We query Rebbi Meir (who says that any Ervah that is not subject by Dinei Yisrael to the death penalty is not forbidden to the b'nei No'ach), from a Beraisa which discusses a Ger who was conceived before his mother converted, but who was born afterwards. On what basis does the Torah permit a Ger to marry any of his former relatives?
Which relations did the Rabbanan prohibit him from marrying?
Why did they do that?
Why does the Beraisa refer specifically to someone whose father or mother converted between his conception and his birth? What if he is born before the conversion?
We query Rebbi Meir (who says that any Ervah that is not subject by Dinei Yisrael to the death penalty is not forbidden to the B'nei No'ach), from a Beraisa which discusses a Ger who was conceived before his mother converted, but who was born afterwards. The Torah permits a Ger to marry any of his former relatives, based on the principle 'Ger she'Nisgayer ke'Katan she'Nolad Dami' (a Ger who converts is like a newborn baby). Consequently, he has no relatives.
The Rabbanan prohibited him from marrying the maternal relatives who were forbidden to him before he converted ...
... so that he should not believe that he came from a stringent religion to a more lenient one).
The Beraisa refers specifically to someone whose father or mother converted between his conception and his birth (not to preclude someone who was born before the conversion from the Chachamim decrees, but) - to preclude someone who was conceived and born after the conversion, who is a full-fledged Yisrael.
The Tana Kama rules that if a Ger married his mother's maternal sister he is obligated to divorce her. What if he marries her paternal sister?
Rebbi Meir extends the obligation to divorce her - to his mother's paternal sister. What do the Chachamim say?
What do these Tana'im learn from the Pasuk ...
... in Vayeira (in connection with Avraham's statement to Avimelech) "ve'Gam Amnah Achosi bas Avi hi Ach Lo bas Imi"?
... in Bereishis "al-Kein Ya'azov Ish es Aviv"?
... "ve'es Imo" (Ibid.)?
Why does Rebbi Meir forbid Achos Imo min ha'Av (seeing as she is not included in the D'rashah of "ve'es Imo"?
The Tana Kama rules that if a Ger married his mother's maternal sister he is obligated to divorce her; but if he marries her paternal sister - he may retain her.
Rebbi Meir extends the obligation to divorce her to his mother's paternal sister. The Chachamim - permit a Ger to marry his mother's paternal sister Lechatchilah.
These Tana'im learn from the Pasuk ...
... in Vayeira "ve'Gam Amnah Achosi bas Avi hi Ach Lo bas Imi" that - a ben-No'ach is permitted to marry his paternal sister but not his maternal one.
... in Bereishis "al-Kein Ya'azov Ish es Aviv"- (which refers to his father's sister) that - min ha'Torah, a Nochri is permitted to marry his father's maternal sister.
... in Bereishis "ve'es Imo" that - he is not permitted to marry his mother's maternal sister.
Rebbi Meir forbids Achos Imo min ha'Av (despite the fact that she is not included in the D'rashah of "ve'es Imo") - due to a Rabbinical decree forbidding any woman who has a touch of 'Eim', in case one comes to permit a maternal sister or a mother's or father's maternal sister.
On what grounds does Rebbi Meir permit a Ger to marry his brother's wife?
Does it make any difference whether ...
... she was married to his paternal brother or to his maternal one?
... his brother married her before he converted or afterwards?
... or whether his brother married her before he converted and retained her after the conversion or whether he married her afterwards - see Maharsha)?
To whom is Rebbi Meir referring when he adds 'all other relatives'?
Why can he not mean to include ...
... his daughter-in-law?
... his wife's sister?
Rebbi Meir permits a Ger to marry his brother's wife - because she would have been permitted to him had he not converted (and, as we explained earlier, the Chachamim only decreed on those relations that were forbidden to him before he converted).
Nor does it make any difference whether ...
... she was married to his paternal brother or to his maternal one, whether ...
... his brother married her before he converted or afterwards.
... his brother married her before he converted and retained her after the conversion or whether he married her afterwards (see Maharsha), because for the reason that we just mentioned, there is no Isur of Eishes Ach by b'nei No'ach.
When Rebbi Meir adds 'all other relatives', he is referring to - his father's wife.
He cannot mean to include ...
... his daughter-in-law - because we are speaking about a Ger who was born after his mother converted (which means that when he married he was already a full-fledged Yisrael).
... his wife's sister - because that would be included in 'Nasa Ishah u'Bitah', which the Tana is about to learn independently.
What does Rebbi Meir say about a Ger who married a woman and her daughter?
What would this Halachah be referring to if it was speaking about someone whose parents converted between his conception and his birth, like the previous cases?
What is the Tana referring to when he says 'u'Lechatchilah' Lo Yichnos'?
And what does the Beraisa say about a Ger marrying his mother-in-law, in the event that his wife dies? What is the case?
Rebbi Meir rules that if a Ger was already married to a woman and her daughter - he marries one and divorces the other.
If this Halachah was speaking about someone whose parents converted between his conception and his birth, like the previous cases, it would be referring to a woman and her daughter who converted (see Maharsha). In fact, the same would apply if the man was a regular Yisrael.
When the Tana says 'u'Lechatchilah' Lo Yichnos', he is referring to - the cases mentioned earlier in the Beraisa which rule 'Yekayem' (as the Sugya explains in Yevamos).
The Beraisa rules that, in the event that a Ger's wife (to whom he was married before he converted) dies, he is permitted to marry her mother, though others forbid it.
What is the Din regarding a Yisrael who marries ...
... his father's wife or his mother-in-law?
... his sister or his father's or mother's sister?
What problem does this create with Rebbi Meir in the Beraisa that we learned on the previous Amud?
We answer by establishing Rebbi Meir in the latter Beraisa like Rebbi Eliezer, and in the former one, like Rebbi Akiva. Which of these was his Rebbe?
They argue over the Pasuk "al-Kein Ya'azov Ish es Aviv ve'es Imo". Rebbi Eliezer interprets this to mean Achos Aviv and Achos Imo. How does Rebbi Akiva explain ...
... "es Aviv"?
... "ve'es Imo"?
A Yisrael who marries ...
... his father's wife or his father-in-law - is Chayav Misas Beis-Din.
... his sister or his father's or mother's sister - is Chayav Kareis, but not Misas Beis-Din.
The problem this creates with Rebbi Meir in the Beraisa that we learned on the previous Amud is that - whereas there, he forbade a Ger to marry any relative who carries the death-penalty, and permits relatives who do not, we have here cases where he permits women who carry the death-penalty (such as his father's wife and his mother-in-law [according to one opinion]); and forbids women who do not (such as his sister or his father's or mother's sister).
We answer by establishing Rebbi Meir in the latter Beraisa like Rebbi Eliezer, and in the former one, like Rebbi Akiva - both of whom were his Rebbes.
They argue over the Pasuk "al-Kein Ya'azov Ish es Aviv ve'es Imo". Rebbi Eliezer interprets this to mean Achos Aviv and Achos Imo respectively. Rebbi Akiva explains ...
... "es Aviv" to mean - his father's wife.
... "es Imo" - his mother.
Rebbi Akiva learns from the word "ve'Davak" (in the continuation of the above Pasuk "ve'Davak be'Ishto ve'Hayu le'Basar Echad ") "ve'Davak", 've'Lo' be'Zachar'. What does he learn from ...
... "be'Ishto"?
... "ve'Hayu le'Basar Echad"?
What do all the cases of Rebbi Akiva have in common?
Why according to Rebbi Eliezer, can "es Aviv" not come to forbid ...
... his father?
... his father's wife?
We refute this answer however, by establishing this Pasuk by Eishes Aviv after his father's death. So how does Rebbi Eliezer really know that "es Aviv" does not come to forbid his father's wife?
Rebbi Akiva learns from the word "ve'Davak" (in the continuation of the above Pasuk "ve'Davak be'Ishto ve'Hayu le'Basar Echad ") "ve'Davak", 've'Lo' be'Zachar', from ...
... "be'Ishto" - "be'Ishto", 've'Lo be'Eishes Chavero' and from ...
... "ve'Hayu le'Basar Echad" - to preclude an animal, which cannot unite with man, since their combined seed cannot produce a child.
What all the cases of Rebbi Akiva have in common is - the fact that they are all Chayav Misas Beis-Din.
According to Rebbi Eliezer, "es Aviv" cannot come to forbid ...
... his father - because we already know that from "ve'Davak", 've'Lo' be'Zachar' (with which Rebbi Eliezer agrees).
... his father's wife - because we already know that from "be'Ishto", 've'Lo be'Eishes Chavero'.
We refute this answer however, by establishing this Pasuk by Eishes Aviv after his father's death. Consequently we conclude, Rebbi Eliezer really knows that "es Aviv" does not come to forbid his father's wife - because he assumes that "es Aviv" is similar to "es Imo", which is not talking about Ishus.
Rebbi Akiva too, discounts the possibility that "es Aviv" might mean 'his father' because that we know from "ve'Davak" ... . Then how can he learn ...
... Eishes Aviv from "ve'Es Imo", seeing that we already know that from "be'Ishto", 've'Lo be'Eishes Chaveiro"?
... Imo from "ve'es Imo", since we already know that too, from there?
Why does ...
... Rebbi Eliezer decline to learn like Rebbi Akiva?
... Rebbi Akiva decline to learn like Rebbi Eliezer?
Rebbi Akiva too, discounts the possibility that "es Aviv" might mean 'his father' because we know that from "ve'Davak" ... . Nevertheless, he learns ...
... Eishes Aviv from "ve'Es Imo" (despite the D'rashah "be'Ishto", 've'Lo be'Eishes Chaveiro") - by establishing the latter whilst his father is still alive, and the former, after his death.
... Imo from "ve'es Imo" - (in spite of the previous D'rashah), by establishing "Imo" by a woman whom his father raped (and who does not therefore fall under the category of 'Eishes Aviv').
Rebbi ...
... Eliezer declines to learn like Rebbi Akiva - because he considers it imperative for the two D'rashos "es Aviv" and "es Imo" to be similar.
... Akiva declines to learn like Rebbi Eliezer - because in his opinion, whereas "Ervas Aviv" does not imply 'Achos Aviv' (even though it might well imply 'She'er Aviv'), it does imply 'Eishes Aviv' (as we find by a Yisrael).
The Torah records in Va'eira that Amram married his aunt. We know that as Levi's daughter, she was the sister of Amram's father K'has. Why could K'has and Yocheved not have been born to the same mother?
Avraham told Avimelech that Sarah was his paternal sister, but not his maternal one. On whom does this pose a Kashya?
What is the problem with the Kashya?
The Torah records in Va'eira that Amram married his aunt. We know that as Levi's daughter, she was the sister of Amram's father K'has. K'has and Yocheved could not have been born to the same mother however - since we learned earlier that a maternal aunt is forbidden even to a ben No'ach.
Avraham told Avimelech that Sarah was his paternal sister, but not his maternal one - implying that if she had been, she would have been forbidden to him, a Kashya on Rebbi Akiva (who permits a Nochri to marry his sister).
The problem with the Kashya is that - seeing as, strictly speaking, Sarah was not Avraham's sister, but his niece, even Rebbi Eliezer (who does not forbid a niece) will have to explain this Pasuk differently.
We answer that what Avraham meant to say was that his relationship was one of 'sisterhood'. What exactly did he mean? How does this tally with his original statement, that Sarah was his sister?
Why did he then find it necessary to add "Ach Lo bas Imi", seeing as she would have been permitted to him even if he and Haran had been born from the same mother?
In what connection do we explain the Pasuk in Tehilim "Ki Amarti Olam Chesed Yibaneh" with regard to Adam and Kayin?
Does this not imply that, in the future, where there is no need for Chesed, a ben No'ach is forbidden to marry his sister?
We answer that what Avraham meant to say was that his relationship was one of 'sisterhood' - by which he meant that, based on the principle 'B'nei Banim Harei heim ke'Banim' (grandchildren are like children), when he had spread the word that Sarah was his sister, he had been telling the truth, since by that token, Sarah was his father's daughter.
And he added "Ach Lo bas Imi", (not because he had to, seeing as she would have been permitted to him even if Haran and he had been born from the same mother, but) - because it was the truth.
We explain the Pasuk "Ki Amarti Olam Chesed Yibaneh" with regard to Adam and Kayin - in connection with the prohibition against Adam marrying his daughter, because if he had, who would Kayin have married?
Although this implies that if not for the Chesed involved, a ben No'ach would be forbidden to marry his sister - the fact is that 'Ho'il ve'Isht'ri, Ishteri' (once Hash-m permitted it, it remained permitted).
On what basis does Rav Huna permit a ben No'ach to marry his daughter?
In the second Lashon, he forbids it. On what grounds do we refute his proof from Adam, who was forbidden to marry his daughter (as we just learned in the Beraisa)?
Rav Chisda permits an Eved to marry both his mother and his daughter. How is that possible? Either he is considered a ben No'ach (in which case the former will be forbidden) or he is a ben Yisrael, (and following the Takanas Chachamim, he ought to be forbidden to marry either of them).
Rav Huna permits a ben No'ach to marry his daughter - either because it is not included in the Torah's list of prohibitions (or because, as the Chidushei ha'Ran explains, it is She'er ha'Av, and not She'er ha'Eim).
In the second Lashon he forbids it. We refute his proof from Adam, who was forbidden to marry his daughter (as we just learned in the Beraisa) - on the grounds that this was only to enable Kayin to marry his sister (but not necessarily a permanent prohibition).
Rav Chisda permits an Eved to marry both his mother and his daughter - because he has left the realm of a ben No'ach, and has not yet entered that of a ben Yisrael.
Rebbi Chanina declares a Nochri who designates a Shifchah for his slave Chayav Misah, should he subsequently have relations with her. From which point does she become ...
... the Eved's 'wife'?
... free, should she want to walk out on him?
On what basis does Rebbi Elazar Amar Rebbi Chanina forbid a Nochri to have abnormal relations with his wife?
Based on which principle does Rava query this?
How does he therefore present Rebbi Chanina's statement?
And what does Rebbi Chanina say about a Nochri who ...
... strikes a Yisrael? What is his source?
... slaps a Yisrael's face? How does he learn this from the Pasuk in Mishlei "Mokesh Adam Yala Kodesh"?
Rebbi Chanina declares a Nochri who designates a Shifchah for his slave Chayav Misah, should he subsequently have relations with her. She becomes ...
... the Eved's 'wife' - from the moment people refer to her as the Eved's girl (see Chidushei ha'Ran).
... free, should she want to walk out on him - from the moment she uncovers her hair (bearing in mind that it was cpmmon practice in those days, for a married woman to cover her hair (see Chidushei ha'Ran).
Rebbi Elazar Amar Rebbi Chanina forbids a Nochri to have abnormal relations with his wife - based on the Pasuk "ve'Davak be'Ishto".
Rava queries this ruling, based on the principle - 'Mi Ika Midi ... ' ('There is nothing which a Yisrael may do that is forbidden to a Nochri').
According to him therefore, what Rebbi Chanina must have said is that - a Nochri who has unnatural relations with a married woman is Patur, based on the dual D'rashah "be'Ishto", 've'Lo be'Eishes Chavero'; "ve'Davak", 've'Lo she'Lo ke'Darko'.
Rebbi Chanina also rules that a Nochri who ...
... strikes a Yisrael - is Chayav Misah, like we find with the Egyptian who struck the Jew, and whom Moshe immediately killed.
... slaps a Yisrael's face - is considered as if he had slapped the face of the Shechinah (Kevayachol). And he learns this from the Pasuk in Mishlei "Mokesh Adam Yala Kodesh", since it is only Yisrael who are called "Adam".
What does Resh Lakish learn from the Pasuk in Sh'mos (in connection with Moshe and the two quarreling Yisre'elim) "Va'yomer la'Rasha, Lamah Sakeh le'Re'echa"?
What does ...
... Ze'iri Amar Rebbi Chanina add to this (based on the Pasuk in Sumuel [in connection with the sons of Eli, who would threaten those who did not give them what they asked for, yet the Pasuk refers to 'their sin'])?
... Rav Huna add, based on the Pasuk in Iyov "u'Zero'a Rasha Tishaver"?
What did Rav Huna once do in this regard? By what justification did he do that?
Based on the Pasuk in Iyov "ve'Ish Zero'a lo ha'Aretz", what ...
... ultimate punishment does Rebbi Elazar ascribe to a person who does this?
... advice does he give in connection with the purchase of land?
And what does Resh Lakish extrapolate from the Pasuk in Mishlei "Oveid Admaso Yisba lachem"?
Resh Lakish learns from the Pasuk (in connection with Moshe and the two quarreling Yisre'elim) "Vayomer la'Rasha, Lamah Sakeh le'Rei'echa" that - a Jew who merely raises his hand to strike his fellow, is called a Rasha.
Ze'iri Amar Rebbi Chanina adds to this that (based on the Pasuk in Sumuel, in connection with the sons of Eli, who would threaten those who did not give them what they asked for, yet the Pasuk refers to 'their sin') - he is called a sinner too
And Rav Huna adds (based on the Pasuk in Iyov "u'Zero'a Rasha Tishaver") - that they deserve to have their arm broken.
In fact - Rav Huna once cut off the hand of a man who was constantly striking others (as we learned earlier 'Beis-Din Makin ve'Onshin she'Lo min ha'Din ... ').
Based on the Pasuk in Iyov "ve'Ish Zero'a lo ha'Aretz", Rebbi Elazar ...
... ascribes to a person who does this - the ultimate punishment of burial (death).
... advises - someone who is not tough, to desist from purchasing land, since it usually involves constant claims, counter-claims and law-suits.
And Resh Lakish extrapolates from the Pasuk in Mishlei "Oveid Admaso Yisba lachem" that - it is only someone who is subservient to the land (who is constantly busy with it, either plowing or watering, digging or weeding), who will ultimately benefit from it.
What does Resh Lakish learn from the Pasuk in No'ach "Yom va'Laylah Lo Yishbosu"?
From where does he learn that he is Chayav Misah?
On what grounds do we reject the text 'P'shita'? Why is it not so obvious at all?
Resh Lakish learn from the Pasuk in No'ach "Yom va'Laylah Lo Yishbosu" - that a ben No'ach who observes Shabbos is Chayav Misah ...
... and we have already learned that 'Azharasan Zu hi Misasan' (the Chiyuv Misah is inherent in the warning).
We reject the text 'P'shita' - on the grounds that it is a Chidush to ascribe the Pasuk "Lo Yishbosu" to people (and not to the seasons).
Is this Mitzvah confined to 'resting' on Shabbos?
Why is it not included in the seven Mitzvos B'nei No'ach?
Seeing as the Torah writes "Lo Yishbosu", what makes it an Asei?
Then why is Dinim (which involves setting up law-courts and judging), included?
This Mitzvah is not confined to 'resting' on Shabbos - but applies to resting from work on any day of the week.
It is not included in the seven Mitzvos B'nei No'ach - since they include only Lavin (and not Mitzvos Asei).
In spite of the Lashon "Lo Yishbosu", resting on Shabbos is an Asei - because it really entails getting up and working.
Nevertheless, Dinim (which involves setting up law-courts and judging) is included, because although at first it appears to be purely an Asei - it also involves the La'av of not performing injustice ('Lo Sa'asu Avel').