Clarification: In the first Perek of Erchin, the Gemara establishes this ruling like R. Meir, who says 'Ein Adam Motzi Devarav le'Vatalah' (a person does not make a statement in vain).

Question: Rav himself says in Perek ha'Shole'ach that someone who declares his Eved Hekdesh, he goes out to freedom, and it attributes this to the fact that 'his body is not sanctified'; and it is implied there that this is not like R. Meir, according to whom an Eved is sanctified for his value?

Answer #1: Rav in Erchin, establishes this ruling like R. Meir, but he himself does not agree with it.

Proof: And so it is implied there, when the Gemara asks 'According to R. Meir, is this not obvious'? Now if Rav is coming to teach us that he holds like R. Meir, why is it obvious. It is therefore clear that he does not hold like R. Meir, and that he is merely coming to teach us that according to R. Meir, he must pay his value (on which the Gemara justifiably asks 'P'shita?')

Answer #2: Alternatively, there are two versions of Rav's statement in Gitin, one with reference to Makdish; the other, with reference to Mafkir - according to the second Lashon, Rav 's statement has nothing to do with R. Meir.

Question: Why can we not establish the Mishnah in connection with an Eved, who is subject to Kedushah, as is implied shortly, since the Gemara asks why one is not Mo'el on the hair of an Eved, and in the Gemara in Gitin (Ibid.) where the Gemara rules that if someone declares Hekdesh his property containing Avadim, then the Gizbarim are not permitted to set them free.

Answer #1: The questioner assumes that 'Adam' does not imply Eved.

Answer #2: Alternatively, the Gemara Kashya goes according to Rav, who holds there that if somebody declares his Eved Hekdesh, the Eved goes free.

Implied Question: Seeing as we learn Me'ilah from Terumah, and by Terumah we don't apply 'Kol ha'Omed Liktzor ... , how can we apply it to Me'ilah?

Answer: In this regard, we do not learn Me'ilah from Terumah, since the Torah writes "Tim'ol Ma'al" (a double expression), to include it, as we learn in Me'ilah regarding various issues.

Clarification: It is implied here that Me'eilah does not apply by anything that is attached, and so the Gemara specifically says in Me'ilah.

Question: on the Rashbam in Perek ha'Mocher es ha'Sefinah, where the Mishnah rules 'Mo'alin ba'Bor', and he presents the case where one placed objects in pit. But that is incorrect, since that is Mechubar?

Explanation: The case must therefore be where one pulled out a clod of earth from the pit and derived benefit from it.

Question: In Perek Na'arah, in connection with the ruling there 'Go and give him from the dates that are on the mat!' 'But when all's said and done, 'Whatever is ready to be shorn, is as if it has already been shorn'? Which the Gemara refutes by establishing the case by dates which still need the tree. What is the Gemara's Kashya there, seeing as the Rabbanan here do not hold of that S'vara?

Answer #1: It is only in the case of a debt (like in our Sugya) where the Rabbanan hold 'La'av ki'Betzurin Damyan', since the creditor does not rely on it (only on what has already been picked [see Tosfos ha'Rosh])

Answer #2: Furthermore, Rabeinu Chananel explains, the Gemara in Kesuvos is asking according to Rav, who rules in Bava Kama, like R. Shimon. R. Shimon rules there that someone who ate ripe fruit that is ready to be picked) must pay ripe fruit, which need nopt be assessed together with the field - implying that he holds ' ... ki'Betzurin Damyan'.

Clarification: From here the Gemara in Arba Misos too learns the warning for the person who is being lain with - 'Just as the Torah punishes after warning, so too the Nishkav'.

Question #1: From where does R. Avahu, who argues there, know that the Mishkav requires twenty-three Dayanim?

Question #2 & #3: And the same question can be asked on R. Shimon there, according to whom the B'nei No'ach are warned against witchcraft since it is compared to someone who lies with an animal, and on ben Azai, who learns from the same Hekesh that a Mechashef is subject to Sekilah?

Answer: For the Hekesh, it would have sufficed to juxtapose "ve'Ish ki Yitein es Shechovto bi'Veheimah" by Machfeifah, rendering the Pasuk "Kol Shochev ... " superfluous to learn from it Nishkav, as we explained (see also Maharsha).

Clarification: This implies that if the Pasuk did come to teach us (that the owner of the ox is Chayav) Misah, then we could no longer learn from it the Hekesh of the ox to the master.

Question: This is difficult however, since earlier we learned that the animal requires twenty-three from the Hekesh of Beheimah to Ishah?

Suggested Answer: Perhaps that is because the Pasuk incorporates them both in one Misah - "ve'Haragta es ha'Ishah ve'es ha'Beheimah"?

Refutation: But by Shochev we also learn the animal from the Hekesh, even though there is a separate P'asuk for each one ("ve'Ish ki Yiten Shechovto bi'Veheimah Mos Yumas" ... "ve'es ha'Beheimah Tahorogu" [see Daf 54b, where the Gemara discusses this Pasuk]).

Answer: Because in the Pasuk cited earlier, the Torah writes "Beheimah" straight afterwards, to compare Beheimah to Ish, whereas here, where it writes Shor and then Ba'alim, it would be coming to compare the owner to the ox, and not vice-versa, were it not for the fact that the phrase is superfluous, as it is not needed intrinsically.

Question: But we need "Yumas" to teach us that the owner is Chayav Misah bi'Yedei Shamayim, like we Darshen in 'Eilu Na'aros', where the Gemara says 'because we find that among those who die bi'Yedei Shamayim those who pay money and are attain atonement, as the Torah says "And if money is placed on them ... "?

Answer #1 (Part 1): If the Pasuk came to teach us Misah bi'Yedei Shamayom alone, then it ought to have said 'Yamus' - "Yumas" implies in Beis-Din; Therefore the Gemara establishes it by Misas Beis-Din, or to teach us the principle of 'ke'Misas ha'Ba'alim Kach Misas ha'Shor'.

Answer #1 (Part 2): Nevertheless, even after learning from it 'ke'Misas ha'Shor ... , we also Darshen Misah bi'Yedei Shamayim as well, applying the principle 'Ein Mikra Yotzei mi'Yedei Peshuto' (the simple explanation of the Pasuk remains intect).

Answer 2: The Gemara means to ask that it should teach us Misah as well (and not to exclude the D'rashah of 'ke'Misas ha'Ba'alim ... ', which we learn from the Hekesh).

Clarification: The Gemara does not ask how many judges were required at Sinai to kill a man, because it is obvious to the Gemara that he required twenty-three, as is evident, when it Darshens shortly 'Just as Ish required twenty-three, so too did Shor'.

Implied Question: Even though the Pasuk "ve'Shaftu ha'Eidah ve'Hitzilu ha'Eidah" (the source for Sanhedrin Ketanah, had not yet been written ...

Answer: Nevertheless, since Yisro had already initiated Sanhedra'os, we can assume that he had also initiated a Sanhedra'os Ketanos to judge those who were Chayav Misah.

Question #1: What is the point of the query regarding Shor Sinai? Seeing as what is passed is passed, it is no practical ramifications?

Question #2: And the same question applies to the Gemara in Avodah-Zarah, which asks 'What Moshe wore when he served in the Mishkan during the seven days of Milu'im?

Answer: Perhaps the Gemara is concerned with understanding the relevant Pesukim, like we find in the first perek of Yoma, which discusses how Moshe dressed Aharon and his sons when they came to serve on the eighth day, for that reason.

Question: Bearing in mind that, based on the fact that we require Pesukim for Rove'a, Nirva and Shor ha'Niskal, we do not even learn Doros from Doros, why would we even think that we might learn Sha'ah from Doros?

Answer: We would indeed have thought so, because we learn all the Dinim of Sekilah from Sinai, like we find in the Gemara in perek Nigmar ha'Din, which learns that the person is pushed down from a cliff from "Yaroh" and that he is actually stoned from "Sakol".

Explanation #1: Rashi explains that this is a polecat.

Refutation #1: This does not appear to be correct however, since the Gemara here implies that it is a powerful Chayah that kills human-beings (and a polecat does not fit that description).

Refutation #2 & #3: Likewise in Perek Eilu Metzi'os, we find that the Gemara inserts Bardeles together with a lion and a bear ('ha'Matzil min ha'Ari u'min ha'Dov ... u'min ha'Bardeles ... '), whilst in the first Perek of Bava Kama it lists it together with the Mu'adin.

Explanation #2: Consequently, it may well be a species of snake, based on the fact that the Gemara there equates it with 'Afa' and to 'Tzavu'a. Now Targum translates the Pasuk "Gei ha'Tzavu'im" (in Shmuel) as 'Meishar Ef'aya', indicating that Tzavu'a is the equivalent of 'Ef'eh' - and the Pasuk in Yeshayah writes "Ef'eh ve'Saraf Me'ofef", indicating that 'Ef'ah/Ef'aya' is a species of snake (like Saraf - serpent).

Alternative: There is however, another species of 'Bardeles', based on the Gemara in the first Perek of Bechoros, which gives the life-span of an Ef'eh as seventy years, and of a Bardeles, as three.

Implied Question: In spite of the fact that there too, it lists it together with a lion and a bear ...

Answer: Nevertheless, it cannot be the same creature as the one mentioned here and in Bava Kama, where it defines it as being synonymous with both Afa and Ef'eh.

Compromise: In fact, it seems likely that the Bardeles mentioned in Bechoros is the polecat that Rashi mentions here

Precedent: And so is the Bardeled mentioned in Pesachim (in connection with Bedikas Chametz) 'If weasels or Bardeleses are found there ... ' - implying that it is a small Chayah like a weasel.

Clarification: R. Yochanan is referring to R. Eliezer in our Mishnah, and he holds that neither can they be trained nor do they have an owner.

Question #1: There is Kashya on this from the first Perek in Bava Kama however, where R. Eliezer himself rules that as long as they can be trained, they are not Mu'adim?

Answer: Rabeinu Tam answers that the correct text there is (not R. Eliezer, but) R. Elazar, whom it mentions there after R. Meir (whose contemporary he was); whereas the Tana in our Mishnah is R' Eliezer, who preceded R. Akiva.

Question #2: The Kashya remains however, in that the Mishnah there rules unanimously that a snake is always Mu'ad, whereas here Resh Lakish states that all the animals listed (including a snake) are only automatically Mu'adim once they have killed; otherwise, they can be trained and they have an owner?

Answer #1: Perhaps one can draw a distinction between a mandate to kill them, which R. Elazar maintains in our Sugya maintains is not blanket, and paying full damages, which a snake must always do.

Answer #2: Furthermore, says R. Tam, trainable there refers to keeping it in the house as a pet; whereas here, it refers to keeping it attached to a chain, like a lion in its cage, which one is not permitted to kill unless it has actually killed a person - likewise a snake.

Precedent: In 'Merubeh' (in connection with a cat) all the opinions agree that one may take the skin.

Implied Question: Why does the Gemara at the beginning of 'ha'Choletz' not reckon this ruling together with the three cases in Shas where the Halachah is like Resh Lakish?

Answer: Because here they are arguing according to R. Eliezer (and not personally).

Clarification: The source of their Machlokes appears to be the Pasuk in Amos "A city from which a thousand people go forth will be left with a hundred; and one from which a hundred people go forth will be left with ten".