1) THE ATONEMENT PROVIDED BY THE KORBAN MUSAF AND YOM KIPPUR
QUESTIONS: The Mishnah teaches that the "Sa'ir ha'Na'aseh Bifnim" of Yom Kippur, and the day of Yom Kippur itself, provide temporary atonement for a person who sinned with "Tum'as Mikdash v'Kodashav" -- by eating Kodshim while he was Tamei or by entering the Beis ha'Mikdash while he was Tamei -- in a case in which the person realized that he was Tamei but later forgot about the Tum'ah at the time that he ate the Kodshim or entered the Mikdash. If Yom Kippur comes before he remembers, then the Sa'ir ha'Na'aseh Bifnim and Yom Kippur provide him with temporary atonement until he realizes his sin. If he realizes his sin after Yom Kippur passes, then he must bring a Korban Oleh v'Yored.
The Mishnah then teaches that the Sa'ir Musaf (the Sa'ir ha'Na'aseh ba'Chutz) of Yom Kippur, together with the day of Yom Kippur, provides atonement for a person who became Tamei without realizing it and then entered the Mikdash, and later it was brought to his attention that he was Tamei when he entered the Mikdash.
In the third case, in which the person was not aware of the Tum'ah before or after the sin, Rebbi Yehudah says that the Se'irei Musaf of the festivals and Rosh Chodesh atone for his sin. Rebbi Shimon argues that only the Se'irei Musaf of the festivals atone for his sin, while the Se'irei Musaf of Rosh Chodesh provide a different atonement. They atone for one who sinned by eating Kodshim that was Tamei while he was Tahor.
RASHI (DH Sa'ir ha'Na'aseh ba'Chutz) explains that when the Mishnah says that the Sa'ir and Yom Kippur atone for his sin, it means that the day itself provides Kaparah.
There are a number of questions on Rashi's comments.
(a) Why does Rashi wait until this point in the Mishnah to explain that Yom Kippur itself provides part of the Kaparah? He should explain this earlier, when the Mishnah first mentions Yom Kippur and says that the day of Yom Kippur provides atonement together with the Sa'ir ha'Na'aseh Bifnim.
(b) Why does Rebbi Shimon (later in the Mishnah), whenever he mentions the Kaparah of the Sa'ir ha'Na'aseh Bifnim, omit the fact that Yom Kippur also provides part of the Kaparah?
(c) Rebbi Meir, who maintains that all of the Musaf offerings provide the same Kaparah, asks Rebbi Shimon, who maintains that all of the Musaf offerings provide different Kaparos, how can a Korban that was designated for a festival, became lost, and then was found be brought on Rosh Chodesh or on Yom Kippur. Why does Rebbi Meir ask his question only on Rebbi Shimon? He should ask this question on Rebbi Yehudah as well! While it is true that Rebbi Yehudah maintains that the Kaparah of the Musafim of festivals and of Rosh Chodesh are the same, he agrees with Rebbi Shimon that the Kaparah of the Musaf of Yom Kippur is different from the other two, and yet he presumably agrees that the Musaf of Yom Kippur may be offered on a festival if it is lost and then found before the festival! (See MAHARSHA.)
ANSWER: The CHASAM SOFER suggests an approach which answers all three questions. His approach is as follows.
Why do some Musaf offerings provide a different Kaparah from others? One reason may be that the day itself plays a role in the Kaparah. A day which has more qualities of atonement enhances the effect of the Korban so that it provides a greater form of Kaparah. Another reason may be simply that a Gezeiras ha'Kasuv states that a Korban Chatas separated for a particular festival provides a particular form of Kaparah (that is, Hash-m wants the various Kaparos to be spread out during the various times of the year, and therefore the Kaparah of the Musaf changes based on the time of the year that it is brought).
The second reason has support from the fact that the festivals and Rosh Chodesh provide different Kaparos, according to Rebbi Shimon. The only day which plays a part in atonement is Yom Kippur. The festival (one of the three Regalim) never plays a part in Kaparah. Clearly, Rebbi Shimon must follow the second approach, according to which the different Kaparos depend on the time of year in which the Musaf is offered, and the quality of the particular day does not play a role in the Kaparah.
Based on this approach, the answers to the questions posed above are as follows.
(a) When the Mishnah states that the Sa'ir ha'Na'aseh Bifnim atones with Yom Kippur, the intention is clear: Yom Kippur itself plays a role in the Kaparah. However, when the Mishnah teaches that the Sa'ir Musaf of Yom Kippur atones with Yom Kippur, one might have thought that the Mishnah does not mean that Yom Kippur actually plays a role in the Kaparah, since other Musafim -- those of the Regalim and Rosh Chodesh -- are also Mechaper even though the days on which they are offered do not play a part in the Kaparah. This is why Rashi emphasizes here that Yom Kippur does play a role in the Kaparah.
Apparently, Rebbi Yehudah disagrees with Rebbi Shimon and maintains that the reason why different Musafim provide different Kaparos is due to the qualities of the day. The qualities of the day of Yom Kippur enhance the Musaf of Yom Kippur. Rebbi Yehudah argues that the Musafim of both Rosh Chodesh and the Regalim provide an identical Kaparah, because the day does not contribute to the Musaf's Kaparah in those cases.
(b) This answers the second question as well. Rebbi Shimon conspicuously omits the fact that Yom Kippur provides part of the atonement. This is because he maintains that the difference in the Kaparah of the Musafim is not related to the ability of the day to provide atonement.
(c) This also explains why Rebbi Meir asks his question specifically on the view of Rebbi Shimon. According to Rebbi Shimon, the difference between the Musafim is that the Musaf designated for one part of the year provides a different atonement from the Musaf designated for another part of the year. Therefore, it follows logically that a Korban separated for one day cannot be offered on a different day. In contrast, according to Rebbi Yehudah, all of the Musafim provide the same measure of atonement. It is the ability of Yom Kippur to atone that enhances its Musaf so that it can provide a different Kaparah from the other Musafim. Consequently, the Musaf of Yom Kippur should be able to be offered as the Musaf for the Regel or Rosh Chodesh, since the Kaparah that the Musaf itself provides is the same regardless of when it is offered.
Perhaps this may also explain why the Mishnah does not mention that Yom Kippur atones together with the Sa'ir ha'Mishtale'ach (see Hagahos of RAV ELAZAR MOSHE HA'LEVI HOROWITZ). Perhaps Rebbi Yehudah infers that the ability of the day of Yom Kippur to atone plays a part in the atonement for sins of Tum'as Mikdash v'Kodashav from the fact that the Musaf of Yom Kippur provides a different atonement than the other Musafim, as the Chasam Sofer explains. For this reason, Rebbi Yehudah concludes that the Sa'ir ha'Na'aseh Bifnim which is also Mechaper on Tum'as Mikdash v'Kodashav must be accompanied by the atonement provided by the day itself. Tum'as Mikdash v'Kodashav is the most difficult sin for a Korban to atone for (since it involves the desecration of the Mikdash and Korbanos themselves), as is evidenced from the fact that so many different Musafim are brought to atone for this category of sin, as the Tosefta (1:2) points out (see MELECHES BETZALEL). Accordingly, there is no basis to assume that all of the other sins for which the Sa'ir ha'Mishtale'ach atones also need Yom Kippur for their Kaparah.
2) OFFERING A "KORBAN TZIBUR" ON A DAY OTHER THAN THE DAY FOR WHICH IT WAS DESIGNATED
QUESTION: Rebbi Shimon maintains that although the Musafim for Yom Kippur, the Regalim, and Rosh Chodesh atone for different forms of Tum'as Mikdash v'Kodashav, a Korban Musaf separated for one of those days may be brought on another of those days, since all of their Kaparos are in the same general category of Tum'as Mikdash v'Kodashav.
What difference does it make if the sins for which the Musafim atone are in the same general category? The Mishnah in Kerisus (27b) cited by the RAMBAM (Hilchos Shegagos 3:3) states that if a person separated a Korban Chatas as an atonement for his sin of eating Chelev on a certain day, he may not bring that Korban as an atonement for a different sin of eating Chelev on another day, since the verse says, "Korbano... Al Chataso" (Vayikra 4:28) -- a Korban must be brought for the sin for which it was designated. It is likely that between the time that the Musaf was separated for Yom Kippur and the time that it was brought (on the following Regel, such as Pesach), more people sinned with Tum'as Mikdash v'Kodashav. Why may a Korban Musaf that was not designated for those sins be offered, even if it was separated for a similar category of sin? (CHIDUSHEI RABEINU CHAIM HA'LEVI to Kerisus 27b)
(a) RABEINU CHAIM HA'LEVI points out that the words of the Rambam (in Hilchos Shegagos ibid., and in Hilchos Pesulei ha'Mukdashin 15:6) imply that although a person should not bring a Chatas, which he designated for one sin of eating Chelev, to atone for another sin of eating Chelev, the Korban is valid b'Di'eved. In contrast, if one designated a Korban for a sin of eating Chelev, he may not bring it for a sin of eating Dam, and if he does, it is not valid and does not atone for his sin.
Apparently, there are two different reasons for why a Korban Chatas cannot be brought for a different sin. The first reason is that since the person who designated the Korban had intention for a specific sin, it is improper to offer it to atone for a different sin. However, if he offers the Korban for the other sin, b'Di'eved the Korban is valid.
The second reason for why a Chatas may not be changed and brought for a different sin is that the sin for which the Chatas was designated becomes part and parcel of the essence of the Korban. The Korban becomes defined as a Korban Chatas for that sin. Just as a Korban Olah is inherently different than a Korban Chatas, a Chatas separated for one type of sin is inherently different than a Chatas separated for another type of sin, and they are not interchangeable. This, however, applies only to the category of sin. The specific act of sin does not become part of the essence of the Korban.
The words of Rebbi Shimon may be understood as follows. Although a Korban Yachid is separated for a specific sin, a Korban Tzibur is not separated for the purpose of achieving Kaparah for a sin at all. Rather, it is separated to be brought as the Korban of the festival, like all other Korbanos of the festival. The atonement that it provides is a secondary effect of the Korban. Therefore, it may be brought even l'Chatchilah for sins done at a later time.
However, although the Korban was not separated in order to provide atonement for Tum'as Mikdash, since it does provide such atonement, the atonement for that sin becomes part of the essence and description of the Korban. Therefore, if the sins for which the different Musafim atone are considered different categories of sin, then the category of sin for which the Korban was designated would become part of the essence and description of the Korban, and, consequently, a Korban Tzibur separated for one category of sin could not be brought for another category of sin. This is the intention of Rebbi Shimon when he says that all of the sins of Tum'as Mikdash v'Kodashav are one category of sin.
(The KEHILOS YAKOV #1, DH Od, suggests a similar answer.)
(b) The KEHILOS YAKOV cites the SHITAH MEKUBETZES in Zevachim (6b, #3) in the name of TOSFOS RABEINU PERETZ who discusses this point. The Shitah Mekubetzes explains that a Korban Chatas Tzibur differs from a Chatas Yachid because it is not separated for a particular sin. Rather, it is separated for the sins of the Tzibur in general. Since it is not separated for a particular sin, it does not have the limitations of a Chatas which must be brought for the sin for which it was separated. (The Korban was separated, though, for a specific category of sin, and therefore it may not be brought to atone for a sin of a different category.)
3) THE ORDER OF MASECHTOS
QUESTION: The Gemara asks why, in the order of Masechtos, Shevuos is placed after Makos. The Gemara asks a similar question with regard to the placement of Makos after Sanhedrin, Nazir after Nedarim, and Sotah after Nazir.
There is a rule (see Bava Kama 102a) that "Ein Seder la'Mishnah," there is no set order for the Masechtos. For this reason, the rule of "Machlokes v'Achar Kach Stam, Halachah k'Stam" does not apply when the two Mishnayos are in two different Masechtos, since there is no way to determine which Mishnah preceded the other. Why, then, does the Gemara here assert that there is an order between the Masechtos, and that there is a reason for why Shevuos follows Makos? (RI MI'GASH)
(a) The RI MI'GASH (cited by the Rashba) explains that although we cannot be certain of the order of the Masechtos, if we can provide a reason for the sequence of the Masechtos as they appear in our texts, we should do so. (The Ri mi'Gash perhaps means that although Rebbi, who redacted the Mishnah, did not place the Masechtos in any particular sequence, a later authority might have made the sequence based on certain logical considerations.)
(b) TOSFOS here and in a number of other places explains that the principle of "Ein Seder la'Mishnah" applies only to the rule of "Machlokes v'Achar Kach Stam, Halachah k'Stam." The Masechtos certainly are organized in a certain order. The reason for this is that when Rebbi first taught the Mishnayos to his students, he did so according to the order of tractates that the students preferred (see Avodah Zarah 19a). It was at that time that Rebbi decided the Halachah by teaching a Mishnah anonymously without citing the name of its author. However, after Rebbi composed all of the Mishnayos, he placed them in a specific order. This is why the Gemara here assumes that Shevuos follows Makos. Nevertheless, Rebbi might have taught Shevuos before Makos, and he taught an anonymous Mishnah in Makos because he changed his mind regarding the Halachah and favored that opinion over the other opinion mentioned in the Mishnah in Shevuos. That is why we cannot determine whether the Mishnah that expresses the Machlokes came first, or whether the Mishnah containing the "Stam" opinion came first, based on the order of Masechtos.
What, though, was Rebbi's point in making a set order for the Masechtos? Why should he not leave it to future teachers to teach the Mishnayos to their students in the order that their students prefer? Perhaps the order of the Mishnayos was used simply as a mnemonic device in order to remember all of the Masechtos, which at that time were transmitted orally. However, each teacher indeed should teach his students in accordance with the order that they prefer. (Not all Rishonim agree that the Mishnayos were committed to writing only after the time of Rebbi. See RAMBAM in his introduction to the Mishnah, AGRA LA'YESHARIM, and RASHASH to Shevuos 4a, on Rashi DH u'Mishnah.)
(c) The other Rishonim cite the Ri mi'Gash as suggesting that when the Gemara in Bava Kama (102a) mentions that according to one opinion, "All of Nezikin is [following a specific order] like a single Masechta," it does not refer to only the three Bavas, but to all of the Masechtos of Seder Nezikin. The Gemara here might be following that opinion. (See RAMBAN who rejects this approach.)
This does not explain why the Gemara in Nazir and Sotah assumes that those Masechtos are in a specific order. It is necessary to add to the words of the Ri mi'Gash the explanation of the RITVA, who says that although not all Masechtos were placed in a specific order, some of them were placed in a specific order. (Even those who maintain that the three Bavas do not follow a specific order might agree that Shevuos follows Makos.)
According to this approach, if a Mishnah that expresses a Machlokes is found in Makos and a Mishnah that expresses a "Stam" is found in Shevuos, we indeed will rule like the Stam even though the two Mishnayos are in two different Masechtos.
(d) The Ri mi'Gash writes further that even if the Amora'im were uncertain of the exact order of the sequence of the Masechtos, they did know which Masechtos were adjacent to which Masechtos. (Accordingly, our order of the Masechtos in each Seder might be the correct order or the exact opposite order. This will answer the question of the Ramban on this approach of the Ri mi'Gash.)
(e) The RAMBAN answers that the Amora'im knew to which Seder each Masechta belongs, and they therefore were certain that Shevuos is part of Seder Nezikin. The only reason for its placement in Seder Nezikin is that it discusses matters related to Makos, since both Masechtos discuss Isurei Lav which are punishable with Malkus. What, then, is the Gemara's question, why does Shevuos follow Makos?
The Gemara is asking that Shevuos should begin with a discussion of a Shevu'ah that one transgressed b'Mezid, which is punishable with Malkus, instead of discussing "Shevuos Shtayim she'Hem Arba" which, according to the Gemara's conclusion (4a), relates to a person who transgresses unintentionally and is obligated to bring a Korban (similar to the punishment of "Yedi'os ha'Tum'ah").
The Ramban cites proof for this from the Gemara in the beginning of Nazir, which begins by asking why Maseches Nazir is in Seder Nashim, rather than why it is in a specific order in Seder Nashim.
However, the Ramban seems to ignore the Gemara at the beginning of Sotah and Makos. The Gemara there asks why the Mishnah was placed after the preceding Masechta.
Apparently, the Ramban understands that there, too, the Gemara is asking why the Masechta starts with a discussion that is not related to the previous Masechta rather than with a discussion from a later Perek that is more clearly linked with the preceding Masechta. For example, Malkus should have started with "Elu Hen ha'Lokin" (the third Perek), and Sotah should have started with the discussion of when the woman is permitted to her husband and when she is prohibited.