1)

(a)When Rav Acha b'rei de'Rava quoting Rebbi Elazar, presents the Machlokes between Rebbi Yishmael and the Rabbanan (by Mufneh mi'Tzad Echad) more leniently than Rav Yehudah Amar Shmuel - he is referring to one which is not Mufneh at all, where he rules 'Lemeidin u'Mashivin'.

(b)The Rabbanan will draw a distinction between Mufneh mi'Tzad Echad and Einah Mufneh Kol Ikar - there where there is a choice between the two (and there is no Pircha on either of them), where they will adopt the former, and ignore the latter.

(c)The Pircha regarding the 'Gezeirah-Shavah' 'B'ri'ah' from 'Yetzirah' by Taninim (fish), causing Rebbi Meir to preclude them from the 'Gezeirah-Shavah' (and from Tum'as Leidah [as we explained]) is - that whereas Adam is subject to Tum'ah during his lifetime (which is perhaps the reason that he is also subject to Tum'as Leidah), Taninim are not.

(d)Rebbi Chiya bar Aba Amar Rebbi Yochanan - gives the same reason to explain Rebbi Meir's insertion of animals and birds in the Din of Tum'as Leidah as Rav Yehudah Amar Shmuel (Because the Torah writes by them Yetzirah, like it does by Adam).

2)

(a)Rebbi Ami queries Rebbi Chiya bar Aba from the Pasuk in Tehilim "ki Hinei Yotzer Harim u'Vorei Ru'ach" - based on which Rebbi Meir ought to also declare a woman who gives birth to a piece of flesh that resembles a mountain.

(b)Seeing as such a scenario is not feasible, we establish the case where she gives birth to a stone-like piece of flesh.

(c)Rebbi Chiya bar Aba now refutes Rebbi Ami's Kashya, that Rebbi Meir ought then to include a woman who miscarries ...

1. ... a stone-like piece of flesh - on the grounds that this would be called miscarrying a solid mass (in which case this Pasuk has no connection with human birth, removing the possibility of Darshening a 'Gezeirah-Shavah', even though the Torah uses the word 'Borei' [see also Maharatz Chayos]).

2. ... Ru'ach (a demon), after ascertaining that the word "u'Vorei" is superfluous and therefore Mufneh - because we cannot learn Torah from Navi and vice-versa, even via a 'Gezeirah-Shavah'.

3)

(a)Rabah bar bar Chanah Amar Rebbi Yochanan explains Rebbi Meir differently. To explain why Rebbi Meir includes animals, but not fish, in the Din of Tum'as Leidah - he refers to the eye of an animal which is round like that of a human-being, whereas those of a fish are not.

(b)We ask why, according to Rebbi Meir, a snake, whose eyes also resemble those of a human is not Metamei Leidah too, which as know - from the fact that Rebbi Meir does not mention it together with animals and birds (see Tosfos DH 'Lisni Nachash').

(c)He did not mention it (see Tosfos ha'Rosh) - because if he had, we would have thought that the Rabbanan only argue with Rebbi Meir there, because the Torah does not mention 'Yetzirah' in connection with it (but not where the woman miscarried a kind of animal, where it does).

(d)The problem with Rabah bar bar Chanah's answer is - that the Mishnah in Bechoros lists eyes that are round like those of a human among the blemishes of an animal.

4)

(a)To reconcile Rabah bar bar Chanah with the Mishnah in Bechoros - we establish the latter by the eye socket of an animal, which is not completely round, whereas Rabah bar bar Chanah is talking about the black of the eye, which is (see also Tosfos ha'Rosh).

(b)Rebbi Yanai attributes Rebbi Meir's distinction between animals and fish to the fact that the eyes of the former are situated in front, unlike fish, which are situated at the side - as are those of a snake, eliminating the question on Rabah bar bar Chanah's explanation from the latter.

(c)Abaye reconciles this with the fact that Rebbi Meir lists birds (whose eyes are alsoat the side) together with animals - by confining 'birds' to different species of owls, whose eyes are situated in front like those of human-beings.

(d)We query this however, from Rebbi Chanina ben Antignos, who favors Rebbi Meir's opinion regarding animals, and the Chachamim's regarding birds - presumably, because their eyes are at the side like those of fish, implying that Rebbi Meir is r3eferring to all birds (a Kashya on Abaye).

5)

(a)To answer the Kashya on Abaye, we amend the Beraisa to read 'Nir'in Divrei Rebbi Meir bi'Veheimah ve'Chayah ve'Hu ha'Din be'Karya ve'Kifufa' (different species of owl). When Rebbi Chanina ben Antignos 've'Divrei Chachamim be'Sha'ar Ofos', he means - that he concurs with the Chachamim regarding other birds, because Rebbi Meir too agrees with them.

(b)We try to support this explanation with another Beraisa. When, after citing the Machlokes between Rebbi Meir and the Chachamim, Rebbi Elazar b'Rebbi Tzadok adds 'u've'Ofos Tibadek' - we think that he is referring to Rebbi Meir, who confines his opinion to owls.

(c)Rav Acha b'rei de'Rav Ika refutes this proof however - by confining Rebbi Elazar b'Rebbi Tzadok's statement to the Chachamim, because they are the ones who make such a distinction (and not Rebbi Meir, as Abaye maintains).

(d)What renders owls subject to Tum'as Leidah, more than all other animals, according to the Chachamim - is the fact that they have cheeks like humans.

6)

(a)Rebbi Yirmiyah asked Rebbi Zeira if, according to Rebbi Meir, in a case where the husband of a woman who miscarries a female animal accepts Kidushin on 'her' behalf before 'she' is born - her sister will be Asur to the Chasan because of Achos Ishto (see Tosfos DH 'Le'itsuri').

(b)Rav Yehudah Amar Rav classifies Rebbi Meir's ruling as being Metamei Leidah - because the species of the fetus can live ...

(c)... implying - that the fetus itself cannot, negating the She'eilah from its inception - since Achos Ishto is only forbidden as long as his wife is alive (see also Tosfos ha'Rosh).

7)

(a)Even though Rebbi Yirmiyah was aware of this too, he only asked the She'eilah - in an attempt to make Rebbi Zeira laugh.

(b)Rebbi Zeira never laughed - because Chazal have forbidden a person to 'fill his mouth with laughter in this world', and Rebbi Zeira was Machmir on himself not to laugh at all.

(c)Rebbi Yirmiyah - did not succeed in his attempt to make Rebbi Zeira laugh here.

8)

(a)Rav Yirmiyah mi'Difti cites a Mishnah in Bechoros, where Rebbi Meir declares a baby who is born after the mother miscarried a firstborn that resembled a Beheimah, Chayah ve'Of, a B'chor with regard to inheritance, but not with regard to Pidyon ha'Ben. When the Rabbanan say 'ad she'Yehei bo mi'Tzuras Adam' - they mean that as long as it does not resemble a human-being, the baby that follows is a B'chor regarding Pidyon ha'Ben, too.

(b)The Mishnah then states that a baby that is born after a Sandal (a flat baby), a Shilya (a placenta) or a Sh'fir (a skin that has the shape of a baby) - is a B'chor regarding inheritance but not regarding Pidyon ha'Ben.

(c)Rav Yirmiyah from Difti tries to prove from there that a baby in the shape of a Beheimah, Chayah or Of cannot survive, because if it could - then the baby that is born after it ought not to be a B'chor for inheritance either.

(d)Rava refutes this proof however, from the Pasuk in ki Seitzei "ki Hu Reishis Ono" - which teaches us that a B'chor over whom the father would not mourn for should he die, is not a B'chor for inheritance (even if it does survive).

9)

(a)Rav Ada bar Ahavah asked Abaye whether, according to Rebbi Meir, a human baby inside an animal is considered an animal (just as in the reverse case, it is considered a human) or not. The ramifications of the She'eilah are - whether, someone who Shechts an animal and finds such a baby inside it, is permitted to eat it, or not.

(b)We might rule that it is permitted - after learning from the reverse case that we go after the mother, as Rebbi Meir holds.

(c)We try to resolve the She'eilah by citing Rebbi Yochanan, who rules that a dove that one finds inside a Shechted animal - is forbidden (in which case, so is the human baby).

(d)We refute this proof however, inasmuch as, despite the fact that a human baby, like a dove, does not have cloven hooves - he does have a heel (which resembles a hoof) and the Torah writes in Shemini "Kol Mafreses Parsah Tocheilu", which we Darshen to mean that whatever one finds inside an animal may be eaten, even if it only has single 'hoofs' (i.e. that are not split).

10)

(a)Rebbi Yirmiyah bar Aba Amar Rav rules that, according to both Rebbi Meir and the Chachamim, a miscarriage that has the body of ...

1. ... a he-goat and the face of a human-being - renders its mother Tamei Leidah.

2. ... a human-being and the face of a he-goat - does not.

(b)Rebbi Meir and the Chachamim, who dispute a miscarriage that resembles an animal - argue over a miscarriage whose face resembles a human except for one animal eye, whose mother is Tamei Leidah according to Rebbi Meir, but not according to the Chachamim ...

(c)... since Rebbi Meir holds 'mi'Tzuras Adam' (a partially human face will suffice), whereas the Chachamim maintain 'Kol Tzuras Adam'.

(d)They queried Rebbi Yirmiyah bar Aba from a Beraisa which specifically cites Rebbi Meir as saying 'Kol Tzuras Adam' and the Chachamim as 'mi'Tzuras Adam', in which case ...

1. ... Rebbi Meir will hold - that a miscarriage whose face has just one feature of a human (an eye or a cheek) renders its mother Tamei Leidah.

2. ... the Chachamim will hold - that it does not render her Tamei Leidah unless its face is recognizable as a human face (in that at least half its features resemble those of a human-being).

(e)Rebbi Yirmiyah bar Aba responded to that - with 'I Tanya, Tanya' (meaning that although he had received his tradition from Rav, since they had a Beraisa, they should follow it).

11)

(a)When Rebbi Yirmiyah bar Amar Rebbi Yochanan said 'the forehead, the eye-brows, the eyes, the cheeks and the chin', he meant - that the animal's face must resemble that of a human in its entirety, like Rav (in the Chachamim), who learned 'Kol Tzuras Adam'.

(b)Whereas when Rava Amar Chasa said the forehead, one eyebrow, one eye, one cheek and half the chin, he meant - that half of it must resemble the human face, like the Beraisa (also according to the Chachamim).

(c)Both opinions conspicuously omit - the ears, which play no role in this issue, as we shall see shortly.

12)

(a)We ask from the Beraisa 'Tzuras Pirtzuf she'Amru Afilu Pirtzuf Echad min ha'Pirtzufim Chutz min ha'Ozen', which we establish like the Chachamim according to the Beraisa ('mi'Tzuras Adam'), which implies that the face only needs to resemble a human-being in one of its limbs (except for an ear), a Kashya on Rava Amar Chasa.

(b)We could in fact, establish it like Rebbi Meir - but we prefer to establish it like the Chachamim.

(c)In fact, we explain it to mean - that if any of the above limbs resembles an animal (with the exception of an ear), it prevents the mother from becoming Tamei Leidah, according to Rav, who holds 'Kol Tzuras'.

(d)Alternatively, it can go even according to the Beraisa, which holds 'mi'Tzuras', and what the Tana then means is - that one of each of the limbs listed in the Beraisa (with the exception of an ear) will suffice to render the mother Tamei Leidah.

13)

(a)Rava draws a distinction between a miscarriage with ...

1. ... one eye or one thigh at the side (where it is normally situated) - which renders its mother Tamei Leidah, and with the eye or the thigh in the middle - which does not.

2. ... a hole in the Veshet (the esophagus) - which renders its mother Tamei Leidah, and one that is stopped up - which does not, since he holds that a T'reifah can live (which it certainly cannot do when it is stopped up).