, he had no way of knowing that his brother definitely would do Chalitzah or Yibum with the second sister and thereby uproot her Zikah retroactively (in case she was the real Yevamah). At the time he lived with the first sister, she was "Achos Zekukaso" even though the Zikah indeed was later uprooted retroactively, because his act -- at the moment that he did it -- was forbidden.

Also, in the case of the four brothers (26a), Rashi writes that each Yevamah was "Ne'esrah" for one moment because of the Isur of "Achos Zekukaso." Although the Isur is removed once the second brother does Chalitzah, at the time the first brother does Yibum (before the other brother does Chalitzah) his act is forbidden because he had no way of knowing that his brother would do Chalitzah. The Safek is not merely what the reality is (i.e. which sister is the real Yevamah), but what will occur in the future. (This dichotomy is more easily understood according to the opinion of "Ein Bereirah" -- when the status of an object is unknown at the present time, a future occurrence cannot determine its status retroactively. The uncertain status of the woman with whom the first brother did Yibum cannot be clarified based on the future event of the second brother doing Chalitzah with her sister. This case is not similar to the case in the Mishnah earlier (23b) in which the doubt is merely which woman was married to the deceased brother, where the only missing information is information which presently exists in the world but is unknown, in contrast to information which will come about only when a future event occurs.)

(b) The RASHASH suggests that the word "l'Mafrei'a" ("retroactively") in Rashi (on 23b) is an error. Rashi does not mean that the Zikah is removed retroactively, but rather that the Isur is removed only from the time of Yibum or Chalitzah. She became "Ne'esrah" for one moment because there was Zikah before the Yibum was done. That is why Rashi says that the brother transgressed an Isur at the moment he did Yibum with her.

The Rashash does not address the question of why "Achos Zekukaso" is permitted once the second brother does Yibum or Chalitzah with the other sister. The answer may be that the Chachamim compare "Achos Zekukaso" after the Zekukah does Chalitzah (and the Isur of Zikah is removed) to an "Achos Ishto" after the death of the wife -- in which case the surviving sister is permitted, and not to an "Achos Ishto" after the divorce of the wife. In the case of an "Achos Ishto" after the divorce of the wife, it is the action of the husband which removes the Ishus, the bond of marriage, from his wife (the first sister). When it is his action that removes it, the Torah does not permit him to marry the woman's sisters. In contrast, in the case of the husband's death it is not the action of the husband that removes the Ishus from his wife, the first sister. Similarly, when the second brother does Yibum or Chalitzah with his Zekukah, it is not the action of the remaining brother that removes the Zikah between him and the Yevamah. Therefore, the case of "Achos Zekukaso" is comparable to a case of an "Achos Ishto" after the death of the man's wife, the first sister, in which case the second sister is permitted to him. (According to this logic, the mother or daughter of all of the Zekukos will be prohibited to all of the brothers even after one brother does Yibum or Chalitzah.)

QUESTION: The Gemara points out a contradiction between Mishnayos. The Mishnah here (23b) discusses a case of a man who betrothed (with Kidushin) one of two sisters and forgot (or did not know) which one. If the man dies childless and has two brothers, one brother does Chalitzah with one woman, and the other brother may do Yibum with the other woman. The Mishnah adds that if, b'Di'eved, the two brothers did Yibum with both of the sisters before they asked Beis Din what they should do ("Kadmu v'Kansu"), they are permitted to remain married ("Ein Motzi'in").

The Mishnah later (26a), however, discusses a case of four brothers, two of whom married sisters and then died childless. The two surviving brothers must do Chalitzah with the two sisters; they may not do Yibum. The Mishnah adds that if, b'Di'eved, the two brothers did Yibum with the sisters before they asked Beis Din what they should do ("Kadmu v'Kansu"), they are not permitted to remain married but must divorce their wives ("Yotzi'u").

There seem to be two points of contradiction between the two Mishnayos. The first difference is that the Mishnah here permits the second brother to do Yibum after the first brother does Chalitzah, while the Mishnah later does not permit the second brother to do Yibum. The second difference is that the Mishnah here says that if, b'Di'eved, both brothers did Yibum, "Ein Motzi'in" -- they do not have to divorce their wives, while the Mishnah later says that b'Di'eved they do have to divorce their wives ("Yotzi'u"). Does the Gemara's question address the contradiction with regard to the first Halachah (what the brothers should do l'Chatchilah) or with regard to the second Halachah (what the brothers should do b'Di'eved)?

RASHI's words are unclear. He seems to give two different explanations for the Gemara's contradiction. Rashi first writes (DH 23b, DH Mai Shena) that the Gemara's question is from the second Halachah of "Kadmu v'Kansu." However, in his next comment (DH Choltzos v'Lo Misyabmos) he writes that the Gemara's question is from the first Halachah -- the Mishnah here says that the second brother may do Yibum, while the Mishnah later permits neither brother to do Yibum.

(From the tone of the Gemara itself it seems more likely that the question is from the first Halachah of the Mishnah. The Gemara does not even quote the second part of the Mishnah of "Kadmu v'Kansu Ein Motzi'in," as TOSFOS asks in DH u'Mai Shena.)

Rashi also seems to contradict his words when he explains the answer of the Gemara (24a). The Gemara answers that in the Mishnah later, in the case of the four brothers the Yevamos are prohibited to each brother either because of "Yesh Zikah" (and thus each one is "Achos Zekukaso") or because of "Bitul Mitzvas Yevamim." In contrast, the prohibition of the sisters in the case of the Mishnah here is a Safek Isur, since each sister might be the Yevamah or the sister of the Yevamah.

Rashi (24a, DH v'Iy l'Man d'Amar) first explains the answer of the Gemara according to the second way he explains the contradiction (that the first Mishnah permits the second brother to do Yibum, while the second Mishnah prohibits both brothers from doing Yibum). Rashi explains that the Mishnah later prohibits Yibum because even after one brother does Chalitzah with one of the sisters, the second sister remains forbidden to the second brother because of the principle, "Ne'esrah Sha'ah Achas" -- as long as there was one moment during which she was forbidden to him, she remains forbidden forever. In contrast, in the case of the Mishnah here there is no prohibition of "Ne'esrah" because the second sister -- if she was not the real Yevamah -- was never married to the deceased brother and was never forbidden; she was neither a Yevamah nor a Tzarah of the Yevamah.

However, Rashi continues and explains that the Gemara's answer means that in the Mishnah here, if, b'Di'eved, the brothers already married the sisters, the reason why they may stay married is that each brother may claim that his wife is the real Yevamah. In contrast, in the case of the four brothers, it is known for certain that at least the first brother who did Yibum transgressed the Isur of "Achos Zekukaso."

This answer, as Rashi explains it, addresses the contradiction between the two Mishnayos in a case of "Kadmu v'Kansu" -- the Gemara's question according to Rashi's first explanation. If Rashi understands that the Gemara's question was from the case of "Kadmu v'Kansu" (the b'Di'eved situation) and that its answer addresses the case of "Kadmu v'Kansu," why does he mention the point of "Ne'esrah" which prohibits the brothers from doing Yibum l'Chatchilah? (RITVA, RASHASH)

Rashi seems to contradict himself in another place as well. In his explanation of the Gemara's answer, Rashi explains that the Gemara's question is from the case of "Kadmu v'Kansu": the Mishnah here permits them to stay married b'Di'eved, while the Mishnah later requires them to divorce. The Gemara answers that in the case of the Mishnah here, the brothers who did Yibum did not transgress any definite Isur.

However, in the end of his explanation on the Mishnah, Rashi gives a different reason for why they may stay married if, b'Di'eved, they both did Yibum with the two sisters. Rashi writes that not only was each brother's act merely a Safek Isur, but even if the first brother did marry the "Achos Zekukaso" and not the real Yevamah, nevertheless when the second brother does Yibum he removes the Zikah from the first brother (retroactively) so that the first brother's wife is not considered "Achos Zekukaso." Neither sister can be called "Achos Zekukaso" (not even out of doubt) once both did Yibum and all Zikah was removed retroactively.

This is not true in the case of the four brothers. Even after the second brother does Yibum, the first brother's wife remains forbidden to him because of "Ne'esrah" -- at one moment in the past she was definitely forbidden to him (when they fell to Yibum, she was definitely his "Achos Zekukaso"). In the case of the Mishnah here, however, it becomes revealed that each sister was never forbidden even for a moment: if one woman is the real Yevamah, then she was always permitted, and if her sister is the real Yevamah, then the first was never married to the deceased brother nor is she the sister of a woman who is Zekukah to Yibum, because the second brother removed that Zikah when he did Yibum! (See TOSFOS REBBI AKIVA EIGER.)

Moreover, what advantage does each way of understanding the Gemara's question and answer have over the other way?

ANSWER: It is clear from TOSFOS and the other Rishonim that in their edition of Rashi, Rashi explains that the question of the Gemara is from the case of "Kadmu v'Kansu," the b'Di'eved situation. Apparently, Rashi at a later time retracted his original explanation and added a new explanation to his commentary. Both explanations were included in our edition of Rashi. (See Appendix to Insights to Maseches Eruvin, where this phenomenon in the text of Rashi is discussed.)

According to Rashi's original explanation (23b), the question of the Gemara is from the case of "Kadmu v'Kansu," as the Rishonim quote Rashi. Rashi in the answer of the Gemara also writes (at the end of DH v'Iy l'Man d'Amar) that the Gemara answers its question when it says that in the case of the Mishnah the Isur is only a Safek Isur, while in the case of the Mishnah later the Isur is a definite Isur. (This is also the intention of Rashi later, 28a, DH b'Shlama.)

At a later time, Rashi retracted his first explanation and wrote the other comments (23b, DH Choltzos v'Lo Misyabmos, until the word "Hilkach" in the end of DH v'Iy l'Man d'Amar on 24a). Rashi added a sentence (from the words "v'Iy Nami") in the end of his commentary on the Mishnah, as well as a sentence (from the words "v'Leis Lei" until the words "Su Lo Mishtaryah") in his explanation later (27b, DH Mesah Rishonah).

Why did Rashi originally understand that the Gemara's question was from the case of "Kadmu v'Kansu," the b'Di'eved case mentioned in the Mishnah, if the Gemara does not even quote those words from the Mishnah?

The RITVA and RASHBA explain that Rashi found the Gemara's answer inconsistent with its question. Rashi had two difficulties with the Gemara if the Gemara's question was why none of the brothers (in the Mishnah on 26a) may do Yibum l'Chatchilah. Did the Gemara know that there is such a concept of "Ne'esrah" when it asked its question, or did it not know of such an Isur? If it did not know of the Isur of "Ne'esrah," then what is the Gemara's answer? The Gemara, in its answer, cannot mean that there is an Isur of "Ne'esrah" in the case of the Mishnah later (the way Rashi explains the answer in his first explanation, in DH v'Iy l'Man d'Amar), because the Gemara would not need to add in its answer that in the Mishnah here "perhaps each one [can claim that he] will get the right sister (the one who is the real Yevamah)." Even if one gets the wrong sister there is no Isur of "Ne'esrah," and thus each brother is permitted to remain married to the woman with whom he did Yibum, whether she is the real Yevamah or whether she is the Yevamah's sister.

The second problem which Rashi had with the Gemara's answer, if the Gemara's question was from the first Halachah of the Mishnah (of doing Yibum l'Chatchilah), was as follows. Rashi originally maintained that the prohibition against forfeiting the Mitzvah of Yibum ("Isur Bitul Mitzvas Yevamim") does not remain in force after Zikah is removed. (This Isur is not one which prohibits the act between that man and that woman, but it is an "external" Isur intended merely to prevent the forfeiting of a different Mitzvah of Yibum.) Since the Gemara in its answer equates the opinion of "Yesh Zikah" and the opinion of "Asur l'Vatel Mitzvas Yevamim," it cannot be saying that the woman is forbidden in the case of the four brothers because of "Ne'esrah" because the Gemara cannot invoke such a principle ("Ne'esrah") according to the opinion of "Asur l'Vatel Mitzvas Yevamim." The Gemara's answer must mean something else -- that in the case of the four brothers, the Chachamim decreed that the brothers should not arrange that one does Chalitzah and another do Yibum, because they might reverse the order and thereby violate a definite Isur (of "Achos Zekukaso" or "Bitul Mitzvas Yibum").

Why, according to the opinion that maintains "Yesh Zikah," does the Gemara not answer simply that in the case of the four brothers, each woman was "Ne'esrah" at one point in time? The Gemara does not need to rely on the Gezeirah, according to the opinion that maintains "Yesh Zikah"! It must be that the Gemara never had a question according to the opinion of "Yesh Zikah" because it knew that there is an Isur of "Achos Zekukaso" which prevents the brothers from doing Yibum. Why, then, does the Gemara ask its question ambiguously, without specifying that the question is only according to the opinion that maintains "Ein Zikah"? Moreover, why in its answer does the Gemara make any mention of the opinion that maintains "Yesh Zikah"?

These questions motivated Rashi to explain that the question of the Gemara is from the second part of the Mishnah, the case of "Kadmu v'Kansu." Accordingly, the Gemara always knew that in the case of the Mishnah later (26a) the Isur of "Achos Zekukaso" prevents the brothers from doing Yibum l'Chatchilah, and its only question was why, in the case of the Mishnah here, may the brothers stay married b'Di'eved, while in the case of the Mishnah later they must divorce their wives. To this the Gemara answers that in the case of the Mishnah later the brothers committed a definite Isur, while here they did only a Safek Isur.

After further consideration, Rashi became dissatisfied with this explanation of the Gemara's question. He reasoned that the question cannot be from the case of "Kadmu v'Kansu" because there is an obvious difference between the Mishnah here and the Mishnah later in a situation of "Kadmu v'Kansu." In the case of the Mishnah here, no Isur exists after the brothers marry the sisters. In the case of the Mishnah later, an Isur still exists after the brothers marry the sisters. Accordingly, the Gemara would not need to answer that one Mishnah (26a) is a case of a definite Isur, and the other Mishnah (here) is a case of a Safek Isur. The Gemara could have answered simply that in the case of the Mishnah here, the Zikah is removed completely and the brothers no longer transgress any Isur by being married to the women!

Rashi therefore revised his explanation and wrote that the Gemara in its question did not know of the Isur of "Ne'esrah," and it answers that there is an Isur of "Ne'esrah" not only according to the opinion that maintains "Yesh Zikah" but even according to the opinion that maintains that one may not forfeit the Mitzvah of Yibum. When the Gemara adds that in the case of the Mishnah here, perhaps each brother gets the right woman, its intention is to answer a different question entirely: even if there is no Isur to do Chalitzah first and then do Yibum (because there is no problem of "Ne'esrah"), it should still be Asur d'Rabanan for the second brother to do Yibum because perhaps the brothers might reverse the order and do Yibum first and then Chalitzah (in which case the first brother will transgress the Isur of "Achos Zekukaso" if the woman with whom he does Yibum is not the real Yevamah). To this question the Gemara answers that even if the brothers mistakenly reverse the order, there will be only a Safek Isur of "Achos Zekukaso," and a Safek Isur is not a valid reason for the Chachamim to prohibit doing Chalitzah and then Yibum due to a concern that the brothers will reverse the order.

Rashi later (27b) points out that this understanding seems to contradict the words of Rav (27b) who says that the Isur of "Ne'esrah" does not apply in the case of two sisters who fall to one brother. If, according to the opinion that maintains "Asur l'Vatel Mitzvas Yevamim," the rule of "Ne'esrah" cannot apply (because the Isur of "Bitul Mitzvas Yibum" is not strong enough to give her the status of Asur for one moment), then Rav might follow that opinion (see Tosfos 27b, DH Aval). However, according to Rashi's second way of explaining the Gemara, the Gemara concludes that "Ne'esrah" always applies, even according to the opinion that maintains "Asur l'Vatel Mitzvas Yevamim." It must be that Rav there argues with the Gemara here.

QUESTION: The Gemara says that the Mitzvah of Yibum is upon the oldest brother of the deceased husband. If he declines to do Yibum, Beis Din asks a younger brother. If none of the younger brothers want to do Yibum, Beis Din forces the oldest brother to do Yibum.

The Gemara derives that the Mitzvah of Yibum is upon the oldest brother from the verse, "v'Hayah ha'Bechor" (Devarim 25:6). The Gemara asks that perhaps the verse teaches that the Mitzvah of Yibum applies only when there is a Bechor (firstborn son) and it does not apply at all when there is no Bechor. What is the source that Yibum applies even when the oldest brother is not a Bechor?

The Gemara answers that the verse teaches that "just as the Bechorah of the Bechor causes him [to have the Mitzvah of Yibum], so, too, the seniority of the oldest son causes him [to have the Mitzvah of Yibum]."

The Gemara's answer is difficult to understand. A Bechor is special not because he is the oldest but because he is the firstborn. A number of unique laws apply exclusively to a Bechor and not to a brother who happens to be the oldest of the siblings (such as Pidyon ha'Ben and the right to inherit a double portion). Why does the Gemara assert that the oldest son is special like a Bechor?

ANSWER: The RASHBA explains that as far as Yibum is concerned, it is clear that the Gemara rejects its original assumption that a Bechor is unique by virtue of the fact that he is the firstborn. As far as Yibum is concerned, the fact that a brother is the firstborn is not relevant; it makes no difference whether he is the Bechor or he is the oldest. What is relevant is the brother's age. If he is the oldest son, the Mitzvah of Yibum falls on his shoulders first. The age makes a difference because it is appropriate for the oldest brother to take responsibility for the deceased brother's family. If he shirks his responsibility, it falls to the younger brothers.

(When the Gemara says that "the Bechorah of the Bechor causes him [to have the Mitzvah of Yibum]," it refers to his age and means that the fact that he is the oldest -- and not the fact that he is the firstborn -- causes him to have the Mitzvah of Yibum.)

QUESTION: The Gemara discusses the validity of the conversion of a Nochri who seeks to become Jewish only to receive the benefits that a Jew receives. It is clear that even according to the opinion that an insincere conversion is valid, Beis Din may not accept such a convert l'Chatchilah (see SHULCHAN ARUCH 268:12).

This ruling seems to conflict with the conduct of Hillel. The Gemara in Shabbos (31a) relates that a Nochri once learned of the honor afforded to the Kohen Gadol. He came to Hillel and requested that he be converted so that he could become a Kohen Gadol. Hillel converted him and told him to go learn the laws of Kehunah Gedolah.

Why did Hillel accept the convert if the Gemara here forbids accepting an insincere convert?

(a) The MAHARSHA in Shabbos explains that Hillel did not actually convert the Nochri upon request. Rather, Hillel told the Nochri to go learn the laws of Kehunah Gedolah before he converted. Even after he discovered that he could not become a Kohen Gadol, he still desired to become Jewish, and thus Hillel converted him.

However, this answer raises another problem. Why was Hillel allowed to teach Torah to a Nochri before he converted? The Gemara in Chagigah (13a) rules that one may not teach Torah to a Nochri. Similarly, the Gemara in Sanhedrin (59a) states that a Nochri who learns Torah is Chayav Misah. The Maharsha answers that for purposes of conversion, one is permitted to teach Torah to a Nochri.

(b) TOSFOS here suggests that Hillel saw that the Nochri was sincere and that he would convert even if he could not become a Kohen Gadol, and therefore he converted him.

REBBI AKIVA EIGER points out that the words of Tosfos refute the assertion of the Maharsha that one may teach Torah to a Nochri for purposes of conversion. Tosfos implies that Hillel "took a chance" by converting the Nochri without immutable evidence that he was sincere. Accordingly, Tosfos understands that Hillel did not teach the laws of Kehunah Gedolah to the Nochri before he converted, for had he taught the Nochri those laws, he would have known beyond a doubt that the Nochri's motivation was sincere. Hillel deliberately waited until after he converted the Nochri in order to teach Torah to him. (See also Insights to Shabbos 31:3.)