1)

(a)Bearing in mind that the Torah has just written "Lehara O Leheitiv", Rebbi Akiva learns from ...

1. ... the words "Asher Yevatei" (in the phrase that follows "le'Chol asher Yevatei ha'Adam bi'Shevu'ah") - to include things that are neither for the good nor for the bad ('she'Ezrok Tzror la'Yam').

2. ... the word "Le'Chol" - to include Shevu'os of the past ('she'Achalti').

(b)Rebbi Yishmael - precludes Shevu'os of the past from Shevu'as Bituy.

(c)Rebbi Akiva's problem with Rebbi Yishmael's opinion is that - if the Torah includes the one, then it also includes the other.

(d)Rebbi Yochanan explains that Rebbi Yishmael Darshens the Torah like his Rebbi Nechunyah ben Hakaneh - who was his Rebbe, in the form of K'lal u'P'rat U'Chelal.

2)

(a)Rebbi Akiva, on the other hand, Darshens the Torah like his Rebbi - Nachum Ish Gam Zu ...

(b)... in the form of Ribuy Mi'ut ve'Ribuy.

(c)The Beraisa quoting Rebbi Akiva therefore explains the Pasuk in Vayikra "O Nefesh ki Sishava", Ribah; "Lehara O Leheitiv", Mi'at; "Le'chol asher Yevatei ha'Adam", Chazar ve'Ribah'. We learn from the Mi'ut that neither a Shevu'ah to negate a Mitzvah - nor a Shevu'ah to change that which is known, is considered a Shevu'as Bituy ...

(d)... since both are impossible to fulfill.

3)

(a)Rebbi Yishmael, on the other hand, learns from ...

1. ... "Le'chol asher Yevatei ha'Adam" (which he considers a 'K'lal') that - a Shevu'ah that is neither for a person's good nor harmful is considered a Shevu'as Bituy.

2. ... "Lehara O Leheitiv" (which he considers a 'P'rat') - to preclude a Shevu'ah of the past from Shevu'as Bituy.

(b)Based on "Lehara O Leheitiv", Rebbi Yitzchak connects Shevu'as Bituy to "Lo Yachel Devaro" (of Nedarim) - to preclude a Shevu'ah of the past (which is not subject to 'Bal Yachel'), and to therefore include Shevu'os that are neither good nor harmful (rather than the other way round as we initially asked on Rebbi Yishmael).

(c)"Lehara O Leheitiv" does not go so well with the La'av of - 'Bal Teshakru' (which implies that it is a lie as soon as it is uttered, which by definition, pertains to the past).

(d)Rav Yitzchak bar Avin answers the Kashya 'Eipuch' by quoting the Pasuk "O Nefesh ki Sishava Levatei bi'Sefasayim". From the fact that "ki Sishava" precedes "Levatei" he learns that - the Shevu'ah must precede the deed to which it pertains, and explains why Rebbi Yishmael insists on precluding a Shevu'ah of the past from Shevu'as Bituy.

4)

(a)From the word "ha'Adam" (in the above phrase "le'Chol asher Yevatei ha'Adam"), the Beraisa - precludes an Oneis from the Korban.

(b)We illustrate this with the story of Rav Kahana and Rav Asi - where initially, each one swore that Rav had taught them something the way he quoted it. After corroborating one of their opinions ...

(c)... Rav allayed the fears of the second one - by assuring him that, due to the current D'rashah, seeing as he was convinced of what he had said, he was not guilty of a Shevu'as Sheker.

(d)The Tana precludes Meizid from the word "ve'Ne'elam". From the juxtaposition of "ve'Ne'elam" to "bi'Shevu'ah", he learns that - he is only Chayav if he forgot avout the Shevu'ah, but not if he forgot that the object of his Shevu'ah was the one on which he swore.

5)

(a)When the Chachamim of Eretz Yisrael heard the previous D'rashah - they laughed ...

(b)... because they held that forgetting the object is synonymous with forgetting the Shevu'ah.

(c)For example - if the Mashbi'a swore that he would not eat wheat-bread, and he then ate wheat-bread, believing that he had sworn not to eat barley-bread, this incorporates forgetting the Shevu'ah as well as the object.

(d)They had no problem with 'Shevu'ah B'li Cheifetz' - where he swore that he would not eat wheat-bread, and he thought that he had sworn that he would, since that is perfectly plausible.

(e)So Rebbi Elazar ruled - that 'Cheifetz B'li Shevu'ah' is Chayav too.

6)

(a)Rav Yosef disagrees with the b'nei Eretz Yisrael. In his opinion - 'Cheifetz B'li Shevu'ah' refers to a case where someone swears that he will not eat wheat-bread, and then takes a loaf of wheat-bread, believing it to be a barley-loaf; since he remembers the Shevu'ah, and it is only the Cheifetz that is hidden from him, it is indeed considered He'elam Cheifetz, and not He'elam Shevu'ah, and he is therefore Patur (as the Tana ruled).

(b)Abaye queried Rav Yosef however, in that this is still considered a He'elam Shevu'ah, bearing in mind that the Korban comes either for what he is holding in his hand - or for the loaf that he ate.

(c)To which Rav Yosef replied that - seeing as it is becoming aware that it was a wheat-loaf that would have caused him to desist (and not a reminder of the Shevu'ah), it is considered a He'elam Cheifetz.

7)

(a)Rava asked Rav Nachman what the Din would be if someone forgets both the Cheifetz and the Shevu'ah. When Rav ...

1. ... Nachman replied 'Harei He'elam Shevu'ah be'Yado ve'Chayav', he retorted - 'Harei He'elam Cheifetz be'Yado, u'Patur'.

2. ... Ashi suggested that we should check and see what would have caused him to desist, the knowledge of the Cheifetz or the knowledge of the Shevu'ah, Ravina retorted - 'K'lum Parish mi'Shevu'ah Ela Mishum Cheifetz?'

(b)Consequently, the outcome of Rava's She'eilah is - 'Ela Lo Sh'na', and he is Patur (see Meleches Betzalel).

8)

(a)Based on the current Beraisa, Rava's problem with Shig'gas Bituy Shevu'ah le'she'Avar (according to Rebbi Akiva) is that - if the Mashbi'a remembers at the time when he swears, then he is Meizid, and if he does not, he is Oneis (both of which are Patur from a Korban, as we just learned).

(b)He does not have the same problem with 'Lehaba' - which speaks when he made the Shevu'ah in his full senses, but forgot the Shevu'ah afterwards.

(c)Rav Nachman answered him by establishing the case like Munbaz with regard to Shig'gas Shabbos that - he realized that he was making a false Shevu'ah, but forgot that a false Shevu'ah is subject to a Korban.

(d)Our Beraisa might even hold like the Rabbanan however, who will concede to Munbaz (that He'elam Korban is sufficient) by Shevu'as Bituy, which is different - inasmuch as it is in itself a Chidush, that one is Chayav a Korban on a mere La'av (as if to say, that one Chidush leads to another).

9)

(a)Ravina asked Rava what the Din will be if someone makes a Shevu'ah forbidding a loaf on himself, and in a moment of starvation he forgets the Shevu'ah and eats the loaf, whether he is Chayav a Korban or not. To which Rava replied that - since, if he came to ask for a Heter, the Rav would definitely revoke the Shevu'ah, he is not considered as having contravened his Shevu'ah (even if he did not consult a Rav).

(b)The problem with this is that - it is obvious, so why did Ravina need to ask the She'eilah?

(c)Ravina therefore amended the She'eilah to a case where he was very hungry and would have eaten the loaf anyway (even though his life was not in danger). To which Rava replied, based on a Mishnah in Horiyos, - that in this case too, he will be Patur, seeing it is not a case of 'Shav mi'Yedi'aso' (meaning that he would have retracted had he remembered the Shevu'ah, a major condition for being Chayav a Korban).

10)

(a)Shmuel learns from the Pasuk "Levatei bi'Sefasayim" that - for a Shevu'ah to be valid, it must be verbalized (and not just thought of in one's heart ["bi'Sefasayim", 've'Lo be'Lev').

(b)We query this however, from a Beraisa, which learns from the Pasuk "le'Chol asher Yevatei (bi'Sefasayim") that - a decision in one's heart is sufficient to render a Shevu'ah effective.

(c)To reconciles this with the Reisha ''bi'Sefasayim", 've'Lo be'Lev', Rav Sheishes interprets ...

1. ... the Reisha to mean that - once a person has decided to verbalize a Shevu'ah, it will not be valid until he does so.

2. ... the Seifa that - if he decided a Shevuah in his heart S'tam, then the Shevu'ah is valid (even though he did not verbalize it).

(d)Shmuel explains the Beraisa differently. According to him, the Reisha means ''bi'Sefasayim", 've'Lo she'Gamar be'Libo Lehotzi Pas Chitin, ve'Hotzi Pas Se'orin'' (meaning that his Shevu'ah must conform to his intentions), and the Seifa that - if he intended to forbid on himself wheat-bread, and then said Pas (S'tam), his Shevu'ah is indeed valid (with regard to wheat-bread [Tosfos ha'Rosh]).

11)

(a)Following the Pasuk in Ki Seitzei (in connection with a Neder to bring a Korban) "Motzei Sefasecha Tishmor ve'Asisa", a second Beraisa learns from the Pasuk in Vayakhel (in connection with the donations for the Mishkan) "Kol N'div Lev" that - someone who intends in his heart to donate towards the Mishkan, becomes obligated to do so.

(b)We reconcile this with Shmuel, who requires a Shevu'ah to be verbalized, according to those who hold ...

1. ... Sh'nei Kesuvim ha'Ba'im ke'Echad, Ein Melamdin' - by considering Kodshim and Terumah (where the Torah also considers one's intentions to be binding) 'Sh'nei Kesuvim ha'Ba'in ke'Echad'.

2. ... Sh'nei Kesuvim ha'Ba'im ke'Echad, Melamdin' - by applying the principle 'Chulin mi'Kodshim Lo Gamrinan' (since the Torah refers to Terumah as Kodesh too), which means that we cannot learn Chulin from Kodshim.

(c)If the above Pasuk (in Vayakhel) is written in connection with Kodshim (see Tosfos DH 'Mishum'), the Pasuk by Terumah to which we are referring is - the word "ve'Nechshav" (in the Pasuk in Korach "ve'Nechshav lachem Terumaschem").