Question: Why don't we deduce from the Mishnah earlier (36b) that says we exempt people (who swore falsely) in cases of fines? Certainly this would be so regarding land, as is apparent from the Gemara earlier (34a)!

Question(cont.): The Gemara asks earlier that according to Rebbi Yochanan who says that witnesses who are made to swear regarding knowing testimony about land are exempt, what is the difference between them (Rebbi Eliezer and Rebbi Akiva)? The difference is a case of fine. (In other words, this shows that even the opinion who says one is exempt in cases of land will certainly say one is liable in cases of fine.)

Answer: This is not a question. Later (referring to the Mishnah on 36b regarding Shevuas ha'Pikadon, see notes on Tosfos ha'Rosh), the reason is given that because he did not deny owing money, as he would not have been liable if he would admit, he is exempt. However, regarding swearing that one does not know testimony, the one who says people who swear about land are not liable will hold that swearing about fines does make one liable. This is because the defendant will be liable to pay based on their testimony, just like he will be liable to pay any money that he owes. (In other words, if the defendant swears falsely regarding his owing a fine he is not liable because his admission would have made him exempt. However, when witnesses deny knowing testimony about a fine, their testimony would have convicted the defendant.)

Text#1: The text here is, "not to you, not to you, and not to you." The only time there is a "vav" (meaning "and") is the last one. This is true regarding all of the statements of "not to you" that are quoted here.

Proof: This must be, as if the text is that there is a "vav" by each of these statements, when we conclude that this is according to Rebbi, we should say that this is the opinion of Rebbi Yehudah who says, "And not to you" is specific. However, with this text we cannot say this is Rebbi Yehudah, as both terms are considered specific whether or not they have a "vav."

Question: There is a difficulty with our Gemara. In Zevachim (30b), the Gemara implies Rebbi Yehudah will more likely hold a word is specific without a "vav" than with a "vav." The Gemara there says, or perhaps "a Kzayis and a Kzayis" according to Rebbi Yehudah is a specific, and certainly "Kzayis Kzayis."

Text#2: In an old Sefer, the text of our Gemara is the exact opposite. (They say that Rebbi Meir holds "and not to you" while Rebbi Yehudah says "not to you.") Rebbi Yochanan says that everyone agrees that "not to you" is specific. The argument is regarding "and not to you." The text is, "the braisa states and not to you." (Our Gemara only has "not to you.") The braisa states Pikadon and Tsumes Yad etc.

Explanation: This means that "not to you" is the specific case of Rebbi Meir. Rashi explains that if this was specific according to Rebbi Yehudah, why would Rebbi Yehudah say again "and not to you?"

Question: Perhaps the reason why he does not say "not to you" is because Rebbi Meir agrees in this case?

Answer: He still should have said, "even and not to you."

Explanation: This is said regarding Shevuas ha'Eidus. If it would be said regarding Shevuas ha'Pikadon, it would have to mention Ashamos (as one brings an Asham for a false Shevuas ha'Pikadon).

Question: This is difficult. The Gemara in Bava Metzia (48a) only makes one liable in a case where a specific vessel was set aside as a source of payment. If so, being that he already paid, he should not be exempt because of his admission!

Answer: The case is where he set aside a vessel in the following manner. He declared that the claimant should collect whatever Beis Din obligates him to pay from this vessel. (He did not yet pay. Rather, he set aside a vessel in case he would be found liable.)

Implied Question: The Mishnah does not say that this applies to men and women as it does earlier (36b) regarding Shevuas ha'Pikadon. (Why not?)

Answer: This is because it is obvious. Earlier (where it was also seemingly obvious), the Mishnah only stated this in order that one should not think that we derive Shevuas ha'Pikadon from Shevuas ha'Eidus (which only applies to men).

Question: Regarding Shevuas ha'Eidus, Bituy, and Pikadon, why don't we require that he should hold a holy article when he is sworn by others, just like we do by Shevuas ha'Dayanim?

Implied Question: This is despite the fact that Avraham made Eliezer swear on his Bris Milah.

Answer#1: We say later that a Talmid Chacham can Lechatchilah swear on Tefilin.

Answer#2: Alternatively, being that at that point in time Avraham was not commanded in anything else, the Milah was considered like a Sefer Torah at that point in time.