Question: [According to R. Yishmael] the Torah did not need to make ["Yetzirah"] extra regarding man, for Tanin is not extra at all, and Behemah is extra from one side (so surely we will learn from it, and not from Tanin), and we do not challenge [even though it is extra only from one side]!

Explanation: This is Mufneh, like it says below [since the Torah added "v'Borei"].

Implied question: It taught Chayah, and a snake is included in Chayah, like it says "veha'Nachash Hayah Arum mi'Kol Chayas ha'Sadeh"!

Answer: After its legs were cut off, it is not called Stam Chayah. It is called Chayah ha'Romeses. It is not included in Chayah of our Mishnah.

Explanation: There are three kinds of Kifuf:

The Targum of "ha'Kos veha'Yanshuf" (two of the Tamei birds that the Torah lists. They are kinds of owls) is Karya v'Kifufa;

Also Tinshames (another Tamei bird listed, the bat), it says in Chulin (63a) that this is the [most] repulsive of the birds, and Abaye said that the [most] repulsive of the birds is Kifuf! (This shows that also Tinshames is a kind of Kifuf.)

There is another Kifuf that is a Chayah, like it says in Berachos (57b) any Chayah that one sees in a dream is a good sign, except for a monkey or Kifuf.

Implied question: Why didn't he ask about her (the baby with the form of an animal) herself, if one who has Bi'ah with her is liable for Eshes Ish, or if one who kills her is liable?

Answer: It was obvious to him that she will not live three years for Bi'ah to apply to her, and not even a year, [which would show] that she is not a Tereifah. (One who kills a Tereifah is exempt.)

Observation: However, we could have asked about if one who has Bi'ah with the baby is stoned, like one who has Bi'ah with an animal. (Mitzpas Eisan says to see Sanhedrin 54b and 78a. There, all agree that Bi'ah with a boy less than three years old is not called Bi'ah, and that one who is Rove'a a Treifah is liable. It is not considered like Bi'ah with a Mes.)

Note: Perhaps he could have asked about a Treifah who killed the baby in front of a Sanhedrin. If the baby is merely considered Treifah, and not a Nefel, we kill the murderer.

Implied question: Since we expound the Gezeirah Shavah of Yetzirah, why do we need the reason that others of its species live?

Answer: Even a total baby must [be a kind that can] survive [to be considered a child]. This excludes one who was born cut up or lacking.

Question: If the body [of a baby] is a goat, and he has a human face, he does not survive, and we say below that all agree that he is a human!

Answer: Even though he does not live, whether he was born to an animal or a woman, in any case his body is a proper goat, and his face is a proper human, and he is not missing anything.

Question: Perhaps this is like Rabanan, and unlike R. Meir!

Answer #1: If so, R. Yochanan should have said "according to Rabanan, if he found the form of a dove..." (Since he taught Stam, it is according to everyone.)

Answer #2: The question was only according to R. Meir, who very easily considers an animal form in a human womb to be a [human] child. Does he also call a human form in an animal's womb a [human] child, or not?

However, according to Rabanan, obviously it is permitted, since they hold that only a human form in a woman is called a [human] child. (Anything else is an animal.)

He brings a proof from R. Yochanan, who forbids even according to Rabanan (since he taught Stam, surely it is not only according to R. Meir), and all the more so according to R. Meir.

Explanation (Rashi): [It suffices to have] part of the entire form, i.e. an eye, jaw, eyebrow and chin. Chachamim require the entire form from both sides, i.e. two eyes...

Implied question: According to R. Meir, even when [a baby has an animal form, and] he does not resemble a person at all, she has Tum'as Leidah! (Why does he require one entire side like a person?)

Answer: [Even so,] when he [partially] resembles a person, we require resemblance in all [features of] the form.

Source: We infer this argument from our Mishnah (21a) "anything that does not have mi'Tzuras Adam (from a human form, i.e. at least partially)." They did not say "it is not a child";

Inference: They argue also about a child that is partially human and partially animal. R. Meir holds that due to part of his form, he is called a child. Rabanan require the entire form.

Note: Chachamim's words connote that a partially human form is a child! However, since R. Meir considers even a totally animal form to be a child, all the more so a partially human form is a child! Since Chachamim argue, they must hold that it is not a child.)

Implied question: Why does it say in the Mishnah "mi'Tzuras"? (Chachamim really require a fully human form!)

Answer: They address R. Meir. We require a full [human] form. You should admit to us that at least part of a [human] form is required!

Explanation #1 (Rashi): Any amount [of a human form], even one eye without the jaw and eyebrows [suffices for R. Meir]. Chachamim say mi'Tzuras - half the entire form.

Objection #1: "The entire form" of Rav and the Beraisa are not the same! (This refers to the Beraisa in which R. Meir requires Kol Tzurah and Chachamim require mi'Tzurah. We will call this Beraisa #1.)

Objection #2: [The Gemara says that] Beraisa #1 teaches oppositely [to Rav]. It is not totally opposite!

Objection #3: Rav and R. Yochanan below argue with Beraisa #1.

Suggestion: We can say that R. Yochanan is a Tana and argues with it, like we can say for Rav!

Rejection: It connotes in Kesuvos (8a) regarding Birkas Chasanim, that Chasanim count towards the count [of 10, that R. Yochanan is not considered a Tana. Tosfos there says that R. Yochanan cannot say that he holds like Rav, who is a Tana, for he did not consider Rav to be a Tana.]

Objection #4: According to Rashi, Rava's teaching in the name of Chasa is like Rabanan of Beraisa #1;

If so, when we ask from the Beraisa (#2) that says that even one Partzuf (feature of the face) fulfills "Tzuras Panim" (the form of the face), he should answer that Beraisa #2 is like R. Meir of Beraisa #1, since he holds like Beraisa #1 (unlike Rav, who argues with Beraisa #1)!

Now that Abaye answers that Beraisa #2 teaches what is Me'akev (any feature like an animal, except for ear, causes that it is not a child), he establishes it like Rav [who says that Chachamim require a totally human form], and he (Rava) disagrees [with Rav, and holds like Beraisa #1. If so, Rava cannot give Abaye's answer!]

Explanation #2: Beraisa #1 is totally opposite [to Rav]. R. Meir says "the entire form." He requires two eyes and jaws [to be called a child]. This (a partially human, partially animal form) is worse than a totally animal form. Regarding the latter, it says Yetzirah;

Rabanan say mi'Tzuras - half the form [suffices].

Consequence: R. Yochanan, who says that "the forehead, eyebrows and eyes" holds like R. Meir of Beraisa #1. Rava's teaching in the name of Chasa is like Rabanan;

We challenge [Rava] from Beraisa #2, and [to answer, Abaye] establishes [Beraisa #2] like R. Meir.

Alternate text: In R. Chananel's text, Rav says "R. Meir says, the entire form. Chachamim say, mi'Tzuras", like in our Mishnah, and Beraisa #1 says oppositely.

Explanation: He holds that a Tereifah can live.

Support: Also in Temurah (11b), regarding '[if one said] "the leg of this is an Olah", it is totally an Olah', Rav Chisda said that [if he was Makdish] something that [its removal] makes it a Tereifah, it is totally an Olah, for a Tereifah cannot live;

Rava said that only [if he was Makdish] something that [its removal] makes it a Neveilah, it is totally an Olah, for a Tereifah can live;

Implied question: In Bechoros (3a), they argue oppositely about being Makneh part [of an animal] to a Nochri to uproot [Kedushas] Bechorah!

Rav Chisda said [that he must be Makneh] something that [its removal] makes it a Neveilah, for a Tereifah can live. Rava said [it suffices to be Makneh] something that [its removal] makes it a Tereifah, for a Tereifah cannot live.

Answer (R. Tam): This is like another version. (The version in Bechoros holds oppositely to the Sugya in Temurah. We find Sugyos in which elsewhere, the opinions are switched.)