1)

(a)Our Mishnah rules that in a case where Shimon (the defending litigant) is a gambler, lends on interest, indulges in pigeon-racing or does business with Sh'mitah-produce - Reuven swears and takes.

(b)According to Rebbi Yossi, if both litigants are suspect of making false oaths, the Shevu'ah returns to its place (which will be explained in the Sugya). Rebbi Meir says - 'Yachloku'.

(c)'Chenvani al Pikaso' cannot refer to a case where the storekeeper cites his ledger in which it is recorded (see Tosfos Yom-Tov) that Reuven owes him two hundred Zuz, who subsequently claims that he paid - because since there are no grounds to suspect the purchaser, there is no reason to impose a Shevu'ah on him.

(d)The case therefore is - where Reuven who asked a storekeeper to give his son a Sa'ah of wheat or his employee a Sela in small coins on his account, and the former claims that he gave it, whereas the latter claims that he did not receive it.

2)

(a)In the case of 'Chenvani al Pinkaso', the Tana Kama rules that - the storekeeper swears that he paid as instructed and the son or the employee swears that he did not receive the goods or the money, and both then claim from Reuven.

(b)ben Na'nes objects to this ruling because - it is not feasible for the Chachamim to institute what is certainly a Shevu'as Shav (seeing as the two Shevu'os are conradictory).

(c)He therefore maintains that - they both claim without a Shevu'ah.

3)

(a)In a case where Reuven asks a storekeeper for a Dinar's worth of fruit, and when the latter asks for the money, he claims that he already paid him and that he put the money in his purse - the Tana obligates Reuven to swear a Shevu'as Heses that he paid (see Gilyon ha'Shas, and Tosfos 48a DH 'Nishba').

(b)And in a case where Reuven first paid the storekeeper and when he subsequently asks him for the fruit, the storekeeper claims that he gave them to him and that he took them home - he obligates the storekeeper to swear.

(c)According to Rebbi Yehudah, whoever has the fruit has the upper hand - in which case Reuven does not need to swear in the earlier case (see also Tif'eres Yisrael) ...

(d)... because a storekeeper would not give the customer his goods before receiving payment.

4)

(a)The Tana Kama rules, in a case where Reuven asks a banker for a Dinar's worth of small coins ...

1. ... and when the latter asks for the Dinar, he claims that he already gave it to him and that he put it in his purse, that - Reuven must swear that he already paid.

2. ... and first hands him the Dinar; then, when he asks for the coins, the banker claims that he already handed them over that - the banker must swear that he indeed did.

(b)Rebbi Yehudah argues, like he argued in the previous case, that - no banker would hand his customer a Dinar's worth of coins before having received the Dinar. Consequently, in the first case Reuven is Patur from a Shevu'ah.

(c)Our Mishnah compares Yesomim who claim a debt with a Sh'tar to 'Pogemes Kesuvasah', 'Eid Echad Me'idah she'hi Peru'ah', and to someone who claims from Nechasim Meshubadim or from the property of Yesomim - all of whom must make a Shevu'ah before receiving what is owed to them.

5)

(a)Before the Yesomim can claim, they must swear that their father did not inform them either at the time of his death or at any time prior to that, that the debt was paid - and that they did not find a receipt that it was paid.

(b)According to Rebbi Yochanan ben Berokah - the same will apply even if the son is born after his father died.

(c)And Rebbi Shimon ben Gamliel rules - that if witnesses testify that, before the father died, he admitted that the Sh'tar was not paid - the Yesomim may claim without a Shevu'ah.

6)

(a)Our Mishnah rules that Shutfin, Arisin, Apotropsin, and a woman whose husband appointed her to manage his estate, or a son who is managing his deceased father's estate - can all be made to swear even though nobody is claiming from them (this will be explained in the Sugya).

(b)'Apotropsin' in this context refers to - custodians of the property belonging to Gedolim (not to Ketanim [which is a Machlokes Tana'im in Gitin], as it normally does).

(c)Once Shutfin and Arisin have divided the property or the goods, they are no longer obligated to swear - unless the one partner is Chayav a Shevu'ah anyway (in which case he can be made to swear about the Shutfus by means of a 'Gilgul Shevu'ah').

(d)The Mishnah's final statement is 've'ha'Shevi'is Meshametes es ha'Shevu'ah' meaning that - Sh'mitah cancels all loans and relevant Shevu'os.

7)

(a)We learn from the Pasuk in Mishpatim (in connection with a Shevu'as ha'Shomrim) "ve'Lakach Be'alav ve'Lo Yeshalem" that - one only swears in order to become absolved from paying, but not in order to receive.

(b)The problem with Rav Yehudah Amar Shmuel, who, in reply to the question why we rule 'Nishba'in ve'Notlin' regarding a Sachir, replies ...

1. ... initially 'Halachos Gedolos Shanu Ka'an' is that - 'Nishba'in ve'Notlin' is not a 'Halachah le'Moshe mi'Sinai'.

2. ... (in answer to the problem) that we must amend 'Halachos' to 'Takanos' is that - this implies that there are small Takanos (which is simply not true).

(c)So Rav Nachman finally quotes Shmuel - as having said 'Takanos Kevu'os Shanu Ka'an.

(d)The problem with the suggestion that ...

1. ... the basis of this Takanah is for the sake of the employee's Parnasah is that - Chazal would not punish the employer for the benefit of his employee.

2. ... it is because the employer will gladly agree with the Takanah, since it enables him to find workers more easily - because by the same token, the employee would prefer the employer to swear, as this will encourage him to hire him more readily.

(e)We dismiss both previous arguments - since on the one hand, the employer out of necessity, will employ the employee, whilst on the other, the employee will of necessity, work for the employer anyway (in which case, we may as well let the employer swear, as he is supposed to).

8)

(a)So we finally ascribe the reason for placing the Shevu'ah with the employee to the fact that the employer is too busy to remember whether he paid him or not, and the Shevu'ah is - merely to put the employer's mind at rest.

(b)Chazal did not institute that the employee ...

1. ... must be paid with witnesses (to avoid swearing unnecessarily) - because it is too much trouble for the employer to have to find witnesses for each and every payment.

2. ... receives his wages before commencing work - because both parties prefer wages to be paid at the end, the one because he does not always have cash so early in the morning, the other, to ensure that he doesn't spend it (or lose it) in the course of the day.

(c)In a case where the employee claims that the employer promised him two Zuz, and the employer claims that they agreed on one, the Beraisa rules - 'ha'Motzi me'Chavero alav ha'Re'ayah' (and the employer is believed).

(d)We do not apply the S'vara there 'that an employer is too busy to remember' - because even though he may be too busy to remember which employees have been paid and which haven't, he will certainly remember how much he agreed to pay them.

9)

(a)In a case where the employee claims his wages after the time limit prescribed by the Torah has expired, the Beraisa rules - 'Harei Zeh Eino Nishba ve'Notel'.

(b)We initially ascribe this ruling to the Chazakah - that an employer would not contravene the La'av (in Kedoshim) of 'Lo Salin Pe'ulas Sachir ... ".

(c)We resolve this with what we just learned (that an employer is too busy to remember these things) - by establishing that a person will ultimately exert himself in order not to transgress a La'av.

(d)And after pointing out that the employee too, has a Chazakah that he would not transgress the La'av of 'Bal Tigzol' - we conclude that the employer has an extra advantage based on the Chazakah that an employee makes sure to claim his wages before the time of expiry.

10)

(a)Rav Nachman Amar Shmuel qualifies our Mishnah - by establishing it to where the employer hires the employee in the presence of witnesses, but where he does not, he is believed ...

(b)... on the basis of a 'Migu', since he could have denied having employed him in the first place (see Tosfos DH 'Mitoch').

(c)Rebbi Yitzchak commented 'Yeyasher' - because that is also what Rebbi Yochanan said.

(d)This does not mean that Resh Lakish disagreed with Rebbi Yochanan - because as we learned in connection with a similar episode (on Daf 'Mem'), he did not know what Resh Lakish subsequently said ...

(e)... either because Rebbi Yitzchak was not in the Beis-Hamidrash when Rebbi Yochanan finished the Sugya, or - because Resh Lakish was drinking water at the time that Rebbi Yochanan made his statement, and by the time he had finished drinking, Rebbi Yiztchak had already left the Beis Hamidrash (as we learned there).

11)

(a)Rav Menashya bar Z'vid quoting Rav concurs with Shmuel. Rava disagrees with Rami bar Chama, who praised this opinion - because if that were so, he argues, a Shomer Sachar should be Patur from a Shevu'ah by Shevurah u'Meisah, since he could have denied having received the article in the first place (see Chidushei ha'Ran).

(b)Initially, we refute Rava's proof - by establishing the Shevu'ah in a case where he received the Pikadon in the presence of witnesses.

(c)Neither will he be believed because he could have claimed that he returned the article - in a case where he received it against a Sh'tar, because then he would not be believed to say that he returned the article without witnesses.

(d)We can extrapolate from here that - even though someone who receives a Pikadon in front of witnesses does not need to return it in front of witnesses, if he receives it against a Sh'tar, he does, because otherwise, the fact that he did not ask for the Sh'tar in exchange for the payment, is proof that he did not pay.

12)

(a)When Rami bar Chama, with reference to Rav Sheishes (whom we are about to cite), quoted the Pasuk in Shmuel "Vayasem David es ha'Devarim he'Eileh be'Libo" he meant that - like David, Rav Sheishes sought the truth, by trying to discover whether the Halachah is like Rav and Shmuel or not.

(b)When Rav Sheishes asked Rabah bar Shmuel what he had learned regarding Sachir, he cited him the Mishnah in Bava Metzi'a, 'Sachir bi'Zemano Nishba ve'Notel' which he qualified - by confining it to where the employer and the employee are arguing over whether the latter received his wages or not, but not if their dispute revolves around the amount that they fixed, in which case the Tana holds 'ha'Motzi me'Chavero, alav ha'Re'ayah' (as we explained earlier0.

(c)Rav Sheishes extrapolates from the Seifa of that Mishnah that - seeing as the Tana specifically mentions a Re'ayah (witnesses), the Reisha, which does not, clearly maintains that the Sachir is believed even when there are no witnesses ...

(d)... disproving the opinion of Rav and Shmuel.

13)

(a)Rav Nachman bar Yitzchak refutes Rav Sheishes' proof however - by establishing the Reisha, as well as the Seifa, where there are witnesses. And the reason the Tana did not say so is - because he only mentions a proof that obligates immediate payment, but not one that obligates a Shevu'ah first.