SANHEDRIN 15(8 Av) - Dedicated l'Iluy Nishmas Mrs. Lily (Leah bas Pinchas) Kornfeld, who passed away on 8 Av 5765. Dedicated by her daughter and son-in-law, Diane and Andy Koenigsberg and family. May Lily and her husband's love for Torah and for Eretz Yisrael continue in all of their descendants.

[15a - 55 lines; 15b - 43 lines]

1)[line 1] ERECH KLI ZEH ALAI- the endowment value of this utensil is [incumbent] upon me [to give to Hekdesh] (For a summary of the opinions presented in this Sugya, see Background to Sanhedrin 2:20.)

2)[line 3] L'SHUM DAMIM- for its market value

3a)[line 3] " "HAI "ARACHIN HA'MITALTELIN- the Mishnah's statement, "Arachin that are chattels"

b)[line 4]" " "ARACHIN SHEL MITALTELIN" MIBA'EI LEI- it should be [more clearly stated as], "Arachin of chattels"

4)[line 5]TENI- one should [instead] teach

5)[line 6]AVIMEI- the name of an Amora

6)[line 6] B'MATPIS MITALTELIN LA'ARACHIN- [the Mishnah refers to a case] in which one designated utensils towards [payment of a pre-existing obligation to donate] Arachin

7a)[line 12] L'APUKEI ME'HEKDESH- to remove from [the possession] of Hekdesh (i.e. to redeem an item from Hekdesh)

b)[line 12] L'AYULEI L'HEKDESH- to bring [an item] into [the possession of] Hekdesh (e.g. to confiscate it as payment of a debt owed to Hekdesh)

8)[line 17]"[ ] [ ]""[K'ERKECHA HA']KOHEN [KEN YIHYEH]"- "As the Kohen shall evaluate, so shall it[s value] be" (Vayikra 27:12, cited by Rashi 2a DH Echad)

9)[line 19] ASARAH KOHANIM KESUVIN B'PARSHAH- the word "Kohen" is written ten times in the section of the Torah (Vayikra 27) dealing with the redemption of Hekdesh: three times regarding Arachin, three times regarding redemption of animals, and four times regarding the redemption of houses or fields (RASHI 14b DH ASARAH)

10)[line 20] CHAD L'GUFEI- one [instance of the word] is necessary for itself (i.e., to teach that one Kohen must take part in the evaluation)

11)[line 20] MI'UT ACHAR MI'UT- one exclusion (namely, the word "Kohen"), following another exclusion (the next instance of the word "Kohen")

12)[line 21] EIN MI'UT ACHAR MI'UT ELA L'RABOS - One Exclusion Following a Different Exclusion Results in an Inclusion

(a)Sometimes a word or phrase in the Torah that implies the exclusion of a particular situation, item, etc. is followed by an additional word or phrase that implies the same exclusion. In such a case, the law of "Ein Mi'ut Achar Mi'ut Ela l'Rabos" is applied. This means that the limitation of a limitation results in an expansion of the Halachah to include additional cases.

(b)The logical basis for this rule is that since the Torah could have written just one Mi'ut had it wanted to limit the Din, the fact that two are written must mean that the Torah desired to broaden the Halachah rather of limiting it. (This rule is closely related to that of "Shnei Chesuvim ha'Ba'im k'Echad Ein Melamdim" (see Background to Sanhedrin 72:49), as well as to the converse rule of "Ein Ribuy Achar Ribuy Ela l'Ma'et (see Background to Menachos 60:1).)

(d)In nearly every situation in which this rule applies, the obvious question is why the Torah found it necessary to express itself in such a roundabout way? Without either Mi'ut we would have reached the same conclusion! TOSFOS (to Yoma 60a DH Trei) explains that in such situations there was a reason such as a Binyan Av (see Background to 72:49) or a Kal va'Chomer (see Background to Avodah Zarah 46:22) that would have taught us to exclude what the Mi'ut was addressing even without the Mi'ut. The Torah therefore included a double Mi'ut in order to teach us that the exclusion in question should not be excluded.

13)[line 22] AFILU TISH'AH YISRAEL V'ECHAD KOHEN- even [ if the ten are comprised of] nine Yisraelim and one Kohen

14)[line 25] ?ADAM MI KADOSH?- can [a person] be designated as Hekdesh?

15)[line 26] " "OMER "DAMAI ALAI"- he says "it is [incumbent] upon me [to give] my [market] value to Hekdesh" (see Background to 14:68:a)

16)[line 27] SHAMIN OSO K'EVED- we evaluate his market value as if he was a slave

17)[line 27] EVED ITKASH L'KARKA'OS - [the Halachah regarding] a slave is compared to [the Halachah regarding] land, through means of a Hekesh (HEKESH)

See Background to 6:13.

18a)[line 28] SEI'AR HA'OMED LI'GEZOZ- [If one donates to Hekdesh human] hair that is ready to be cut.... Human hair has a value, as it is usable for the straps of a donkey's harness (RASHI).

b)[line 29]?B'CHAMAH?- how many "judges" (i.e. assessors) must take part in its evaluation?

19)[line 30] EIN MO'ALIN BO - a person does not transgress Me'ilah [even] if he derives benefit from it (ME'ILAH - Misappropriation of items belonging to Hekdesh)

(a)It is forbidden to derive personal benefit from anything that is Hekdesh, as the Torah states, " ... " "Lo Suchal le'Echol b'Sha'arecha... Nedarecha Asher Tidor" - "You may not eat in your settlements... your pledges [to Hekdesh] that you will pledge" (Devarim 12:17) (RAMBAM Hilchos Me'ilah 1:1-3). The minimum amount for which one transgresses this prohibition is a Perutah's worth of benefit.

(b)If someone benefited from Hekdesh intentionally, he receives Malkos and must pay to Hekdesh the amount that he benefited. However, the object from which he benefited remains Hekdesh.

(c)If someone benefited from Hekdesh unintentionally, the object loses its Kedushah. He must bring a Korban Asham Me'ilos, and repay Hekdesh the value of his benefit plus an additional fifth (of the ensuing total, or a quarter of the original value).

(d)This Beraisa teaches that slaves are an exception to the above rule; one who benefits from a slave belonging to Hekdesh is exempt from the penalty and Korban. This is because slaves are compared to land (see entry #17 above), and land is also excluded from the laws of Me'ilah (RASHI).

20)[line 33] SHEMA MINAH- we may infer from this [that the answer to Rebbi Avin's query is likewise a Machlokes Tana'im]. The Tana Kama, who considers hair ready to be cut as part of the person, would require ten judges to assess its value, while Rebbi Shimon would require only three (RASHI).

21)[line 34] , YESH DEVARIM SHE'HEN K'KARKA, V'EINAN K'KARKA- there are things which are like land [in one respect], and which are not like land [in another respect]

22)[line 35] GEFANIM TE'UNOS- vines laden [with fruit]

23)[line 36]HALAH- the other one (the opposing litigant)

24)[line 37] REBBI ME'IR MECHAYEV - Rebbi Meir obligates him [to take a Shevu'ah] (MODEH B'MIKTZAS HA'TA'ANAH - The Oath of One who Partially Acknowledges)

(a)If one admits to owing part of what another claims is due him, we must suspect that he truly owes the amount of the entire claim. Since he does not have the funds to pay now - nor the audacity to deny the claim completely - he partially acknowledges the debt in an effort to postpone his repayment. He is therefore required to take an oath that he does not owe the remainder of the claim (Shemos 22:8; Kesuvos 18b et. al.).

(b)This oath applies only to claims of movable objects (Metaltelin). If one denies a claim of land (Kefiras Karka), or if one admits to part of a claim but his admission is only to land (Hoda'as Karka), then he is exempt from taking a Shevu'ah. In these situations, the Halachah is "ha'Motzi me'Chaveiro Alav ha'Re'ayah" - the burden of proof rests upon the claimant (Mishnah, Bava Metzia 56a).

25)[line 39] OMDOS LI'BATZER- ready to be harvested

26)[line 40] KI'BETZUROS DAMYAN- they are as if already harvested

27a)[line 42] [] KOL KAMAH [D']SHAVKAS LEHU- the longer that you leave them [unharvested]

b)[line 43] MIKACHASH KACHASHEI- they continually become weaker (and will begin to spoil)

28)[line 44] ASHBUCHEI MASHBACH- it improves

29)[line 45] KA PASIK V'TANI- the Mishnah states decisively (that twenty-three judges are required)

30a)[line 45] ROVE'A ZACHAR- a (male) animal that committed an act of relations with a male human

b)[line 46] ROVE'A NEKEIVAH- a (male) animal that committed an act of relations with a female human (see Background to Sanhedrin 2:23)

31a)[line 49] IM EINO INYAN- if it is unnecessary to state this Halachah as applied to...

b)[line 49] TENEI'HU INYAN - instead, apply it to... (IM EINO INYAN)

(a)One of the methodologies employed by Chazal when determining Halachah from the verses of the Torah is known as "Im Eino Inyan." At times, it may be impossible to apply a particular law in the verse to the context in which it appears. This may be because we already know that law from a different verse, or conversely, because it would be contradicted by a different verse or by logic.

(b)In such a case, Chazal may instead apply that law to a parallel case, or to a broader scope of cases.

(c)Once the methodology of "Im Eino Inyan" has been applied, we consider the law to have been written explicitly in its new context, and it may be used even as the basis for applying the death penalty (see Encyclopedia Talmudis, vol. 2, "Im Eino Inyan").

32a)[line 50] V'APKEI RACHMANA B'LASHON SHOCHEV- the Torah nevertheless states (lit. "brings out") this law with the terminology of "Shochev"

b)[line 50] L'AKUSHEI NISHKAV LA'SHOCHEV- to make [the law in] the case when the man was "Nishkav" comparable to the law in the case when the man was "Shochev"

33)[line 54]"[ , ;] ""...HA'SHOR YISAKEL V'GAM BE'ALAV YUMAS"- " [But if the bull was prone to gore with its horn in the past, and its owner had been warned, but he had not watched it properly, and it killed a man or a woman;] the bull shall be stoned, and its owner also shall pay Kofer (lit. be put to death)" (Shemos 21:29).


34)[line 1]KETALA- the death -penalty

35)[line 3] ?SEKILAH SALKA DA'ATACH?- could you possibly have thought [that the owner] would be punished by stoning?

36)[line 3] / SEKILAH / SAYAF - [death by] stoning / the sword (MISOS BEIS DIN - The Death Penalties Administered by Beis Din)

(a)The four types of death penalies administered by Beis Din, in order of severity according to the Tana Kama (of the Mishnah 49b), are Sekilah (stoning), Sereifah (burning), Hereg/Sayaf (beheading), and Chenek (strangulation).

(b)According to Rebbi Shimon (loc. cit.), the order of severity is Sereifah, Sekilah, Chenek, Hereg/Sayaf.

(c)For more detail, see Background to Sanhedrin 8:58.

37a)[line 3] , KATAL IHU B'SAYAF- if he himself killed [a person], he would be punished with death by the sword

b)[line 4][] , ?![KATAL] MAMONO, BI'SEKILAH?!- if his property [killed a person], should he be punished with death by stoning (which is a more severe punishment)?!

38a)[line 5] L'AKULEI ILAVEI- to be lenient upon him

b)[line 5] L'APUKEI MI'SAYAF L'CHENEK- to remove (i.e. downgrade) his punishment from beheading to strangulation. When the Torah states "Yumas," and does not specify with which type of death penalty, the penalty of Chenek applies (Sanhedrin 84b).

39)[line 6]HA'NICHA- [Abaye's challenge (as to why we do not interpret the verse as meaning a literal death penalty for the owner)] may be considered resolved

40a)[line 6] L'MAN D'AMAR CHENEK CHAMUR- according to the opinion that strangulation is more severe (see entry #36 above)

b)[line 7] CHENEK KIL- strangulation is more lenient

41)[line 8]" , [ ]"IM KOFER YUSHAS ALAV, [V'NASAN PIDYON NAFSHO K'CHOL ASHER YUSHAS ALAV]- "If [payment of] Kofer is placed upon him, [he shall pay the redemption for his soul, the entire amount that is placed upon him]" (Shemos 21:30).

42)[line 9]"[] [ ; ]""[V']LO SIKCHU CHOFER L'NEFESH ROTZE'ACH, [ASHER HU RASHA LA'MUS; KI MOS YUMAS]"- "[And] do not accept Kofer [payment] for the soul of a murderer [who is guilty to be put to death; rather, he shall surely be put to death]" (Bamidbar 35:31).

43)[line 10] !MI'SHUM HI GUFA!- because of this very question!

44)[line 10] LO SISGEI- it shall be insufficient

45)[line 12] LI'FROK NAFSHEI- he should be able to redeem himself

46)[line 13]"[ ,] , ...""[O V'EIVAH HIKAHU V'YADO VA'YAMOS,] MOS YUMAS HA'MAKEH, ROTZE'ACH HU..."- "[Or if with malice he struck him with his hand, and he died,] the assailant shall surely die, he is a murderer..." (Bamidbar 35:21).

47a)[line 14] AL RETZICHASO ATAH HORGO- for his own act of murder, you are to execute him

b)[line 15] V'IY ATAH HORGO AL RETZICHAS SHORO- but you are not to execute him for a murder committed by his ox

48a)[line 16] SHOR SINAI- an ox [that encroached the boundaries around] Har Sinai (during the three days of "Hagbalah" preceding the Giving of the Torah)

b)[line 16]?B'CHAMAH?- with how many [judges was it tried]?

49)[line 16] MI GAMAR SHA'AH MI'DOROS- do we derive a temporary Halachah from [ones that apply to all] generations

50)[line 17]"[ , ,] ...""... IM BEHEMAH IM ISH, LO YICHYEH..."- "[A hand should not touch him, rather he shall surely be stoned or he shall surely be thrown off,] whether animal or man he shall not remain alive..." (Shemos 19:13).

51)[line 20] HU SHEHEIMISU- the opinion of Rebbi Eliezer in the Mishnah (2a) (namely, that any person may kill any of these six dangerous animals, and we do not require a Beis Din of twenty-three to convict it) applies only in a case when the animal has already killed a person (RASHI)

52a)[line 21] YESH LAHEN TARBUS- they are capable of being civilized (not to harm people)

b)[line 21] V'YESH LAHEN BA'ALIM- and they are therefore considered the property of their owners

53)[line 22] AF AL PI SHE'LO HEIMISU- [Rabbi Eliezer permits any person to kill any of these dangerous animals] even though they have not killed a person

54a)[line 25] L'MAI ZACHAH- to what [tangible reward] is he entitled

b)[line 25] ZACHAH L'ORAN- he is awarded the hide of the animals

55)[line 26]SHAVINHU- they deem it

56)[line 27] K'MAN D'GAMAR DINAI'HU- as if they have been tried and found guilty


(a)Isurei Hana'ah are items from which it is prohibited by the Torah to derive benefit. Such items are considered to be of no monetary value. Some examples are Chametz b'Pesach (see Background to Bava Metzia 42:18) and Shor ha'Niskal (an animal that has been convicted of killing a person; see Background to Bava Kama 96:39a).

(b)According to Rebbi Eliezer, a wild animal that kills a person may be killed without being put on trial at all. Therefore, the Gemara equates its status to that of an ox that has already been convicted.

58)[line 28] ZACHAH LA'SHAMAYIM- he merits reward in heaven

59)[line 33] IKA BEINAIHU NACHASH- they differ regarding a snake (the Tana Kama requires twenty-three judges, while Rebbi Akiva does not)

60)[line 34] ?D'CHATA B'MAI?- In what did they sin?

61a)[line 35] PALIG RACHMANA BEIN YECHIDIM LIM'RUBIN- the Torah makes a distinction between [the trial of] individuals and the many

b)[line 36] L'INYAN AVODAS KOCHAVIM- regarding idolatry (for which individuals are tried in the local Beis Din of twenty-three, and a city (an Ir ha'Nidachas) is tried before the Sanhedrei Gedolah)

62)[line 37]HUDACH- that was led astray (to idolatry)

63)[line 38] ?L'MEIMRA DIV'DINA D'RABIM DAYENINAN LEI?- Do you mean to say that we judge [an entire tribe] by the rules of the many (namely, before the Sanhedei Gedolah, and with Hereg)?

64)[line 39] AD KAMAH- Until what size [of a city do we apply the rules of Ir ha'Nidachas)?