On what grounds do we refute the suggestion that Rebbi Shimon ('Afilu Niskaven Laharog es Zeh ... Patur') is referring to the Seifa 'Niskaven Lehakos es ha'Gadol ... Chayav'?
So we establish him on the Reisha. With which case does he then argue?
Why does the Mishnah wait until here to present Rebbi Shimon's opinion?
We refute the suggestion that Rebbi Shimon ('Afilu Niskaven Laharog es Zeh ... Patur') refers to the Seifa 'Niskaven Lehakos es ha'Gadol ... Chayav' because - if that were so, then the Mishnah should have just said 'Rebbi Shimon Poter'.
So we establish him on case in the Reisha - 'Niskaven Laharog es ha'Beheimah Veharag es ha'Adam ... Patur', from which we can infer 'Ha Niskaven Laharog es ha'Adam Veharag es ha'Adam, Chayav. Rebbi Shimon Omer ... Patur'.
The Mishnah waits until here to present Rebbi Shimon's opinion - because had he said it at the end of the Reisha, we would have thought that he refers to all the cases there, even to 'Niskaven al Masnav, ve'Halchah lo al Libo', which of course, he does not.
What do we mean when we ask 'le'Chad Minaihu Mai', according to Rebbi Shimon? What exactly is the She'eilah?
What second She'eilah do we ask?
To resolve the She'eilos, we cite Rebbi Shimon's own statement. What did Rebbi Shimon specifically state in a Beraisa, that will settle both She'eilos?
What does Rebbi Shimon learn from the words " ve'Arav lo" (in the Pasuk in Shoftim "ve'Arav lo ve'Kam Alav")?
When we ask 'le'Chad Minaihu Mai' according to Rebbi Shimon, we mean to ask - what the Din will be according to him, if Reuven declares that he doesn't care whether he kills Shimon or Levi. The She'eilah is whether that is considered Miskaven or not, seeing as on the one hand, he did intend to kill the person that he killed, whilst on the other, he would not have minded had he killed the other one.
We also ask - what the Din will be if he aimed at one specific person, thinking that it was Shimon, but it turned out to be Levi, since on the one hand, he did aim at the person whom he hit, whilst on the other, it was a case of mistaken identity.
To resolve both She'eilos, we cite a statement of Rebbi Shimon, who specifically states in a Beraisa - 'Ad she'Yomar li'Peloni Ani Miskaven', precluding both of the above cases.
He learns from the words " ve'Arav lo" (in the Pasuk in Shoftim "ve'Arav lo ve'Kam alav") - 'ad she'Yiskaven lo' (that he must intend to kill the person whom he actually killed, as we just explained).
The Rabbanan learn from the same Pasuk 'P'rat le'Zarak Even le'Gav' (to preclude someone who throws a stone into a group of people and kills one of them). Why can they not be referring to a case where someone tosses a stone into a group comprising ...
... nine Nochrim and one Yisrael?
... five Nochrim and five Yisre'elim?
Then which case are they referring to?
What principle do we learn from the Pasuk? When do we now not follow the majority to sentence someone to death?
The Rabbanan learn from the same Pasuk 'P'rat le'Zarak Even le'Gav' (to preclude someone who throws a stone into a group of people and kills one of them). They cannot be referring to a case where someone tosses a stone into a group comprising ...
... nine Nochrim and one Yisrael - because he would be Patur anyway, since there are a majority of Nochrim.
... five Nochrim and five Yisre'elim - because then we would apply the principle 'Safek Nefashos Lehakel' (we always go to the lenient side in matters concerning life and death).
So they must be referring - to a group of nine Yisre'elim and one Kuti, where he would otherwise be Chayav, because there are a majority of Yisre'elim.
The principle we learn from the Pasuk is that - when the minority is fixed (Kavu'a), as it is here (one known Kuti among the group), then it has the Din of Mechtzah al Mechtzah, and the murderer is not sentenced to death.
We already discussed in the previous Perek the Parshah in Mishpatim of two fighting men, one of whom strikes a woman. What does Rebbi Elazar mean when, commenting on the Pasuk "ve'Im Ason Yih'yeh ... " he states 'be'Mitzvos she'be'Misah ha'Kasuv Medaber'?
How do the Rabbanan now interpret the conclusion of the Pasuk "ve'Nasata Nefesh Tachas Nafesh"?
Rebbi Shimon however, will interpret the Pasuk like Rebbi. What does Rebbi in a Beraisa learn from the 'Gezeirah-Shavah' "Nesinah" ("ve'Nasata Nefesh ... ") "Nesinah" ("Lo Yih'yeh Ason", in the same Parshah, in the case where the woman is not killed)?
We already discussed in the previous Perek the Parshah in Mishpatim of two fighting men, one of whom strike a woman. When Rebbi Elazar, commenting on the Pasuk "ve'Im Ason Yih'yeh ... " states 'be'Mitzvos she'be'Misah ha'Kasuv Medaber', he means that - the Pasuk is speaking where the man actually intended to kill his friend (turning this into a classical case of 'Niskaven Laharog es Zeh ve'Harag es Zeh').
The Rabbanan now interpret the conclusion of the Pasuk "ve'Nasata Nefesh Tachas Nafesh" - literally.
Rebbi Shimon will interpret the Pasuk like Rebbi, who learns in a Beraisa from the 'Gezeirah-Shavah' "Nesinah" ("ve'Nasata Nefesh ... ") "Nesinah" ("veIm Lo Yih'yeh Ason, ve'Nasata", in the same Parshah, in the case where the woman is not killed) - that just as in the latter case, "ve'Nasata" means monetary payment, so too in the former (where she is), because 'Niskaven La'harog es Zeh ve'Harag es Zeh, Patur'.
What does Tana de'bei Chizkiyah say about 'Shogeg u'Meizid, Miskaven ve'Eino Miskaven, and Derech Yeridah ve'Derech Aliyah', with regard to someone who kills ...
... an animal?
... a person?
How does he learn this latter ruling from the Pasuk in Emor. "Makeh Beheimah Yeshalmenah, u'Makeh Adam Yumas"?
What do we learn from the Pasuk in Mishpatim "Petza tachas Patza"?
What is the significance of 'Derech Yeridah ve'Derech Aliyah' mentioned by Tana de'bei Chizkiyah? In which area of Halachah do we find such a distinction?
Tana de'bei Chizkiyah does not differentiate between Shogeg and Meizid, Miskaven and Eino Miskaven and Derech Yeridah ve'Derech Aliyah (whether the culprit dealt an upward stroke or a downward one), with regard to someone who kills ...
... an animal. Consequently - he is always Chayav to pay.
... a person. Consequently - he is always Patur from paying.
He learns this latter ruling from the Pasuk in Emor "Makeh Beheimah Yeshalmenah, u'Makeh Adam Yumas" - where the Torah is comparing someone who kills a person to someone who kills an animal (a Hekesh). Just as the latter is always Chayav Mamon (irrespective as to whether he is Meizid or Shogeg ... ), so too, is someone who kills a person always Patur (irrespective as to whether he is Meizid or Shogeg ...).
We learn from the Pasuk in Mishpatim "Petza tachas Patza" that - someone who damages somebody else's property even be'Shogeg, is Chayav to pay.
The significance of 'Derech Yeridah ve'Derech Aliyah' mentioned by Tana de'bei Chizkiyah is manifest in the area of Chiyuv Galus, where if Reuven kills Shimon be'Shogeg, he is 'Chayuv Galus' for a downward stroke, but Patur for an upward one.).
Why can we not interpret 'Miskaven and Eino Miskaven' literally?
Then what does it mean?
How do we know that Tana de'bei Chizkiyah is speaking even in a case where the culprit is not actually Chayav Misah?
In which point does Tana de'bei Chizkiyah argue with ...
... Rebbi (and Rebbi Shimon)?
... the Rabbanan?
We cannot interpret 'Miskaven and Eino Miskaven' literally - because then it would be the same as 'Shogeg and Meizid'.
What it therefore means is - 'she'Ein Miskaven la'Zeh Ela la'Zeh' (the case in our Mishnah currently under discussion).
We know that Tana de'bei Chizkiyah is speaking even in a case where the culprit is not actually Chayav Misah - because otherwise, it would not need a Pasuk (since it would then be synonymous with the principle 'Kam leih bi'de'Rabah Mineih').
Tana de'bei Chizkiyah argues with ...
... Rebbi (and Rebbi Shimon) in that - according to the latter, Niskaven La'harog es Zeh ve'Harag es Zeh, is Chayav Mamon, and according to ...
... the Rabbanan, even Misah - whereas Tana de'bei Chizkiyah exempts him completely.
According to the Tana Kama of our Mishnah, if a Rotze'ach got mixed up in a group of other people, they are all Patur from Hereg. Rebbi Yehudah says 'Konsin Osan le'Kipah'? What does that mean?
If the same happened to a group of Chayvei Misos, they would all receive the most lenient of the deaths that are due. What will Niskalin who got mixed up with Nisrafin receive, according to ...
... Rebbi Shimon?
... the Chachamim?
Rebbi Shimon proves that S'reifah is more stringent than S'kilah from the fact that a bas Kohen receives S'reifah (as we discussed in the seventh Perek). How do the Chachamim counter that argument?
What will Rebbi Shimon say if the majority of the group are Nisrafin?
According to the Tana Kama of our Mishnah, if a Rotze'ach got mixed up in a group of other people, they are all Patur from Hereg. Rebbi Yehudah holds - 'Konsin Osan le'Kipah', which entails placing them all in a room and feeding them barley, until their stomachs split.
If the same happened to a group of Chayvei Misos, they would all receive the most lenient of the deaths that are due. Niskalin who got mixed up with Nisrafin receive ...
... S'kilah, according to Rebbi Shimon.
... S'reifah, according to the Chachamim.
Rebbi Shimon proves that S'reifah is more stringent than S'kilah from the fact that a bas Kohen receives S'reifah (as we discussed in the seventh Perek). The Chachamim counter - with the argument that if S'reifah was more stringent, why does the Torah sentence a Megadef and an Oved Avodah-Zarah to S'kilah?
Rebbi Shimon says that they are sentenced to 'S'kilah' - even if the majority of the group are Nisrafin.
When our Mishnah speaks about a Rotze'ach who got mixed up in a group of other people - why can 'other people' not be taken literally?
So how does Rebbi Avahu Amar Shmuel establish it?
And how does he then explain the basis of the Machlokes between Rebbi Yehudah and the Rabbanan? Why do the Rabbanan exempt them all even from 'Kipah', whereas Rebbi Yehudah sentences them all to Kipah?
When our Mishnah speaks about a Rotze'ach who got mixed up in a group of other people - 'other people' cannot be taken literally - because why, according to Rebbi Yehudah, should innocent people be sent to the Kipah?
Rebbi Avahu Amar Shmuel therefore establishes it by - a Rotze'ach whose Din has been started but who has not yet been sentenced, who got mixed up in a group of murderers who have.
And the basis of the Machlokes between Rebbi Yehudah and the Rabbanan according to him is - whether the Din of a criminal can be completed (to be sent to the Kipah) when he is absent (or unidentifiable [Rebbi Yehudah]) or not (the Rabbanan).
Resh Lakish maintains that if our Mishnah was talking about people, both Tana'im would agree that they would all be Patur. Why is that?
Then what is their Machlokes, according to him?
Rava queries what we just learned, from Rebbi Yossi in a Beraisa, who says 'Afilu Aba Chalafta Beinehen'. Who was Aba Chalafta?
Whom is he querying?
Resh Lakish maintains that if our Mishnah was talking about people, both Tana'im would agree that they would all be Patur - based on the Pasuk "ve'Hitzilu ha'Eidah".
And their Machlokes according to him, concerns (not people, but) - animals who got mixed up in the same way, and they argue over whether an ox can be sentenced not in its presence, as we just explained.
Rava queries this however, from Rebbi Yossi in a Beraisa, who says 'Afilu Aba Chalafta - (Rebbi Yossi's father) Beinehen' ...
... a Kashya on both of the above opinions, since Aba Chalafta was neither a sentenced murderer, nor an animal.