We know from various sources that a woman who has unnatural relations with a man is Chayav. Rav Nachman bar Rav Chisda holds that the same will apply if she brings an animal on herself unnaturally. What does he say about a man performing unnatural bestiality with an animal?
What is the basis for this distinction?
On what grounds does Rav Papa object to this? What does he say?
Both opinions however, are proved wrong by a Beraisa. Which Beraisa?
We know from various sources that a woman who has unnatural relations with a man is Chayav. Rav Nachman bar Rav Chisda holds that the same will apply if she brings an animal on herself unnaturally. But, he says, a man performs unnatural bestiality with an animal - is not Chayav.
The basis for this distinction is - the Pasuk "Mishk'vei Ishah", comparing the two Mishkavos of a woman, whereas no such Pasuk exists with regard to an animal.
Rav Papa objects on the basis of a S'vara - because he says, if anything, the reverse is true; a woman is only Chayav if she brings the animal on herself naturally, since the Bi'ah itself by her is natural, but not if she does so unnaturally (since she derives little pleasure from it); whereas regarding the Bi'ah of an animal, which is intrinsically unnatural, one ought to be Chayav either way.
Both opinions however, are proved wrong by the Beraisa - that we cited earlier, which renders both a man and a woman Chayav for bestiality, whether it is ke'Kedarkah or she'Lo ke'Darkah.
Ravina asked Rava what the Din will be with regard to 'ha'Me'areh be'Zachur'. What does 'ha'Me'areh be'Zachur' mean?
What did Rava answer him? Why did he not even consider this a She'eilah?
Ravina asked Rava what the Din will be with regard to 'ha'Me'areh be'Zachur' - which means somebody who only performs a partial Bi'ah with another male.
Rava dismissed the She'eilah - on the basis of the Pasuk "Mishk'vei Ishah", which compares Bi'ah with a man to Bi'ah with a woman in this regard (in which case it is obvious that he is Chayav, as one is for Ha'ara'ah) with a woman).
What did Rava reply, when Ravina then asked him whether one is Chayav for Ha'ara'ah with an animal?
Why is that Ha'ara'ah superfluous? From where can we otherwise learn Ha'ara'ah by Achos Aviv ve'Imo?
We ask why the Torah then presents the source for Ha'ara'ah by bestiality by Achos Aviv va'Achos Imo, rather than by Arayos that are Chayvei Misas Beis-Din. Why would that have been preferable?
How do we answer this Kashya?
When Ravina then asked Rava whether one is Chayav for Ha'ara'ah with an animal, he replied that - we learn it 'Im Eino Inyan' from the Ha'ara'ah that is written in connection with Achos Aviv va'Achos Imo, by whom "Ha'ara'ah" is superfluous ...
... since we already know the Chiyuv of Ha'ara'ah by all cases of incest, which the Torah compares to Ha'ara'ah by a Nidah.
We ask why the Torah then presents the source for Ha'ara'ah by bestiality by Achos Aviv va'Achos Imo, rather than by Arayos that are Chayvei Misas Beis-Din - to which category bestiality belongs, whereas Achos Aviv va'Achos Imo belongs to the category of Chayvei Kareis.
And we answer by pointing out that - since the entire Pasuk of Achos Aviv and Achos Imo is anyway superfluous, and is used for various D'rashos (as we learned in Yevamos), the Torah takes the opportunity of adding this D'rashah, too (no matter that it is slightly inappropriate).
What did Rav Sheishes mean when he replied 'K'vastan' to Rav Achdevui bar Ami's She'eilah whether a person is Chayav for performing Ha'ara'ah on himself?
How did Rav Ashi explain the possibility of Rav Achdevui bar Ami's She'eilah actually taking place?
To which other Machlokes is this She'eilah now subject?
So what does Rav Ashi conclude, according to the opinion of those who say 'ha'Meshamesh Meis ba'Arayos, Chayav'?
When Rav Sheishes replied 'K'vastan' to Rav Achdevui bar Ami's She'eilah whether a person is Chayav for performing Ha'ara'ah on himself, he meant that - the She'eilah is irrelevant since it cannot happen (the word means 'You hurt (or misled) me' (or 'You made me want to vomit').
Rav Ashi however, explains the possibility of Rav Achdevui bar Ami's She'eilah actually taking place - in the case of an Eiver Meis (when the Eiver is limp and can therefore be stretched).
This is subject to another Machlokes - whether one is Chayav for performing an act of incest with an Eiver Meis ('ha'Meshamesh Meis ba'Arayos).
Rav Ashi concludes, according to the opinion of those who say 'ha'Meshamesh Meis ba'Arayos Chayav' that - one is Chayav two Korbanos, one for Shochev and one for Nishkav.
They asked Rav Sheishes whether the animal with which a Nochri committed bestiality is put to death. On what grounds might it not be?
Rav Sheishes answered them from a Beraisa. What does the Beraisa say in connection with trees of an Asheirah?
By the same token, we ask, if a Nochri prostrates himself before an animal, it too, ought to be forbidden and put to death. From where do we know that ...
... it is not?
... if a Yisrael does the same thing, the animal is not forbidden?
We counter this by suggesting that it should indeed be forbidden even if a Yisrael did it, no less than if he raped it. If so, how would we explain the fact that the Torah needs to forbid it as a Korban?
They asked Rav Sheishes whether the animal with which a Nochri committed bestiality is put to death. It might not be - seeing as our Mishnah (in the case of bestiality) gives two reasons for the animal having to be killed, Takalah (the cause of the person's death) and Kalon (the cause of his disgrace), and the second reason does not apply to a Nochri, who does not consider this a disgrace. So if the Tana considers both reasons crucial to the Chiyuv, the animal will not be put to death).
Rav Sheishes answered them from a Beraisa - which learns that a person who causes others to sin should be destroyed through a 'Kal va'Chomer' from trees of an Asheirah in Eretz Yisrael (which, unlike people, do not eat, drink or smell, and) which must be burned, because they caused the seven nations to sin. So we see that Takalah applies without Kalon (since worshipping trees is not considered a disgrace in the eyes of Nochrim).
By the same token, we ask, if a Nochri prostrates himself before an animal, it too, ought to be forbidden and put to death. We know that ...
... it is not - from the fact that if a Yisrael does the same thing, it is not forbidden, which we know, in turn ...
... from the fact that the Torah forbids it to be brought as a Korban, implying that it is Mutar be'Hana'ah, and need not be killed.
We counter this by suggesting that should indeed be forbidden even if a Yisrael did it, no less than if he raped it. And as for the Torah's need to forbid it as a Korban - that speaks where there is only one witness or where only the owner knows about it.
How does Abaye, who requires both Takalah and Kalon, explain the difference between the original two cases? Why does a Yisrael who rapes an animal renders it forbidden, but not a Nochri?
This explanation assumes that Abaye totally disagrees with Rav Sheishes (with regard to an animal that was raped by a Nochri). How might we partially reconcile his opinion with that of Rav Sheishes?
In which point will he still argue with him (besides the fact that he requires both Takalah and Kalon, whereas Rav Sheishes does not)?
Why does Abaye not learn the Din of an animal that was worshipped from an Asheirah that was worshipped?
Abaye, who requires both Takalah and Kalon, explains that a Yisrael who rapes an animal renders it forbidden - because there is both Takalah and Kalon, whereas a Nochri does not, because there is no Kalon (as Rav Sheishes explained).
This explanation assumes that Abaye totally disagrees with Rav Sheishes (with regard to an animal that was raped by a Nochri). We might partially reconcile his opinion with that of Rav Sheishes - by differentiating between rape, which causes a great Kalon (that applies even by Nochrim), and prostrating oneself, which entails only a small Kalon, even by a Yisrael (and none at all by Nochrim). In this case, Abaye might well concede that an animal that is raped by a Nochri is put to death.
He will still argue with him however (besides the fact that he requires both Takalah and Kalon) - inasmuch as he does not learn it from the Beraisa of trees (like Rav Sheishes does) ...
... because it is only by an animal (on which, due to the fact that it has life, the Torah has pity [as we see from the fact that it requires twenty-three judges and witnesses]), that the Torah requires Kalon as well as Takalah, but not by a tree (See also Ran on the Sugya).
Rava learns like Rav Sheishes, who forbids an animal even where there is no Kalon. How does he then explain the distinction between an animal that is worshipped and one that is raped?
Then why does the Torah forbid an Asheirah?
We finally try to resolve Rav Sheishes' She'eilah from the Seifa of our Mishnah, which ascribes the animal being forbidden to Kalon (in addition to Takalah). What do we try and extrapolate from there?
How do we refute this proof? If the Reisha is not speaking where there is Takalah but no Kalon, then what is it speaking about?
Rava learns like Rav Sheishes, who forbids an animal even where there is no Kalon. And he ascribes the fact that an animal that was raped is forbidden - to the fact that it derives benefit from the act (which is on a par with Kalon), as opposed to one that was worshipped, which does not.
The Torah nevertheless forbids an Asheirah - because it is only animals, which have life, that the Torah has pity and permits (provided they do not derive benefit from the act).
We finally try to resolve Rav Sheishes' She'eilah from the Seifa of our Mishnah, which ascribes the animal being forbidden, to Kalon (in addition to Takalah), from which we try and extrapolate that - the Reisha must be speaking about Takalah where there is no Kalon, such as where the animal was raped by a Nochri (a proof that Takalah without Kalon is forbidden).
We reject this proof however - by establishing the Reisha where there is Kalon without Takalah, where a Yisrael has relations with an animal be'Shogeg.
We just learned that the case of Kalon without Takalah is where a Yisrael has relations with an animal be'Shogeg. On what grounds do we describe it as such?
Then why does the Tana in the Reisha refer to it as 'Takalah'?
What is the advantage of explaining the Mishnah like this rather than by Takalah without Kalon (as we initially suggested)?
This explanation also resolves Rav Hamnuna's She'eilah. Which She'eilah?
We just learned that the case of Kalon without Takalah is where a Yisrael has relations with an animal be'Shogeg - since on the one hand, the perpetrator is embarrassed, whilst on the other, there is no Takalah, since he is not punished.
The Tana in the Reisha nevertheless refers to it as 'Takalah' - because through the Kalon, a Takalah came about (that the animal has to be killed).
The advantage of explaining the Mishnah like this rather than by Takalah without Kalon (as we initially suggested) is that - the entire Mishnah now speaks about a Yisrael (rather than half about a Nochri and half about a Yisrael).
This explanation also resolves Rav Hamnuna's She'eilah - whether an animal that is raped by a Yisrael be'Shogeg is put to death (since there is Kalon) or not (because one needs Takalah and Kalon).
Rav Yosef tries to resolve Rav Hamnuna's She'eilah from a Beraisa, which discusses a girl above the age of three. What does the Tana ...
... say about her Kidushin, her Yavam acquiring her, and someone else subsequently committing adultery with her?
... mean when he says 'u'Metam'ah es Bo'alah le'Tamei Mishkav Tachton ke'Elyon'? Does this imply that, before the age of three, she is not Metamei be'Nidah?
Then what does he mean?
What is the difference between the top sheet of a Zav and the sheets on which he is lying?
Rav Yosef tries to resolve Rav Hamnuna's She'eilah from the Beraisa, which discusses a girl above the age of three. The Tana ...
... rules that - her Kidushin is valid, her Yavam acquires her with Bi'ah, and that someone who subsequently commits adultery with her is Chayav Misah; and when he ...
... says 'u'Metam'ah es Bo'alah le'Tamei Mishkav Tachton ke'Elyon' - he does not mean to preclude a girl of under three from Tum'as Nidah, since in fact, she renders Tamei (for one day) whoever touches her from the day she is born.
What he does mean is that - she renders whoever is Bo'el her an Av for seven days, and he in turn, renders the bottom sheet underneath him Tamei, but only like the top sheet of a Zav.
The difference between the top sheet of a Zav and the sheets on which he is lying is that - whereas the former is a Rishon le'Tum'ah, which renders Tamei only food and drink, the latter is an Av ha'Tum'ah, which renders Tamei a person and vessels who touch it as well.
With regard to the Tana's earlier statement, can a girl ...
... of three become betrothed with Bi'ah under her own auspices?
... who is under three become betrothed with Kesef and Sh'tar?
The Beraisa rules that if she marries a Kohen, she is betrothed permitted to eat Terumah. Will she be able to eat Terumah if her father betroyths her to a Kohen with Kidushei Kesef or Sh'tar?
If one of the Pesulim (e.g. a Nasin or a Mamzer) rapes her, he disqualifies her from eating Terumah. What does Rav Yosef extrapolate from the Tana's next statement 've'Im Ba alehah Echad mi'Kol ha'Arayos ha'Amuros ba'Torah, Mumsin al-Yadah, ve'Hi Peturah'?
How do we refute the proof from there that Kalon without Takalah is sufficient to warrant the animal's death?
With regard to the Tana's earlier statement, a girl ...
... of three - cannot become betrothed with Bi'ah under her own auspices, only through the auspices of her father.
... under three can become betrothed with Kesef and Sh'tar.
The Beraisa rules that if she marries a Kohen, she is permitted to eat Terumah. If her father betroths her to a Kohen with Kidushei Kesef or Sh'tar - she will not be able to eat Terumah, since she is not yet fit to make Bi'ah, and is therefore not subject to Chupah either (without which she cannot eat Terumah).
If one of the Pesulim (e.g. a Nasin or a Mamzer) rapes her, he disqualifies her from eating Terumah. Rav Yosef extrapolates from the Tana's next statement 've'Im Ba alehah Echad mi'Kol ha'Arayos ha'Amuros ba'Torah, Mumsin al-Yadah, ve'Hi Peturah' - that even the animal that raped her is put to death, even though there is only Kalon without Takalah.
We refute this proof however, on the grounds that - in fact, seeing as she sinned on purpose, there is Takalah too, only Hash-m took pity on a Ketanah, and spared her life.
Another Beraisa rules that a boy of over nine acquires his Yavam. What does the Tana say about ...
... giving her a Get? Why is that?
... a case where he is Bo'el a Nidah? What will be the Din if he is under nine?
What will be the Din if he ...
... is a Pasul Yisrael who has relations with a bas Kohen?
... is a Kohen who betroths a bas Yisrael with Bi'ah?
... commits bestiality in front of only one witness?
... commits bestiality in front of two witnesses?
What do we try and prove from the Tana's next statement 've'Im Ba al Achas mi'Kol ha'Arayos ha'Amuros ba'Torah, Mumsin al-Yado'?
How do we refute that proof too?
Another Beraisa rules that a boy of over nine acquires his Yavamah. The Tana rules that ...
... he may only give her a Get - once he becomes a Gadol, since the Kidushin was performed by his brother, who was a Gadol when he betrothed her.
... in a case where he is Bo'el a Nidah - he is Metamei the sheet on which he is lying like the sheet that covers a Zav (as we explained earlier). If he is under nine, he merely becomes Tamei for one day for having touched a Nidah.
If he ...
... is a Pasul Yisrael who has relations with a bas Kohen - he disqualifies her from eating Terumah.
... is a Kohen who betroths a bas Yisrael with Bi'ah - he may not feed her Terumah (because, based on the fact that a Katan cannot acquire) she is not called "Kinyan Kaspo".
... commits bestiality in front of only one witness - the animal is Pasul to go on the Mizbe'ach.
... commits bestiality in front of two witnesses - it must be put to death.
Here too, we try and extrapolate from the Tana's next statement 've'Im Ba Al Achas mi'Kol ha'Arayos ha'Amuros ba'Torah, Mumsin al-Yado' (incorporating animals) - that Kalon without Takalah, will suffice to warrant the animal's death.
We reject that proof in the same way as we rejected the previous one - in that there is a Takalah, since the boy sinned on purpose, only Hash-m took pity on a Katan, and spared his life.
How do we try to resolve Rav Hamnuna's She'eilah from the Seifa of our Mishnah, which ascribes the animal being forbidden to Kalon (in addition to Takalah). What do we try and extrapolate from there?
How do we refute that proof as well?
We try to resolve our She'eilah from the Seifa of our Mishnah, which ascribes the animal being forbidden, to Kalon (in addition to Takalah) - implying that the Reisha is a case where a Yisrael rapes the animal be'Shogeg (which is Kalon without Takalah), yet the animal is killed.
But we refute that proof as well - by explaining the Reisha by a Nochri (as we initially explained it earlier [which is Takalah without Kalon]) like they asked Rav Sheishes earlier.