According to Rav Gidal Amar Rav, 'ha'Erchin ha'Metaltelin bi'Sheloshah' of our Mishnah refers to someone who says 'Erech K'li Zeh alai'. Although regular Erchin are confined to people - Rav Gidal Amar Rav also taught that - seeing as everyone knows this (and based on the principle 'Ein Adam Motzi Devarav le'Vatalah') someone who makes such a declaration clearly intends to give its value to Hekdesh anyway.

And he actually - amends the Lashon of the Mishnah to read 'Erchin shel Metaltelin'.

Rav Chisda Amar Avimi explains 'ha'Erchin ha'Metaltelin' to mean that - someone designated Metaltelin to pay Hekdesh for Erchin that he had previously declared.

And he too - amends the Mishnah to read 'Metaltelin shel Erchin'.

Rebbi Avahu establishes the Mishnah where the owner declared 'Erchi Alai' (a regular case of Erchin), and the Tana merely draws a distinction between the two possible ways of paying - either with Metaltelin (which require three judges to assess them), or with Karka (which requires ten).

Rav Acha from Difti queried Rebbi Avahu's explanation - on the grounds that if taking out of Hekdesh requires assessment (in order to prevent Hekdesh from losing), why should putting into Hekdesh require it?

Ravina replied that putting into Hekdesh too, requires assessment - to prevent Hekdesh from evaluating the object at too high a price and losing the difference.

According to Rebbi Yehudah, one of the three assessors in the current case must be a Kohen. Rav Huna bar Nasan asks on the Tana Kama (who disagrees) - why the Torah then writes ''Kohen'' with regard to Erchin. This Kashya too, remains unanswered.

Shmuel extrapolates the previous Halachah from the fact that the word "Kohen" appears ten times in the Parshah - once, for the intrinsic Halachah, and the other nine times, as a 'Ribuy Achar Ribuy', which comes to include (rather than to exclude) nine non-Kohanim.

Rav Huna b'rei de'Rav Nasan queries this explanation however, on the grounds that - it would be more logical to interpret each pair of "Kohen" (as a Miy'ut and a Ribuy) independently, to exclude one non-Kohen and to include one from each pair, so that we ought to end up with five Kohanim and five non-Kohanim.

Here too - the Kashya remains unanswered.

We learned in our Mishnah that a person requires ten judges just like Karka. The problem with this is - since when does a person become Hekdesh?

Rebbi Avahu answers - by establishing the Mishnah in a case where someone says 'Dami alai', in which case he is obligated to pay Hekdesh ...

... his own value as if he is an Eved Cana'ani, as we learned in a Beraisa.

And we learn from the Pasuk "ve'Hisnachaltem osam li'Veneichem Achareichem" - that Avadim have the Din of Karka, which explains why the Tana requires ten judges.

Rebbi Avin asks what the Din will be if someone declares his fully-grown hair Hekdesh - whether, since it is still attached to the owner, it has a Din of Karka, and requires ten judges to be assessed, or whether, because it stands to be cut off, it has a Din of Metaltelin and requires only three.

Human hair - which is Mutar be'Hana'ah, might be used as a strainer or as a thread for ornaments.

We resolve Rebbi Avin's She'eilah from a Beraisa, where the Tana Kama says 'Ein Mo'alin be'Sa'aro', whereas Rabban Shimon ben Gamliel holds - 'Mo'alin bo'.

The basis of their Machlokes is - whether fully-grown hair is considered attached (Tana Kama) or detached (Rabban Shimon ben Gamliel).

This proves that - human hair is considered Metaltelin, since Karka is not subject to Me'ilah.

Rebbi Meir and the Chachamim argue in another Beraisa over a case where Reuven claims from Shimon ten laden vines and Shimon admits to five, where Rebbi Meir obligates the latter to swear (a Shevu'as Modeh be'Miktzas), whilst the Chachamim exempt him from swearing - because the grapes are still considered attached, and one does not swear over Karka.

Rebbi Yossi b'Rebbi Chanina establishes the case - where the fruit is fully ripe and ready to pick.

We reject the suggestion that this Machlokes is equivalent to the Machlokes between the Tana Kama and Rabban Shimon ben Gamliel - because it is only hair, which improves whilst it is attached to the head, that Rebbi Meir considers Karka, but not in the case of the attached grapes, since they tend to deteriorate if they are left on the tree.

From our Mishnah, which, in the statement 'Rove'a ... be'Esrim-u'Shaloshah') mentions 'Rove'a' S'tam - we extrapolate that the animal is Chayav Misah irrespective of whether it raped a man or a woman.

The Tana learns that an animal that raped a woman requires twenty-three judges to sentence it to death, since the Torah writes in Kedoshim "ve'Haragta es ha'Ishah ve'es ha'Beheimah" - comparing the animal to the woman).

He knows that the Pasuk in Mishpatim "Kol Shochev Im Beheimah" is talking about an animal that lies with a man and not vice-versa - becaue we already know the latter from the Pasuk in Kedoshim "Ish asher Yiten Shechovto bi'Veheimah Mos Yumas".

And from the fact that the Pasuk expresses itself using the Lashon "Shochev im Beheimah" we learn that - an animal that lies with a man is compared to the man with whom it lies (to require a Beis-Din of twenty-three), just like it is in the case where the man lies with it.

And we know that when a man lies with an animal, the animal too, requires twenty-three judges - from the continuation of the previous Pasuk "ve'es ha'Beheimah Taharogu".

We learn from the Pasuk "ha'Shor Yisakel ve'Gam Be'Alav Yumas" - that a Shor ha'Niskal (that killed a person), like its owner who performed a similar act, requires twenty-three judges to sentence it to death.

Abaye asked Rava what prompts the Tana to learn like this, and not simply that - the owner of an ox that killed is Chayav Misah?

Rava initially answered that to teach us that, the Torah could have omitted the word "Yumas". The question that we would then have thought that the owner is Chayav Sekilah, is unacceptable - because if a murderer receives only Hereg, how can he receive Sekilah for his ox's killing?

This leads us to ask that if "Yumas" does not come to sentence the owner to the more stringent death of Sekilah (stoning), perhaps it comes to teach us - that he receives the lighter punishment of Chenek (strangulation).

This Kashya is not valid according to those who hold that - Chenek is more stringent than Cherev (the sword [with which a murderer is killed]).

We reject it even according to those who hold that Chenek is more lenient however, based on the Pasuk in Mishpatim "Im Kofer Yushas alav" - which teaches us that the owner of an animal that killed is able to escape death by paying 'Kofer'.

And we reconcile this Pasuk with the Pasuk in Mas'ei "ve'Lo Sikchu Kofer le'Nefesh Rotze'ach" - by restricting the latter to a murder that the person committed, but not to a killing perpetrated by his ox.

So Chizkiyah, as well as Tana de'bei Chizkiyah, finally learns from the Pasuk "Mos Yumas ha'Makeh, Rotze'ach Hu" - the D'rashah 'al Retzichaso atah Horgo, ve'I atah Horgo al Retzichas Shoro' (that it is only for a murder that he commits that he must be put to death, but not for one that is perpetrated by his animal [as we just explained]) ...

... leaving "Yumas" superfluous, as we explained initially (to compare the death of the ox to that of his master, as we learned in our Mishnah).

They asked whether Shor Sinai also required twenty-three judges, or whether three sufficed. 'Shor Sinai' - refers to any ox that might have ascended Har Sinai, for which it would have been stoned to death, as the Pasuk writes in Yisro.

And the She'eilah is - whether that ox required twenty-three judges to sentence it to death, or not.

Rami bar Yechezkel resolves the She'eilah from the Pasuk in Yisro "Im Beheimah Im Ish Lo Yichyeh" - comparing the errant animal, to an errant man, who would certainly have required twenty-three judges.

According to Resh Lakish, when Rebbi Eliezer in our Mishnah permits anyone to kill the six wild animals listed there, he refers specifically to where they killed someone. He argues with the Tana Kama inasmuch as he permits anyone to kill them, even without the sanction of a Beis-Din of twenty-three.

According to Rebbi Yochanan - Rebbi Eliezer permits anyone to kill them - even if they did not kill.

The basis of their Machlokes is twofold - a. whether a wild animal that has not yet killed is tamable Rebbi Yochanan) or not (Resh Lakish); and b. whether it has an owner (Resh Lakish) or not (Rebbi Yochanan).

Rebbi Eliezer says 'Kol ha'Kodem le'Horgan Zachah'. The ramifications of this statement, according to ...

... Rebbi Yochanan are - that the person who kills them may keep the skin.

... Resh Lakish are - that he has earned himself a good deed (but not the skin, which belongs to the owner).

Resh Lakish's opinion - has the support of a Beraisa.

Rebbi Eliezer draws a distinction between an ox that killed, which always requires a Beis-Din of twenty-three - and any other tame or wild animal, which anyone may kill, from the moment they have killed someone.

Rebbi Akiva disagrees with Rebbi Eliezer. He says 'Misasan be'Esrim u'Sheloshah' - like the Tana Kama, with the exception of a snake, regardinbg which he agrees to Rebbi Eliezer.

Our Mishnah requires twenty-three judges to judge a tribe. We refute the suggestion that the tribe sinned by desecrating Shabbos on the grounds that - the Torah in Shoftim only differentiates between an individual and many who sinned, with regard to Avodah-Zarah.

If, as we conclude, it is then talking about a tribe that served idols, it will fall under the heading of - 'Ir ha'Nadachas'.

We query this however, from the Beraisa which discusses an Ir ha'Nidachas. According to Rebbi Yashiyah, it is only a town in this regard, if there are between ten and a hundred residents. A 'town' of less than ten residents is not considered a town, and one of more than ten residents is not an Ir ha'Nidachas - because it falls under the category of Tzibur (which has a Din of its own regarding bringing a Par He'elam Davar).

For a town to fall under the category of an Ir ha'Nidachas, Rebbi Yonasan requires - between a hundred and the majority of the town.

The residents of an Ir ha'Nidachas are sentenced to Hereg - whereas those of a town that is not an Ir ha'Nidachas receive Sekilah.

Based on the previous Beraisa, the problem with our Mishnah 'Ein Danin es ha'Sheivet Ela al-Pi Beis-Din shel Shiv'im ve'Echad' is that - either way, on what grounds does our Mishnah require seventy-one judges for an entire tribe (since it exceeds both a hundred residents and the majority of the town)?