QUESTION: The Gemara proves that the word "v'Ne'elam" does not always indicate prior knowledge of something. The Gemara proves this from the word "v'Ne'elam" as it appears with regard to Sotah (Bamidbar 5:13) and with regard to Torah (Iyov 28:21). When the verse describes a Sotah, it says that her act was "Ne'elam" from her husband. If this means that her husband once knew -- and then forgot -- what she did, then how can the Sotah water test her honesty? The Gemara says that the Mei Sotah tests the woman's honesty only when her husband is free of sin. If the husband himself is not free of sin, then the water is not effective at all.

How would the knowledge of the husband be considered in the category of not being free of sin? In what way is he considered not "Menukeh me'Avon," free of sin? The Derashah that the husband must be free of sin means that if the husband lived with his wife after she became a Sotah (which he is not allowed to do, as derived from the verse "v'Nitme'ah" (Bamidbar 5:29)), then the Mei Sotah will not work. How does the Gemara here know that the husband lived with his wife and forgot what she did?

(a) TOSFOS (DH v'Ne'elam) and others explain that the state of "Menukeh me'Avon" is not limited to sins involving forbidden relations. Even if the husband did not have forbidden relations but did something which he should not have done with regard to his relationship with his wife, he is not considered "Menukeh me'Avon." Therefore, if the husband knows that his wife sinned in private and he does not divorce her immediately, he is not "Menukeh me'Avon." Alternatively, when the husband does not know for sure that his wife committed adultery, but he does know that his wife secluded herself with another man, and then he forgot that fact, he is not considered "Menukeh me'Avon." The husband's forgetfulness about his wife's seclusion with another man shows that he did not consider her seclusion important enough to remember. This displays a lack of regard for the sin of a Sotah.

The RITVA suggests a similar explanation. He adds that this Halachah -- that the Mei Sotah is not effective when the husband does not show proper regard for the prohibition of Sotah -- is learned from another verse, as the Sifri (Naso #7) says, "v'Ne'elam me'Einei Ishah" (Bamidbar 5:13). The Gemara is asking that even if the husband is "Menukeh me'Avon," meaning that he did not live with his wife during the period that he forgot about the sin, the Mei Sotah still should not be effective because her husband did not show proper respect for the Isur of Sotah. Consequently, the implication of the verse -- that if the husband is "Menukeh me'Avon" the Mei Sotah will be effective -- would be incorrect.

(b) RASHI (DH Ein ha'Ish) seems to take a different approach. Rashi apparently understands that if the husband forgets about his wife's sin, then the Mei Sotah will not be effective because he lived with her. Why, according to Rashi, does the Gemara assume that he lived with her during the period that he forgot about her sin? The TOSFOS HA'ROSH explains that if "v'Ne'elam" teaches that the husband forgot something, there must be a reason why it is important to know that the husband forgot; it must be a significant fact. There is, however, no significance to his forgetting unless he did a sin during that period (i.e., he lived with her). In this sense, the Ha'alamah of Sotah is comparable to the Ha'alamah of Yedi'as ha'Tum'ah in the Mishnah. That is why the Gemara asks that if there was a Ha'alamah -- that is, the husband forgot his wife's sin and because of that he had relations with her, then the Mei Sotah should not be effective.

QUESTIONS: Rebbi derives from the word "v'Ne'elam" (Vayikra 5:2) the requirement that there be an initial Ha'alamah (forgetting of prior knowledge) in order for the person to be obligated to bring a Korban for Tum'as Mikdash v'Kodashav. "V'Ne'elam" implies that he already knew previously about his Tum'ah. The additional words "v'Hu Yada" (Vayikra 5:3) imply a second Yedi'ah. This teaches that one is obligated to bring a Korban only when he had a Yedi'ah at the beginning (before he sinned) and at the end (after he sinned).

The Gemara challenges Rebbi's assumption that "v'Ne'elam" implies a previous knowledge. The verse uses the word "v'Ne'elam" with regard to a husband's knowledge of the actions of his wife who is a Sotah, and with regard to knowledge of the Torah, and yet in those two cases there was no prior knowledge. Abaye answers that when Rebbi says that there was prior knowledge he means that the sinner knew about the sin of Tum'as Mikdash v'Kodashav through "Yedi'as Beis Rabo," what he learned as a child in school, and that knowledge is enough to qualify as prior knowledge to obligate him to bring a Korban.

What was it that the person learned when he was a child? He learned that a Sheretz is Metamei, and that a person who is Tamei may not eat Kodshim or enter the Mikdash. TOSFOS (DH Yedi'ah) and other Rishonim explain that according to Rebbi, the prior knowledge of these Halachos qualify as a Yedi'ah b'Techilah, even if he never forgot them. The person who went into the Mikdash knew the Halachos but was not aware that he himself was Tamei or that he was entering the Mikdash (or eating Kodshim). Rebbi maintains that a person is obligated to bring a Korban Oleh v'Yored in such a case since a prior knowledge of the Halachos suffices, and there is no need to have knowledge of the specific circumstances of his own sin; he needs to know only the Halachos that apply.

This is how the Gemara answers the question. "V'Ne'elam" implies a vague knowledge, and not a prior, clear knowledge. In the case of Sotah, there is a vague knowledge but not a clear knowledge (TOSFOS DH Yedi'as).

The CHIDUSHEI HA'RAN explains the Gemara's answer differently. The Chidushei ha'Ran suggests that the fact that the sinner must have Yedi'as Beis Rabo is learned from the words "v'Ne'elam Mimenu v'Hu Tamei." These words imply that the sinner was not aware that he touched the Sheretz, but he was aware of the Halachos of Tum'ah because he learned them in his youth.

RASHI explains the Gemara's answer differently. Rashi here (DH Yedi'as Beis Rabo; the word "she'Hirgish" in Rashi should be amended to "v'Hirgish," or omitted altogether, as in all of the old manuscripts of Rashi's text) and later (14b, DH O Dilma) explains that according to Rebbi, Yedi'as Beis Rabo is enough to obligate the person if he once learned the law that one may not eat Kodshim or enter the Mikdash while Tamei, and he knows what makes a person Tamei. At the time that he touched the Sheretz, however, he did not realize that he became Tamei, even though he was aware that he touched a Sheretz. It seems that Rashi means that it indeed is necessary for the person to know that he touched the Sheretz in order for him to be obligated to bring a Korban Oleh v'Yored. Accordingly, when the Gemara says that Yedi'as Beis Rabo suffices to make him liable, it means that the person indeed learned that a Sheretz is Metamei but at the time that he touched the Sheretz he forgot that Halachah. Consequently, although he was aware that he touched a Sheretz, he was not aware that he became Tamei. (See TOSFOS to 14b, DH O Dilma, TOSFOS HA'ROSH here, CHASAM SOFER, and Acharonim.)

There are a number of difficulties with Rashi's explanation.

(a) From where does Rashi derive that a person is obligated to bring a Korban only if he is aware that he touched a Sheretz? Rashi's words (in DH Yedi'as) imply that he derives this from the phrase, "v'Hu Yada," which implies that the person was aware of something at the time that he sinned. However, the Beraisa earlier (4b) implies that Rebbi understands that "v'Hu Yada" refers to Yedi'ah b'Sof; the sinner became aware of his sin after he sinned. It does not refer to the moment at which he touched the Sheretz (see Insights there). What, then, is Rashi's source that the sinner must be aware that he touched the Sheretz at the time that he touched it? If the Gemara was not bothered by the Derashah of the words "v'Hu Yada" until now, then why does Rashi find it necessary to give a new explanation for that Derashah according to the conclusion of the Gemara? (See the CHASAM SOFER's discussion of this at length, end of 4b.)

(b) According to Rashi, the person did not even have a Yedi'as Beis Rabo at the time that he touched the Sheretz. How, then, can he infer from the word "v'Ne'elam" -- which, like the words "v'Hu Yada," describes what the person was aware of at the time that he touched the Sheretz -- that the person must have Yedi'as Beis Rabo? At the time that the person touched the Sheretz, he no longer had a knowledge of what he learned when he was a child! It seems that the Gemara returns to its previous explanation, that "v'Ne'elam" implies a prior knowledge. However, if this is true, then even according to the Gemara's conclusion, how has the Gemara answered the verses which use the word "v'Ne'elam" with regard to a Sotah and with regard to the Torah?

(c) Rav Papa asks Abaye, how is it possible to ever have a person who has no Yedi'ah b'Techilah if it suffices to have learned the laws as a child (for, presumably, every Jew learned the laws)? The Gemara answers that such a person exists in the case of a child who was captured and raised by Nochrim and was never able to learn the laws of Tum'as Mikdash. According to Rashi, however, a much simpler case of a person who has no Yedi'ah b'Techilah exists: one who touched a Sheretz without realizing that he touched it (even though he knows the laws)! (TOSFOS to 14b, DH O Dilma, cited by the GILYON HA'SHAS)

(a) Many Rishonim explain that Rashi does not mean that the person forgot that a Sheretz makes him Tamei at the time that he touched it. Rather, Rashi means that even at the time that he touched the Sheretz and was aware that he touched it, he knew that a Sheretz makes a person Tamei. However, he did not take note of the fact that since he is touching a Sheretz, he is now Tamei; he knew the Halachah only in theory, and he failed to apply it in practice to his particular situation. (See RITVA and CHIDUSHEI HA'RAN.)

According to this explanation, the Yedi'ah b'Techilah is the knowledge that he touched the Sheretz. The knowledge of the Halachos (the Yedi'as Beis Rabo) serves only to make that touching of the Sheretz qualify as a Yedi'ah b'Techilah.

Thus, the argument between Rashi and the other Rishonim is that according to the other Rishonim, the knowledge of the laws at the time that the person touched the Sheretz qualifies as Yedi'ah b'Techilah even if he did not know that he touched a Sheretz at the time that he touched it. Rashi maintains that the knowledge of the laws is not considered a Yedi'ah b'Techilah unless that knowledge caused a Yedi'ah at the time that the person touched the Sheretz. This occurs only if the person was aware that he touched the Sheretz. According to both Rashi and the other Rishonim, the verse clearly requires that there be some knowledge at the time that he touches the Sheretz.

(b) According to this approach, the answer of the Gemara to the question from Sotah and Torah is the same according to Rashi and the other Rishonim. Rashi will also explain that "v'Ne'elam" implies a vague Yedi'ah, as Tosfos explains, or that Yedi'as Beis Rabo is not learned from "v'Ne'elam" but from the words "v'Hu Tamei," as the Chidushei ha'Ran explains.

(c) TOSFOS later (14b, DH O Dilma) and the RITVA here explain that according to Rashi, the Gemara indeed could have answered that an example of "Ein Bo Yedi'ah b'Techilah" is when a person did not realize that he touched a Sheretz. This answer also would have sufficed.

It seems that these Rishonim understand that even according to Rashi, Rav Papa was not aware that the Yedi'as Beis Rabo must be accompanied with a knowledge that the person touched a Sheretz. That is why he asked his question.

However, this answer is not sufficient, since the Gemara does not explicitly disagree with Rav Papa on this point. Where in the Gemara does Rashi find that the person must know that he touched a Sheretz? A number of Rishonim reject Rashi's explanation for this reason.

Perhaps the following answer to this question may be suggested. The Mishnah states that there are four different Yedi'os of Tum'ah, and it continues and says which Korban atones when there is no Yedi'ah b'Techilah. This implies that it is possible to have a situation in which the person has no prior knowledge of any one of the four Yedi'os ha'Tum'ah mentioned in the Reisha of the Mishnah.

Moreover, in the Gemara later (14b) Rebbi Yirmeyah asks that if a person from Bavel knows that there is a Beis ha'Mikdash but does not know where it is, and he enters the Beis ha'Mikdash while he is Tamei, does the knowledge that there exists a Beis ha'Mikdash suffice to be considered Yedi'as Beis Rabo, or does he also have to know where the Beis ha'Mikdash is located in order to be considered Yedi'as Beis Rabo? Rav Papa obviously maintains that knowledge that there exists a Beis ha'Mikdash suffices, for otherwise the Gemara would have an obvious case of "Ein Bo Yedi'ah b'Techilah" -- the case of a person from Bavel who does not know where the Beis ha'Mikdash is located, as Rebbi Yirmeyah discusses.

Accordingly, one may suggest as follows. Rav Papa is asking how will Rebbi find a case in which there is no Yedi'ah b'Techilah of the Mikdash? That is, it is easy to find a case in which there is no Yedi'ah of Tum'ah at first, since, according to Rashi, if the person was not aware that he touched a Sheretz, it is considered a lack of Yedi'as Tum'ah. However, a lack of Yedi'as Mikdash exists only when -- at the time the person touched the Sheretz -- he was not aware that there was a Beis ha'Mikdash in the world. (Similarly, it is not considered a lack of Yedi'ah of Kodesh unless the person who touched the Sheretz was unaware that there was any Kodshim in the world.)

This is why Rav Papa asks how a person could not know that there is a Mikdash. If Yedi'as Beis Rabo does not suffice, then it does not suffice to know that there is a Mikdash; a person also must know exactly where the Mikdash is (as the Gemara says on 14b). According to Rebbi, however, who maintains that Yedi'as Beis Rabo suffices, the very knowledge that a Beis ha'Mikdash exists would be considered a Yedi'ah. In what case can there be no Yedi'ah of Mikdash (or Kodesh) at the time that the person touches the Sheretz? Abaye answers that indeed the only case where there is no Yedi'ah of Mikdash is where the person is a Tinok she'Nishba who, due to his circumstances, had no knowledge that there was a Beis ha'Mikdash.

QUESTION: The Gemara explains the intent of the Mishnah (2a) when it says that there are "two Yetzi'os of Shabbos which are four." The Gemara first suggests that the four Yetzi'os refer to the Avos Melachos of Hotza'ah, but not to the Toldos Melachos. The Gemara rejects this suggestion, because only Hotza'ah is considered an Av Melachah, and there are only two cases of Hotza'ah. Hachnasah is not considered an Av Melachah.

Rav Papa concludes that the Mishnah counts all of the cases of carrying from one domain to another on Shabbos for which one is obligated to bring a Korban Chatas, whether it is an Av or a Toldah. This includes Hachnasah.

The Gemara asks how can the Mishnah be referring to Hachnasah when it uses the word "Yetzi'os," which implies Hotza'ah? Rav Ashi answers that the word "Yetzi'os" refers to Hachnasah as well as to Hotza'ah, and he proves this from the Mishnah in Shabbos which lists the Avos Melachos. The concluding words of the Mishnah there are, "ha'Motzi me'Reshus li'Reshus." Rav Ashi says that it is clear that the Mishnah is referring to Hachnasah as well, even though it refers to it as Hotza'ah ("ha'Motzi").

RASHI (DH Mi Lo Askinan) asks how Rav Ashi knows that the words "ha'Motzi me'Reshus li'Reshus" include Hotza'ah. Rashi writes that those words must include Hachnasah, since one is liable for doing an act of Hachnasah just as one is liable for Hotza'ah, and therefore it must be included in the words of that Mishnah.

Rashi's comment is very difficult to understand. Although one is liable for Hachnasah, that does not make it an Av Melachah! Rashi himself writes (5a, DH Toldos) that Hachnasah is considered a Toldah since it is not written explicitly in the verse, as the Gemara there teaches. Since the Mishnah which says "ha'Motzi me'Reshus li'Reshus" lists only the Avos Melachos of Shabbos, why must it include Hachnasah which is a Toldah? (TOSFOS HA'ROSH)

ANSWER: The TOSFOS HA'ROSH explains that the reason why the Gemara assumes that "ha'Motzi me'Reshus li'Reshus" includes Hachnasah is that the Mishnah does not say "ha'Motzi me'Reshus ha'Yachid li'Reshus ha'Rabim," as the Gemara explains a few lines later. This seems to be the approach of the other Rishonim as well. Rashi, however, did not find this approach satisfactory, because the Gemara has not yet made this inference from the words "me'Reshus li'Reshus" at this stage. He therefore explains the proof from the Mishnah in Shabbos in a different manner.

How, though, does Rashi answer our question?

Rashi's explanation here is based on his opinion expressed elsewhere. Rashi understands that the term "Av Melachah" does not always refer to an Av as opposed to a Toldah. Rather, it means "a category of Melachah which the Torah prohibits on Shabbos," and it includes both Avos and Toldos Melachos (see Rashi to Shabbos 68a, DH Av Melachah, and Shabbos 18a, DH she'To'anin). The Mishnah which lists the thirty-nine Avos Melachos is not listing Avos as opposed to Toldos, but rather it is listing thirty-nine categories of Melachah, each of which may include many Toldos. Therefore, the words "ha'Motzi me'Reshus li'Reshus" represent a category which includes all of the Melachos d'Oraisa of Hotza'ah, both the Avos and the Toldos, and thus it may be assumed that this category includes Hachnasah as well. (See also Insights to Chulin 14:5 and Shabbos 2:2.)

Therefore, according to Rashi, the words "ha'Motzi me'Reshus li'Reshus" also include walking four Amos in Reshus ha'Rabim, since the Mishnah uses a term which refers to any of the Toldos of Hotza'ah. How, though, is carrying for a distance of four Amos in Reshus ha'Rabim included in this phrase? Apparently, Rashi understands the Melachah of carrying four Amos in Reshus ha'Rabim the way the BA'AL HA'ME'OR explains it in Shabbos (96b). The "place" of a person extends four Amos around him. If he carries an object from where he is standing a distance four Amos away from him, it is considered as though he moved it from its present Reshus to a different Reshus (see Insights to Shabbos 96:3).