Explanation #1: Rashi explains that R. Meir does not hold of the D'rashah (of R. Shimon in Yevamos) 'Atem Keruyim Adam' (to preclude Nochrim).

Question: In the first Perek of Kerisos, 6b, the Gemara exempts someone who anoints a Nochri with the anointing oil, apparently because the Torah writes "Al B'sar Adam Lo Yisach"?

Answer: It is however, possible to attribute the reason there to the D'rashah that whoever is forbidden to anoint is forbidden to be anointed, whereas whoever is permitted to anoint, is permitted to be anointed.

Explanation #2: Some texts quote R. Yirmiyah here in place of R. Meir.

Explanation #3: Rabeinu Tam draws a distinction between "Adam" (in Kerisos) and "ha'Adam" (in our Sugya), since "Adam" implies the superior 'Adam' who is elevated and crowned with the Torah of Hash-m.

Proof: The proof for this is the fact that the Gemara in Yevamos (Daf 61a & 61b) does not cite the Pasuk in Yonah "Kol ha'Adam ve'ha'Beheimah ... "

Implied Question: And when the Gemara says here 'Kohanim, Levi'im ve'Yisre'elim Lo Ne'emar' (and not 'Adam Lo Ne'emar') ...

Answer: ... it means that it doesn't say "Adam", which would have implied 'Kohanim, Levi'im and Yisre'elim.

Explanation #3: R. Meshulam explains that it is in connection with punishment exclusively, where it is not befitting to write 'Yisrael', that the Torah refers to them as 'Adam'; whereas in the Pasuk "ha'Adam va'Chai bahem" it ought to have written 'Kohanim, Levi'im ve'Yisre'elim', as it accustomed to do everywhere else (for example in Vayikra - "Emor el ha'Kohanim"; in Bamidbar - "ve'el ha'Levi'im Tedaber", and in Sh'mos - "Daber el B'nei Yisrael").

Proof: And so the Midrash Vayechulu, commenting on the Pasuk in Balak, "Mah Ekov Lo Kabo Keil" states - 'The Torah does not mention Yisrael by name with regard to punishment: "Adam ki Yih'yeh be'Or Besaro ... "; "Nega Tzara'as ki Sih'yeh ba'Adam", and not 'be'Yisrael'; On the one hand the Torah writes "Eileh Ya'amdu Levarech es Yisrael", and in connection with punishment, "Eileh Ya'amdu al ha'Kelalah".

Implied Question: And although the Gemara asks there (in Yevamos) from Pesukim, even though Nochrim are also called 'Adam' ...

Answer: ... the Gemara's queries are justified, seeing as, since with regard to punishment, the Torah calls Yisrael 'Adam', it ought not to have used the same term when speaking specifically about Nochrim.

Clarification: And according to the Rabbanan, Eiver min ha'Chai.

Question: Earlier we learned a Beraisa that learns Eiver min ha'Chai from "Achol Tocheil", and it established the current Pasuk by Sheratzim, as it will extrapolate later in the Sugya 'a creature whose blood is separated from its flesh'?

Clarification #1: In Perek Gid ha'Nasheh, Chulin, 101a, we learn from this Pasuk that Eiver min ha'Chai applies both to Tahor and to Tamei animals.

Clarification #2: And when we establish it here to teach us dam Hakazah, it is according to the opinion there in 100a, that confines it to Tahor animals.

Clarification: A Nochri who rests on Shabbos (that the Gemara mentioned above) is not applicable here, seeing as Yisrael are commanded to keep Shabbos.

Clarification: We do not say this with regard to something that is a Mitzvah on a Yisrael to perform, such as keeping Shabbos, for which a Nochri is Chayav, whereas a Yisrael performs a Mitzvah.

Implied Question: Even though on Monday (for example) a Nochri is Chayav for resting even though there is no Mitzvah for a Yisrael ...

Answer: ... nevertheless, there is a Mitzvah per se for a Yisrael to keep Shabbos.

Implied Question: Why are Nochrim Chayav for killing a fetus, even though a Yisrael is Patur?

Answer: Even though a Yisrael is Patur, he is nevertheless not permitted to do so.

Question (Part 1): We have learned in Perek ben Sorer u'Moreh, later on Daf 72b, that once the head of a fetus emerges one is not permitted to as much as touch him (to save the mother), since one is not permitted to not push away one soul to save another. Before it has emerged however, the midwife is permitted to place her hand inside the mother's womb and cut its limbs apart, and remove them, in rder to save the mother ...

Question (Part 2): Yet this latter case is forbidden in the case of a Nochri, since they are warned against killing fetuses?

Answer (Part 1): Here too, like we answered earlier, in the case of a Yisrael it is a Mitzvah to kill the fetus to save the mother.

Observation: In fact, it may well be permitted even for a Nochri to do so.

Question: From where do we know that the Mitzvah of Piryah ve'Rivyah was not said to the B'nei No'ach?

Implied Answer: We cannot learn it from the fact that it is not included in the seven Mitzvos B'nei No'ach ...

Refutation: ... because, as we learned earlier, that that list does not incorporate Mitzvos Asei?

Answer: Because Piryah ve'Rivyah incorporates a Mitzvas Lo Sa'aseh, seeing as whoever is commanded to have children is also commanded not to waste their seed.

Clarification (Part 1): Rashi explains that whatever is forbidden by a Beis-Din, even though it has a time-limit, requires a Beis-Din to permit it, even though the time-limit has passed.

Clarification (Part 2): Rashi then retracts however, and explains that the prohibition of "Al Tigshu el Ishah" (in Sh'mos, 19:15) did not have a time-limit ...

Implied Question: And when the Torah writes "Be prepared for three days time"?

Answer: It says that with reference to receiving the Torah on the third day (and not to the prohibition of "Al Tigshu el Ishah"). But a prohibition that is time-bound, once the time has passed, the prohibition does indeed fall away, and it is automatically permitted!

Question: And if you will ak that, surely, if something is forbidden S'tam (without a time-limit) it is obvious that it requires a Beis-Din to permit it?

Answer: We need the ruling in a case where the reason for the prohibition has fallen away, and we would therefore have otherwise thought that the prohibition no longer applies either ...

Example #1: ... such as here, where they were forbidden to be intimate only in order to receive the Torah be'Taharah.

Example #2 (Part 1): Like the case cited in the first Perek of Beitzah, (Daf 5a & 5b) regarding a vineyard of R'vai within the distance of one day's journey, which had to be brought yo Yerushalayim (and not redeemed) - in order to 'adorn the streets of Yerushalayim'.

Example #2 (Part 2): And that required a Beis-Din to permit it even though the Beis-ha'Mikdash was no longer standing.