Implied Question: Even though the letters "Yud - Heh" together form a name of Hash-m, if someone says these letters together (one after the other) as they are written, he has not transgressed (and this is why the Gemara says, Yud Heh instead of "the name"). (Why hasn't he transgressed?)

Answer #1: This is because he does not mention these letters with intent that they should be a whole name of Hash-m.

Answer #2: Additionally, this transgression of pronouncing the name of Hash-m as it is written is explained by Rashi as only applying to one who teaches (i.e. says) the letters of the forty two letter name of Hash-m.

Opinion: Even so, we are careful not to do so with all of the names of Hash-m (and we therefore say, "Yud - Key" instead, see Sfas Emes).

Opinion #1: Some explain that this literally mean underneath, as one was literally on top of the other.

Question: This is illogical, as this is not considered that the phrases are read together.

Opinion #2: Rather, one can explain that one is not opposite the other, meaning that the beginning of the bottom row contains the words, "Kodesh Lamed," while the end of the top row has the name of Hash-m.

Opinion #1: The Gemara implies that according to this opinion the Misgeres was not merely an added design for the Shulchan (that is secondary to it). Rather, it was placed on top of the Shulchan during the festivals and the board of the Shulchan was placed on top of it.

Opinion #2: This is unlike the opinion of Rabeinu Tam who says that according to the opinion that it was on the bottom, it was connected to the Shulchan.

Proof: Rabeinu Tam holds this was because he has a difficulty with the statement of Rebbi Yochanan in Menachos (96b) that according to the opinion that the Misgeres was underneath the Shulchan, a board that is flipped from side to side is impure.

Proof (cont.): In Bechoros (38a), the Gemara says that we do not find a vessel that can be immersed in a Mikvah is impure according to Torah law if it does not have an inside to it, besides for those vessels that become impure through people sitting on them (i.e. a chair). In Bava Basra (66a), the Gemara concludes regarding a baker's board that straight wooden vessels can only become impure according to Rabbinic law.

Proof (cont.): This cannot be according to the opinion that the Misgeres was on top, as Rebbi Yochanan says in Menachos (96b) that you should ask what the law is regarding a board that one can flip and use either way according to this opinion. (There is no proof from the Shulchan since the Misgeres was above it, causing the Shulchan to always have a place where it contained things, making it able to become impure. This does not provide any proof to a board that can be flipped over and become a container. This as opposed to the other opinion that says the Misgeres was below the Shulchan, as according to him it is proof to the case of the board, as explained below.)

Proof (cont.): Based on the above, Rabeinu Tam felt forced to say that according to the opinion that the Misgeres was underneath the Shulchan, it had an area in it where it could hold things underneath it (since the Misgeres was a rim around the bottom of the Shulchan, if the Shulchan would be flipped over it would not be a straight board rather it could hold things within the Misgeres). This is the meaning of a board that can be turned over. If it would be flipped, it would have a place where it could hold things on the top side of it. This is why it is considered impure (the Gemara there says that the Shulchan was able to become impure) more than other straight items made of wood.

Question: This cannot be, as is implied by our Gemara.

Explanation #1: It must be that when the Gemara says that a baker's board is impure according to Rabbinic law, this is according to the opinion that the Misgeres was on top. It is impure according to Rabbinic law, and it is a question whether it is pure according to Torah law. Rebbi Eliezer is lenient, as it could be pure according to Torah law.

Explanation #2: Alternatively, the answer in Bava Basra (ibid.) is unlike Rebbi Yochanan and we do not rule this way. This indeed is stated by the Rashbam there.

Explanation #3: It is also possible that the question regarding a board that can be flipped over is because it serves people and items that serve people (as explained below).

Explanation #3 (cont.): This is as the Beraisa states in Toras Kohanim, "And it was on the eighth day...wooden vessels." "One might think that even a ladder, hanging stand (with hooks used by merchants to hang their wares such as belts etc. - Maharshal), piece of board, and a lamp are impure. This is why the Pasuk says, "from all wooden vessels" implying not all wooden vessels. One might think this excludes a table, serving board (board upon which food is served), and a serving plate. The Pasuk states, "All vessels" including these vessels.

Explanation #3 (cont.): Why should we include the former list and exclude the latter list since there is an inclusion and an exclusion? The Pasuk says, "a bag." We therefore derive that just as a bag is special in that it serves people and things that serve people, so too we will include tables, serving boards, and serving plates as they serve people and those that serve them. We will exclude ladders that serve people but not things that serve them, and hanging stands, pieces of boards, and lamps as they serve items that serve people but do not serve people.

Observation: It must be that they are not fit for laying on, since the Beraisa did not even mention a bed, chair, or bench. Additionally, it otherwise could have included them due to their being able to be laid upon. It similarly must be that they do not have a containing area (i.e. they are flat), since the Beraisa does not say, "Just as a bag carries items when it is full and empty etc."

Explanation #3 (cont.): The Gemara in Menachos (ibid.) inquires whether this derivation is Torah law or merely an Asmachta (and therefore Rabbinic law).

Explanation #3 (cont.): This is because even the opinion that says the Misgeres was under the Shulchan holds that even though all derivations are needed, the one in Toras Kohanim is needed to include things that serve people and things that serve items that serve people, and the Pasuk "And the pure Shulchan" is required to teach that we pick up the Shulchan for those who came to Yerushalayim for the festivals, regarding the serving board this cannot be a regular derivation. This is because we derive a serving board that can be turned over from, "And the pure Shulchan."

Observation: Now, a board used by bakers which is obviously only impure according to Rabbinic law, is not used by people or things that serve people.

Implied Question: In many places, the Gemara implies that straight wooden vessels (that do not contain anything) cannot even become impure according to Rabbinic law. (How can we say they are impure according to Rabbinic law?)

Proof #1: This is as the Gemara implies in Chulin (3a) when it says regarding an impure case of Kodshim that a person checked a reed to ascertain it was fit to use for slaughtering and they used it for slaughtering. The case there must be where they made the reed into a vessel (similar to a knife), as an Olah requires a vessel.

Proof #2: This is also implied in Eruvin (31a) when the Gemara says that the case is where he took it with flat wooden vessels.

Proof #3: In Shabbos (123b), regarding a stick used to check olives being pressed, the Gemara asks, "Isn't it a flat wooden vessel?"

Proof #4: The Gemara in Shabbos (16a) says that flat wooden or glass vessels are pure even according to Rabbinic law, just like glass vessels.

Proof #5: Later (12b), the Gemara says that if he used pointy wooden sticks as Sechach, it is valid Sechach. If they accept impurity even according to Rabbinic law, they would be invalid to be used as Sechach! Even pieces of cloth that are smaller than three by three fingers and a bunch of combed flax are invalid to be used as Sechach, even though they do not become impure.

Answer: All of these cases are not similar to the case of a baker's board, as the board of a baker is very wide and it is fitting to be used to put things upon it. They therefore decreed it is impure according to Rabbinic law, similar to the impurity of a container. This is as Rashi explains in Menachos (96b) that for this reason a serving board that turns over is impure according to Torah law according to the opinion that the Misgeres was underneath the Shulchan.

Answer (cont.): If we could say that a baker's board is like a serving board that serves people and the items used by people, it would certainly be understandable, as it would not be like all of the items quoted above that are pure even according to Rabbinic law.

Implied Question: The Gemara earlier said that the Tzitz was two fingers wide. (How can it say here that it has no set amount?)

Answer: The Gemara earlier was according to Rabbinic law, as the Pasuk says "On his forehead" this refers to the size of the forehead. A standard forehead has a width of two fingers.

Opinion: However, the Riva explains that the Tzitz would be worn on the head (not the forehead).

Proof: This is because he has the following difficulty. Why does the Pasuk call the hat of a Kohen Gadol a "Mitznefes," as the Pasuk states, "And you will put the Mitznefes on his head" and as its states, "And he will fasten a Mitznefes of cloth?" The Gemara in Gitin (7a) similarly says (i.e. specifically calls it a Mitznefes) that when the Mitznefes is on the head of the Kohen Gadol an Atarah can be worn by anyone. Why is the hat of a Kohen Hedyot called a Migba'as (and not a Mitznefes), as the Pasuk states "And you will make Migba'os for them?"

Proof (cont.): Rather, it must be that they were very different from each other. The hat of the Kohen Hedyot was larger than the hat of the Kohen Gadol, as the Tzitz pushes the hat of the Kohen Gadol aside.

Proof (cont.): Similarly, regarding Tefilin, the Gemara in Zevachim (19a) says that his hair was seen between the Tzitz and the Mitznefes, as that is where he put his Tefilin.

Implied Question: The Kohen Hedyot also wore Tefilin. (Why is this a proof?)

Answer: He could put them where the Kohen Gadol would put the Tzitz, as there is room on the head where one can place a pair of Tefilin (Shel Rosh), as stated in Eruvin (95b).

Implied Question: This is despite the fact that regarding the Tzitz the Pasuk says, "forehead." (How can the Riva says it is not the forehead, but rather it is worn on the head?)

Answer: The Targum states (see the side of our Gemara that the text in Tosfos should read, "(However,) The Targum states" and not "And the Targum states"), "between the eyes," and we say in Kidushin (66a) that King Yanai said, "raise them with the Tzitz that is between your eyes." "Between your eyes" implies the same definition that this phrase has regarding Tefilin, which is on top of the head (not the forehead).

Implied Question: However, this is not so acceptable, since the Gemara in Menachos (37b) derives this definition of "on top of the head" regarding Tefilin through a Gezeirah Shaveh of "Bein Einecha" from the Pasuk, "Lo Sasimu Korchah b'Rosham (Bein Eineichem l'Mes, see Menachos ibid.)" which is referring to a place where there is hair. (Perhaps it is only regarding these two topics which share a Gezeirah Shaveh of Bein Eineichem that the Torah means Einecha refers to the top of the head?)

Observation: Even if the Tzitz would literally be on his forehead, he would have to tie his Tzitz and Tefilin in the back of his head, and both of them would push aside the Mitznefes.

Implied Question: The Gemara in Yoma (12b) says that the clothes worn on Yom Kippur by the Kohen Gadol can be used afterwards by the Kohen Hedyot, despite the fact that regarding the "white clothes" he wears a Mitznefes!

Answer: The Gemara means the other garments would be valid besides the Mitznefes.

Implied Question #1: However, the Gemara uses the term "Mitznefes" for the hat of a Kohen Hedyot. This is as it states in Yoma (25a) regarding the lottery that they would take the "Mitznefes" of one of the Kohanim.

Implied Question #2: It is also difficult as the Tzitz was not worn as part of the "white clothes" (Bigdei Lavan). Why, then, would the hat worn with the Bigdei Lavan be called a Mitznefes (if it did not have to be small, since it was not being worn with the Tzitz)?

Answer: Perhaps it was as small as the Mitznefes was the entire year. [See Tosfos in Eruvin 95b, DH "Makom."]

Explanation #1: Some say that this is because the greater amount is infinite.

Question #1: This is impossible to say here, as obviously one can only derive from a face that can fit inside the Mishkan (which is finite).

Question #2: Similarly, in Rosh Hashanah (4b) and Chagigah (17a) regarding the law that one can make up the sacrifice he is supposed to bring on Shevuos for up to seven days, we derive this from Pesach. The Gemara asks, why don't we derive from Sukos? The Gemara answers, "Tafasta Merubah Lo Tafasta." There, too, this is a finite number (of eight days of Sukos compared to seven days of Pesach).

Question #3: This is also apparent from the Beraisa in Toras Kohanim (that reads as follows). "The Pasuk says, "When the flow of her blood will flow for many days." "Days" is a minimum of two. One might think that this refers to many (more) days (than two). Rebbi Akiva says, whenever something is implied to be a small amount or a big amount, if you take the big amount you have not taken but if you take the small amount you have taken. Rebbi Yehudah ben Beseirah says that if there are two measures, one that is finite and one that is infinite, you should measure with the finite measure and not the infinite measure. Rebbi Nechemiah says, is the Pasuk coming to teach and open (inform) or close (not inform)? It is clearly not coming to close, but rather to inform! If you say "Days" means ten, perhaps it means one hundred or two hundred or one thousand or ten thousand! When you say "days" means two, you have made it less.

Explanation #2: The following is the meaning of Tafasta Merubah. If you take the small amount it cannot be taken away from you, as the small amount is included in a big amount. However, if you take the big amount, I will tell you that you should bring proof that that this is so and (only) then take it.

Explanation #2 (cont.): Rebbi Yehudah ben Beseirah comes to teach the custom in the world that the finite measure is used, not the infinite measure. So too here, we take the smaller measure that is finite. Rebbi Nechemiah teaches from the Pesukim that they usually do not try to give an unclear amount, but rather a clear amount. Regarding making up days for the sacrifice of Shevuos, all of these opinions require Rebbi Akiva's reasoning. [See Tosfos in Yoma 72am DH "Navid."]

Explanation: The height of the Keruvim was ten cubits and the height of the Beis Hamikdash was thirty cubits.

Implied Question: The Pasuk states, "And before the Dvir was twenty cubits long, twenty cubits wide, and twenty cubits high" (Melachim 1, 6:20).

Answer: This was from the edge of the Keruvim and higher, as stated in Bava Basra (99b).

Observation: This is unlike Rashi's explanation in Melachim (ibid.) that the attic above the Kodesh Kdoshim was lower than the Heichal. [See Tosfos in Yoma 52a DH "v'Esrim."]