Explanation #1: Rashi explains that a Revi'is is an amount measured regarding other prohibitions of Nazir. There is an opinion in Nazir (34b) that branches (i.e. soft vines), leaves, and pits combine to equal the amount of a Revi'is of wine. (How does one know if these branches etc. are a Revi'is?) This means that if he puts them in a cup with wine and a Revi'is of wine is displaced, he is liable for eating this amount of branches etc.

Explanation #1 (cont.): Measuring the amount with a cup of wine is not the same as measuring with a cup of water, as wine is thicker and it does not fall out of the cup quickly. Rather, it piles up and gathers by the edge of the cup much more than water.

Explanation #2: In Eruvin (4a), Rashi explains that "Gefen representing a Revi'is of wine for a Nazir" means that consuming this amount (Revi'is) of wine causes a Nazir to be liable to receive lashes. This implies that he means that if he drinks a Revi'is of wine he is liable.

Question: This is not like the other amounts mentioned here, as we use the other amounts (i.e. a Zayis, implied by the Pasuk) to measure other things (not that the item mentioned is measured by a different amount, namely a Revi'is, which has nothing to do with grapes).

Opinion: Rashi's explanation in our Gemara is the main explanation.

Proof: This is stated in the Tosefta. The Tosefta says, "What does he do? He brings a cup full of wine and brings an Iguri olive and puts it in the cup, and he lets the wine pour out. If he drinks this amount (of wine that poured out of the cup) he is liable, and if he does not he is exempt. These are the words of Rebbi Akiva. Rebbi Elazar ben Azaryah says he is only liable if he drinks a Revi'is.

Proof (cont.): Our Gemara implies that it shares the opinion of Rebbi Elazar ben Azaryah, and this is fine, as the case of ten Revi'iyos in Nazir (38a) is also like him.

Observation: Even though we say there that the Gemara there is not getting involved in an argument, the Gemara did not worry about that here, even though Rebbi Akiva argues on Rebbi Elazar.

Observation (cont.): In Nazir (34a), there is also an argument. The Mishnah there states that one is not liable until he eats a Kzayis of grapes. The first Mishnah says he is only liable if he drinks a Revi'is of wine. Rebbi Akiva says that even if he dips his bread in wine and he can combine the bread to make a Kzayis, he is liable.

Observation (cont.): We say in the Gemara (38b) that the Tana Kama compares the prohibitions of Nazir to drinking, and therefore says that regarding eating leaves and branches one also is liable if he eats an amount of a Revi'is (i.e. that woudl displace a Revi'is). Rebbi Akiva holds that since the Pasuk says, "And wet and dry grapes he should not eat," that just as eating is with a Kzayis, so too everything (all prohibitions of Nazir) is measured by a Kzayis, meaning even drinking (wine).

Question: This text is somewhat difficult. Where do we find that a Revi'is is required for a prohibition regarding eating?

Answer: One must say that this is implied by the phrase, "until he eats a Kzayis of grapes" that it even applies to drinking. The first Mishnah that says, "until he drinks a Revi'is" must mean that this applies to eating as well. (Why didn't they explicitly say, "Until he eats and drinks a Revi'is/Kzayis?) Rather, it must be that one of them only mentioned eating because he derives from there that it applies to drinking as well, and the other mentioned drinking because he derives from there that it applies to eating as well.

Text: Rabeinu Tam's text in Nazir is that the Tana Kama does not compare it to all prohibitions of Nazir regarding eating. He found this text in an old Sefer. Some Sefarim also have the text, "And he does not compare them to prohibitions of Nazir regarding drinking." These texts all have the same intent. However, for eating it is more understandable. This means that the first Mishnah indeed differentiates between eating and drinking, and we do not derive one from the other.

Text (cont.): According to this text, the amount for eating is a Kzayis according to everyone. In our Gemara, Rabeinu Tam's text is "Kzayis of wine for a Nazir." This is according to everyone (according to Rabeinu Tam) and is solely regarding eating (i.e. grapes).

Question: There is a question on the opinion of Rabeinu Tam. Who cares if we measure the olive with a cup full of wine? One can measure the displacement of an olive with water just like they can measure it with wine, as long as the olive is put in the same cup as the pits etc. are put in with the same liquid!

Question (cont.): If we say our Gemara is referring to liquids, since we say that one who drinks the small amount of wine that an olive would cause to fall from a cup is liable, it would be obvious that since he is drinking wine the amount would only be measured in wine!

Proof: The Yerushalmi implies that Rabeinu Tam's explanation that everyone agrees eating (grapes etc.) is measured by a Kzayis, is correct.

Proof (cont.): This is because the Yerushalmi says there that when the Mishnah Rishonah says, "until he drinks a Revi'is of wine" that it derived "Sheichar-Sheichar." Just as the first Sheichar is referring to a Revi'is, so too the Sheichar by Nazir is regarding a Revi'is. They then retracted that since the Pasuk says, "he should not eat, he should not drink" we derive that just as eating is measured with a Kzayis, so too drinking is measured with a Kzayis.

Explanation: This is taught regarding wooden vessels in the seventeenth chapter of Keilim. However, regarding earthenware vessels the Mishnah in Keilim (3:1) states that any vessel made to contain food must have a hole the size of an olive in it (to make it pure again), and whatever is made to contain liquid etc.

Implied Question: The Gemara says in Shabbos (95b) that there are five scenarios regarding an earthenware vessel. If it has a hole in it the size of an olive falling out of it, it is pure if its purpose is to contain olives, but it is still impure if it is used for pomegranates. (What is this amount? Doesn't it contradict the Mishnah in Keilim quoted above?)

Answer: This is referring to a case where he designated the vessel to be used with pomegranates. However, in general a vessel used to contain food becomes pure again if it has a hole that lets an olive fall out of the vessel.

Observation: The Mishnah in Keilim (17:4) teaches that the size of these pomegranates is three that are "holding onto each other." This does not mean that a hole is needed that is so large that it allows three pomegranates to fall out at once. Rather, it means that one falls out at a time.

Proof #1: This is as the Gemara in Shabbos (95b) says, "like the size for a pomegranate to fall out." It does not say "pomegranates."

Proof #2: Additionally, in Shabbos (112b) and Eruvin (24a) Chizkiyah asks that if a vessel has a hole that allows an olive to fall out, he then seals it, and another hole of that size appears, he seals it, etc. until the entire amount of area where there was a hole is the size of a pomegranate, what is the law?

Proof #2 (cont.): If it would be three pomegranates in a row, Chizkiyah should ask "a hole the size of a pomegranate, he then seals it, and another hole of that size appears, he then seals it, until it totals three pomegranates, what is the law?"

Explanation #1: It appears that the Mishnah in Keilim (ibid.) means when it says "three pomegranates holding onto each other" that even though they fall out of the vessel one at a time, they would not easily fall (one after the other) out of a smaller hole as they fall out of a bigger hole one after the other.

Explanation #2: One can also explain that "three pomegranates holding onto each other" refers to the size of the pomegranate being referred to by the Mishnah. This is because a pomegranate that grows alone or next to one other pomegranate is a very big pomegranate. If a group of four pomegranates grows clustered together, they are very small pomegranates. The ones that grow in groups of three are average size pomegranates, and the Mishnah is referring to a hole the size of one of these pomegranates. [See also Tosfos in Shabbos 112b, DH "Ad" and Tosfos in Eruvin 4b, DH "Shiuran."]

Observation: Our Gemara is a question on the texts of the Gemara in Yoma (80a) that read, "Rebbi Yochanan says that amounts and punishments are Halachah l'Moshe mi'Sinai. The Gemara asks, aren't Shiurim written? Doesn't the Pasuk say, "Eretz Chitah etc.?" The Gemara answers, "Rather, the amount of punishment (is a Halachah l'Moshe mi'Sinai)."

Question #1: The text there is difficult. What is the Gemara's question, "Doesn't the Pasuk say?" Our Gemara concludes that this Pasuk is just an Asmachta!

Question #2: Additionally, what is the answer there, "the amount of punishment?" The Gemara asked that amounts are already written!

Question #3: Additionally, whenever the Gemara quotes this Pasuk (Eretz Chitah) regarding amounts, it also quotes the entire statement of Rav Chanin (stated here in Sukah).

Text: This is why Rashi there has the text, "Aren't punishments stated in the Pasuk?" The Gemara answers, "Rather, the amounts of punishments."

Implied Question: The Gemara in Berachos (41a) somewhat implies that this is a real derivation, as Rebbi Yitzchak there says that whatever is mentioned earlier in the Pasuk is first when it comes to what to make a Berachah on (before the other type of fruit mentioned in the Pasuk). This is as the Pasuk says, "Eretz Chitah etc." It then says that this argues on Rav Chanin, as he says that this entire Pasuk is meant for Shiurin. (If it is an Asmachta, why should it make a difference?)

Answer: Perhaps according to the Gemara's conclusion in Berachos (ibid.), where it says, "And does the other opinion hold Shiurin are stated" there is no argument (between these two opinions).

Opinion: Some explain that our Gemara is referring to the hair. However, if the Chatzitzah being discussed is somewhere on the flesh, even a small amount that one does not care whether or not it is there is Chotzetz.

Question #1: Rabeinu Tam has a difficulty from the Gemara in Yevamos (78a) that says that if a pregnant Nochris woman converts her son that is born afterwards does not require immersion in a Mikvah. The Gemara asks, why is this so? If you will say it is because of Rebbi Yitzchak's law, doesn't Rav Kahana say that we only learned this regarding most of the area having a Chatzitzah, but if the entire area has a Chatzitzah it is Chotzetz? According to the opinion above, the Gemara should have asked a better question. If a Chatzitzah on the flesh is even a Chatzitzah if there is a small amount and he does not care whether it is there or not, certainly here there is a Chatzitzah!

Question #2: Additionally, the Mishnah in Mikvaos (9:5) says an amount for Chatzitzah. This amount is quoted in Shabbos (114a). [If there is a stain] on a saddlebag, Rabban Shimon ben Gamliel says that it can be immersed unless the stain is the size of an Italian Issar (coin).

Question #2 (cont.): The Gemara (ibid.) also states that if the stain is on clothing of Torah scholars, even if it is a light stain that is only apparent on one side of the clothing, it is considered a Chatzitzah (as Torah scholars must take care not to have stains on their clothing at all). If it is on the clothes of an ignoramus it is only a stain if it is so heavy that it soaked through the clothing to the other side.

Question #2 (cont.): In Zevachim (98b), the Gemara says that if there is blood on his clothing it is a Chatzitzah. If he is a butcher, it is not a Chatzitzah. If there is a stain on his clothing, it is a Chatzitzah. If he sells stained garments, it is not a Chatzitzah.

Question: If the Halachah l'Moshe mi'Sinai is regarding most of it and not a minority of it, why do we need the Pasuk of "his flesh" to teach that there should not be anything interrupting between his flesh and his skin?

Answer: This Pasuk is needed regarding hidden areas in one's body, as stated in Kidushin (25a).

Explanation: Everyone agrees that we derive from both Mikra and Mesores, as it is clear that there are differences in the way the Pesukim are written for a reason.

Explanation (cont.): Rather, when these two styles contradict each other they argue. Rebbi Akiva holds the primary tool for derivation (when it has to be one or the other) is Mikra, as he holds in Sanhedrin (4a). In Pesachim (36a), regarding Lechem Oni, he derives both Mikra and Mesores.

Explanation (cont.): In Sukah (34b), the Mishnah states that Rebbi Akiva says that just as there is on Lulav and one Esrog, there is also only one myrtle branch and one willow. The Gemara says that he derives this from the fact that the Torah stated "Lulav" without a Vav (Mesores).

Explanation (cont.): Rebbi Shimon also holds Yesh Aim l'Mikra here, yet in Kidushin (18b) he derives regarding the Pasuk, "b'Vigdo Bah" Mikra and Mesores.

Question #1: However, there is a difficulty according to Rebbi Akiva who only derives Mikra in Sanhedrin (4a). Why does he not derive both of them like Rebbi Shimon, as stated regarding Lechem Oni?

Question #2: We also find that Rebbi Akiva holds Yesh Aim l'Mikra, yet later on (7b) Rebbi Akiva says that a Sukah on top of a boat is valid. The Gemara clearly indicates that this is because he holds that a Sukah must (at least have the ability to) be a temporary dwelling. This implies that he does not require three full walls, as this is dependent on the same reasoning (of temporary/permanent). This is as stated in that Gemara (7b) that Rebbi Shimon and Rabban Gamliel who argue on Rebbi Akiva hold that a Sukah must be a (more) permanent structure. This indicates that Rebbi Akiva holds the main way to derive is through Mesores.

Answer: However, this second question can be answered based on what I will say later that saying, "Everyone holds that a Sukah must be a permanent structure" does not mean that they in fact share the exact same opinion (as some hold it must be more permanent and some hold it can be less permanent, see Tosfos 7b, DH "Kulhu").

Question #3: There is another question. Rebbi Akiva and Rebbi Shimon hold "Yesh Aim l'Mikra." They hold in Kerisus (22b) that one is liable (to bring an Asham Taluy) for eating one piece of something that may be forbidden to eat (even without another piece present).

Question #3 (cont.): Regarding one piece of Chulin and one piece of Kodesh that became mixed up, where one person ate the first piece and then someone else came and ate the remaining piece, each one of them bring an Asham Taluy. These are the words of Rebbi Akiva. Rebbi Shimon holds that they both bring one Asham Taluy together. The same applies if there were two pieces and one was forbidden fat and one was permitted fat.

Question #3 (cont.): The opinion that requires one piece out of two pieces (for someone to be liable to bring an Asham Taluy, and he is not liable if there is only one piece which might be permitted or forbidden) holds this way in Kerisus (17b) because the Pasuk is read "Mitzvos (with two Vavin, indicating two)." The opinion that holds Mesores (including Rebbi Akiva) would read this as Mitzvos (with one Vav, indicating one piece). (Why doesn't Rebbi Akiva learn like the first opinion if his primary tool for derivation is Mikra?)

Implied Question: One cannot explain the case in Kerisus (ibid.) as regarding two big pieces that he ate a Kzayis from one piece while the other person ate a Kzayis from the other piece, and they are therefore considered two "Mitzvos."

Answer (cont.): It must be that his reason is that he does not require one piece out of two pieces, as is apparent from the Gemara at the end of the chapter where Rebbi Yosi says that the difference is whether the case must be where a person takes one piece out of two pieces.

Implied Question: One also cannot say that since there originally were two pieces that this is considered "Mitzvos" since the prohibition on both pieces had already been established (since both were in doubt when they were together). (Why not?)

Answer: Rav Nachman is the one who says this in Kerisus (18a). However, Rabah is the one who explains that the argument is due to the Pasuk "Mitzvos," and he does not hold of Rav Nachman as is apparent from the Gemara there.

Question #4: There is another question from Rebbi Shimon. Our Gemara has an explanation that holds that everyone holds Yesh Aim l'Mesores, yet Rebbi Shimon himself holds in Pesachim (86b) regarding everyone (from a Chaburah) having to eat the Pesach in one house Yesh Aim l'Mikra!

Question #5: There is an additional difficulty. Later (9b), we say that everyone holds that a Sukah built under another Sukah is invalid since the Pasuk states, "ba'Sukos (without a Vav, indicating only one Sukah is valid and not a Sukah under another Sukah)." We do not say there Yesh Aim l'Mikra. [See also Tosfos later on 32a, DH "Kapos," in Sanhedrin 4a, DH "Kulhu," in Zevachim DH "Lo Nitzrachah," in Nidah 15a DH "Lo," and in Pesachim 36a DH "Oni."]

Observation: The Gemara implies that everyone holds that Sechach does not require a Pasuk, and even so one is taken off for the Mitzvah of Sukah and it is not counted according to the opinion that does not derive Techilos.

Question #1: This is unlike Rashi's explanation in Sanhedrin (3b) regarding the Gemara's statement that three words of Elokim are stated in the Parshah. He explains that Ain Dorshin Techilos is because the first Pasuk is required for a single expert judge.

Question #2: There is another difficulty according to the Gemara's conclusion (in Sanhedrin) there that according to everyone Ain Dorshin Techilos. Rebbi Yoshiyah said to him that if so, the Pasuk should say, "to the judge." If you say we should derive this from the word, "Shofet" we would not know that this applies to an expert, as Rashi himself explains there.

Question #2 (cont.): Rebbi Yonasan himself says that this terminology is a regular term, as people say that "if someone has an argument, he should go to an expert judge and not a regular person." Since the word, "Shofet" does not exclude a regular person, it must be part of the number of judges! Rather, it is not even required to have a Pasuk for an expert judge, but even so one should be taken off for itself since Ain Dorshin Techilos.

Observation: All of the derivations in the beginning of Sanhedrin (4b) such as "Karnos (with a Vav), Karnos (without)," "l'Totafos (with a Vav), l'Totafos (without)," and the derivations regarding ten Kohanim in Sanhedrin (14b) have to be checked as to why we include every single Pasuk and we do not say there Ain Dorshin Techilos.

Explanation: In the Yerushalmi, the reason for Rebbi Shimon's opinion is given based on the Pasuk, "v'Sukah Tihyeh l'Tzel Yomam mei'Chorev (l'Machseh uli'Mistor mi'Zerem umi'Matar)." "Mei'Chorev" is one wall, "l'Machseh uli'Mistor" are two more walls, and "mi'Zerem umi'Matar" are two more walls. The Rabbanan say that "mi'Zerem umi'Matar" equals one wall.