1)

(a)Both the Rabbanan (Vaday, even in the R'shus ha'Rabim) and Rebbi Shimon (Safek, in the R'shus ha'Yachid) derive their respective opinions (regarding Mikvah) from Sotah. The Rabbanan learn - that just as there, the Rabanan gave a Safek Sotah the Din of a Vaday (by forbidding her on her husband [see Cheishek Shlomoh]), so too in the case of 'Mikvah she'Nimdad'.

(b)If the Sotah is seen with the man concerned in the R'shus ha'Rabim - she will be not declared a Sotah, and is permitted to her husband.

(c)Nevertheless, the Rabbanan are stringent regarding the Din of Mikvah, even in the R'shus ha'Rabim - because whereas by Sotah, it is not considered seclusion in the R'shus ha'Rabim, there is no logical reason to permit a Safek Tamei in the R'shus ha'Rabim any more than in the R'shus ha'Yachid.

(d)Nor do they apply the principle of 'Safek Tum'ah bi'Reshus ha'Rabim Tahor' to the case of Mikvah - since the Chazakah has two flaws (as we explained).

2)

(a)Rebbi Shimon learns from Sotah - that Safek Tum'ah bi'Reshus ha'Rabim is Tahor even when there are two flaws (as we learned earlier).

(b)He does not however, learn from Sotah that Safek Tum'ah bi'Reshus ha'Yachid at least, is Vaday Tamei - because unlike Sotah (where there is sound reason to suspect Tum'ah), there is nothing to indicate that the Mikvah was Pasul before it was found lacking.

(c)Alternatively, we conclude, Rebbi Shimon learns Sof Tum'ah from T'chilas Tum'ah (regarding Safek Tum'ah bi'Reshus ha'Rabim). And we are forced to retract from our initial proposition (that both Tana'im learn Mikvah from Sotah) - because if they did, then the Rabbanan would have declared the Mikvah Tahor in the R'shus ha'Rabim.

3)

(a)So when we say that Rebbi Shimon learns Sof Tum'ah from Techilas Tum'ah - we mean that just as Safek Naga in the R'shus ha'Rabim is Tahor, so too, is the case of Sof Tum'ah (where the person Toveled in the Safek Mikvah after dealing with Taharos in the R'shus ha'Rabim).

(b)The Rabbanan disagree with that however - bearing in mind that whereas in the case of T'chilas Tum'ah, the Safek has a Chezkas Taharah, by Sof Tum'ah, he has a Chezkas Tum'ah, and now that we are faced with a Safek, we will leave him in his Chazakah.

(c)We now query Shamai from a Mishnah later (in connection with a Sheretz that one finds in a Mavoy). The Tana there rules that all Taharos with which one worked there - are Tamei retroactively.

4)

(a)The Taharos will be Tahor (in the future) - the moment someone claims that he examined the Mavoy and found no Sheratzim there.

(b)The Taharos that were performed before the sweeping (prior to the inspection that preceded the finding of the Sheretz) are Tahor too - due to the Chazakah that Yisrael always examine their Mavo'os whilst sweeping them, and the Tana is only stringent here because they actually found a Sheretz in the Mavoy, and we assume that it fell immediately after the last sweeping.

(c)To reconcile this Mishnah with Shamai, we base that ruling on a double flaw (like we did Mikvah and Chavis) - since the Mavoy has a. its own Sheratzim and b. Sheratzim that come from outside.

5)

(a)Alternatively, Shamai's reason (in our Mishnah) is that a woman generally senses when blood emerges from her womb. Consequently - since she did not sense it yesterday, the blood must have emerged today as a result of her having examined herself with a cloth (see Tosfos DH 'Margeshes be'Atzmah').

(b)Hillel counters that however - with the argument that the woman may have mistaken the feeling of a movement of blood for the need to urinate.

(c)Shamai ...

1. ... maintains that even if she was asleep when the blood emerged - she would still have woken up, just as she would if she needed to urinate.

2. ... concedes that in the case of a Shotah, who does not have Da'as - she is indeed Tamei retroactively.

(d)Initially, we explain Shamai's Lashon 'Kol ha'Nashim Dayan Sha'atan' to mean - 'Kol ha'Nashim Pikchos (i.e. normal women)'.

6)

(a)We conclude however, that Shamai needs to say 'Kol ha'Nashim ... ' to preclude from Rebbi Eliezer, who learns (in the next Mishnah) - that we confine 'Dayan Sha'atan' to four women (as we shall see).

(b)A woman who finds a bloodstain on her clothes in the area of the womb - is Tamei.

(c)According to Abaye, Shamai, who holds that she would have known had the blood emerged from her womb - will concede there that she is Tamei, even though she did not feel the blood emerging ...

(d)... because seeing as she had not been dealing with a bird, neither did she walk through the butchers' market (either of whose blood might have somehow gotten on to her clothes [as will be explained in Perek Dam Nidah]), we are forced to admit that there the blood emerged from her womb, even though she was not aware of it.

7)

(a)We already cited the final interpretation of the Machlokes in the Mishnah (that according to Shamai, had the blood moved earlier, it would have left the womb immediately). We query Shamai from the Mishnah in Yotzei Dofen (in connection with three women who are permitted to use a Moch during Tashmish) - meaning that she is permitted to have relations with her husband with wads of cotton-wool lining her womb (which she leaves there permanently, only removing them when it becomes necessary), in order to soak in the Zera (so as not to become pregnant).

(b)The problem from there is - why we are not concerned that - the wads of cotton-wool will absorb the blood, preventing it from emerging immediately.

(c)Abaye maintains that in such a case, Shamai will concede to Hillel - who holds that we cannot say 'Dayah Sha'atah' - because he suspects that the walls of the womb may have prevented the blood from emerging earlier.

(d)Rava disagrees with Abaye - because i may well that, due to the sweat, the wads of cotton-wool shrink, leaving gaps for the blood to emerge.

(e)Rava will concede to Abaye however - that, in a case where the cotton-wool is pressed tight (and there is no way that the blood will seep through), Shamai will not say 'Dayah Sha'atah'.

8)

(a)The advantage these two latter Leshonos (explaining Shamai) have over the initial Lashon ('Ha'amed Ishah al Chezkasah') is - that they avoid the questions that we asked on the first Lashon from 'Chavis' and 'Mikvah'.

(b)And the difference between the two latter Leshonos ('Ho'il ve'Ishah Margeshes ... ' and 'Me'ikara havah Asi' - is in the case of a woman who uses a 'Moch' (according to Abaye), or a 'Moch Dachuk' (according to Rava), who even Beis Shamai will agree, is Tamei retroactively, according to the last Lashon, but not according to the previous one.

(c)It is the last Lashon ('Me'ikara havah Asi') - that has the support of a Beraisa.

9)

(a)Based on this Beraisa, Hillel queried Shamai from a case of a box which was used for Taharos, and inide which, after emptying out the Taharos, they discovered a dead Sheretz. Hillel is referring to a very large box (where it is feasible not to have seen the dead Sheretz in one of the corners). Consequently - the Taharos are Tamei (because we assume that the Sheretz was in the box together with them.

(b)Had the Sheretz been found in the same corner as the Taharos was - the latter would be Tahor (because the Sheretz must have fallen into the box after the owner emptied out the Taharos; otherwise, he could not have avoided seeing it).

(c)Hillel thought, that according to Shamai - the Taharos ought to be Tahor, since the Sheretz did not fall out of the box together with the Taharos (just like he holds with the blood in the woman's womb).

(d)Shamai replied however - that Hillel is talking about a box with a bottom, which prevents the Sheretz from falling out (and when he took out the Taharos from the top, he failed to see the Sheretz lying in the other corner); whereas in our Mishnah. there is nothing to stop the blood from emerging from the womb.

10)

(a)Rava gives Shamai's reason as 'Bitul Piryah ve'Rivyah', by which he means - that if we contend with the possibility of blood being held back in the womb, then (for fear of being Chayav Kareis), the man may decline to have marital relations with his wife.

(b)And he has the support of a Beraisa. He reconciles this with the previous Beraisa (which gave the reason as 'Me'ikara hvah Asi') in that there - it was only Hillel who thought that this was Shamai's reason, prompting him to ask from the case of the box. Shamai replied however, that (apart from the answer that we cited earlier) his real reason was 'Bitul Piryah ve'Rivyah' (and not 'Me'ikara Havah Asi'). Note that we could have reconciled the earlier reasons with this Beraisa in the same manner (by saying that Hillel erred, and that Shamai's real reason is because 'Ha'amed Ishah al Chezkasah').

(c)And those who cite the earlier Beraisa, reconcile it with the Beraisa which gives the reason as 'Bitul Piryah ve'Rivyah' in the following way: Initially, Hillel asked Shamai that, even if min ha'Torah, we say 'Me'ikara havah Asi', we ought to issue a decree and declare her Tamei retroactively (like we do in many other cases).

(d)And it was in answer to this question - that Shamai gave his true reason as 'Bitul Piryah ve'Rivyah'.

11)

(a)Hillel refutes Shamai's current argument - based on the fact that the decree to which he referred was confined to Taharos, in which case it does not affect the husband at all.

(b)To which Shamai replies that even if, as Hillel maintains, the decree is confined to Taharos, 'Bitul Piryah ve'Rivyah' is applicable - we are afraid that the husband, knowing that the Chachamim decreed her Tamei retroactively (albeit regarding Taharos), will decline to have relations with her.

12)

(a)In a case where a large box is used for Taharos, and a Sheretz is found on the other side of the Taharos that one is currently handling, Chizkiyah holds that the previous batch of Taharos is Tahor, but that the current batch is Tamei. According to Rebbi Yochanan - the previous batches are Tamei too.

(b)The problem with ...

1. ... Chizkiyah is - how he can argue with Shamai and Hillel, both of whom maintain that the previous batch of Taharos is Tamei, too.

2. ... Rebbi Yochanan (after establishing the case were the box is bottomless) is - that there is no way that, upon lifting up the box (to remove the Taharos), the Sheretz would not have fallen out together with the Taharos (in which case it must have fallen into the box after the Taharos was removed).

(c)So we further establish the case - where, even though the box had no bottom, it did have a rim (at the base), which according to Rebbi Yochanan, may have held the Sheretz when he lifted the box (see also Tosfos DH 'Ki P'ligi').

13)

(a)We query this however, from a Mishnah in Taharos (in connection with someone who draws ten buckets-full of water one after the other [which he subsequently pours into a cistern]), and finds a Sheretz in one of them. The Tana rules there - that only the water in the bucket at the time when the Sheretz is found is Tamei; the rest is Tahor.

(b)Resh Lakish in the name of Rebbi Yanai establishes the case where the bucket has no rim (on top) - in which case the Sheretz would have been bound to have fallen out earlier, had it been there.

(c)If it did have one - then all the water would be Tamei (because we would assume that the Sheretz was there all the time, only the pourer failed to see it.

(d)We try to prove from there - that Chizkiyah does not hold like Rebbi Yanai.

14)

(a)To reconcile Chizkiyah with Rebbi Yanai, we differentiate between water and fruit - in that water slides out of the barrel easily, in which case it is not necessary to tip the bucket completely (which explains why the Sheretz did not fall out), whereas fruit does not fall out of a box so easily, and one therefore tends to tip it over completely, in order to empty its contents (in which case, the Sheretz would have been bound to fall out).

(b)Alternatively - one tends to be more concerned to empty out the fruit than one is about the water (resulting in the same difference).