Clarification: He distanced himself from ruling, though strictly speaking, he was not disqualified; Likewise the case in 'Sh'nei Daynei' Gezeiros, where 'R. Yishmael b'R. Yossi's sharecropper brought him a basket of fruit a day earlier.

Clarification: In other words, he threatened to place him in Niduy (Cherem).

Implied Question: How do we understand this in light of the Gemara in Mo'ed Katan, which rules 'Menudeh le'Talmid Eino Menudeh le'Rav'?

Answer: That is only where the Talmid places him in Cherem to protect his own Kavod, but not where he does so on account of Kavod Shamayim (as was the case here).

Explanation #1: Rashi explains this with regard to the husband's claim 'Pesach Pasu'ach Matzasi' (that he discovered that she was not a virgin), with the intention of causing her to lose her Kesubah.

Question #1: Rabeinu however queries this from many angles; Firstly, inasmuch as the Mishnah (also) mentions Motzi Shem Ra in connection with Oneis and Mefateh, which are Kenasos?

Question #2: Moreover, wherever Motzi Shem Ra is mentioned (in connection with a husband and wife), it is with reference to the hundred Sela'im that he is obligated to pay?

Question #3: In addition, the three judges mentioned in the Mishnah means three Mumchin, whereas we find in many places that they judged the Dinim of Kesubah in Bavel (where there were no Mumchin), as was indeed customarily in the time of Tosfos?

Question #4: What's more, when Rashi explains 'Chosheshin le'La'az' to mean that since the husband claimed 'Pesach Pasu'ach Matzasi', we suspect that witnesses might get to hear about it and come and testify that she committed adultery; the expression 'La'az' does imply this, but rather something that is untrue, such as the Gemara in Gitin, which states 'It transpires that you are producing a stigma on the early Gitin'?

Question #5: Furthermore, when, as the Gemara will shortly explain, the husband claims 'Dunu li Miyha Dinei Mamonos', what pushes him to say that, as long as his wife is not claiming her Kesubah?

Question #6: And why does the Beraisa say 'Tav'o Mamon (if he claimed from him) bi'Sheloshah'? It ought to have said 'Tav'ah ... (if he claimed from her)?

Question #7: In any case, the term 'Tava' is inappropriate, seeing as he is coming (not to claim from her but) to absolve himself from having to pay her?

Question #8: When the Gemara says shortly 'And there where it is a case of Nefashos', this implies that it refers to the same case of Mamon (i.e. the money that the father is claiming from the husband - see R. Chiya bar Aba, Amud Beis).

Question #9: And finally, we ask, quoting the Maharap, according to R. Meir, who maintains in Perek Af-al-Pi that Kesubah d'Oraysa, the husband is not believed to cause his wife to lose her Kesubah - only according to those who hold that it is mi'de'Rabbanan ...

Proof: As is evident from the Gemara in the first Perek of Kesuvos, where Rav Nachman states 'the Chachamim instituted for the daughters of Yisrael two Manah for a virgin and one Manah for a widow, and they believed the husband ... '.

Explanation #2 (Part 1): Rabeinu Tam therefore explains that the entire Sugya is referring to the hundred Sela'im that the father claims from the husband.

Explanation #2 (Part 2): And 'Chosheshin le'La'az refers to stigmatizing the Dayanam, where the husband brought witnesses that his wife committed adultery and they were contradicted. The Chachamim therefore hold that this requires twenty-three judges, because if there were only three, we are afraid that perhaps witnesses will turn up who testify that she did in fact, commit adultery, creating the necessity to add Dayanim (to form a Beis-Din of twenty-three). And people will now assume that they needed to add judges because the original Beis-Din erred in their judgement

Explanation #2 (Part 3): This is confined to witnesses who were contradicted by a conflicting testimony, who may nevertheless have told the truth, and there is good reason to suspect that other witnesses will still come to uphold their testimony; It does not however apply to where the witnesses became Zom'min, where it is clear that the husband is looking for false witnesses, and nobody will suspect that other witnesses may still come to uphold their testimony. Whereas R. Meir is not concerned about the La'az of the Dayanim.

Comment: Although the Chachamim here are concerned about 'La'az' of the Dayanim, this cannot be compared to the Mishnah later in the third Perek, where the Tana holds 'Yosifu ha'Dayanim (see Maharam).

Clarification #1: It is speaking where the father gathered witnesses to be Mazim the husband's witnesses, and the Dayanim subsequently scattered before they managed to accept them, either due to some unforeseen circumstances, fear, to greet the king or to measure the distance between the corpse and the nearest town (regarding Eglah Arufah), and only three remained.

Clarification #2: It is not possible to invert the order (that the Dayanim scattered only after they had accepted the witnesses, since then the words 'Dunu li Miha Dinei Mamonos' will not make sense.

Clarification: Meaning that he did not gather them initially for Dinei Nefashos.

Clarification #1: Before the conclusion of the judgement, so that the Zom'min are not subject to the death-sentence.

Clarification #2: If he (the father) comes to claim money from the husband, then three judges will suffice - since there is no need to worry about 'La'az' (in case other witnesses will come and they will need to add judges), because since the first witnesses became Zom'min, they are definitely false witnesses.

Clarification #3: Whereas if it is a matter of Nefashos (i.e. it might lead to Nefashos, because the witnesses did not become Zom'min, but were merely contradicted, then twenty-three judges are required. And 'Tav'o Nefashos' means that he claimed Mamon, but that this could turn into Nefashos.

Clarification #4: according to Rabeinu Tam, Abaye is justified in stating that everyone agrees 'Chosheshin le'La'az', seeing as the entire Sugya speaks where the husband's witnesses were contradicted by a conflicting testimony, and it is because they are concerned about La'az, that the Rabbanan require twenty-three judges, since Misah is applicable via a S'tam Hasra'ah, and perhaps they will need to add judges (see Maharam).

Implied Question: according to Rashi however, Abaye might just as well have said that everyone holds 'Ein Chosheshin le'La'az' (see Maharam); nevertheless the Rabbanan will require twenty-three?

Answer: Some commentaries explain that, even according to Rashi, Abaye needs to say 'de'Kuli Alma Chosheshin le'La'az', to teach us that R. Meir requires only three judges (despite the fact that he is worried about La'az), since there is no need to worry about other witnesses turning up.

Question #1: There is however a Kashya on Rabeinu Tam, according to the Gemara's final interpretation linking the Machlokes in our Mishnah to the Machlokes between ben Azai and the Rabbanan; Because it transpires that Motzi-Shem-Ra of R. Meir, who requires three judges - refers to the claim of a hundred Sela'im which the father is claiming, whereas the Motzi-Shem-Ra of the Rabbanan, who require twenty-three judges - refers to the Chiyuv Misah of the woman, and not to the monetary claim, seeing as their testimony is not negated through the Hakchashah of the Bedikah according to the Rabbanan?

Question #2: Furthermore, it seems that this answer refers to the statement of Abaye (see Tosfos 9b DH 'P'lugta de'ben Azai ... ') 'that everybody is concerned about La'az', in which case, even if the witnesses are contradicted, even R. Meir ought to require twenty-three judges, in case other witnesses arrive, necessitating more judges, creating a La'az?

Answer #1: Is is however possible to resolve the problem that when the Gemara establishes that the witnesses were contradicted by the Bedikos, it speaks that after that, the father's witnesses contradicted those of the husband completely, in which case the woman will not be killed even according to the Rabbanan, in spite of which it will require twenty-three, because, even though there is no suspicion that the father will bring other witnesses, there is room to suspect that the husband will bring Eidei Hazamah, who will be Mazim the witnesses who contradicted his witnesses.

Answer #2: Alternatively, it speaks where the husband has two pairs of witnesses who contradict each other by the Bedikos, in which case it is possible that there are other witnesses.

Implied Question: But surely those witnesses too will be contradicted by the Bedikos of one of the previous sets?

Answer: Nevertheless, she will be killed, according to the Rabbanan, since 'Hakchashah' by the Bedikos is not considered Hakchashah, whereas according to R. Meir, it is.

Implied Question: Why can we not query Rabeinu Tam's explanation that, according to Abaye and all the Amora'im later, who hold that, according to R. Meir, the woman is not Chayav Misah, how can her husband be Chayav a hundred Sela'im, seeing as the Gemara in Kesuvos rules that wherever there is no possibility of Misah, there can be no K'nas.

Source: This is based on the Gemara in 'Na'arah', which rules that someone who is Motzi-Shem-Ra on his wife who is a Ketanah, is Patur, since it is not possible to fulfill the Pasuk "ve'Im Emes ha'Davar, u'Sekaluhah".

Answer: The answer is because from that D'rashah we only preclude a Ketanah, who is punishable at all.

Refutation: Nevertheless, Rabeinu Tam's explanation, that obligates a hundred Sela'im even where there is Hakchashah but no Hazamah is a Dochek.

Ruling #1: In any event, we will have to say that, according to Rabeinu Tam, where the testimony is not accurate or where it is contradicted, she is permitted to her husband

Proof: Because otherwise, how can her husband be Chayav a hundred Sela'im, seeing as we cannot fulfill the continuation of the Pasuk "And she shall be his wife!"

Ruling #2: And we can learn from here that if witnesses came and claim that so-and-so's wife committed adultery, D'rishah and Chakirah are needed to forbid her on her husband.

Proof: In any event it is logical to say that, seeing as it is not worse than cases of theft and wounds, which do.

Machlokes Amora'im: The Rashba found in the Yerushalmi a Machlokes as to whether the Machlokes in the Mishnah pertains to the woman's Kesuvah (like Rashi) or to the hundred Sela (like Rabeinu Tam).

Implied Question: Seeing as Abaye holds 'Chosheshin le'La'az', what difference will it make whether he holds 'Chosheshin li'Chevodan shel Rishonim' or not?

Answer: The difference will manifest itself in a case where the husband brought witnesses that she committed adultery, and the father's witnesses subsequently rendered them Zom'min (where La'az does not apply, as we explained earlier).

Comment: The truth of the matter is that Abaye might just as well have said that everybody holds 'Ein Chosheshin li'Chevodan shel Resha'im'.

Suggested Explanation: Perhaps what he means is that whoever holds Chosheshin le'La'az, certainly holds 'Chosheshin li'Chevodan shel Resha'im', as Rabah evidently holds.

Refutation #1: This is incorrect, firstly because what does one have to do with the other.

Refutation #2: And secondly, because according to Ula, the Rabbanan are Choshesh for La'az, but not for Chevodan shel Rishonim, since there where the husband brought witnesses that she committed adultery, and the father subsequently brought witnesses who were Mazim them, they nevertheless rule 'Ba Lig'vos, Mamon, bi'Sheloshah'.

Question: How will Abaye and the other Amora'im later, establish 'she'Tav'o Mamon bi'Shelashoh'?

Problem: We cannot establish it there where the husband brought witnesses that she committed adultery ... (like Rava [since they hold 'Chosheshin li'Chevodan shel Resha'im']).

Answer #1: according to them, 'Tav'o Mamon' speaks where they did not warn the woman at all, in which case there is no Misah.

Answer #2: Rashi actually establishes it like Rabah and R. Chiya - 'where the husband brought witnesses that she committed adultery ... ', But Abaye and the other Amora'im maintain that, seeing as before it was the husband who was claiming and now it is the father, it looks like a new case, and 'Kevodan she Rishonim' is not applicable.

Clarification #1: A Meisis too, requires 'Eidah' (twenty-three Dayanim), and it is the Din of "ve'Hitzilu ha'Eidah", which, based on the ruling 'Ein To'anin le'Meisis' (one does not defend a Meisis) does not apply to him. But as regards twenty-three, which we also learn from this Pasuk, there is no reason to differentiate between a Meisis and other Chayvei Misah.

Clarification #2: The truth is that a Meisis also requires 'Eidin ve'Hasra'ah', and the Gemara's distinction is based on the fact that one hides the witnesses from him, as the Gemara will explain and that b. one does warn him directly, but merely says to him 'How can we forsake our Father in Heaven and worship wood and stones, as the Mishnah explains in Perek Arba Misos.

Clarification: And it is speaking when the witnesses testified that she committed adultery a number of times. Otherwise, they can claim that they came to forbid her on her husband (and not to have her killed), in which case they are not Chayav Misah, and if they are not sentenced to death, neither is she, as we will learn in 'Hayu Bodkin'.