Opinion: Rashi explains that there is no reason to ask this question regarding Shevuas ha'Eidus, because there is no certain warning regarding Shevuas ha'Eidus, as who knows if they really know relevant testimony.

Question: This does not appear correct. This is not considered a doubt, as the person being warned has no doubt (that he knows testimony). This is evident from Eidim Zomimim (which the Gemara in Kesuvos 33a states does not require warning). If they would require warning they would be warned, even though the ones warning the witnesses would have no idea before they give their testimony whether or not they are lying.

Implied Question: This question was not asked regarding Shevuas ha'Eidus. (Why not?)

Answer: This is because it is impossible to know if they purposely did not testify, as they could say they forgot (what had happened). (The Re'aim Horowitz explains that regarding Shevuas ha'Pikadon a person cannot claim he forgot and therefore took an oath against a witness. He is supposed to believe the witness if he is unsure!)

Explanation: This is not a completely novel concept, as there are a few sins (that whether they are done by accident or on purpose the result is the same) where this is true, as explained by Rashi. Rather, the Gemara means that being that doing so on purpose can be atoned with a Korban like doing so by accident, this is a relatively rare law.

Implied Question: This is despite the fact that regarding a Shifchas Charufah the Pasuk states, "She will be checked and he will bring his Asham." (The Maharsha explains that this implies that we give both lashes and require a Korban if someone was with a Shifchah Charufah on purpose. Why, then, should we entertain in this case that the sinner should receive lashes and not bring a Korban?)

Answer: We say in Kerisus (11a) that she receives lashes, and he brings a Korban. (Shifchah Charufah is not an example of one person requiring both punishments.)

Question: This is difficult. The Gemara originally seemingly wanted to derive a stringency from Nazir, as it is understandable that we should be stringent regarding Nazir as he certainly receives lashes.

Question(cont.): However, according to the Gemara's conclusion, it is apparent that this is stated as a leniency regarding Nazir, as it is understandable we should be lenient regarding Nazir as he is exempt after he receives lashes. (This is as opposed to Pikadon where the Gemara concludes he could receive lashes and still have to bring a Korban. Why didn't the Gemara know if this was a stringency or leniency?)

Answer#1: It appears that the Gemara did not know the context of the statement regarding Nazir. (It therefore could not judge for certain whether it was stated as a stringency or leniency.)

Answer#2: Alternatively, the Gemara originally thought that the Beraisa means as follows. "No. If you will say this regarding Nazir where he is impure, and his atonement is dependent on lashes that are lenient and not on a Korban, will you say this regarding Shevuas ha'Pikadon where his atonement is not dependent on lashes, but rather on a Korban which is strict." This is clearly unlike the opinion earlier who said that a person would rather bring a Korban than receive lashes.

Opinion: However, the Sifri teaches this Beraisa, and explains it in the opposite fashion. The Sifri in Naso says regarding Nazir, "In sudden" - this includes a victim of forced circumstances. "Suddenly" - This includes someone who transgresses accidentally. This is a Kal v'Chomer. If in a place where the one who sins on purpose was not held liable, one who sinned accidentally was held liable, here where the one who sins on purpose is liable, certainly the one who sinned accidentally should be held liable!"

Opinion(cont.): "How do we know that one who sins on purpose is liable? You can say that this is a Kal v'Chomer. If regarding Shevuas ha'Eidus one who accidentally (forgets he knows testimony) sins is not liable but one who sins on purpose is liable, here where one who accidentally sins is liable, certainly one who sins on purpose is liable!"

Opinion(cont.): "This is not so. Perhaps you will only say this regarding Shevuas ha'Eidus, as he does not receive lashes. Can you say this regarding Nazir where he does receive lashes? Being that he receives lashes, perhaps he should not bring a Korban? This is why the Pasuk says, "And he will atone from his sinning etc."

Text: It appears that this last part of the Sifri is what is quoted in our Gemara. Instead of Shevuas ha'Eidus, we have the text "Shevuas ha'Pikadon." We should also have the text here reversed, as we say in the Sifri, "Perhaps this is only regarding Shevuas ha'Pikadon as he does not receive lashes etc."

Text(cont.): This is also the text of the Rach. This is his language: "The Gemara tries to answer the question from the Sifri which says, no. If you will say this regarding Shevuas ha'Pikadon where he does not receive lashes, will you say this regarding a Nazir who became impure that he does receive lashes, and that because he does (he should not have to bring a Korban) etc.?!

Question: What is the Gemara's answer that he was not exempt from lashes, meaning that he still must bring a Korban? This itself is the topic, as we are trying to derive from Nazir that he should still have to bring a Korban!

Answer: Rabeinu Tam explains that the Gemara means as follows. He is not exempt with lashes means lashes does not suffice by itself as an atonement. Will you apply this to Nazir where lashes itself suffices to atone? Even when an accidentally impure Nazir brings a Korban, he only does so in order that Nezirus of purity should start, as the Gemara concludes. This is unlike Rebbi Elazar ha'Kapar, who says in Nazir (19a) that an impure Nazir is considered a sinner.

Explanation: When the Gemara asks, "Doesn't it say Korban?" It means that regarding someone who does so accidentally the Pasuk states he must bring a Korban. Why is he bringing a Korban if not for the fact that he must atone for something? If so, we should derive from Shevuas ha'Pikadon where if someone does so on purpose he does not suffice with lashes but rather must bring a Korban. The Gemara answers etc.

Explanation: For example, the case could be where he said, "I did not borrow," as this is as if he said, "I did not pay."

Explanation: The Gemara had to say that they were related through their wives, but did not have to say that their wives were on their deathbeds. This is because the Gemara cannot ask that this is obvious. The novelty in this case is that if someone admits, and afterwards witnesses come forward, he must pay the principle and a fifth. If witnesses come forward and he then admits, he must pay double.

Question#1: This is difficult. Rebbi Yochanan himself holds in Bava Basra (175b) that a person owing another person money establishes a lien on land according to Torah law. If so, even an oral loan should make one exempt from Shevuas ha'Eidus and Shevuas ha'Pikadon (as essentially this is denying a lien on land, and one does not swear regarding a denial of owing land)!

Question#2: This is similarly difficult from Gitin (37a). Rebbi Yochanan says that a document that has a clause regarding a lien on the property is not taken away by Shemitah. If so, he should never even hold an oral loan is taken away by Shemitah, as every oral loan in essence creates a lien on the property!

Question#3: Similarly, in Bava Kama (4b) [regarding partial admission] and in Kesuvos (87b), the Gemara says regarding a single witness that one does not swear regarding denying owing land. According to the opinion that owing money creates a Torah lien, one will never find an obligation to make an oath!

Answer: One must say according to Rebbi Yochanan that the cases where one can swear are when he waived the lien.

Implied Question: This teaching is required even according to the opinions that do not hold one is liable for damaging through Garmi (loosely translated as semi-direct damage) in Bava Kama (98a) or burning the loan documents owed to his friend. (Why is this teaching necessary according to them? They would say he is exempt without a special Pasuk stating so!)

Answer: Even so, being that if the documents were extant he would have to return them, one would think that if he denies having the documents he is liable.

Question: However, being that the Gemara concludes that they are only arguing regarding returning the field, whether or not he can say when the field has changed, "Here is yours before you," and they are not arguing regarding swearing, this is difficult. How can one exclude documents? Even if he would burn them he would be exempt! He would certainly be exempt if they changed!

Answer#1: One must say that he holds like Rebbi Meir who judges Garmi.

Answer#2: Alternatively, he is exempt if he burns them where they are. However, if he physically takes them and burns them, he is liable.

Implied Question: This question is asked, despite the fact that the opinion who says one must take an oath would agree that the Rabbanan say one is exempt in this case. (What, then, is the proof from this Mishnah?)

Answer: Even so, the Gemara still quotes this proof, as the Stam Mishnah (which we generally rule according to) reads better according to the opinion that one is exempt.

Question: However, there is a slight difficulty that we bring a proof from our Mishnah which is eventually pushed aside (top 38a). Why don't we bring proof from the Mishnah later (38b) that states clearly that one does not swear regarding denial of having a lien on his land? If so, one would clearly not bring a Korban!