Question (Part 1): According to whom does this conclusion go? If it is according to the opinion in Makos, 15b. that holds 'Hasra'as Safek La'av Sh'mah Hasra'ah', we ought to declare him Patur without the reason of 'Safek Nefashos Lehakeil', since the warning is not valid, even if we were to hold 'Safek Nefashos Lehachmir'?

Question (Part 2): Whereas according to the opinion there that holds 'Hasra'as Safek Sh'mah Hasra'ah', on what grounds do we declare him Patur here, seeing as, if it turns out that he killed a Yisrael, how will this case differ a. from that of 'Hikah es Zeh, ve'Chazar ve'Hikah es Zeh', where he is Chayav (for striking his father) even though each one is a Safek? And b. from that of where they warn a man not to leave over a Korban, and he does, where he is Chayav, even though it is a Safek at the time that they warn him as to whether he will transgress?

Answer: Both those cases are different, inasmuch as the sinner knows for sure that he will definitely transgress the La'av of Nosar or of striking one's father, should he leave over or should he strike both men, whereas in our case, he does not know at the outset that he will come to transgress a Vaday Isur, since he does not know whom the stone will hit.

Clarification: It is from here that we learn the principle of 'Kol Kavu'a ... ' throughout Shas.

Question: From where does Rebbi Shimon, who does not agree with this D'rashah, learn it?

Suggested Answer: It cannot be because, as we conclude, Rebbi Shimon holds like Rebbi, who Darshens 'Nesinah' 'Nesinah', leaving "ve'Arav lo" redundant, to learn from it "Kol Kavu'a ... '.

Refutation #1: ... since the Kashya then remains from where will Tana de'bei Chizkiyah (who argues with Rebbi) in Rebbi Shimon learn it (See Maharsha).

Refutation #2: And besides, seeing as Rebbi Shimon declares Patur even where they are all Yisre'elim (unless he says that he is aiming at one specified person), one cannot Darshen 'Kol Kavu'a' at all from there.

Answer (Part 1): According to Rebbi Shimon, one can establish the case where there are nine Yisre'eilim and one Kuti, and where he says that he is aiming at one specified person, where he is Patur from "ve'Arav lo" because of 'Kol Kavu'a' ...

Answer (Part 2): Whereas in the same case, if they would all be Yisr'eilim, he would be Chayav.

Question (Part 1): In Perek Eilu Na'aros (Kesuvoos, 34b & 35a), the Gemara initially thinks that Rebbi Yochanan and Resh Lakish argue as to whether 'Chayvei Misos Shogegin' are Patur or not ...

Question (Part 2): The Gemara then asks how can anyone hold Chayav, seeing as this clashes with Tana de'bei Chizkiyah ... ? And it is due to this Kashya that the Gemara establishes the Machlokes by Chayvei Malkos Shogegin.

Question (Part 3): What is now the Kashya, seeing as we have in our Sugya a Tana who does not agree with Tana de'bei Chizkiyah?

Answer #1 (Part 1): The reason that the Tana argues with him is not because he does not hold of the Hekesh regarding other money that he becomes Chayav together with the Chiyuv Misah, such as where he shot an arrow on Shabbos that traveled four Amos that tore silks as it traveled, about which the Gemara rules in 'Eilu Na'asros', 31a, that he is Patur, as he is in a case where he killed the babies together with the woman.

Answer #1 (Part 2): ... but they argue exclusively with regard to paying the value of the murdered man, with regard to whom the Torah reveals "And you shall pay for the soul" - 'money'.

Question: The Kashya remains however, from the Sugya at the beginning of 'ha'Nechnakin', later on Daf 84b, which implies that there is a Tana who disagrees with the Hekesh of Tana de'bei Chizkiyah altogether, as the Gemara asks (with regard to the Hekesh of "Makeh Adam" to "Makeh Beheimah") 'That is very well according to the opinion that holds like Tana de'bei Chizkiyah, but according to those who don't, why do we need the Hekesh?'

Answer (Part 1): The Tana concerned is that of the Beraisa of Rebbi Chaga from the south, cited in Perek Arba va'Chamishah (Bava Kama, 42a and 42b) who Darshens 'Men who mean to strike each other, even though an accident happened to the woman, are subject to punishment'. So we see, that he does not hold of Tana de'bei Chizkiyah ...

Answer (Part 2): Nevertheless, the Gemara in Kesuvos considers the Beraisa of Chizkiyah more significant, seeing as he was the son of Rebbi Chiya, who presented the Beraisos of his father, about whom we say 'Any Beraisa that is not learned in the Beis-ha'Medrash of Rebbi Chiya and Rebi Oshaya is not authentic'.

Answer #2 (Part 1): Alternatively, the Gemara in Kesuvos (35a & 35b) queries Rebbi Yochanan, whom we know, holds like Tana de'bei Chizkiyah ...

Answer #2 (Part 2): ... because earlier in the Perek (on 32a), the Gemara queried the Mishnah 'ha'Ba al Achoso, Yesh lah K'nas', from the Mishnah in Makos 've'Eilu Hein ha'Lokin, ha'Ba al Achoso', and we have a principle 'Ein Lokin u'Meshalem?

Answer #2 (Part 3): And Rebbi Yochanan there establishes the Mishnah of K'nas where the man did not receive a warning; and the Seifa there rules 'Ba al Bito, Ein lah K'nas, Mipnei she'Misaso Misas Beis-Din'.

Implied Question: Why did the Gemara then not ask directly from the Mishnah itself? ...

Answer: ... because it would have then been necessary to to ask from the Diyuk (the extrapolation), so the Gemara preferred to ask directly from the Beraisa of Chizkiyah.

Question: Seeing as Tana de'bei Chizkiyah precludes from both Rebbi and the Rabbanan, how will we establish the Pasuk "ve'Nasata Nefesh Tachas Nafesh", since it can be speaking neither about Mamon nor about Misah, seeing as 'Miskaven Laharog es Zeh, ve'Harag Zeh' is Patur from both of them?

Rejected Answer: And it is a Dochek (pushed) to answer that the Pasuk is not speaking about 'Miskaven Laharog es Zeh, ve'Harag Zeh', since, when the Pasuk writes "ve'Chi Yinatzu Anashim", it implies that one man meant to hit the other, and when it continues "ve'Im Ason Yih'yeh", it implies that he hit the woman instead.

Precedent (Part 1): Indeed, that is precisely what prompts the Gemara to ask earlier how Rebbi Shimon will explain the Pasuk "ve'Nasata Nefesh Tachas Nafesh" ...

Precedent (Part 2): ... because if the Torah was speaking where the culprit struck the person that he aimed at, there would be nothing to ask.

Answer: We must therefore say that, although on the one hand, the Gemara would not push to explain the Pasuk like that, Chizkiyah on the other, must hold like that, and he explains the Pasuk like this: "If there will be an accident (Din Ason), that he actually meant to strike the woman, then "You shall pay a Soul for a Soul" (literally).

Dual Interpretation of Pasuk (1): It now transpires that. whereas the Seifa is speaking about a Din Ason, the Reisha is referring to a real Ason ...

Dual Interpretation of Pasuk (2): This is because "Im Lo Yih'yeh Ason" cannot be referring to Din Ason, only to a real Ason, since wherever an accident occur, Chizkiyah exempts him from paying.

Dual Interpretation of Pasuk (3): The Pasuk must therefore mean wherever no Ason occurred.

Question: At the beginning of Perek ha'Nechnakin (later, on Daf 84b) the Gemara establishes this Pasuk in connection with someone who strikes his father, which is not subject to a distinction between Derech Aliyah and Derech Yeridah?

Answer: We do not learn the Hekesh from that Pasuk, but from the preceding one "ve'Ish ki Yakeh Kol Nefesh Adam", which is followed by "Makeh Nefesh Beheimah Yeshalmenah", and which refers to a murderer, as the Gemara explains in Perek Yotzei Dofen (Nidah, 44b & 45a).

Implied Question: Even though according to one text at the beginning of 'ha'Chovel' (Bava Kama, 83b) it implies that this (latter) Pasuk is speaking about someone who wounds his friend, that text is incorrect, as Tosfos explained there.

Refutation (Question #1): The Gemara in Perek ha'Nechnakin (later,Daf 84b) however, implies that Tana de'bei Chizkiyah learns the Hekesh from the Pasuk which we established by Makeh Aviv?

Question #2 (Part 1): Furthermore, the Gemara in Perek Eilu Na'aros (Kesuvos, 35b & 36a) (also) implies that it is from "Makeh Adam" that we learn the Hekesh, since it asks there that, according to Tana de'bei Chizkiyah, how do we know that it is written with regard to a weekday, perhaps it is written with regard to a Shabbos, in which case one can draw a distinction by Makeh Beheimah on its own?

Question #2 (Part 2): And the Gemara refutes this suggestion by citing the entire Pasuk "Makeh Beheimah Yeshalmenah, u'Makeh Adam Yumas", implying that that is the Pasuk from which we learn the Hekesh?

Answer (Part 1): We must therefore say that, even though we initially establish the Pasuk in question with regard to Makeh Aviv (based on the fact that it does not add "u'Meis") - that is only because we need to Darshen from it where he wounded his father without killing him . ...

Answer (Part 2): ... but once we learn that via 'Im Eino Inyan' from "Nefesh Beheimah", we establish 'Makeh Adam' by Rotze'ach, despite the fact that the Torah has not inserted the word "u'Meis".

Question: The Kashya remains however, that also according to the Gemara's conclusion, we learn from there that a son is permitted to let his father's blood?

Answer (Part 1): We must therefore say that the Pasuk is speaking with reference to both Makeh Aviv and Makeh Chavero - To Makeh Aviv, seeing as it refers to Makeh S'tam, without adding va'Meis'; and To Makeh Chavero based on the principle 'Davar ha'Lameid mi'Inyano' (something that we learn from its context), similar to the preceding Pasuk, which is talking about a murderer ...

Answer (Part 2): ... and the Gemara is teacing a split explanation - with regard to his friend, where he killed him, and with regard to his father, where he merely wounded him.

Conclusion: And the fact that the Pasuk is speaking about all the cases enables us to learn the Hekesh from Makeh Beheimah.

Clarification (Part 1): Tana de'bei Chizkiyah is speaking about three different aspects of Mamon: 'Bein Shogeg le'Meizid' is speaking about an external Chiyuv Mamon that comes together with Misah. And we learn that Chayvei Misos Shogegin are Patur from paying, due to the principle 'Lo Chilakta' (from Meizid), in which context the Gemara at the end of ha'Meni'ach (Bava Kama, 35a & 35b) and in Eilu Na'aros (Kesuvos, 35a) discusses it.

Clarification (Part 2): And in this regard, the Hekesh is unanimouosly accepted, as is evident in 'Eilu Na'aros' (ibid.), when the Gemara asks 'And is there an opinion that holds 'Chayvei Misos Shogegin is Chayav'?

Clarification (Part 3): Whereas 'Bein Miskaven le'she'Ein Miskaven' is not speaking about an external Chiyuv Mamon that comes together with Misah, since we already know that from 'Shogeg', and it is even a 'Kal va'Chomer'. Only it comes to exempt the murderer from paying the value of the victim. And it comes to preclude from Rebbi, who Darshens that by 'Niskaven Laharog es Zeh, ve'Harag es Zeh' - "ve'Nasata Nefesh", 'Mamon'.

Clarification (Part 4): ... and Tana de'bei Chizkiyah now teaches us that just as someone who strikes the person whom he intended to is Patur from paying, so too, will he be Patur if he strikes the person whom he did not intend to.

Clarification (Part 5): ... and 'Bein Derech Yeridah le'Derech Aliyah' comes to teach us that, just as we don't extract money from Derech Aliyah, whose Shogeg is not subject to a Kaparah, so too, do we not extract payment for Derech Yeridah, even though their Shogeg is subject to a Kaparah. And it also teaches us that he Patur by Meizid as well.

Alternative Explanation: There are some who err and who switch them round to exempt Shogeg by an upward stroke, just like by a downward stroke ...

Refutation: From the Sugya of "Lo Yih'yeh Ason" in Eilu Na'aros however, it is clear that the above explanation is correct.

Clarification: Consequently, according to the Rabbanan they are all Patur, seeing as one can only conclude the Din of an ox in its presence; whereas Rebbi Yehudah holds 'Konsin osan le'Kipah'.

Question (Part 1): The Rivam asks from the Mishnah in Perek ha'Ta'aruvos (Menachos, 70a & 70b), which rules that all Zevachim with which a Shor ha'Niskal becomes intermingled, even if it is only one in ten thousand, they must all die.

Question (Part 2): That being the case, now that there, where the majority are Heter and it is Hekdesh that stands to lose, the Tana nevertheless requires them all to die - in our case, where the majority is Isur and it is Hedyot that stands to lose, how much more so?

Answer #1 (Explanation #1): The Rivam therefore opts for the text that appears in an old version that establishes it by an ox whose Din was not completed that became mixed with other regular oxen, in which case we need to omit the words 'whose Din has been concluded'.

Explanation #2 (Part 1): Rabeinu Tam queries the Rivam's explanation from the Mishnah, which states 'Kulam Peturim', implying that the others are subject to Chiyuv.

Implied Question: And even though at the beginning of the Sugya the Gemara asks 'What does 'Acherim' mean? If it means Acherim that are Kasher, this is obvious? And note that it does not ask 'Peturim'? 'Patur' is what it should have said?

Answer: Since it was able to ask directly, without having to extrapolate, it preferred to do that.

Explanation #2 (Part 3): Moreover (Rabeinu Tam explained), Resh Lakish (the author of the current explanation) is referring to Rebbi Avahu, who answered (the question 'To whom does 'Acherim' refer?) by establishing the case with regard to a murderer whose Din has not yet been concluded who became intermingled with other murderers. And it is in connection with this that Resh Lakish comments that by Adam everyone agrees that that they are all Patur ... . This implies that Resh Lakish establishes the same case by Shor that Rebbi Avahu did by Adam.

Conclusion (Part 1): The text in our Sefarim therefore seems to be the correct one ...

Conclusion (Part 2): But if the ox became intermingled with regular oxen, even if its Din had been concluded, Resh Lakish would concede that we mix them up and make them move ... before applying the principle 'Kol de'Parish ... ' (Whatever separates, separates from the majority).

Answer #2: And as for the Mishnah in Avodah-Zarah, 74a, which implies that Shor ha'Niskal is Asur be'Mashehu, that speaks where it has already been stoned, in which case, the Heter of mixing them up ... does not apply.

Proof: Since the Tana there does specifically state 'whose Din was concluded'.

Explanation: As for the Mishnah in Zevachim, which rules that all the animals must die (the Rivam's original Kashya), is speaking where it (the Shor ha'Niskal) became mixed up with other Zevachim, for Hash-m; And the reason they are all need to die is because of a decree in case ten Kohanim come simultaneously and sacrifice all ten animals that are still 'Kavu'a' on the Mizbe'ach, as the Gemara explains there. But otherwise, we apply the principle 'Nichbeshinhu ve'Naydinhu' ('mix them up and make them move').