1) PUTTING BREAD IN THE OVEN TOWARDS THE END OF SHABBOS
OPINIONS: The Gemara tells teaches that in order to be obligated to bring a Chatas, a person must be unaware of the Isur that he did from the beginning until its end. Therefore, if one placed dough in an oven on Shabbos and remembers -- before the bread is baked -- that baking bread on Shabbos is prohibited, he is not obligated to bring a Chatas, since he remembered before the end of the Melachah (the baking of the bread). What is the Halachah in a situation in which the bread was placed in the oven on Shabbos, but became baked only after Shabbos?
(a) The AVNEI NEZER (OC 48:5; IGLEI TAL, Zorei'a #8) debated with Rav Yoav Yehoshua of Kintzk (the CHELKAS YOAV) what the Halachah would be if one puts bread in the oven on Shabbos and it becomes baked after Shabbos. The Avnei Nezer insisted that one is exempt, for it is not logical that the results of an action that occur after Shabbos should retroactively cause a person to have desecrated Shabbos. If a person would be liable for such an act, then when a person lights a candle for a very sick person on Shabbos (which is permitted), immediately after Shabbos ends he should be required to extinguish it so that it not continue to burn the fuel because of an action done on Shabbos for the sick person, retroactively causing his action of kindling a flame on Shabbos to be an Isur d'Oraisa (since the sick person no longer requires the Chilul Shabbos once Shabbos is over).
(b) The CHELKAS YOAV argued that one is liable when the bread becomes baked after Shabbos. His position is based on the logic of the NIMUKEI YOSEF in Bava (Kama 22a, DH Esho Mishum Chitzav) who writes that a person is permitted to light candles before Shabbos even though they remain lit when Shabbos arrives, and it is not considered as though he is continuing to light them on Shabbos even though they are lit as a result of his action ("Esho Mishum Chitzav"). The reason is because the original act of lighting the candle "contains" in it all of the consequences of that act. The Chelkas Yoav suggests that the original act of cooking on Shabbos similarly contains within it even the cooking that occurs after Shabbos.
These two opinions seems to revolve around whether the Melachah includes only the act of placing food on the fire, or whether the Melachah includes the baking process as well. If the baking process is part of the Melachah, then the baking itself must also occur on Shabbos, and not just the act of placing the dough into the oven. If the baking process is only a condition in the Melachah (that is, one who bakes on Shabbos is liable only if that condition is fulfilled), then the person may be liable if the bread is baked (the condition fulfilled) even after Shabbos.
RASHI (DH Techilasah v'Sofah) states clearly that the transgression of baking is not finished until the bread is baked. This seems to support the view that the baking process is part of the Melachah, and the Avnei Nezer's ruling that the bread must be baked entirely on Shabbos. (RAV HILLEL RUVEL)
The Avnei Nezer (in Iglei Tal) points out that one is liable for performing the Melachah of Zorei'a even before the plant grows (which occurs long after the Melachah was done), while one is liable for performing the Melachah of cooking or baking only when the food becomes cooked right away as a result of his act.
What is the reason for this difference between Zore'a and Bishul? Perhaps the answer lies in the fact that food is normally baked on the same day as it is placed in the oven, while produce does not normally grow until long after it is planted. Each Melachah is based on the normal manner in which the action is done. It is logical to assume that the Torah does not intend for a person to be left in doubt for several weeks or months until it becomes known whether he has transgressed a Melachah or not; after Shabbos it should be clear whether or not he has done a Melachah.
2) "HASRA'AS SAFEK"
QUESTION: In order for one to be given the death penalty for intentionally committing an Isur, one must have received "Hasra'as Vadai" -- unequivocal warning from witnesses ("By doing this act, you will transgress the Isur and be liable..."). If the person is not definitely going to be liable for the punishment for the transgression even if he commits the act, the warning of the witnesses is considered "Hasra'as Safek" ("By doing this act, you might transgress the Isur and be liable..."), which does not constitute Hasra'ah according to many opinions, and one is not liable for punishment in Beis Din in such a case.
TOSFOS (DH Kodem) asks, how could anyone be liable for baking bread on Shabbos? At the moment he puts the dough into the oven, he must be warned with Hasra'ah. However, the Hasra'ah will not be definite Hasra'ah, because perhaps the bread will be removed before it is baked and the person will not transgress the prohibition of baking with his act of placing dough into the oven!
ANSWER: TOSFOS answers that the category of "uncertain warning" ("Hasra'as Safek") only includes situations in which the transgressor is warned against transgressing a prohibition which still requires that another act be done before the transgressor may be punished. In the case of baking, there is no other act for the baker to do; by leaving the dough alone and doing nothing he will transgress. Even though he may do an act to avoid being liable, this does not make the Hasra'ah into a Hasra'as Safek.
Tosfos adds that to be liable for baking, an additional condition is necessary. The person who puts the dough into the oven must intend to keep it there until it is baked. REBBI AKIVA EIGER (in Gilyon ha'Shas) asks why this extra condition is necessary. As long as the dough will become baked eventually, that should be sufficient to make him liable, since no further action is required for the transgression! The Acharonim (see Chazon Yechezkel, Chidushim on Maseches Shabbos) answer that the baking of the bread is an intrinsic part of the Melachah, and not merely a condition for transgressing the Melachah (see previous Insight). The person who sins must have in mind to violate the transgression in its entirety. Normally, however, when the transgression is completed in its entirety with the initial misdeed, it is not necessary for the person to intend to fulfill the conditions that are related to the transgression.
3) THE DIFFERENCE BETWEEN "HANACHAH" AND "AKIRAH"
QUESTION: The Gemara suggests that Akirah must be done from a place which has an area of at least four by four Tefachim, but Hanachah does not have to be done onto a place which has an area of four by four Tefachim.
What is the source that Akirah must be done from an area of at least four by four Tefachim in order to be considered an Akirah? In addition, what is the reason for the difference (in the Gemara's Havah Amina) between Akirah and Hanachah?
(a) TOSFOS (DH v'Dilma) suggests two sources for the requirement of four by four Tefachim for Akirah. First, in the Mishkan, they would remove the objects used to build the Mishkan from their boxes and give them to the people who did the work. Since the box in which they were kept was most likely at least four by four Tefachim, we may derive from what was done in the Mishkan that Akirah must always be from an area that is at least four by four Tefachim. In contrast, when they handed the objects to the people doing the work, they did not place them on areas of four by four Tefachim. Therefore, the Gemara proposes that Hanachah does not need an area of four by four Tefachim.
(b) Tosfos writes that the requirement that Akirah be done from an area of four by four Tefachim is derived from the verse, "A person shall not bring out (lit. go out) from his place (mi'Mekomo)..." (Shemos 16:29). The Gemara in Eruvin (17b) states that we derive from this verse that one may not bring an object out from its place on Shabbos. The word "place" describes an area of significant size, or at least four by four Tefachim. With regard to Hanachah, though, The Torah does not specify any need for a significant "place" with regard to where the object is put down.
(c) The ME'IRI (4a, DH ha'Zorek) says that it is more logical to require a place of four by four Tefachim for Akirah, because Akirah is the beginning of the execution of the Melachah.
(d) It could be that Hanachah does not require an area of four by four Tefachim because of the concept of "Achshevei." By placing an object on a particular place, one bestows upon that place importance (Eruvin 99a). This does not apply to Akirah, because when one removes an object from a certain place, he is not giving that place any importance.
(This difference applies to the case in the Mishnah here, and in the case of Acherim on 5a, in which one intends to place an object in a particular place. However, it will not explain why an area of four by four Tefachim is not necessary for a Hanachah in the case of "Kelutah," where one has no intention that the object rest where it is, in mid-air. This perhaps is why the Rishonim do not suggest that "Achshevei" explains why Hanachah does not need an area of four by four Tefachim. See also TOSFOS DH Ela. -M. KORNFELD)
4) WHEN DOES "KELUTAH" WORK?
QUESTION: According to Rebbi Akiva, an object that passes through the air of Reshus ha'Rabim is considered as though it has rested there ("Kelutah k'Mi she'Hunchah Dami"). The Rishonim ask that according to Rebbi Akiva, how can one ever be liable for throwing an object four Amos through the airspace of Reshus ha'Rabim, if the object is considered resting at every point through which it travels?
(a) TOSFOS (5b, DH b'Shleima) answers that it is a Halachah l'Moshe mi'Sinai that "Kelutah k'Mi she'Hunchah Dami" does not take effect when an object is thrown four Amos in Reshus ha'Rabim (as the Gemara says (96b), carrying or throwing an object four Amos in Reshus ha'Rabim is derived from a Halachah l'Moshe mi'Sinai).
(b) The RAMBAN (5b) and TOSFOS YESHANIM (4b) explain that the concept of "Kelutah" applies only l'Chumra, to make a person liable, but not l'Kula, to exempt a person from transgressing.
(c) The Ramban and Rishonim offer another answer. The concept of "Kelutah" applies only after the object has entered a new Reshus. Within the same Reshus, though (such as Reshus ha'Rabim), "Kelutah" does not apply.
5) THE BRANCH OF A TREE
QUESTION: The Gemara says that when one throws an object from Reshus ha'Rabim onto the branch of a tree, whose trunk is in Reshus ha'Yachid and branch is in Reshus ha'Rabim, he is Chayav according to Rebbi. Rebbi maintains that although the branch is very small, we consider the branch to have an area of four by four Tefachim because it assumes the properties of the trunk to which it is subordinate.
Why, though, is the person Chayav for transferring an object four Amos in Reshus ha'Rabim by throwing it onto the branch? If the branch is within three Tefachim of the ground of Reshus ha'Rabim, then one does not need an area of four by four Tefachim to be obligated for Hanachah on the branch (100a). If, on the other hand, it is higher than three Tefachim from the ground, the branch is not a Reshus ha'Rabim even if it is considered to have an area of four by four Tefachim: if it is less than four by four Tefachim it is a Makom Petur, and if it is more than four by four Tefachim it is a Karmelis! If we give the branch the status of the tree, it is a Reshus ha'Yachid altogether! How, then, could the branch possibly be considered a Reshus ha'Rabim such that one is liable for carrying four Amos in Reshus ha'Rabim when he throws an object onto it?
(a) TOSFOS (DH b'Ilan) gives an entirely different explanation for the Gemara. Tosfos explains that the Gemara does not mean that the branch is considered a Reshus ha'Rabim and one is Chayav for moving an object four Amos in Reshus ha'Rabim. Rather, the branch is a Reshus ha'Yachid. When the Gemara says that the branch follows the properties of the trunk, it means that it is considered a Reshus ha'Yachid. Therefore, one is Chayav according to Rebbi for transferring from Reshus ha'Rabim to Reshus ha'Yachid, and not for transferring four Amos within Reshus ha'Rabim.
(b) RASHI (DH Zarak) says that the branch is considered Reshus ha'Rabim. How, then, does Rashi answer our question? Tosfos suggests that perhaps Rashi means that the person threw a sticky object that stuck to the side of the branch. Since it is stuck to the side of the branch and is hanging over Reshus ha'Rabim, it is considered to be resting in Reshus ha'Rabim (as we find in Rashi to 7a, DH Chayav). Nevertheless, if the branch to which the object is stuck is not four by four Tefachim, it will not be considered to be resting on an area of four by four since it is actually resting on the branch and not on the ground beneath it (as Rabeinu Tam explains on 7b, as cited by Tosfos DH v'Tach).
(c) Perhaps Rashi is discussing a branch that is exactly nine Tefachim above the ground. Since people rest their objects on it (8a), it is considered a Reshus ha'Rabim. Tosfos does not suggest this obvious answer because he is of the opinion (as the RASHBA explains on 8a) that anything that is nine Tefachim high on which people rest their loads is considered significant even if it is not four by four Tefachim. If Rebbi requires a surface of four by four Tefachim, he cannot be discussing a nine-Tefach tall branch. Nevertheless, Rashi maintains that even a nine-Tefach tall pedestal in Reshus ha'Rabim must be four by four Tefachim in order for the act of placing an object on it to be considered an act of Hanachah (as Rashi writes on 92b, DH v'Iy Neima; see, however, Rashi to 8a, DH Mikatfei). (M. KORNFELD)