Rebbi Yossi ha'Gelili in a Beraisa echoes our Mishnah, which ascribes the harsh judgment of the ben Sorer u'Moreh to his future actions, and not to his past ones. What is the basis of this statement?
(b)
What is the Torah afraid will happen?
(c)
The Tana also praises the death of Resha'im and laments their tranquility, whilst he laments the death of Tzadikim and praises their tranquility. Why is tranquility such a good thing for Tzadikim?
1)
(a)
Rebbi Yossi ha'Gelili in a Beraisa echoes our Mishnah, which ascribes the harsh judgment of the ben Sorer u'Moreh to his future actions and not to his past ones. This statement is based on the fact that - if not for what it will lead to, the Torah would not punish a boy merely for eating some meat and drinking some wine.
(b)
The Torah is afraid that - the boy will become addicted to these luxuries, with the result that, when he has spent all his father's money, he will search for new funds to increase the pleasures of life, until it reaches a point where he takes to highway robbery and murder.
(c)
The Tana also praises the death of Resha'im and laments their tranquility, whilst he laments the death of Tzadikim and praises their tranquility - which is good for them and the world, because it enables them to learn Torah and perform Mitzvos (much to everybody's advantage).
2)
(a)
Who else (besides a ben Sorer u'Moreh) does our Mishnah add to the list of those who are judged according to their future actions, and not according to their current ones?
(b)
To whom is the Tana referring when he rules with regard to a 'Ba be'Machteres' who breaks vessels in the course of his break-in ...
1.
... 'Im Yesh lo Damim, Chayav'?
2.
... 'Im Ein lo Damim, Patur'?
(c)
This latter ruling applies even if the sinner is not sentenced to death. Why is that? On what principle is it based?
2)
(a)
Besides a ben Sorer u'Moreh - our Mishnah adds a Ba be'Machteres (someone who breaks into a fellow-Jew's house in order to steal) to the list of those who are judged according to their future actions, and not according to their current ones.
(b)
When the Tana rules with regard to a 'Ba be'Machteres' who breaks vessels in the course of his break-in ...
1.
... 'Im Yesh lo Damim, Chayav' - he is referring to a father breaking-in to his son's house (as we will see shortly).
2.
... 'Im Ein lo Damim, Patur' - he is referring to any other person (even a son breaking in to the house of his father).
(c)
This latter ruling applies even if the sinner is not sentenced to death - based on the principle 'Chayvei Miysos Shog'gin, Ein Meshalmin' (Someone who commits a sin for which he is Chayav Misah, but without warning, is Patur from paying for any damage that was caused simultaneously).
3)
(a)
Which Chazakah does Rava rely on as the basis for the Din of 'Ba be'Machteres'?
(b)
What does 'Ein lo Damim' therefore mean?
(c)
Based on what principle does the Torah then permit the owner to kill the Ganav?
(d)
Why does Rav permit a Ba be'Machteres to retain vessels that he took in the course of the break-in?
3)
(a)
The Chazakah that Rava relies on as the basis for the Din of 'Ba be'Machteres' is - the fact that the Ganav, knowing that the owner will not stand idly by as he steals his money, is prepared to kill him should he catch him as he is breaking in. Consequently, he (the owner) is permitted to kill him in self-defense.
(b)
'Ein lo Damim' therefore means that - the Ganav has no value (it is as if he is already dead, based on the following principle).
(c)
The Torah permits the owner to kill the Ganav - because of the principle 'ha'Ba le'Harg'cha, Hashkem le'Hargo' ('Kill the person who comes to kill you, before he kills you!').
(d)
Rav permits a Ba be'Machteres to retain vessels that he took in the course of the break-in - on the basis of the S'vara 'be'Damim Kaninhu' (he acquired them with his life [which was on the line]).
4)
(a)
Why did Rava initially assume that Rav only exempted the Ba be'Machteres from paying if he broke the vessels (see Tosfos DH 'Mistavra'), but not from returning them if he took them?
(b)
What made him change his mind?
(c)
And what did h meean when he said 've'ha'Elokim Amar Rav!'?
(d)
On what grounds did he disagree with him?
(e)
What do we try to extrapolate from our Mishnah 'Ba be'Machteres ve'Shiber es ha'Keilim, Ein lo Damim, Patur'? On whom does this pose a Kashya?
4)
(a)
Rava initially assumed that Rav only exempted the Ba be'Machteres from paying, if he broke the vessels, but not from returning them if he took them - because, he thought, Rav's reason for exempting him is because of 'Kam leih bi'de'Rabah mineih' (Beis-Din only give a person the more stringent of two punishments), but that is no reason to permit him to keep an article that belongs to somebody else.
(b)
He changed his mind however - due to the Din in the Seifa 'Yesh lo Damim', where, if he took vessels and they broke be'Oneis, he is Chayav to pay, a proof that he acquires them (otherwise he would be Patur). And he now applies this ruling to the Reisha, by 'Ein lo Damim' (even if the vessels are still intact).
(c)
And when he said 've'ha'Elokim Amar Rav!' he meant - that he was willing to swear that Rav said that.
(d)
He disagreed with him however - by drawing a distinction between the Chiyuv Oneis, where the Torah placed the object in his R'shus in order to be Chayav (just like a borrower) on the one hand, and actually acquiring the article to keep, on the other, where there is no reason to assume that the Torah would do that.
(e)
We try to extrapolate from our Mishnah 'Ba be'Machteres ve'Shiber es ha'Keilim, Ein lo Damim, Patur' - that had he taken the vessels, he would be Chayav to return them, a Kashya on Rav.
5)
(a)
How do we try to answer this Kashya? If not for the inference, why does the Tana mention 'Shiber es ha'Keilim' (and not when he took them)?
(b)
In fact though, he is a Mazik, whom we already know is Chayav to pay. Why is it not good enough to answer that he broke the vessels inadvertently?
(c)
What is the significance of the final word 'Kashya' (as opposed to 'Tiyuvta')?
5)
(a)
We try to answer this Kashya by pointing out that - the Tana requires 'Shiber es ha'Keilim' per se, to teach us that 'Yesh lo Damim' is Chayav even there (and not for its inference).
(b)
In fact though, he is a Mazik, whom we already know is Chayav to pay. Neither will it do to answer that he broke the vessels inadvertently - because that too, is obvious (based in the principle 'Adam Mu'ad le'Olam' [a person is always liable for his actions]).
(c)
The significance of the final word 'Kashya' is that - it is not a total refutation (as opposed to 'Tiyuvta', which would be), and we can therefore establish the Mishnah as we explained according to Rav, even though there is a Kashya on it.
6)
(a)
What does the Beraisa say about someone who steals a purse on Shabbos ...
1.
... by picking it up and carrying it into the street?
2.
... by dragging it out into the street without picking it up?
(b)
Why does this Beraisa pose a Kashya on Rava?
(c)
How do we establish the Beraisa in order to reconcile Rava with it?
(d)
Bearing in mind that Rava holds that Ba be'Machteres does not acquire the vessels that he steals, why, when a Ba be'Machteres came to return to him the rams that had stolen from him, did he refuse to accept them?
6)
(a)
The Beraisa rules that someone who steals a purse on Shabbos ...
1.
... by picking it up and carrying it into the street - is Chayav to return it, since he acquired it before breaking Shabbos.
2.
... by dragging it out into the street without picking it up - is Patur from returning it, since the Kinyan and the Chilul Shabbos come simultaneously.
(b)
This Beraisa poses a Kashya on Rava - in whose opinion, one does not acquire a stolen object as long as it is intact.
(c)
To reconcile Rava with the Beraisa, we establish it - where the Ganav then threw the purse into the river.
(d)
Despite Rava's opinion that Ba be'Machteres does not acquire the vessels that he steals, when a Ba be'Machteres came to return to him the rams that he had stolen from him, he refused to accept them - in deference to Rav, who holds that he does acquire them.
7)
(a)
What problem does the Beraisa have with the Pasuk "Ein lo Damim, Im Zarchah ha'Shemesh alav ... "?
(b)
How does the Tana resolve it? What is the Torah coming to teach us?
(c)
How does another Beraisa explain the Pasuk "Im Zarchah ha'Shemesh alav, Yesh lo Damim"?
(d)
How do we establish the two Beraisos, to resolve the apparent discrepancy between them?
7)
(a)
The problem the Beraisa has with the Pasuk "Ein lo Damim, Im Zarchah ha'Shemesh alav ... " - is that the sun shines on everyone, and not just on the Ganav.
(b)
The Tana resolves it - by explaining the Pasuk metaphorically: 'If it is as clear as the shining sun that he wants to kill you, kill him first; but if you have doubts, then don't!'
(c)
Another Beraisa explains the Pasuk "Im Zarchah ha'Shemesh alav, Yesh lo Damim" to mean - 'If it is as clear as the shining sun that he will not kill you, then don't kill him, but if you have doubts, then kill him.
(d)
To resolve the apparent discrepancy between them, we establish the first Beraisa - by a father breaking in on his son, where, unless there is a clear indication that he intends to kill him, the son may not kill him first (because we take for granted that a father will not kill his son). Whereas the second Beraisa speaks by a son breaking in on his father (and certainly by someone else), whom we assume, is prepared to kill if he is caught, unless there is a clear indication to the contrary.
72b----------------------------------------72b
8)
(a)
Rav declared that he would kill anybody who broke into his house via a tunnel except for Rav Chanina bar Shilo. Why was that? What made Rav Chanina bar Shilo special?
(b)
Why can the reason not have been because he was a Tzadik?
(c)
Why does the Beraisa find it necessary to teach us that even on Shabbos ...
1.
... "Ein lo Damim" applies?
2.
... "Yesh lo Damim" applies?
(d)
What prompts the Tana to make this dual D'rashah?
8)
(a)
Rav declared that he would kill anybody who broke into his house via a tunnel except for Rav Chanina bar Shilo - because, he claimed, the latter loved him like a father loves a son (and would therefore not kill him under any circumstances).
(b)
The reason cannot have been because he was a Tzadik - because that is not a title one would confer on a person who breaks into houses and steals.
(c)
The Beraisa finds it necessary to teach us that even on Shabbos ...
1.
... "Ein lo Damim" applies - because we might have thought that he is no different than Harugei Beis-Din (people who are sentenced to death at the hand of Beis-Din), who cannot be put to death on Shabbos (as we learned in the fourth Perek).
2.
... "Yesh lo Damim" applies (not to teach us that one may not kill him on Shabbos, which is obvious, says Rav Sheishes, but) to teach us that - if a wall caved in on him, one is obligated to remove the bricks to try and save his life.
(d)
What prompts the Tana to make this dual D'rashah - is the fact that the Torah writes "Damim" in the plural.
9)
(a)
In the Pasuk in Mishpatim "Im ba'Machteres Yima'tzei ha'Ganav, ve'Hukah u'Meis ... ", what does the Beraisa learn from ...
1.
... "ve'Hukah"?
2.
... "u'Meis"?
(b)
Seeing as the Ba be'Machteres has nothing to fear from a third party, who, he knows, is not as concerned about the robbery as the owner, on what grounds is anyone allowed to kill him?
(c)
From whom ought we to learn that one is permitted to kill a Ba be'Machteres in any way possible, if one cannot kill him by striking him down (in which case we would not require an independent Pasuk)?
(d)
Why indeed, can we not learn from there? What is the second case that makes it 'Sh'nei Kesuvim ha'Ba'in ke'Echad?
9)
(a)
In the Pasuk in Mishpatim "Im ba'Machteres Yima'tzei ha'Ganav, ve'Hukah u'Meis ... ", the Beraisa learns from ...
1.
... "ve'Hukah"that - anyone who discovers him digging may kill him.
2.
... "u'Meis" that - if one cannot kill him by beating him, then one may kill in any way possible.
(b)
In spite of the fact that the Ba ba'Mechteares has nothing to fear from a third party, who, he knows, is not as concerned about the robbery as the owner, nevertheless, anyone is allowed to kill him - because he is a Rodeif (threatening the owner's life), whom anybody is permitted to kill.
(c)
We ought to learn that one is permitted to kill a Ba be'Machteres in any way possible, if one cannot kill him by striking him down - from a murderer (who has already killed), in which case we would not require an independent Pasuk.
(d)
We cannot however, learn from him - since based on the fact that the same Din is written in connection with a Go'el ha'Dam, in which case we apply the principle 'Sh'nei Kesuvim ha'Ba'im ke'Echad Ein Melamdin' (we cannot learn from two Pesukim that come to teach us the same thing).
10)
(a)
How does the Tana learn from the Pasuk (Ibid.) "ve'Im ba'Machteres Yimatzei ha'Ganav ... " that 'Gago, Chatzero ve'Karfifo' is also Chayav?
(b)
What does 'Gago, Chatzero ve'Karfifo' mean?
(c)
Then why does the Torah present the case of Machteres?
(d)
The second Lashon draws a distinction between Machteres and someone who breaks in through an open door. What is the difference between them?
(e)
How does one warn a Ganav who enters through an open door?
10)
(a)
The Tana learns from the Pasuk (Ibid.) "ve'Im ba'Machteres Yimatzei ha'Ganav ... " that 'Gago, Chatzero ve'Karfifo' is also Chayav - from the word "ha'Ganav", which is superfluous (because the Torah could have written "ve'Im Yimtza'ehu").
(b)
'Gago, Chatzero ve'Karfifo' means that - the Ganav used a ladder to climb on to the roof, or walked into the Chatzer or the enclosure through an open door (see also Rashash).
(c)
The Torah nevertheless presents the case of Machteres - because it is more common.
(d)
The second Lashon draws a distinction between Machteres and someone who breaks in through an open door. The difference between them will be - in a case where the Ganav was not warned - in which case Ba be'Machteres is Chayav, but another Ganav, who gained entry easily, is not (because there is no indication that he is prepared to kill, since having entered easily, he will also exit easily and run away). See also the fore-mentioned Rashash.
(e)
One warns a Ganav who enters through an open door - by informing him through two witnesses, that if he persists, he will be killed, and only if he does not desist after being warned may one actually kill him.
11)
(a)
What does Rav Huna say about a Katan who is chasing a Katan (or even a Gadol) with the intention of killing him?
(b)
Since when is a Katan subject to warning?
(c)
What does the Beraisa say about the case of a woman who is dying due to a difficult childbirth, with regard to killing the fetus to save her ...
1.
... before he is born?
2.
... once his head has emerged from the womb?
(d)
Rav Chisda queried Rav Huna from the latter ruling. What did the latter reply?
11)
(a)
Rav Huna rules - that one is permitted (even obligated) to kill a Katan who is chasing a Katan (or even a Gadol) with the intention of killing him.
(b)
A Katan is not subject to warning - but neither is a Gadol (who is a Rodeif).
(c)
The Beraisa rules that if a woman is dying due to a difficult childbirth ...
1.
... before the fetus is born - one may kill it to save the mother, because he is a Rodeif.
2.
... once its head has emerged from the womb - one can do nothing, on account of the principle 'Ein Dochin Nefesh Mipnei Nefesh' (One may not kill one [innocent] person to save another).
(d)
When Rav Chisda queried Rav Huna from the second ruling. The latter replied - that the case there is different inasmuch as the baby is doing nothing, and that consequently, it is 'from Heaven' that she is being chased.
12)
(a)
What problem do we now have with the story in Shmuel, where a woman killed Sheva ben Bichri and tossed his head down to Yo'av (who was besieging the town) to save the other people?
(b)
One answer is that that case was different, since Sheva ben Bichri was destined to die anyway, even in the event that Yo'av would capture the town (because he was the man whom Yo'av was chasing). What is the other answer?
12)
(a)
The problem with the story in Shmuel, where a woman killed Sheva ben Bichri and tossed his head down to Yo'av (who was besieging the town) to save the other people is that, based on the principle 'Ein Dochin Nefesh Mipnei Nefesh' - what right did she have to do that?
(b)
One answer is that that case was different since Sheva ben Bichri was destined to die anyway, even in the event that Yo'av would capture the town (because he was the man whom Yo'av was chasing). Alternatively - he was a Moreid be'Malchus (guilty of treason), and was therefore Chayav Misah anyway.
13)
(a)
We cite a Beraisa to prove Rav Huna's ruling. What must Levi say to Reuven if he sees Reuven chasing Shimon with the intention of killing him, before he is permitted to kill Reuven?
(b)
How is that a proof for Rav Huna?
13)
(a)
To prove Rav Huna's ruling, we cite a Beraisa, where Levi sees Reuven chasing Shimon with the intention of killing him. If Levi wants to kill Reuven to save Shimon - he must warn him that Shimon is a Yisrael and a ben B'ris (not a Rasha), and quote the Pasuk in No'ach "Shofech Dam ha'Adam, ba'Adam Damo Yishafech" (see Maharatz Chiyos) ...
(b)
... a proof for Rav Huna - in that the Tana says nothing about Reuven needing to verbally accept the warning (like a Katan), which is generally an intrinsic part of the warning, yet Levi may then kill him.
14)
(a)
To refute the proof, Rav Chisda establishes the Beraisa like Rebbi Yossi b'Rebbi Yehudah. What does Rebbi Yossi b'Rebbi Yehudah say?
(b)
What is his reason?
(c)
In that case, about whom is the Beraisa speaking? How does that refute Rav Huna's proof?
(d)
What would the Chachamim then hold?
14)
(a)
To refute the proof, Rav Chisda establishes the Beraisa like Rebbi Yossi b'Rebbi Yehudah, who maintains that - a Chaver (Talmid-Chacham) does not require a warning ...
(b)
... because the role of warning is merely to distinguish between Shogeg and Meizid (in which case, verbally accepting the warning is unnecessary).
(c)
Consequently, the Beraisa is speaking about an Am-ha'Aretz, who requires a warning, but who does not need to verbally accept it.
(d)
The Chachamim however, hold - that Hasra'ah together with Kabalas Hasra'ah are intrinsically necessary, and without them, the sinner cannot be killed (even a Rodeif).
15)
(a)
What distinction does another Beraisa make in a case where Levi warns Reuven who is chasing Shimon not to kill him, between a case where Reuven replies 'al-M'nas kein Ani Oseh', and where he doesn't?
(b)
How do we reconcile Rav Huna with this Beraisa?
(c)
How else does Rav Huna reconcile his explanation with the Beraisa?
15)
(a)
Another Beraisa, in a case where Levi warns Reuven who is chasing Shimon not to kill him - permits Levi to kill Reuven only if he replies 'al-M'nas kein Ani Oseh', but not if he doesn't.
(b)
We reconcile this with Rav Huna by establishing it where they are standing on two sides of the river - in which case, Levi is anyway unable to save Shimon, and the warning is in order to punish Reuven in Beis-Din in the event that he kills the Shimon.
(c)
Alternatively, Rav Huna explains - he personally (does not hold like that Beraisa, but) follows the opinion of the Tana (discussed earlier), who does not require Hasra'ah by a Rodeif.
